


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**M E M O I R S**  
OF THE  
**K I N G S o f S P A I N.**

—  
**SECOND EDITION.**  
—

**FIVE VOLUMES.**

—  
**VOL. I.**

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M E M O I R S  
OF THE  
K I N G S O F S P A I N  
OF THE  
H O U S E O F B O U R B O N ,  
F R O M T H E A C C E S S I O N O F P H I L I P V .  
T O T H E D E A T H O F C H A R L E S III .

1700...to...1788.

DRAWN FROM ORIGINAL AND UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

BY  
WILLIAM COXE, M.A. F.R.S. F.S.A.  
ARCHDEACON OF WILTS, AND RECTOR OF BEMERTON.

SECOND EDITION.

IN FIVE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

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TO  
HIS GRACE  
**ARTHUR WELLESLEY,**  
FIELD MARSHAL;  
**DUKE, MARQUESS, EARL, AND VISCOUNT**  
OF  
**WELLINGTON;**  
MARQUESS OF DOURO;  
BARON DOURO AND WELLESLEY;  
AND  
KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER,  
OF  
**England:**  
DUQUE DE VITTORIA,  
MARQUEZ DE TORRES VEDRAS, AND CONDE DE VIMIEIRO  
KNIGHT GRAND CROSS OF THE TOWER AND SWORD,  
AND  
MARSHAL GENERAL OF THE ARMIES OF THE PRINCE REGENT  
OF  
**Portugal:**  
GRANDEE OF SPAIN OF THE FIRST CLASS,  
DUQUE DE CIUDAD RODRIGO,  
KNIGHT OF THE ILLUSTRIOS ORDER OF THE GOLDEN FLEECE,  
COMMANDER OF THE ORDER OF SAN FERNANDO,  
AND  
CAPTAIN GENERAL OF THE ARMIES  
OF  
**Spain:**  
KNIGHT OF THE FIRST CLASSES OF THE  
ORDER OF ST. GEORGE,  
OF  
**Russia:**  
THE ORDER OF MARIA THERESA,  
OF  
**Austria:**  
AND  
THE ORDER OF THE SWORD,  
OF  
**Sweden:**



DEDICATION.

*MY LORD,*

TITLES and Honours frequently denote either the merit of ancestry, or the favour of princes; but those which have been conferred on your Grace, are testimonies of national gratitude, and memorials of great achievements.

To no one could these Memoirs be inscribed with more propriety than to your Grace, who will occupy so distinguished a place in the annals of Spain; and in presenting them to the Public under your auspices, I feel an honourable pride, in being permitted to add my tribute of individual admiration to the voice of grateful and applauding Nations.

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**DEDICATION.**

The Victories of Vimieiro, Talavera,  
and Salamanca, recal to our recollection  
the glories of Cressy, Agincourt, and Blen-  
heim; and Britain exults in associating  
with her **EDWARD**, her **HENRY**, and her  
**MARLBOROUGH**, the immortal name of

**WELLINGTON.**

I have the Honour to subscribe myself,

**My Lord,**

**Your Grace's**

**Most obedient**

**Humble Servant,**

**WILLIAM COXE.**

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## P R E F A C E.

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IN the History of all nations, no epochs are more important, than those which are marked by the introduction of a *new* dynasty, by which *new* connections are formed, *new* principles established, and *new* systems of administration introduced. In the modern History of Spain, two such periods occur ; the accession of the Austrian dynasty in the person of the emperor Charles the fifth, and of that of Bourbon in the person of Philip the fifth.

It was once my intention to write the History of these two dynasties ; that of Austria, to complete the Work I have already given to the public, and that of Bourbon, to trace the various and important transactions which have materially affected Europe in general, and England in particular, in consequence of the transfer of the Spanish crown to a prince of France. But as the first of these periods has already been illustrated, either in the whole or in part, by able pens ; and as few authentic materials exist within

the reach of an individual, which have not been already employed, I relinquished, or at least suspended, my design. In my researches, however, for the compilation of the political state of Europe, which I formerly proposed to give to the public, I collected a great variety of unpublished and interesting documents, relative to the transactions of Spain under the Bourbon family, of which I drew up a rapid sketch, to form a part of that work. When I relinquished that publication, I intended, as I have done with regard to Austria, to expand this sketch into a more general and regular narration.

THE burst of patriotic enthusiasm which the usurpation and perfidy of the french ruler excited among the spaniards, and the deep interest which the british public took in the exertions of a brave and magnanimous nation, combating in the sacred cause of freedom and independence, drew my attention to the modern period of Spanish History, which commenced with the contest between the two Houses of Austria and Bourbon for the succession. In that contest, as in the present, England took an active share, to arrest the encroachments and usurpations of a rival power, and to prevent the two monarchies of France and Spain from being united in the family

of a prince, whose ambition knew no bounds, and whose projects of universal dominion threatened no less than the subjugation of Europe.

THE great and unparalleled efforts which were made, first, under the guidance of William the third, and afterwards under that of Marlborough, were on the point of being crowned with the most signal success ; when England herself, by the impolitic desertion of her allies, and the iniquitous sacrifice of British blood and treasure, which was consummated at the peace of Utrecht, rendered vain the labours of her great warriors, and the views of her patriot statesmen. She left a power, already too mighty for the safety of other states, to rise with new strength from depression, and to realise, under other pretexts, and with other means, designs which would have startled even the aspiring mind of Louis the fourteenth.

THE various relations and events which arose out of the accession of a Bourbon prince in Spain, cannot fail to be highly interesting, at a period when a revolution, far more important in its nature and effects than any change of dynasty, has united us in the same cause with the Spaniards, and when an intimate connection between

two nations long and reluctantly at enmity, may produce new changes in the situation, circumstances, and political interests of both.

WITH this impression, I composed, and now deliver to the public, these Memoirs of the Spanish Kings, of the House of Bourbon ; principally drawn from original and unpublished documents. The work is preceded by an historical sketch of the most material events under the austrian dynasty, calculated to exhibit the situation of Spain before the change of sovereigns, and to develope the progress of those wars and intrigues, which produced the transfer of the crown to a french prince. I have terminated my narrative with the death of Charles the third, at the end of 1788 ; from the same motive which induced me to close my History of the House of Austria with Leopold the second. It is difficult to obtain authentic information on recent periods ; it is also an invidious task to write the history of passing events, and trace the conduct of living characters, amidst the misrepresentations of prejudice, interest, and passion. Indeed, the death of Charles in itself forms an epoch ; because it took place at the very moment when that tremendous revolution began, which changed the face of continental Europe,

altered the characters of nations and of individuals, and swept away the established institutions of moral and political society.

My authorities are, printed, manuscript, and oral.

As the printed authorities are cited at the periods and facts to which they relate; it is needless to detail them. I shall confine myself to the enumeration of the works from which I have derived the most valuable assistance.

Desormeaux *Abregé Chronologique de l'Historie d'Espagne*. Paris, 1758, 5 tomes, 12mo. This History is agreeably written, but teems with inaccuracies and french partialities ; and is extremely brief and incorrect in the short portion which relates to the Bourbon dynasty.

*Compendio Cronologico de la Historia de España*, desde los tiempos mas remotos hasta nuestras dias, por D. Josef Ortiz y Sanz.' Madrid, 1795, 8vo. Of this, the last volume contains the reign of Philip the fifth, with whose death this compendium closes.

*Memoires du Maréchal de Berwick*, écrite par lui-même. Paris, 1780, 12mo.

*Memoires politiques et militaires pour servir à l'Histoire de Louis XIV, et de Louis XV*. Composés sur les pieces originales, recueillies par Adrien Maurice, Duc de Noailles, Maréchal de

## MEMOIRS OF SPAIN:

France, &c. par M. l'Abbé Millot. Paris, 1777, 12mo.

Memoires et Lettres du Maréchal de Tessé. Paris, 1806, 8vo.

Oeuvres complettes de Louis de St. Simon, &c. pour servir à l'Histoire des Cours de Louis XIV, de la Regence, et de Louis XV. Strasbourg, 1791, 8vo.

Vie du Maréchal duc de Villars, écrite par lui-même, et donnée au public par M. Anquetil, &c. Paris, 1785, 12mo.

Memoires de M. l'Abbé de Montgon, publiés par lui-même. Contenant les différentes négociations dont il a été chargé dans les cours de France, d'Espagne, et de Portugal, et divers evenemens qui sont arrivés depuis l'année 1725. Lausanne, 1753, 12mo.

Commentarios de la guerra de España, e Historia de su Rey Phelipe V, el animoso, desde el principio de su reynado hasta la Paz general del año de 1725. Por D. Vincente Baccalar y Sanna, Marques de San Phelipe, &c. Genova, 4to.

This interesting work was translated into french under the title of Memoires pour servir à l'Histoire d'Espagne, sous le regne de Philippe V, &c. Amsterdam, 12mo. 1756, which I have generally cited, because I could not, for a considerable time, procure the original. It com-

mences with the struggle for the succession in the latter part of the reign of Charles II, and terminates in 1725, and is the work from which Ortiz and subsequent writers have chiefly drawn their materials.

Of the reign of Ferdinand the sixth, no historical memorial has been given to the public, worthy of notice; and for that of Charles the third, I can only cite *Storia del regno di Carlo III, di Borbone, Ré Cattolico delle Spagne, &c. Corredatta degli opportuni documenti. Per l'Abbate Fr. Beccatini. Venezia, 1790, 8vo.* Of this, a great part relates to his early life and reign, as king of Naples.

WITH respect to manuscript authorities, I trust, without incurring the imputation of vanity, I may boast, that for number, authenticity, and interest, they yield to none ever committed to the inspection of any individual writer. They comprise the diplomatic correspondence of the British government with the courts of Europe in general, during the greater part of the last century, of which I availed myself in composing the *Memoirs of Sir Robert and Lord Walpole*, and the *History of the House of Austria*; the correspondence and papers of our ministers and agents in Spain; and a great variety of plans, reports, and communications, from numerous

individuals, either directly or indirectly connected with the british government.

I SHALL proceed to specify the collections which I have principally consulted.

THE letters from Torcy and Harcourt, relating to the Testament of Charles the second, in the Hardwicke Papers, to which I obtained access by the permission of my noble friend the earl of Hardwicke, whose kindness I can never sufficiently acknowledge.

I AM indebted to my venerable friend H. P. Wyndham, esq. late member for the county of Wilts, for communicating the correspondence of Mr. Bubb Dodington, afterwards lord Melcombe, envoy in Spain from 1714 to 1716. This has furnished rare and valuable information on the character, conduct, and designs of Alberoni; and has enabled me to place in a new and distinct point of view the short but brilliant period of his administration.

LETTERS from sir Luke Schaub and earl Stanhope, both of whom were deputed to Madrid in 1717 and 1718, to prevent or suspend a rupture with Spain.—In the Hardwicke Papers.

THE diplomatic correspondence of Mr. William Stanhope, afterwards earl of Harrington, during his missions in Spain, from 1722 to 1727, furnishes many interesting particulars relative to the negotiation for the cession of Gibraltar ; the abdication of Philip the fifth ; the short reign and death of his son Louis ; the resumption of the crown by Philip ; and the administration of Ripperda. Also his correspondence during his temporary mission in 1728 to conclude the Treaty of Seville.—Principally in the Harrington Papers, for the communication of which, I again beg leave to repeat my grateful acknowledgments to the earl of Harrington.

PAPERS and documents relative to the rise, administration, and disgrace of Ripperda. Of these, I may particularly specify the letters and communications of Platania and Caraccioli, two Sicilian abbots, in high favour with Philip. Also the Papers and Reports of St. Saphorin, british agent at Vienna during the celebrated mission of Ripperda.—In the Walpole and Hardwicke Papers.

D I S P A T C H E S and communications from the french ambassadors at Madrid, during the intimate intercourse between the british and french governments in 1727 and 1728, among which, I

may distinguish those of count Rottembourg. Also the letters of Louis the fifteenth ; the official instructions of the french government ; the correspondence of cardinal Fleury with the king and queen of Spain ; and various notices relative to the court and cabinet of Madrid, communicated by him to Horatio, afterwards lord Walpole, then british minister at Paris.—In the Walpole Papers.

From this period, commences the interesting correspondence of Mr., afterwards sir Benjamin Keene, who first filled the post of consul at Madrid, and subsequently of envoy plenipotentiary, from 1723 to 1742, and from 1749 till his death in 1757, when he was invested with the character of ambassador. It would be needless to enlarge on the advantage I have drawn from this unrivalled collection, in regard to the administrations of La Paz and Patiño ; the causes of the war in 1742 ; and above all in narrating the life and reign of Ferdinand the sixth, which are comparatively little known even to the spaniards themselves. Lastly, this collection has furnished the interesting correspondence with Mr. Pitt, on the attempt to implicate Spain in the war against France, by the cession of Gibraltar. It has seldom been the lot of a public minister to fill so important a post as sir Benjamin Keene,

for so long a period of time, and with such general success; or to enjoy the honour of so intimate an intercourse with the sovereigns at whose court he resided.

THE late Earl of Hardwicke, who was an accurate judge of diplomatic merit, once purposed to publish an analysis of so valuable a portion of our diplomatic treasures; and thus spoke of sir Benjamin Keene and his correspondence, in his intended Preface :

" Sir Benjamin Keene was remarkable for a thorough knowledge of the secret springs of the spanish cabinet. The portraits he has drawn are singularly striking and descriptive; and the sketch he has left of Ferdinand the sixth, and of his queen Barbara; of the discordant characters of Carvajal and Ensenada; of the means which he employed to procure the disgrace of Ensenada, and the appointment of Wall, is the most interesting narrative of secret history that ever was given in the dispatches of any ambassador. He was a perfect master of the forms of business in Spain, and always negotiated with temper, firmness, and address. He never miscarried for want of laying his stress on the proper argument, or misapplying the mode of inforcing it.

" His skill in the spanish language contributed greatly to the success of his negotiations. He

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knew how to accommodate himself to the circumstances of the times, and to adapt his conduct to the temper of the court in which he resided, and of the ministers with whom he negotiated. Such justice is now done to the memory of sir Benjamin Keene, that a comparison with him carries with it the eulogium of any foreign minister."

To the kindness of my friend Benjamin Keene, esq., nephew of the embassador, I owe the advantage of being able to present to the public the information contained in this interesting correspondence. Indeed it was this advantage which first encouraged me to undertake the composition of these Memoirs.

A FEW letters from the earl of Bristol, who succeeded sir Benjamin Keene, are preserved in the Hardwicke Collection, and have been employed in the narrative.

To Frederic Nassau, esq. I am indebted for the use of the diplomatic correspondence of the earl of Rochford, who went to Madrid as embassador in 1763, and continued till 1767. It contains many notices relative to the administrations of Squillaci and Grimaldi, to the memorable tumult at Madrid, to the insurrections in America, to the expulsion of the Jesuits and

to the negotiations with Grimaldi, on the American settlements, on the Manilla ransom, and on other matters of considerable interest.

My grateful thanks are due to the Earl of Malmesbury, for the kind communication of his interesting papers, when chargé d'affaires at Madrid in 1770 and 1771, at the outset of his diplomatic career. These documents shew the origin and arrangement of the dispute relative to Falkland's Islands, which was successfully terminated by his agency, and comprise many valuable hints, on the character of Charles the third, on that of the prime minister Grimaldi, and on the state of the Spanish court and nation. From the same source, I derived various communications relative to the transactions of Spain with Russia, especially the armed neutrality, and the offer of purchasing the co-operation of Catherine the second in the American war, by the cession of Minorca.

To the kindness of Lord Grantham, I owe the obliging communication of the dispatches written by his noble father Lord Grantham, during his embassy at Madrid from 1771 to 1779, a period of which the secret history is little known. From this valuable correspondence, I have drawn the most important infor-

mation. It throws much light on the administration and retreat of D'Aranda, as well as on the causes which led to the resignation of Grimaldi, and the appointment of Florida Blanca. Lastly, it develops the motives which induced Charles the third to join France in the American war, a measure so opposite to the real interests of Spain, as well as to his own professions and those of his minister. The collateral correspondence of Lord Rochford, when secretary of state, as well as of his predecessor, Lord Weymouth, and of Lord Stormont, during his embassy at Paris, which is also preserved in the Grantham Collection, contributed greatly to trace the connections and policy of the two Bourbon courts at that eventful period.

I OBTAINED various documents from the Papers of sir Stanyer Porten, who was consul at Madrid during the embassy of Lord Bristol, afterwards secretary to Lord Rochford, and Under Secretary of State. Among these Papers, I found many notices on the commerce and finances of Spain, and the interesting account written by Mr. Cumberland, of his mission to Madrid, printed in the seventy-second Chapter. These Papers were in the possession of his late widow.

The Marquess of Lansdowne obligingly and

liberally committed to my inspection, the various communications between his noble father, then earl of Shelburne, and the british agents at Paris, as well as with M. de Vergennes, de Grasse, and Rayneval, on the negotiation for the peace of 1782.

My warmest acknowledgments are due to Lord Auckland, who, after concluding the commercial treaty with France, filled the office of british ambassador at Madrid, with equal honour to himself and advantage to his country. His lordship kindly favoured me with the use of his Manuscript Collections, which furnished much valuable information, relative to the period between the peace of Paris and the death of Charles the third, to the administration and principles of Florida Blanca, and to the financial, commercial, military, and naval system of Spain.

By the favour of Lord Holland, I obtained also the inspection of several manuscript documents, collected during his Lordship's journey in Spain :

*Succinta Relacion y ultima desgracia acaecida al Marques de la Ensenada.*

*Representacion \* del Conde de Florida Blanca*

\* I have referred to this Paper under the various titles of Representation, Review, Apology, and Statement of Florida Blanca.

á S. M. Don Carlos Tercero. This document, which needs no eulogium, is translated and given at the end of the last volume.

Also several papers written in the controversy between that minister and his opponents. Of these, the most remarkable are, the Satire composed by the marquis of Manca, under the title of Confesion del Ex<sup>mo</sup> Señor Conde de Florida Blanca; Papel que se cayò de la manga al Padre Comisario General de S. Francisco.

And the answer of Florida Blanca, under the title of

Observaciones sobre el papel intitulado Confesion, &c.

BESIDES these authorities, which I have recapitulated in chronological order, I have availed myself of several manuscript narratives and deductions, relating to the most important negotiations, drawn up by the persons who were themselves engaged in them, or compiled from official documents for the use of the ministers. Of these, the principal are :

A short Narrative of the Reconciliation, between France and Spain, and of the preliminaries during the cardinal de Fleury's ministry, from June 1726 to Jan. 1728.

A State of the Negotiations with Spain, from the treaty of Vienna in 1725 to Dec. 1727.

**A State of the Negotiations between the Allies of Hanover and those of Vienna, jointly or separately, from the opening of the congress of Soissons, June 1728 to June 1730.**

**Memoire sur les Garnisons Espagnoles.** Account of what passed at Vienna relative to the introduction of spanish garrisons into Tuscany, and the admission of Don Carlos to the fiefs of Parma and Placentia, from March to November 1731.

**Dates of Transactions relative to Spanish depredations, &c. from Oct. 1737 to March 1739.** Considerations relating to the navigation and commerce of Great Britain in America, with respect to the treaties with Spain, &c. 1737-8.

Points to be considered with regard to the depredations of Spain.

Rhapsody of foreign politics, occasioned by the conclusion of the general treaty of Aix la Chapelle in 1748, and of that with Spain in 1750, written by Horatio lord Walpole.

All these documents are contained in that rich magazine of historical and political intelligence, the Walpole Papers. I cannot speak of this source, from which I have drawn such important materials, without adding a tribute of gratitude and veneration for the memory of my noble and much respected friend, the late lord Walpole, of Wolterton, and earl of Orford.

## MEMOIRS OF SPAIN:

I RECEIVED other information, both oral and manuscript, from the most respectable quarters, relative to the reign of Charles the third; particularly from several of the Spanish ministers in foreign courts, and from persons whose names delicacy forbids me to reveal.

IN concluding this enumeration, I repeat my deep sense of obligation, and I trust I may likewise confidently anticipate the thanks of an enlightened public, to the noblemen and gentlemen, whose kindness and liberality have furnished these communications. I have thus been enabled to fill up a great chasm in the modern history of Spain, and to present to the public the first full and authentic narrative which has appeared in print, of the period between the accession of Philip the fifth, and that of Charles the fourth.

I HAVE adopted the form and style of MEMOIRS, because the nature of my materials, as well as the events and characters I describe, approach more to Biography, than to regular and formal History.

I CANNOT close this Preface without announcing my obligations to my faithful and intelligent secretary, Mr. HATCHER, for the very great

advantages which I have derived from his assistance in preparing this work for the press ; and in particular from his knowledge of the Spanish and Portuguese languages. His modesty prevented me from making this acknowledgment in my former publications ; but I can no longer with-hold this tribute of esteem and gratitude, for his literary services during a period of sixteen years.

*Salisbury, Jan. 1, 1813.*



## ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE OCTAVO EDITION.

IN preparing this new edition for the press, I have examined, with the minutest attention, all the criticisms on the first edition, which appeared both in England and abroad. At the same time also that I testify my gratitude to the public for the favourable reception which the work has experienced, I have the satisfaction to add, that I have found no occasion to retract a single opinion, or to correct any material error.

I sincerely join in the public joy at the liberation of Spain from a more galling tyranny than any country had experienced since the visitations of Genseric and Attila; as well as at the stupendous events which have given peace to Europe. It is satisfactory to observe in the termination of a contest almost unparalleled, a salutary change of sentiment in the different

## ADVERTISEMENT.

states, with regard to the dangers of French preponderance, and the solicitude now evinced to secure the independence and safety of Holland and Germany, by separating the Netherlands from France. Such a recurrence to the principles which led to the war for the Spanish succession in the last century, cannot but be highly gratifying to a writer, who, on all occasions, has laboured to vindicate the sound policy and enlarged views manifested in the Grand Alliance.

In closing this address, I cannot refrain from again expressing my respectful acknowledgments to the illustrious commander to whom this work is dedicated, for permitting it to appear under his auspices ; nor from testifying the exultation I feel, in common with my countrymen and Europe, at the additional honour which national gratitude has conferred on the DUKE OF WELLINGTON, as the first captain of the age.

*June 1, 1814.*

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OF

VOLUME THE FIRST.

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
HISTORICAL  
INTRODUCTION,  
OR  
A SKETCH  
OF  
*Spanish History;*  
FROM THE UNION OF CASTILE AND ARAGON,  
TO  
THE EXTINCTION OF THE AUSTRIAN LINE.

VOL. I.


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*Genealogical Table of the Kings of SPAIN, from the Union of CASTILE and ARAGON,  
to the Extinction of the AUSTRIAN Line.*



*Claimants of the Spanish Succession.*



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## HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

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### SECTION I.

*From the earliest period to the death of Philip the Fourth—Origin and rise of the Christian monarchies in Spain—Union of Leon and Castile; and of Castile and Aragon—Rivalry of France—New system of European policy—Marriages and aggrandisements of the sovereigns of France, Austria, and Spain—Transfer of Spain to the Austrian family—Accession of Charles the Fifth; and union of the Burgundian territories and the Milanese with the Spanish crown—Continuance of the political struggle between France and Austria—Increase and decline of the Spanish monarchy—Dismemberment of the seven united provinces—Thirty years war—Loss of Portugal—Treaties of Westphalia and the Pyrenees—Marriage of the eldest Infanta to Louis the Fourteenth—Death of Philip the Fourth.*

FROM the earliest ages to the middle of the fifteenth century, Spain was divided into different sovereignties, and more or less subjected to a foreign dominion. The natives were successively conquered by the Carthaginians, the Romans, the Goths, and the Saracens or Moors; and successively incorporated with their different conquerors.

SECT. I.

## SECT. I.

The Moors expelled the gothic sovereigns from the finest provinces of the peninsula, and gradually established the kingdoms of Cordova, Seville, Toledo, and Grenada. They were distinguished in arts and sciences, in arms, industry, and personal accomplishments ; and finally, in every advantage or acquirement which can grace individuals, or give power and splendour to a nation. But separated into different sovereignties, independent and jealous of each other, they soon became a prey to all the evils of divided rule. Intestine wars, treasons, and assassinations, filled their country with feuds and carnage. The Christians, who had chiefly retired to the mountains of Galicia, Asturias, and Biscay, profited by the divisions of their enemies. They emerged from their fastnesses, overspread Castile and Aragon, conquered Toledo, Cordova, Seville, Valencia, and Murcia ; and finally confined the Moors to the single territory of Grenada.

The rising greatness of the Christian power was however checked by the rival interests of the different monarchs, and the successive dismemberments of their states ; till the first foundation of future grandeur was laid in the union of Aragon and Catalonia, by the marriage of Petronella, daughter and heiress of Ramiro the second, with Raymond Berenger, count of Bar-

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celona ; and of Leon and Castile, in the person of Ferdinand the third.\*

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In the fifteenth century, Spain was divided into four kingdoms, three christian, and one moorish.

1. Castile, comprising the provinces of Old and New Castile, Leon, Galicia, the Asturias, Murcia, and Andalusia, with the lordship of Biscay, and its dependencies.

2. Aragon, comprising Aragon proper, Catalonia with Roussillon and Cerdagne ; Valencia, Murcia, and the Balearic Isles : to these possessions was added the island of Sicily.

3. Navarre, containing Upper and Lower Navarre.

\* Sancho, called the great, from his victories over the Moors, seventh king of Navarre, was sovereign of Aragon by inheritance, and of Castile by marriage. He divided his territories among his three sons. Ramiro was king of Aragon, Garcias king of Navarre, and Ferdinand king of Castile.

Ferdinand, surnamed likewise the great, acquired Leon by his marriage with Sancha, sister and heiress of Bermudo the third, in 1037, and drove the Moors from Old Castile. His dominions, at first divided between his three sons, Sancho, Alphonzo, and Garcias, were finally re-united in Alphonzo. On the death of Alphonzo, Castile and Leon were divided between his two sons, Sancho the third, and Ferdinand the second ; but again re-united by the marriage of Alphonzo the ninth, son of Ferdinand the second of Leon, with Berengena, daughter of Alphonzo the eighth, king of Castile. Their son, Ferdinand the third, obtained Castile by the resignation of his mother in 1217, and Leon in 1230, on the death of his father. From that period these two crowns continued united in the same sovereign, till on the extinction of the male line, in Henry the fourth of Castile, they escheated to Isabella his sister, who espoused Ferdinand of Aragon.

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## 4. The moorish kingdom of Grenada.

Towards the close of the fifteenth century, Castile and Aragon were united by the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella; and the union of these two crowns forms the most distinguished epoch in the annals of Spain. Under their able reign, the reduction of Grenada extinguished the last remnant of the moorish empire. The conquest of Upper Navarre from the family of Albret filled up the chasm between Aragon and Biscay, and extended their dominions to the foot of the Pyrenees.\* To his hereditary possession

\* Navarre, comprising Upper and Lower Navarre (so called from their situation on the Spanish and French side of the Pyrenees,) continued in the male line of Garcias, eldest son of Sancho the great, till the death of Henry the first, without issue male, when it descended to his daughter Jane. By her marriage with Philip the handsome, it became united with France, in the person of her son Louis Hutin. His daughter Jane was compelled to yield it to her uncles, Philip the long, and Charles the handsome, in return for a pension. On the death of Charles, Jane resumed her rights; and espousing Philip, count of Devereux, of the royal blood of France, Navarre became again an independent sovereignty, under her son and grandson, Charles the second and third. It was then connected with the dominions of Aragon, by the marriage of Blanche, daughter of Charles the third, with John the first of Aragon. Their daughter Leonora conveyed it into the family of Foix, by her marriage with Gaston, count of Foix. On her death, it was transferred, to her heir and grandson, Francis Phœbus, and on his decease in 1483, fell to his sister Catharine, who espoused John d'Albret, son of Alain, lord of Albret.

This kingdom from its situation was naturally coveted by the sovereigns both of France and Aragon. Accordingly, in the contest between Louis the twelfth and pope Julius the second, John d'Albret having declared for the cause of France, his kingdom was laid under an interdict by Julius; and Ferdinand in virtue of the papal interdict conquered Upper Navarre.

Lower

of Sicily, Ferdinand also joined the kingdom of Naples ; † and finally, the discovery of America opened a new and vast career to Spanish ambition and enterprise.

At the same period, when the present political system began to attain consistency, the principal powers of Europe were, the sovereigns of Spain, under the two heads of Castile and Aragon,

Lower Navarre, however, still continued in the family of Albret, was transferred by marriage to that of Bourbon, and finally united with France by Henry the fourth.

† Naples and Sicily were conquered from the Saracens or Moors, by the Norman counts, who established the Norman dynasty. On the failure of their male line, Constantia, daughter of Roger the second, transferred the crown to her husband, the emperor Henry the sixth; and their son the emperor Frederic the second, united the two Sicilies with the hereditary possessions of the Swabian House. His son Conrad, emperor and king of the two Sicilies, dying in 1250, the Sicilian territories were usurped from his son Conradien then an infant, by Manfred, natural son of Frederic.

Meanwhile, Pope Clement the fourth, as liege lord of those dominions, conferred them on Charles, count of Anjou, of the royal blood of France. Charles accordingly invaded Naples, defeated and killed Manfred at the battle of Benevento, and was acknowledged king of the Two Sicilies. Conradien, who made an attempt to recover his paternal inheritance, was defeated, and beheaded by Charles; but the natives of Sicily detesting the French yoke, liberated their island by the celebrated massacre, called the Sicilian Vespers, (1282) and elected as their sovereign, Peter the third, king of Aragon, who had espoused Constantia daughter of Manfred. The descendants of Peter retained possession of Sicily, notwithstanding all the attempts of the kings of Naples to recover it; and Ferdinand, the ninth in descent from Peter, succeeded to it by inheritance. He joined with Louis the twelfth to wrest the crown of Naples from Frederic the fourth, and their invasion being crowned with success, Ferdinand finally appropriated the portion of his less adroit coadjutor, and re-united the two kingdoms, (1516.)

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Austria, the House of Burgundy, and England. Portugal, also, from her extensive trade and maritime discoveries, the abilities of her sovereigns, and her local situation, was rising to a higher degree of importance, than her insulated position and scanty territories seemed to promise. From the advantages likewise of local situation, military spirit, or commercial resources, the Swiss, the dukes of Savoy and Milan, the republics of Genoa, Florence, and Venice, obtained a considerable share of public consideration and political influence; while the union of the spiritual and temporal power occasionally rendered the popes the arbiters of christendom.

The systematic policy and vigorous administration of Louis the eleventh, joined to the compactness, position, and internal resources of France, gave him important advantages over each of the contemporary sovereigns, whose territories bordered on his own. Hence, though he was occasionally favoured by all, yet generally suspicion or apprehension produced a tacit or express combination of two or more states against him. These political connections led to intermarriages between different princely families, which tended to a greater union of power under one head. Among these, the most remarkable were, that of Maximilian archduke of Austria, with Mary the heiress of Burgundy,

and afterwards that of his son the archduke Philip with Joanna the heiress of Castile and Aragon, which transferred the Spanish dominions to the House of Austria. The sovereigns of France found means to balance these unions by similar accessions of territory and influence, particularly by the appropriation of Burgundy and Picardy, on the death of Charles the bold; the acquisition of Britanny by the successive marriages of Charles the eighth, and Louis the twelfth, with the heiress Anne; and the incorporation of different royal fiefs, or petty sovereignties, with the domains of the crown.

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Such marriages and re-unions brought the principal rival powers of France, Austria, and Spain, into a closer contact; while their hostilities were rendered more vigorous by their jarring pretensions to the territories of Navarre, Roussillon, and other countries on the side of the Pyrenees, their disputes for the possession of the two Sicilies and the Milanese, and their claims on different portions of the Burgundian inheritance.

The death of Isabella, in 1504, and the struggle for the regency of Castile between her husband Ferdinand, and their son-in-law Philip, occasioned a temporary connection between Aragon and France. But this accidental schism ceased on the death of Philip. Ferdinand, on

SECT. I. his appointment to the regency for his grandson Charles, recurred to that system of policy which had originally led to the matrimonial connection between Austria and Spain.

Such was the situation of the contending parties, when the death of Ferdinand, in 1516, left the succession of Spain open to the archduke Charles, who had already inherited the territories of the House of Burgundy; and as apparent heir to those of Austria, aspired to the throne of the empire, which soon afterwards became vacant by the death of his grand-father Maximilian. To obviate the contests attendant on divided rule, as well as to relieve himself from the embarrassments of a distant government, Charles, after his elevation to the imperial throne, relinquished his share of the austrian succession to his brother Ferdinand. The austrian family was thus divided into the two branches of Spain and Germany, and the power of the latter was soon increased by the acquisition of the crowns of Hungary and Bohemia. To prevent the future alienation of these extensive possessions, the two brothers concluded various compacts for the mutual succession of their respective territories, should the male issue of either become extinct; and their example was repeatedly imitated by their descendants.

The Burgundian inheritance, thus united with

Spain, was consolidated or enlarged by purchase or conquest, till it formed that rich and extensive territory, distinguished under the name of the Seventeen United Provinces of the Netherlands, with Artois and Franche Comté. The permanent acquisition of the Milanese, which was at length effected by Charles the fifth, in favour of his son Philip, contributed to establish a connection between the different portions of this extensive monarchy. In America also, the conquest of Peru and Mexico became a vast addition to the Spanish colonies discovered under Ferdinand and Isabella; and opened new and abundant sources of wealth to the mother country.

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Philip the second, in 1556, succeeding his father Charles, the crown of the empire was transferred to the German branch; but the acquisition of Portugal united the whole Peninsula under his sceptre, and to the treasures of the western, added those of the eastern world. At the same time the discovery and settlement of the Philippine Isles completed the chain of communication which embraced the whole circumference of the globe, and realised the proud boast that the sun never set in the dominions of Spain.

The successive aggrandisements of the Austrian house were watched with jealousy, and strenuously opposed by other powers, particu-

SECT. I. larly by the rival sovereigns of France. For a long period, Europe beheld these mighty monarchies, developing all the force of arms, and all the arts of intrigue ; enlisting in their respective causes political and religious feuds, public and private enmities ; and in the struggle for superiority, not only involving the bordering provinces of France, Spain, Germany, and Italy ; but convulsing the distant regions of the north, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia, and even the remote frontiers of the turkish empire.

During the reigns of Charles and Philip, the different treaties and engagements, which mark the temporary intervals of the conflict, evince that their strength and resources were nearly balanced. For although the increase of the spanish conquests in America, and the incorporation of Portugal, appeared to open inexhaustible sources of riches and power ; yet the vast and disjointed extension of the monarchy was a principle of weakness ; the sudden influx of wealth produced a detrimental effect on the habits and morals of the people ; while the aversion of the natives to a spanish yoke, rendered the acquisition of Portugal rather an embarrassment than an advantage.

But that auspicious fortune which had fostered the spanish monarchy in its rapid and gigantic growth, ceased to favour it when arrived at ma-

turity. Extensive, multiplied, and frequently unfortunate enterprises, wasted its strength without; while within, its foundations were sapped by the abuse of authority, and the diffusion of new principles both in religion and policy. The events which first inclined the balance in favour of France, were the internal troubles excited in the Spanish dominions, by the despotism and bigotry of Philip the second; the rebellion which terminated in the independence of the seven united provinces; the destruction of the invincible Armada, and the unsuccessful hostilities with England.

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In the midst of this long career of rivalry, the incessant efforts of the austrian princes to cement the union of their families, and secure the reciprocal succession to their respective dominions, had been no less sedulously opposed by France, than their projects of conquest and aggrandisement. In the pursuit of this object, the address and good fortune of the french repeatedly triumphed over the inverate hostility of the rival house; and by dextrously availing themselves of times and circumstances, they succeeded in forming frequent marriages between the two families of France and Spain. Philip the second espoused Isabella, a princess of France; a double match was also concluded between the infanta, Anne, daughter of Philip the third, and Louis the thir-

## SECT. I.

teenth, and between Isabella, sister of the french monarch, and the prince of Asturias, afterwards Philip the fourth. To obviate, however, the mischiefs likely to ensue from these occasional aberrations of policy, the austrian sovereigns endeavoured to guard and fortify their respective pretensions to the family inheritance, by renunciations, compacts, and treaties.

These marriages and arrangements formed only temporary suspensions of hostility. In 1619, the long and eventful contest of the thirty year's war commenced. The Spanish monarchy, already weakened by past disasters, was shaken to its foundations. Exactions rendered necessary by the diminished resources of the government, joined with the abuses inseparable from delegated power, excited civil troubles : the progress of its decline was marked by a rebellion in Catalonia ; by the temporary insurrection which rendered a simple fisherman master of Naples ; and by the revolution which placed the family of Braganza on the throne of Portugal. The event of this direful conflict was the degradation of the austrian house in both its branches ; and the partial accomplishment of those extensive designs which France had long meditated against the remnant of the burgundian inheritance, and even against Spain itself. The peace of Westphalia in 1649, opened passages into Germany and Italy, reduced

the empire to an aristocracy; and destroyed the union of the germanic body, by the establishment of a religious and political schism.

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But even after the emperor Ferdinand the third had been forced to withdraw from the contest, and to submit to the reduction of his power and influence, Philip the fourth was induced to continue the war, from the consciousness of past greatness, the hope of drawing advantage from the civil discords which arose in France during the minority of Louis the fourteenth, and above all, from an unwillingness to give his eldest daughter in marriage to the french monarch, which was exacted as the price of peace. During this interval, he not only resolved to affiance his daughter to the archduke Leopold; but having become a widower, he cemented his connection with the german branch, by espousing Mary Anne, daughter of Ferdinand the third. At length, his increasing embarrassments; the loss of Jamaica and Dunkirk, wrested from him by the successful hostility of Cromwell; the birth of a son, Philip Prospero; and another pregnancy of his queen, induced him to accept the proposals of France. Accordingly, preliminaries were signed at Paris, Nov. 7, 1659, and a treaty of peace arranged by the two prime ministers of France and Spain, Cardinal Mazarin and Don Louis de Haro, in the isle of Pheasants,

¶

## SECT. I.

a small islet in the river Bidassoa, which divides the two kingdoms. This celebrated act, which has been termed the treaty of the Pyrenees, sowed the germ of future wars, and produced to France no less important advantages on the side of the Peninsula and Flanders, than the peace of Westphalia had produced to Austria on that of the empire. To France, Spain ceded Roussillon with part of Conflans and Cerdagne, of Flanders and Hainault, and all Artois, except the towns and districts of St. Omer and Aire. The pretensions of France to Navarre were reserved; Dunkirk and Jamaica were yielded to England; and the duke of Lorraine, the last remaining ally of Spain, was reduced to dependance, by dismantling the fortifications of Nancy, and by the compulsory cession of Moyenvic and Bar. Finally, the king of Spain consented to give in marriage his eldest daughter, Maria Theresa, to Louis the fourteenth; but under the express condition that she should, for herself and issue, renounce all right to her paternal inheritance. In return, the king of France restored all his conquests in the Netherlands, Italy and Catalonia, and agreed not to assist the Portuguese.

Accordingly, the signature of the treaty was followed by the celebration of the marriage, June 2, 1660, before which the infanta renounced for herself and her posterity all right

and title to every part of the Spanish dominions, in the strongest terms which ingenuity could devise. Her renunciation was afterwards ratified with equal solemnity, by Louis the fourteenth, for himself and his heirs, and confirmed by the cortes then assembled at Madrid. The French court, however, made a mockery of such engagements; and the well known observation of Mazarin to the plenipotentiaries employed in negotiating the treaty, shews at once the most shameless perfidy, and the ultimate object of this connection: "Let the match be concluded, and no renunciation can prevent the king from pretending to the succession of Spain."

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As little did the French monarch respect his engagements not to interfere in the affairs of Portugal, the hope of which had been one of the principal inducements with Philip to conclude this disadvantageous treaty. On the contrary, the most glaring prevarication was employed to justify the active support afforded to the Portuguese: their resistance was successfully employed to exhaust the remaining strength of the Spanish monarchy, and to prepare the way for that system of aggression and usurpation, which was shortly to be exhibited, to the terror and indignation of Europe.

The remainder of Philip's reign was ineffectually spent in attempting the recovery of Por-

SECT. I. tugal. At the same time he evinced his unceas-ing solicitude to secure the eventual succession of his dominions in his family. As the deaths of his different children in their youth, particularly of Philip Prospero, and the tender age and sickly constitution of his only surviving son Charles, afforded but faint hopes of a male suc-cession, he affianced Margaret, his eldest daughter by his second wife, to the emperor Leopold, with the hope of counteracting the effects which he apprehended from his compulsory connection with France.

In the midst of these designs, Philip closed his troubled reign, on the 17th of September 1665, in the 60th year of his age, leaving the regency in the hands of his widow, and, according to the forms of the spanish constitution, appointing a council of the principal officers of state, to assist her with their deliberative voice.\*

\* For the contents of this chapter have been consulted the dif-ferent bodies of National History, and for Spain in particular Mariana, Ferraras, Ortiz; the different treaties and public acts.—Diplomatie Françoise.—Oeuvres de Louis 14. Dumont—Koch Hist. des Traités de Paix t. 1.

## SECTION II.

1665—1697.

*Sketch of the reign of Charles the second—Regency of the queen dowager—Administration and disgrace of Father Nitard—Aggressions of France in the Netherlands—The independence of Portugal acknowledged—Rise and fall of Vulensuela—Administration and death of Don John—Continuation of the wars and treaties with France—Marriage of Charles with a french princess—Influence of d'Eguya—Administration of Medina Celi, Oropesa, and Melgar—Second marriage of Charles with an austrian princess—New aggressions of France—Grand alliance, and guaranty of the spanish succession to the austrian family—Wretched state of Spain—Peace of Ryswick.*

SECT. II.

1665—1697.

THE death of Philip the fourth was highly detrimental to his country. He left an only son, Charles the second, a sickly infant, in the fourth year of his age, under the regency of the queen mother, a princess inordinately fond of power, but without the abilities to obviate the evils or avert the dangers of a declining monarchy.

The queen placed her whole confidence in father Nitard, her confessor, a german jesuit of obscure birth, whose most distinguished quality was a supple and intriguing spirit. He was raised to the important post of grand inquisitor, which gave him a place in the council of regency, constituted a counsellor of state, and intrusted

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1665—1697.

with the sole direction of affairs. Dazzled with his elevation, he offended the castilian nobles, by assuming the austerity and haughtiness of a Ximenes; while he proved himself unequal to the task of governing a great and turbulent nation, exhausted by past reverses, and engaged in an unfortunate contest with Portugal, recently one of its own conquered provinces. The general discontent excited no less by his personal vanity, than by the imbecility of his administration, was fomented by the intrigues of Don John, natural son of the deceased monarch, who, in his father's reign, had distinguished himself as a statesman and a soldier, was respected by the nobles, adored by the people, and hailed by the general voice, as the only person capable of sustaining a sinking monarchy, and vindicating the rights of a minor king.

Foreign aggression aggravated the evils of a weak and unpopular government, assailed by internal cabals. Almost at the moment when the marriage between Leopold and the infanta was solemnized, as the means of cementing the union of the austrian house, and forming an additional barrier against the ambition of France, Louis the fourteenth profited by the embarrassments of the spanish court, to grasp a part of the succession which he had so solemnly renounced. Under the flimsy pretext of a local custom in one of the

provinces, called the right of devolution,\* he claimed a large portion of the Netherlands, in the name of his wife. While he supported his pretensions by arms, he added insult to injustice, by notifying to the queen regent his intention of taking possession of what had been usurped from his consort, but disclaiming any design to break the recent peace. He rapidly overran a country unprepared for defence; in less than three months reduced the line of fortresses between the channel and the Scheldt; and before the close of the winter added Franche Comté to his conquests. At the same time, he increased the domestic troubles and dangers of the Spanish government, by changing his secret connections with Portugal into an open and offensive alliance.

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1665—1697.

The invasion of the Netherlands awakened the maritime powers to a sense of the danger with which they were threatened by the recent aggrandisement of France. As a barrier against her encroachments, the triple alliance was concluded between England, Holland, and Sweden in 1667. Too weak, however, and too divided in interests, to repel the unjust pretensions of Louis by a vigorous resistance, they sacrificed a part of these important territories, to

\* This right of devolution, which was an obscure, uncertain, and local custom, in a few districts, empowered the daughters of the first wife to inherit property in preference to the sons of the second.

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1665—1697.

save the remainder. Assuming the character of mediators, they offered terms of peace, to which they avowed their resolution of extorting the consent both of France and Spain, by joining that power which should refuse to acquiesce. However mortified by their interposition, Louis bent to circumstances, with the hope of dividing and baffling the combination; and Spain was reduced to the necessity of submitting to new dismemberments.

By the peace of Aix la Chapelle, Spain indeed recovered Franche Comté, but lost the fortresses of Charleroy, Binche, Ath, Douay, Tournay, Oudenard, Lille, Armentieres, Courtrai, Bergue, and Furnes;\* cessions which gave to the french monarch the command of the Lys and the Scheldt, opened a dangerous breach into the center of the spanish Netherlands, and led to their subjugation in the subsequent wars. The invasion of the Low Countries, joined with the pressure of internal distress, compelled the spanish government to acknowledge the independence of Portugal, and thus to reconcile an enemy, who had called all their forces from their other frontiers and distant possessions.†

These disadvantageous treaties, though the

\* Treaty between France and Spain, concluded at Aix la Chapelle, May 2, 1668.—Prontuario de Tratados.

† Treaty between Spain and Portugal, Feb. 13, 1668.—Prontoario, p. 91.

necessary consequence of internal weakness, and the want of foreign support, roused such general indignation, that Don John found little difficulty in driving the unpopular minister from power. During the aggression of France, he had been nominated to the government of the Netherlands, and was on the point of embarking at Coruña, when he received information that Don Joseph Malladas, one of his confidential adherents, had been arrested and put to death. He profited by the sensation which this violent and cruel act excited. Instead of continuing his journey, he returned towards Madrid; but received an order from the queen to retire to his seat at Consuegra, and not to approach within twenty leagues of the capital. He increased his own popularity by obeying the order, and by a bold remonstrance against the upstart favourite.

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The rashness of the minister increased with the rising resentment of the nation. He not only arrested Don Bernard Patiño, brother to the first secretary of Don John, but sent a detachment of troops to seize the prince himself. This imprudent violence accelerated the crisis. Don John, informed of the arrest of Patiño, quitted Consuegra, and repaired to Aragon, where he was hailed as the deliverer of the nation. Conscious that his own popularity would secure him support in Castile, he advanced towards the

SECT. II. capital, at the head of seven hundred men, and,   
1665—1697. arriving at Torrejon, demanded the immediate  
dismissal of the confessor. The event justified  
his expectations. His cause found partizans even  
in the councils; and the queen endeavouring to  
place the capital in a state of defence, the inha-  
bitants tumultuously assembled before the palace,  
exclaiming, “Deliver us from the jesuit; dis-  
miss the jesuit, or the city will be abandoned to  
pillage!”

In an agony of indignation and despair, the queen threw herself on the ground, and bewailed her situation. “Alas; alas!” she cried, “what does it avail me to be a queen and regent, if I am deprived of this good man, who is my only consolation? The meanest individual is permitted to chuse a confessor; yet I am the only persecuted person in the kingdom. I alone am deprived of my spiritual guide!” Despair and lamentation were alike unavailing. After a short negotiation, conducted by the agency of the papal nuntio, she was compelled to dismiss her favourite; and he was fortunate in being permitted to escape from Madrid, without falling a sacrifice to party vengeance, or popular fury. In February 1669, he retired to Rome, where the favour of his royal mistress offered him the title of ambassador, and the dignity of cardinal. In justice, however, to the memory of the disgraced

minister, we ought to observe, that he gave an unusual example of disinterestedness. He declined the pecuniary assistance offered by different individuals, and preferred, to use his own expression, quitting Spain a poor priest, as he entered it. He reluctantly accepted two thousand pistoles given by his royal mistress for his journey to Rome, and an augmentation to a pension of two thousand crowns ; but he refused the proffered embassy.

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The reluctance of the queen to admit Don John to a share in the government, giving rise to new troubles ; the commotions which took place in different quarters, appeared the harbingers of civil war. At length, a compromise was again effected by the interference of the nuncio. Don John was reinstated in the government of the Netherlands, but without the obligation to quit Spain ; and to remove him from the court, he was appointed viceroy of Aragon and Catalonia.

The exile of Nitard, however, only led to the choice of a new favourite, Don Fernando de Valenzuela, a gentleman of Grenada, who had accompanied the duke of Infantado, Spanish ambassador to Rome, as a page, and on his return was recompensed with the order of St. Jago. His noble patron dying without granting him a permanent provision, he was reduced to great

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distress, and gained a scanty subsistence by writing verses, and composing several comedies, which were not without merit. Being presented to Nitard, he acquired his good graces by great versatility of genius, suppleness of manners, and the zeal with which he executed several commissions of great importance. He was intrusted with various state secrets, and employed as a spy on the conduct of Don John and his partisans.

His intercourse with the court enabled him to gain the affections of Donna Eugenia, a lady of the queen's household, who enjoyed the favour of her royal mistress. By espousing her, he made himself known to the queen, obtained the post of equerry, and increased his interest by his address in tracing the intrigues against Nitard. On the dismission of the confessor, he became the sole depositary of the royal confidence, and when the first alarm had subsided, was summoned into the presence of the queen. In two interviews, at which his wife assisted, to avoid scandal, his lively conversation, agreeable manners, and graceful person, improved those favourable sentiments, which his zeal and fidelity had first inspired. By his means, the queen was apprised of all the secret machinations which agitated the city and the court; and as her state of retirement appeared to preclude her from the knowledge of such intelligence, it became the common remark,

that she was favoured by the communications of a familiar spirit.

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This familiar spirit was soon found to be Valenzuela. He was immediately courted as the distributor of royal favours, directed the puppets of administration, rose by rapid steps to the highest employments, and became no less absolute, and no less hated than father Nitard. He was appointed master of the horse, raised to the rank of a grandee of the first class, with the title of marquis, and finally declared prime minister.

Valenzuela, though a man of lively parts and extensive knowledge, yet possessed not the character and acquirements necessary for his delicate situation. In vain he courted popularity by splendid works, public diversions, and acts of liberality. His humble birth, youth, and rapid rise, exposed him to the attacks of envy and jealousy. By puerile vanity, he at once increased his own unpopularity, and drew on the character of his royal mistress the most scandalous imputations. He made an ostentatious display of his high favour, affected the airs of a successful lover as well as of a public minister; and it did not escape notice, that his usual device in tournaments, was an eagle gazing at the sun, with the motto "*Tengo solo licencia.*"\*

At this juncture, Charles the second attained

\* I alone have permission.

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the age of fifteen, which had been fixed as his majority, and testified his intention to confide the government to Don John. The tears and intreaties of the queen appeared to prevail over the weak and indecisive mind of a youth ; but in the midst of the confidence inspired by this partial triumph, the enemies of the minister repeated their attack with a decisive effect. In the night of January the 11th, 1677, the young monarch escaped from his apartment in the old palace, where he was held in a species of honourable captivity, and took refuge in the Buen Retiro. Don John being instantly recalled, was appointed to the office of prime minister, and the queen imprisoned in a convent at Toledo.

Valenzuela at first baffled the vigilance of his persecutors. After taking a short and affectionate leave of his royal mistress, he retired to the monastery of the Escorial, where he was concealed behind a pannel of the wainscot, in the cell of a monk, in whose fidelity he confided. The whole monastery was repeatedly, though ineffectually searched, by the emissaries of government. But the health of Valenzuela being affected by the closeness of his confinement, he was bled by the surgeon of the convent, under the most solemn obligations to secrecy. The surgeon, however, betrayed him ; the pannel was taken down, and the unfortunate minister was dis-

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covered in a sound sleep, with his fire arms and sword by his side. After an imprisonment of some months, without being permitted to have the slightest communication with his wife and children, who were confined in the prison of Talavera, he was banished to the Philippine Islands.\*

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Don John assumed the reins of government, amidst the exultation of a people by whom he was regarded as their deliverer; who looked with confidence to his talents and virtues, matured by experience, and meliorated by misfortune. But he was not tardy in discovering, that it is far easier to awaken than to gratify public expectation; that the transition from popular

\* From the obscure and uncertain accounts preserved relative to the subsequent fate of this minister, we collect the following circumstances. He was conveyed to Manilla, the capital of the Philippines, and confined in the castle of St. Philip, in a wooden house erected on purpose. His confinement, at first severe, was afterwards mitigated. Having conciliated the favour of the governor, he was permitted to amuse himself with theatrical representations of his own comedies. On the death of Don John, the queen dowager obtained an order for his recal, but it appears to have been frustrated by the machinations of d'Eguya.

In 1689, he was permitted to remove to Mexico, where he experienced a kind reception from the viceroy, the count of Galva, who was brother to his original patron the duke of Infantado. He received a yearly pension of 1,200 pesos; and if we may believe Gemelli, whose entertaining travels are often intermixed with idle tales, his principal amusement consisted in breaking horses. While engaged in this occupation, he received a kick from one which occasioned his death.—*Viaggi di Gemelli nelle Isole Philippine*, v. 4, p. 45.—*Memoires de la Cour d'Espagne*.

SECT. II. favour to popular odium is short and rapid.  
1665—1697. With diminished resources, from the very first moment of his elevation to the government, he had to contend with the same powerful enemy, who had repeatedly shaken the castilian throne.

Ever anxious to appropriate the valuable remnant of the Burgundian inheritance, Louis the fourteenth had scarcely signed the peace of Aix la Chapelle, before he turned his attacks against the United Provinces, who had taken so active a share in opposing his late aggression, and whose territory formed a point of union for the powers confederated against him. He gained England, renewed his connection with Sweden, secured the support of the german princes on the Rhine, and commenced hostilities by expelling the duke of Loraine, who was collecting an auxiliary force for the assistance of the States. At this juncture, the spanish government gave a solitary proof of their pristine vigour and magnanimity, by rejecting the insidious overtures of France, and concluding, in January 1672, a defensive alliance with the republic. This arrangement was followed by the transport of reinforcements into the Netherlands. But the promptitude, vigour, and advantageous situation of the french monarch baffled the tardy combinations of two powers, so distant from each other, and so ill adapted to coalesce. In April, France and England de-

nounced hostilities against Holland at the same moment. Before the close of the campaign, the french army penetrated to the very neighbourhood of Amsterdam ; and to preserve their independence, the dutch were reduced to the last and desperate expedient of breaking down the dikes, and inundating the country.

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So unprovoked and successful an irruption awakened general alarm and indignation. A revolution took place in the United Provinces ; the ruling party, which had attached itself to France, was driven from power, and William prince of Orange, at the early age of eighteen, was called by the voice of his country, to secure that independence which his ancestors had won. The austrian court appealed to arms, and in September 1672 a new alliance cemented the union between the emperor, Spain, and the United Provinces. The effect of this combination was rapid and decisive. Louis was reduced to abandon most of his conquests, with the same celerity as they were made. In 1674, he was deserted by England, as well as by many of his german allies, and threatened by the forces of the empire. With his usual promptitude and decision, he again turned even failure to advantage. During the campaigns of 1674 and 1675, he over-ran Franche Comté, induced the swiss to shut the passages from Italy into Germany

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against the spaniards, and baffled the attempts of the austrians to regain their footing beyond the Rhine. While an attack from his allies, the swedes, diverted the forces of the elector of Brandenburg, he directed his most vigorous efforts against the Netherlands; and having defeated the dutch and spaniards, extended his conquests by the capture of the principal fortresses which covered those provinces. He distracted the attention of the spaniards by incursions into Catalonia, and by fomenting insurrections among a turbulent people, ever ripe for revolt.

Profiting by that disunion which is the effect of ill-success, and of a protracted contest, Louis succeeded in luring Holland into a separate peace, which was concluded at Nimeguen, in August 1678, under the mediation of England. He restored his conquests from the United Provinces, on the condition of being permitted to retain Franche Comté; and in return for the surrender of some of the minor fortresses acquired by the peace of Aix la Chapelle, he obtained new cessions which consolidated the extension of his frontier from the channel to the Sambre.\* Thus deserted, Spain had no other resource than to take advantage of an article which stipulated for her accession within six

\* Koch. t. 1, p. 211.

weeks.\* The emperor was soon afterwards compelled to purchase peace by acquiescing in the exchange of Philipsburg for Friburg in the Brisgau, which contributed still further to establish the power of France on the Rhine.

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The influence which France now began to acquire in the court of Spain, was marked by the marriage of the young king with Maria Louisa, daughter of the duke of Orleans, brother of Louis the fourteenth. A match had been already arranged, and the contract even signed, with an austrian princess ; but Don John, dreading lest such a connection should give new weight to the queen dowager, profited by the accommodation to form this alliance with the royal family of France. It was hastily negotiated by the spanish plenipotentiary in his return from the congress at Nimeguen, celebrated in October 1679, at Quintanapalla, and in the commencement of the ensuing year the new queen made her solemn entry into Madrid.

Don John, however, did not live to witness the solemnization of the nuptials. Like his predecessor, he drew on himself the resentment of a high spirited people, by the humiliating terms

\* Treaty between France and the United Provinces, and between France and Spain, Sept. 17, 1678.—Prontuario de Tratados, p. 179, and 197.

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of peace to which he was constrained to submit. Embarrassed by the disorders in the government, and hated for his rigorous treatment of the queen dowager, he rendered himself obnoxious to all parties, by the banishment of many nobles who had shewn their attachment to her cause. Dreading also the machinations of a host of enemies, he alienated his young sovereign, by keeping him in a state of undue restraint. Lastly, the treaty of marriage with a french princess, completed the series of his political delinquencies, in the eyes of a people, who from character and principles, were hostile to the very name of France.

He saw, with alarm, the powerful combination which was forming against him ; he found the favour of the king gradually withdrawn, and the queen dowager courted by his enemies. Although he had braved dangers, and supported disgrace, he wanted magnanimity to renounce power, and relinquish a post which he could no longer maintain. Oppressed with chagrin and disappointment, he brooded over his dangers and difficulties. His health was gradually affected ; he was seized with a lingering, but incurable disorder, and on the 17th of September, 1679, sunk into the grave, in the fiftieth year of his age, and the second of his troubled administration.

With Don John expired the genius of the austrian dynasty. A species of dissolution took place in the government, which hastened the decline of the monarchy. The queen dowager was recalled, but becoming timid, from past disgrace, did not at first venture to resume an active part in the administration of affairs. The king, too weak and inexperienced to govern alone, was abandoned to the guidance of a cabal, formed by his confessor ; the duchess of Torranueva, camerara mayor to the young queen, an old lady of imperious character, and a zealous antigallican ; and d'Eguya, who performed the functions, without the title, of secretary of state. The latter, by a supple and insinuating behaviour, had risen from the situation of a petty clerk, to the height of favour. Profiting by his access to the royal presence, he persuaded the king not to nominate a prime minister, and obtained the sole direction of affairs ; but being devoid of talents, and accustomed only to the routine of office, his influence aggravated the public disorders, and occasioned an almost total suspension in the machine of government. Every department became a scene of confusion ; the dispatches and papers submitted to the council remained unanswered ; those referred to the king were seldom returned, and a total

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SECT. II. lethargy in every branch of administration set  
1665—1697. the seal to the national calamities.

At length, a dread of public indignation vanquished the ill judged ambition of this minion, and induced him to relieve himself from the responsibility of office. To secure his own power, he directed the choice of the king to the duke of Medina Celi, whose principal merits were his high birth and conciliating character; but whose constitutional indolence and want of experience rendered him likely to submit to the guidance of another hand. Medina Celi, however, feeling his own want of experience, and jealous of d'Eguya, brought forward other co-adjutors, and endeavoured to lessen his difficulties, by committing the deliberations of state to juntas, formed for the occasion, of persons distinguished in the administration, or possessing influence with the monarch. Among these we find a species of financial committee, consisting of the presidents of Castile and finance, the royal confessor, a dominican monk, and a jesuit, who possessed the confidence of the king in spiritual concerns. From such a motley ministry, emanated numerous plans, equally specious and impracticable: the public distress was aggravated, and the labours of such mock statesmen exposed the government to contempt and ridicule. Nothing

could exceed the disorders of the country at this melancholy period. Sudden changes in the value of the currency suspended circulation, and ruined public confidence; scarcity and dearth followed the fluctuations of the coin. The people, to use the proverbial expression of the nation, were reduced to subsist on the beams of the sun;\* and earthquakes, hurricanes, and inundations, swelled the deplorable catalogue of human miseries. While want and calamity oppressed the provinces, cabals and factions divided the court. The king, incapable of business, and a prey to a hypochondriac malady, which bordered on insanity, was distracted by the contending animosities of the queen mother and queen consort, and divided between his love for his wife and that rooted resentment which he felt for the multiplied insults of the french monarch. In this struggle of contending interests, d'Eguya bore a distinguished part, and contributed to aggravate the embarrassments of the government. Dissatisfied with the attempt of Medina Celi to free himself from control, he caballed against him with the confessor, and the duchess of Torranueva; he next excited the jealousy of one party against the other, and of the king against all. Finally, with the hope of

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\* “*Tomar el sol*,” equivalent to our expression, to live on air.  
—*Memoires de Mad. de Villars*, p. 81.

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1665—1697. preventing the formation of a more efficient ministry, he joined Medina Celi in procuring the disgrace of the confessor, and the dismission of the duchess, whose imperious temper had disgusted the queen consort.

After a contest too long for the public welfare, the voice of the nation, supported by the representations of the nobles, and the influence of the queen dowager, drove Medina Celi from the helm. A new administration was formed, under the count of Oropesa, a young nobleman, whose talents and conciliating qualities bore the fairest promise. He reformed abuses in the administration, and issued new financial regulations, more just and practicable than those of his predecessor. But amidst the rapid succession of foreign troubles and domestic wants, the royal revenue was absorbed as fast as it flowed in: according to the expression of a native writer, the american treasures, once the great resource of the monarchy, were like a drop of water, which aggravated instead of quenching a raging thirst.\*

The death of the queen consort in 1690, and the subsequent marriage of the widowed monarch with an austrian princess, concluded at the instigation of the queen dowager, became a new source of discord. Oropesa, although respected

\* Ortiz.

by the king, was disgraced, and his place supplied by the young count of Melgar, afterwards admiral of Castile, who was handsome and gallant, and better fitted to manage a court intrigue, than to govern a kingdom. Like preceding ministers, he soon found it necessary to provide against the threatened hostilities of France; and carried to a still further extent than Oropesa the suspension of pensions, the reform of offices, the imposition of vexatious taxes, and the demand of free gifts.

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In 1696 the death of the queen dowager, who had survived her credit, produced no other effect, than to strengthen the influence of the queen consort. Public distress, and the difficulty of finding resources for the necessities of government, produced a coalition between Oropesa and Melgar. Oropesa was made president of Castile; and the two rival statesmen suspended their animosities, to remedy the internal disorders, and avert the foreign dangers which threatened the downfall of the monarchy.

The helpless situation of Spain, and the apathy or timidity of other powers, encouraged the french monarch to proceed in his career of spoliation and incroachment. Profiting by the contradictory stipulations, which had been introduced into the preceding treaties, he adopted a new system, and continued his dismember-

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ments under the guise of peace, with still more success than in time of war. He established tribunals or chambers of re-union, at Brisac for Alsace ; at Metz for the three bishoprics, and at Besançon for Franche Comté. The object of these tribunals was to reunite to the territories before acquired by France, not merely single places, or inconsiderable districts, but even whole principalities and provinces, which, according to tradition or record, had ever been attached to the ceded countries. Among other territories, he wrested from the empire the city and district of Strasburgh ; the town and part of the bishopric of Spire ; Sponheim and Montbeillard ; Deux Ponts, Saarburgh, Weldorf, and numerous districts of inferior importance. From Spain, he extorted Courtray, Dixmude, Alost, and Luxemburgh. He claimed the county of Chinay, under pretexts too frivolous to be recapitulated, and even attempted to appropriate Navarre by force.

His power, resources, and past successes, awed the other states of Europe. After a fruitless attempt to form a combination against this new species of aggression, the parties aggrieved found it necessary to submit to a compromise. By the truce of twenty years, concluded at Ratisbon with the emperor and Spain, in 1684, the french monarch was enabled to consolidate a

part of his recent usurpations. He retained Luxemburgh, Beaumont, Bouvines, and Chinay, with their dependencies; and by extending his frontier from the Sambre to the Moselle, united his dismemberments of the Spanish inheritance with those wrested from Austria and the empire. From the empire, he obtained the cession of Strasburgh and Kehl, and of all the re-unions decreed by the chambers of Metz, Brisac, and Bezançon, before the 1st of August, 1681, with the full rights of sovereignty.

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These progressive incroachments, which, under the insidious name of peace, threatened little less than universal subjection, excited alarm and indignation in every quarter of Europe. The petty states within the grasp of French ambition looked to the greater powers for support; while the greater powers themselves felt that open, vigorous, and common resistance, could alone secure their safety. For some time, the disgraceful dependence to which England was reduced under the reigns of the two last Stuarts, prevented that general combination which was competent to resist so overwhelming a force. In 1686, the league of Augsburgh prepared the way for the glorious Revolution, which secured the liberties and religion of England, and became the foundation of the grand alliance. The object of this extensive combination was to put

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a period to the aggressions and tyranny of the french monarch, and to prevent him from realising the design of appropriating the spanish succession.

These combinations were the signal of hostilities; and for the first time since France became predominant, she was reduced to depend on her own strength and resources. But in this, as in other instances, it was too soon proved, that a powerful and compact monarchy, in a commanding position, with a government of sufficient energy to call forth all the resources of the people, with the most numerous and best constituted army in Europe, led on by the ablest generals of the age, is enabled to combat with advantage against an extensive combination of nations, differing in interests, harrassed with internal troubles, and forming a vast and heterogeneous body, incapable of acting on one common plan. Favoured by these advantages, the french monarch succeeded in baffling the first and most dangerous attack. Keeping the powers united on the side of the Netherlands and Germany at bay, he directed his principal efforts against Italy and Spain; while he overran the territories of Savoy, he poured his forces into Navarre and Catalonia, reduced Barcelona, and rapidly extended his conquests towards the Ebro.

At length the different states began to sink

under the evils of protracted war ; and the first impulse of resentment having subsided, each consulted its hopes, its interests, or its fears. The duke of Savoy, robbed of his territories, and lured with the prospect of an alliance with the royal family of France, in 1696, set the example of defection, which became a signal for the dissolution of the grand alliance. Suspicion and alarm spreading through the confederacy, Louis proposed terms which appeared moderate, contrasted with his former pretensions, and obtained a ready attention from the maritime powers and Spain. Accordingly a formal separation took place among the allies, and a peace was concluded at Ryswick. Louis conciliated William the third, by acknowledging the protestant succession, and engaging not to assist his enemies ; and the dutch, by agreeing to restore his conquests, to renew their commercial privileges, and to accede to the formation of a barrier for their security on the side of the Netherlands. To the surprise and satisfaction of the spanish nation, he not only relinquished his recent conquests, but even a part of the dismemberments which he had been permitted to retain by the treaty of Ratisbon.\* In the midst of the joy inspired by this relief from the burthens of war, the great principle of the

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\* Treaty between Spain and France, signed at Ryswick, Sept. 20, 1697. *Prontuario de Tratados*, p. 317.

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alliance, to secure the succession of Spain in the House of Austria, was overlooked ; and the emperor Leopold, after a short and fruitless opposition, was compelled to accede to the peace, without the slightest allusion to the claims of his family.

During these contests abroad, various revolutions had agitated the court of Madrid. The temporary advantage, which France derived from the elevation of a bourbon princess to the throne, had been lost by her death ; and the austrian party had regained the ascendancy by the marriage between Charles and Eleonora, princess of Neuburgh, sister of the empress. Other changes had ensued in the administration. Oropesa, though restored after a temporary disgrace, had been compelled to bend to the superior influence of the count of Melgar ; and Melgar himself had seen new candidates arise for power, in the dukes of Sessa and Infantado, and in the count of Monterrey. But his most dangerous competitor was cardinal Portocarrero, who after filling the office of embassador at Rome, had been elevated to the archiepiscopal see of Toledo, and to the advantages of high birth, and extensive influence in his order, united great energy of character, with the arts of intrigue, which had been called into action and matured in so celebrated a school as the court of Rome. Lastly, at this momen-

tous period, a fatal change took place in the health of the king. His constitution, naturally weak, and his mind, naturally feeble, sunk under the attacks of a tertian fever: his life for a considerable time was in danger; and the four last years of his reign were embittered with sufferings which rendered his existence a continued malady.\*

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\* Lettres de Mad. la Marquise de Villars.—Memoires de la Cour d'Espagne.—Ortiz.—Desormeaux.—Abregé Chronologique de l'Histoire d'Espagne.—Oeuvres de Louis 14.—Diplomatie Françoise—and the different public acts, conventions, and treaties, as well as the Histories of England, Holland, and House of Austria, ch. 65, 66.

## SECTION III.

1692—1700.

*Contest for the succession to the throne of Spain—Rights of the principal pretenders—Policy of the french court—State of the austrian party in Spain—Embassies of Harrach and Harcourt—Successful intrigues of Harcourt—Cardinal Portocarrero becomes the partisan of France—First Treaty of Partition—Charles appoints the Electoral Prince of Bavaria his heir—Death of the Prince—Effect of this Treaty in Spain—Manœuvres of Portocarrero and the french party to influence the mind of Charles—His rapid decline—Disgrace of Oropesa, the austrian adherents, and the admiral of Castile—Second Treaty of Partition, and breach between Spain and the maritime powers—Vigorous struggle between the austrian and bourbon parties—Vacillations of the King—Consults the different councils in Spain and refers to the Pope—Effect of these appeals—Ascendancy of the French interest—Last illness of the King—Testament in favour of a French Prince—Death of Charles.*

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FROM infancy to manhood the whole life of Charles had been chequered with mortifications and calamities. Engaged in repeated and unsuccessful struggles against a superior power, with allies who had rendered the interests of Spain subservient to their own advantage, he had seen his provinces ravaged or dismembered, his army and navy mouldering away, his country reduced to a deplorable state of penury and weakness. But these trials, however severe, were only the prelude to still heavier afflictions.

Pining under a lingering and hopeless malady, without hope of issue, domineered by an imperious consort whom he did not love, and treated like an infant by the austrian ambassador; Charles became the sport of the contending parties who agitated his court, and was reduced to witness the unfeeling attempts of foreign states to parcel out and appropriate his dominions. Lastly, the frail remnant of a life divided between care and sorrow was embittered by the prospect of the future evils which threatened his devoted country, and the apprehension that his succession would be wrested from his own family, to which he was affectionately attached, to give splendour to the rival house of Bourbon.

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As the succession to the crown of Spain had long attracted the attention, and excited the alarms of Europe, the treaty of Ryswick was followed by those négotiations and intrigues, which the near prospect of so important an object could not fail to produce.

The principal claimants were the dauphin, the electoral prince of Bavaria, and the emperor Leopold.\*

The pretensions of the dauphin were founded on the rights of his mother, the infanta Maria Theresa, as eldest daughter of Philip the fourth, although she had renounced all claims to the

\* See the Genealogical Table preceding this Introduction.

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succession, and although that renunciation had been ratified by the Cortes and confirmed by the testament of her father, which were all the formalities required by the law of Spain to give it validity.

The emperor Leopold founded his claims, first, on his descent from Philip and Johanna of Castile; and, secondly, on the rights of his mother, Mary Ann, daughter of Philip the third. To obviate the jealousy which the European powers might conceive at the union of the whole austrian possessions and dignities on one head, he and his eldest son Joseph relinquished their pretensions in favour of his second son the archduke Charles.

The rights of the bavarian prince were derived from those of his mother, the only daughter of the infanta Margaret by the emperor Leopold; and notwithstanding a renunciation had been extorted on her marriage, yet as it had neither been confirmed by the king of Spain, or ratified by the Cortes, he might be justly considered as the legitimate heir.

Two other claimants presented themselves: Philip duke of Orleans, in right of his mother the infanta Anne, wife of Louis the thirteenth; and Victor Amadeus, duke of Savoy, as descended from Catherine, second daughter of Philip the second. But these inferior claims

were soon lost in the superior power or right of the principal pretenders.

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At every period since the solemnization of the marriage between Louis the fourteenth and the infanta, the french court evidently regarded her renunciation as a mere formality, to satisfy the wishes of the spaniards, and to dissipate the alarm of the european powers at the disclosure of a design to unite the two monarchies. At the very moment of passing this solemn act, Mazarin declared, that in spite of a renunciation, the king might pretend to the succession of the Spanish dominions in right of his wife. In subsequent periods the diplomatic correspondence, and even the public papers which emanated from the french cabinet, invariably asserted the same principle; that no renunciation by a french or spanish princess could invalidate the rights of her children, or change the law of succession established in both countries.

Under this quibbling distinction, these claims were kept in reserve; until, as Barillon remarks, "they had accustomed the public to hear of the *rights* of the dauphin to the crown of Spain; and to regard them as better founded than those which depended on a renunciation filled with nullities."\* The jealousies, fears, and petty interests of other powers favoured

\* Barillon to Louis 14, April 3, 1685. Fox's History of James 2, App. p. 65.

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their designs. The french monarch succeeded in dissolving the grand alliance, without the establishment of the principle which had given it birth ; and the succession to the crown of Spain, though likely to become the immediate cause of a new war, was left in the same uncertain state as before the commencement of hostilities.

While the whole attention and means of the french monarch were employed in silently maturing his designs, the marriage of Margaret, sole daughter of Leopold, by the infanta Maria Theresa, with the elector of Bavaria, and the birth of her son, Joseph Ferdinand, in 1692, divided the interests of the austrian family. The claims of the young prince being considered as prior to those of Leopold, were consequently supported by the queen mother, and by some members of the cabinet, at the head of whom was the count of Oropesa, then president of Castile. The whole strength of this party was employed in counteracting the efforts of the queen consort, in favour of an austrian prince.

In this divided state the court of Madrid continued, till the death of the queen mother, and the retreat of Oropesa, gave the ascendancy to the queen consort. To take advantage of this change, the emperor Leopold dispatched Ferdinand Bonaventura count of Harrach, a veteran

statesman, to Madrid, as his ambassador ; with the hope, that if the nomination of an archduke could be secured during the war, he should at least obtain the guaranty of the maritime powers, in favour of his pretensions, on the re-establishment of peace.

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The austrian minister found the court divided into two parties. The cause of the archduke was supported by the queen, by cardinal Portocarrero, by the count of Melgar, admiral of Castile, and by a majority of the cabinet, as well as the principal nobles ; that of the bavarian prince, by Oropesa, who, though in retirement, was consulted by the king ; by the marquis of Mancera, and a few other ministers. The only person of any consideration who was inclined to the bourbon cause, was the count of Monterrey, head of the council of Flanders, more from aversion to the germans than from devotion to France.

The king himself, if the inclinations of so weak and indecisive a prince can be taken into consideration, was favourable to the bavarian claims ; but he continually fluctuated in his wishes, and avoided any conversation on a subject which aggravated his hypochondriac malady, by bringing to his mind the idea of approaching dissolution.

The queen, however, was ill calculated to call

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into action all the advantages of her situation. She was vain, imperious, unsteady, and without talents for business. She was wholly governed by her german adherents, particularly the countess of Berlips, her camerara-mayor, a woman of low extraction, and her confessor, father Chiusa, a german jesuit ; both of whom considering their residence in Spain as merely temporary, were guilty of the most shameful rapacity. The german partialities of the queen, joined with the venality of her favourites, disgusted a people remarkable for their dislike of foreigners ; while the austrian party was weakened by contests between Portocarrero and the admiral for the pre-eminence.

At length the austrian embassador succeeded in infusing unanimity into this heterogeneous body ; and even obtained from the king a promise to nominate the archduke, provided the emperor would send him into Spain with a force of 10,000 men, to assist in repelling the aggression which was apprehended from France. But the exhausted state of Leopold's finances on one hand, and on the other the fear of exposing his darling son to a dangerous voyage, deterred him from accepting the proposal. He alienated his partisans by demanding the government of the Milanese, which was considered as a proof of his intention rather to dismember the mo-

narchy, than to secure the object of all true Spaniards, the indivisibility of their empire. These dissensions having prevented any arrangement before the conclusion of the war, Leopold lost the co-operation of the maritime powers, and full scope was opened to the intrigues of France.

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Louis the fourteenth had long watched with anxious attention the state of the Spanish court and nation, and gradually prepared the means of bringing forward a French, or at least of excluding an Austrian prince. Hence, in the negotiation for the peace of Ryswick, he displayed great affectation of forbearance, and restored without an equivalent all the conquests which his victorious arms had wrested from Spain. After the conclusion of the peace, he systematically pursued the design of conciliating the king of Spain and his people. At the same time he did not disband his army; but even increased his forces on the frontiers, formed magazines, and filled his own and the Spanish harbours with ships of war.

To counteract the Austrian influence, and secure a party in the country, he sent as his ambassador the Marquis, afterwards Duke of Harcourt, a nobleman whose address and munificence were calculated to win over a high-spirited nation, and to eradicate the prejudices

SECT. III. fostered against France. The first and principal  
1692—1700. object of his instructions was to procure the nomination of a french prince; but should that prove impracticable, he was at all events to weaken the austrian interest, by favouring the pretensions of the bavarian house, or even of a spanish grandee.

Arriving at Madrid, where his entry was distinguished by unusual splendour, Harcourt found the austrian cause predominant. The king himself was anxious to transmit to the archduke his nephew, the crown of his ancestors, had he not been deterred by his dread of France, and the want of decision or power on the part of Leopold. By the influence of the queen, however, no indirect means had been neglected to attain this object. The germans were all-powerful at court; the two principal governments of Catalonia and Milan, which were calculated to favour the introduction of an austrian prince, were confided to the prince of Darmstadt, and the prince of Vaudemont, both germans and in the service of Austria; while the viceroyalty of Naples was filled by the duke of Popoli, who was attached to the same cause. Notwithstanding these advantages, the ill-judged œconomy, and punctilio stiffness of the austrian ambassador, were ill calculated to resist the address, affability, and munificence of Harcourt,

who was ably seconded by his wife, a lady of the most accomplished and fascinating manners.

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Harcourt successfully profited by the divisions of the austrian party. He gained the countess of Berlips, who was offended with Harrach for attempting to check her rapacity and procure her dismission, and he lured Chiusa with the prospect of a cardinal's hat. By their means he even opened a secret communication with the queen herself; he inflamed her displeasure against Harrach, and rendered her less zealous in the cause of her family, by holding forth the prospect of an union with the dauphin, when she became a widow. He employed the hours of convivial and familiar intercourse, to expose to the grandes the petty intrigues and misconduct of the german cabal, to excite their dissatisfaction against the domineering spirit of Harrach, and to attack the character of the emperor himself. He lavished his attentions on the clergy, and gradually disposed the court and capital towards a more favourable opinion of the House of Bourbon. But the masterpiece of his art was the acquisition of cardinal Portocarrero, who by his birth, station, profession, and personal influence with the king, was competent to give the preponderance to the party which he espoused; and who from jealousy of the admiral, laboured for the ruin of that cause, which he had at first supported, and was not permitted to rule.

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The first effect of these intrigues was the departure of Harrach, who finding himself unequal to combat the machinations of his artful rival, demanded his recall, and quitted the court with a degree of ill humour, which injured the declining interest of his imperial master. His son Louis, who replaced him, was equally haughty and unconciliating, without his talents, experience, and sagacity; and this change of ministers, at so critical a period, greatly contributed to the ascendancy of the Bourbon influence.

At the same time that these secret springs were operating at Madrid, the public conduct of Louis was skilfully adapted to forward his design. While by his warlike preparations he deterred the emperor from adopting any decisive measure, he kept in reserve the claims of his family; and took advantage of the internal embarrassments of the maritime powers, and their solicitude to prevent the renewal of war. He conciliated William the third, by appearing to abandon the interests of the pretender. He adroitly avoided any engagement with the members of the grand alliance collectively; but by an affected disinterestedness with regard to the pretensions of the dauphin, and an appearance of zeal for the preservation of peace, he drew the british monarch into an engagement which was at once calculated to irritate the emperor, and to alarm the

spaniards with the apprehension of a dismemberment. This was the first treaty of partition, which originated during the conferences for the conclusion of peace, by the proposal of Torci to the earl of Portland, and was arranged between France and the two maritime powers. Spain and the Indies, with the Netherlands, were assigned to the electoral prince of Bavaria ; Milan to the archduke Charles ; to the dauphin, Naples and Sicily, with the marquisate of Finale, and the provinee of Guipuscoa. Should the electoral prince die after his accession, without issue, the spanish crown was to be transferred to his father ; if the bavarian and austrian families should refuse to accede, the allies were to unite in attacking them, and afterwards regulate to whom their respective portions should belong. The treaty was to be kept secret, and William engaged to demand the consent of the emperor.

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By this arrangement, Louis succeeded in separating the maritime powers from Austria, and in virtually forcing them to supersede his own renunciation, as well as that of the electress of Bavaria ; while he prepared the way for opposing the claims of the bavarian, to those of the austrian family. The elector of Bavaria, who had hitherto been attached to Austria, was won over by an engagement, which opened so

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flattering a prospect to his ambition ; and there is little doubt that the elevation of his son to the throne of Spain was to be repaid by the cession of the Netherlands to France.

The emperor was highly indignant at the attempt to set aside the claims of his family, in return for the cession of the Milanese, which escheated to the empire on the death of Charles ; and by the unjust entail of the spanish crown on the elector of Bavaria. He accordingly refused to accede to a treaty so dishonourable to himself, and so derogatory to his rights.

The contents of this treaty excited the strongest sensation in the spanish court and nation, who resented the attempt of foreign states to dispose of their monarchy. Louis profited by this sentiment to turn the indignation of the spaniards against the maritime powers, whom he secretly depicted as its principal movers. The effect of this policy did not disappoint his expectations. His warlike preparations deterred the king from naming an austrian successor, and left no alternative but the choice of the bavarian or bourbon prince. As it would have defeated his whole scheme to have extorted a premature decision in favour of his own family, he contented himself with excluding the most dangerous rival, and made no direct attempt to influence the mind of Charles, who was thus provoked to nominate a

successor. A reference being made to the most learned jurists and casuists, both in Spain and Italy, they justly approved the claims of the bavarian prince. A will was accordingly drawn up in his favour, with the connivance of the french adherents ; but to retain a plausible pretext for eventually thwarting the disposition, Louis made a formal protest against such arrangements as might prejudice the *rights* of his family. With the approbation of Portocarrero, Harcourt presented this protest, in the form of a memorial, to the king, and it was disseminated throughout Spain with the utmost activity.

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This measure was scarcely effected, before the untimely death of the bavarian prince on the 8th of February 1699, frustrated the disposition of the spanish monarch, and gave a new and more embarrassing aspect to the question of the succession ; for the scale was now to preponderate either in favour of Austria or France. But at this important crisis, Louis developed consummate address, and his views were ably seconded by his creature Portocarrero.

Accordingly, the contest between the bourbon and austrian parties revived with double violence. The queen displayed new zeal in the cause of the archduke ; Oropesa followed her example, the admiral resumed his activity, the inquisitor general, Don Balthazar Mendoza, joined this new

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combination ; and above all, the confessor father Froylan Diaz, though raised to his post by Portocarrero, refused to imitate the defection of his patron. To awe the partisans of France, a body of foreign troops, under the command of the prince of Darmstadt, was drawn to the vicinity of Madrid.

Difficult as it appeared to break so powerful a party, the disappointed ambition of Portocarrero stimulated him to new efforts ; and his station, address, and influence, furnished the means of obtaining success. The hypochondriac king was persuaded, that his malady was the effect of sorcery ; and malicious reports were actively circulated, inculpating the queen, the admiral, and Oropesa. The authority of Portocarrero, united with that of the grand inquisitor, induced the confessor to have recourse to the ceremony of exorcism. The dreadful expressions used on this awful occasion increased the weakness of a diseased mind, and the king sunk into a state of alarming despondency. Still, however, brooding over the apprehension of sorcery, he was persuaded to consult a woman of Cangas in the Asturias, who was supposed to be under the influence of a demon, and the credulous confessor suffered himself to be charged with the dangerous commission.

The planners of the design were too adroit to

be disappointed in the result of the appeal. The sorceress replied, that the king was affected by witchcraft, and named various persons as guilty of the crime ; while the queen, irritated by this new imprudence of the confessor, even joined her opponents in procuring his dismission. He was succeeded by father Nicholas Torres, whose principles were so doubtful, that he is described as an adherent to both parties.

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During this transaction, Portocarrero had retired to his see ; but at the secret instances of Harcourt, was recalled by the king. At this moment a new plot was carried into execution by the bourbon adherents. The regular supply of provisions to the capital, which were furnished by monopoly, suddenly failed. The licentious and starving populace were roused into tumult, and their indignation was pointed against the admiral and Oropesa, as the authors of their misery. Crowds repaired to the royal palace, with clamorous demands of relief, and threats of vengeance. The king being unwilling to expose himself to a furious multitude, the queen herself appeared in the balcony, and endeavoured to still the commotion, by declaring, “ that the king was sleeping.” A deep and ominous voice burst from the crowd : “ He has slept too long ; it is time he should be awakened to the miseries of his people.” The tumult increased, and it was

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vain to reason or remonstrate. The wretched monarch was brought forward, trembling, pale, and agitated. In his name, and in his presence, satisfaction was promised to the people, and the disgrace of the admiral and Oropesa was announced. The mob withdrew from the palace, and turned their fury against the mansions of the obnoxious ministers, who, with difficulty, escaped in disguise. Plunder and devastation only served to inflame their rage ; and alarming execrations burst forth against the queen and her confessor. In vain the corregidor, Don Francisco Ronquillo, rode into the crowd with a crucifix in his hand, endeavouring to soothe the commotion ; in vain the holy sacrament was exposed by the monks of Santo Domingo. All efforts were fruitless, till the approach of a military force extorted that respect from the insurgents which was denied to the symbols of religion ; and as the night approached, they gradually dispersed themselves through the streets and allies of the city.

The danger being averted, the council of Castile made an effort in favour of their president and the admiral ; but their appeal was counteracted by the representations of Portocarrero, and the dread of a new tumult. The admiral and Oropesa were banished from the capital ; the office of president of Castile confided to Don Manuel Arias, a creature of the cardinal ; the

german troops were discharged, and the prince of Darmstadt retired to his government of Catalonia. The austrian partisans were thus driven from court, and the whole power was left in the hands of Portocarrero and his adherents.

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The infirm monarch quitted the capital for the Escurial, in April 1700, to escape from the persecution of those who importuned him to nominate his successor; and to soothe his agitated mind, after the troubled scene to which he had been dragged, a reluctant spectator. In this retreat, he appeared to regain strength and spirits, and hopes were even entertained of his recovery. But the restless curiosity natural to disease, induced him to recur to a superstitious custom common in Spain, which had been resorted to by his father. He descended into the vault of the Pantheon, to visit the corpses of his deceased relatives, trusting that the intercession of their departed spirits would arrest the progress of his malady. The coffin of his mother being opened, the spectacle made little impression; but the body of his first wife appeared with few marks of dissolution, and with a countenance scarcely less blooming than when alive. The sight of features once tenderly beloved, and now triumphant over death, struck him with horror. He recoiled from the view, exclaiming, "I shall soon be with her in Heaven!" and

SECT. III. 1692—1700. hurried from the vault. The effect of this terrible emotion on a weak frame was deep and irremediable. His morbid imagination continually brooded over the idea of dissolution, and he was haunted with the apprehension that the blooming appearance of his departed queen portended his own speedy decease.

After this fatal experiment, his sensitive mind could no longer find repose at the Escurial. He hurried to Aranjuez ; and having in vain endeavoured to dissipate the melancholy impression by exercise and diversion, returned in June to the capital, in a still more deplorable state than before his departure. The presence of the king at Madrid, and the power committed to the cardinal, furnished new means to diminish the austrian influence, and to mature, in conjunction with France, the scheme for transferring the spanish throne to a bourbon prince. At this period also, the queen was attacked in the persons of her adherents ; and the countess of Berlips and the confessor were driven from Spain.

Meanwhile the intrigues and anxiety of foreign powers to interfere in the arrangement of the spanish succession, contributed to aggravate the disorder of the infirm monarch, and to promote the designs of the bourbon partisans. On the death of the bavarian prince, negotiations were instantly renewed for a new arrangement ; the

arts of Louis again prevailed ; and he had the address to obtain the consent of William and the dutch to a second treaty of partition.

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Spain, the Netherlands, and the Indies, were assigned to the archduke Charles, as universal heir, with the exception of the cessions reserved for other powers. The dauphin, in return for the sacrifice of his pretensions, was to have Naples and Sicily, the states of the Presidii, and the province of Guipuscoa. To these were to be added, if the consent of the duke could be obtained, the duchies of Lorraine and Bar, in exchange for the Milanese. The emperor and his eldest son were to renounce their pretensions to the spanish succession in favour of the archduke Charles ; and means were to be adopted to prevent the future union of the spanish and imperial crowns on one head. Should the duke of Lorraine refuse to acquiesce in this arrangement, Milan was assigned to the elector of Bavaria, the duchy of Luxemburgh, with the county of Chinay, to France ; or Milan was to be transferred to the duke of Savoy, and France to receive Nice, the Barcelonette, and the duchy of Savoy, with the kingdom of Upper Navarre. The term of three months was left for the emperor to announce his acquiescence ; and if necessary, the archduke was to be prevented by force from entering Spain or the Italian domi-

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nions, till after the death of Charles. The three contracting parties were to employ their offices in obtaining the accession of other powers.

The terms of this treaty sufficiently shew the helpless state to which William and the United Provinces were reduced. It was a virtual exclusion of an austrian prince, to prevent the archduke from repairing to Spain till the succession became actually vacant; while the treaty itself afforded the king of France a pretext for increasing his military and naval force on the frontier of Spain and the Low Countries, under the plausible pretence of charging himself with the whole burthen of its execution.

But it was in Spain in particular that it produced the most decisive effect. The first hint of the negotiation, which was immediately divulged, roused the resentment of Charles, and induced him to make the warmest remonstrances in every court of Europe, against this indecorous interference. He did not spare his expostulations with the court of France; but in England and Holland, his ministers assumed a language unusual in diplomatic intercourse, and he vehemently appealed to the british nation and parliament against a measure, which was stigmatised as an infamous breach of good faith on the part of their sovereign.

However just this representation, and however



cogent the motive, no sovereign could tolerate such language against his person and government: William, though with regret, ordered the Spanish minister to quit his dominions in eighteen days. At the same time the states refused to accept the memorial of the Spanish minister, or to acknowledge him in a public character. The consequence of these measures was the dismission of Mr. Stanhope, the British minister in Spain; and all amicable communication was cut off with the maritime powers. Louis and his partisans were therefore enabled to pursue their machinations at Madrid with redoubled effect.

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The different courts of Europe appeared inclined to temporise, and wait the event. But the emperor being encouraged by the secret assurances of Charles, and the expectation that his son would be nominated sole heir, deferred his consent to the treaty under various pretences, and asserted the rights of his family to the entire succession.

Meanwhile, Madrid became the scene of a violent struggle between the contending parties. Portocarrero and his adherents, acting in concert with the French ambassador, turned to their advantage the sentiment of indignation excited by the recent treaty of partition. While the Austrian party was discouraged and diminished

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by the timidity of the queen and the banishment of Oropesa and the admiral, that of France was rapidly increased by the accession of the principal grandees, among whom we particularly distinguish the marquis of Villafranca, the count of St. Estevan, and the duke of Medina Sidonia. They inflamed the resentment of the king and nation against the maritime powers, as the principal authors of this insulting partition ; they represented the king of France as drawn into the engagement from a consciousness that the claims of the dauphin were likely to be passed over ; they dwelt on the weakness of Austria when deserted by England and Holland, exaggerated the power of France, and gradually brought into public view the validity of the dauphin's pretensions.

When they had made the intended impression, and the claims of a bourbon prince became the general theme of discourse, they proceeded to more decisive measures, with a view to over-rule the remaining reluctance of the king. A select number of the bourbon partisans, Portocarrero, Villena, St. Estevan, Medina Sidonia, and Villagarcias, met at the house of Portocarrero, to arrange their plan of operations. On this occasion, Villena suggested the argument, afterwards employed to elude the renunciation of the spanish infanta, by urging that the intention was

solely to prevent the union of the two crowns on one head, and consequently if this objection were obviated, her descendants ought to enjoy the priority of right. He charged himself with submitting the proposal to the council of state, while Portocarrero was to exert his influence in obtaining the approbation of the king.

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At this interesting crisis, Harcourt, either to divert the public attention, or to be ready on the frontier to direct the movements of the army, in concert with his partisans at Madrid, left the nominal agency of France to Blécourt, but the real negotiation in the hands of Portocarrero. He then repaired to the south of France, and assumed the command of the army.

The machinations of the french partisans again roused the queen, and she was instigated and directed by the counsels of Oropesa and the admiral. At the same moment the court of Vienna resumed its activity. Leopold offered 60,000 men to defend the Italian dominions, and his ambassador turned against the french partisans their own argument, that the king of France had bound himself by the most solemn engagements to dismember the succession ; that he had expressed his resolution to accept no will in favour of his family, and consequently that the indivisibility and independence of the monarchy rested solely on the House of Austria.

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Such representations made a deep impression on the mind of Charles, who was habitually attached to his family. A tacit permission was given to receive the imperial troops in the Italian dominions, and assurances were conveyed to Vienna that the archduke would be nominated universal heir.

At this time, Portocarrero employed all the powers of his sacred office. He attacked the conscience of the king; ventured gradually to develop the claims of the House of Bourbon; and alarmed the weak and terrified monarch with the threat of eternal punishment, should he neglect to appoint a successor, or violate the rights of the lawful heir. To decide on so high and delicate a matter, he prevailed on him to consult the most profound jurists, as well as the principal grandees and counsellors of state. Accordingly the jarring claims of the two rival houses were submitted to the most learned lawyers of Spain and Italy, who unanimously decided in favour of the House of Bourbon, provided means were adopted to prevent the union of the two crowns.

Charles, still struggling between his superstitious fears and affection for his family, was advised by Portocarrero to recur to the pope, as the common father of christendom, and the safest counsellor in a matter of such difficulty. The effect of this appeal was well foreseen, from the

inveterate jealousy fostered by Innocent the twelfth against the House of Austria.

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The resolution being taken, Charles selected for this delicate mission the duke of Uzeda, one of his household, a nobleman possessing his entire confidence. He said, one morning, “ Duke of Uzeda, it is my intention to send you to Rome, in quality of ambassador.” The duke endeavouring to decline an appointment which would remove him from the royal presence and service, the king continued, “ You know I have no children, and may shortly die. Have you not held me thrice as dead in your arms ? Lastly, do you not perceive that, for the tranquillity of my subjects, and the whole monarchy, I should think of chusing a successor ? It is for this great work, for which I am answerable to God and to the world, that I would consult the pope ; and as it is necessary to keep the design secret, I have chosen you to serve me in so important a mission.” He concluded with a remark which shewed the impression made by the representations of the french partizans ; “ Though partial,” he added, “ to my own family, my future salvation is dearer to me than the ties of blood !” The duke was accordingly charged with the opinions of the jurists, and a letter to the pope.\*

\* Torcy observes, that the duke of Uzeda was at Rome, and received the letter from Charles with orders to deliver it to the pope. But the anecdote in the text is drawn from the account

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“ Having no children, and being obliged to appoint an heir to the spanish crowns from a foreign family, we find such great obscurity in the law of succession, and in the circumstances of the case, that we are unable to come to a settled determination. Strict justice is our only aim, and to enable us to decide with that justice, we have constantly besought the Supreme Being to direct us in the present exigency. Anxious to act rightly, we have recourse to your holiness, as to an infallible guide. We intreat you to consult on this important affair with the cardinals and divines, whom you judge most sincere and able ; and after having attentively examined the testaments of our predecessors, from Ferdinand the catholic to Philip the fourth ; the decrees of the Cortes, the renunciations of the infantas Mary Anne and Maria Theresa, the marriage compacts, cessions, and all the acts of the austrian princes, from Philip the handsome to the present time, to decide by the rules of equity and justice. As to ourself, we are not guided either by love or hatred, and we only wait for the opinion of your holiness to regulate our conduct.”

On receiving this application, the pope affected some reluctance to assume the decision of so delicate a matter ; but at length referred given by Uzeda himself to marshal Tessé, when in Spain. See Memoires de Tessé, t. 1, p. 181, sur le Testament de Charles II, Roi d'Espagne.

the documents to the cardinals Albano, Spinola and Spada, all of whom were attached to France. SECT. III.  
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After deliberating forty days, the decision was such as might have been anticipated. That the king of Spain was bound in conscience to entail his succession on the duke of Anjou or the duke of Berri, the younger sons of the dauphin, provided proper precautions were taken against the union of the two crowns. Innocent dispatched this report, with a letter calculated to influence the devout mind of Charles.

"Being," he observed, "myself in a situation similar to that of your majesty, on the point of appearing at the tribunal of Christ, and of rendering an account to my sovereign pastor of the flock which has been entrusted to my care, it is no less my duty to give such advice as will not be a matter of reproach to my conscience at the day of judgment. Your majesty should reflect that you ought not to put the interests of the House of Austria in competition with those of eternity, and with that dreadful account of your actions which you must soon give before the King of kings, who admits no excuse, and is no respecter of persons. You cannot be ignorant that the children of the dauphin are the rightful heirs of the crown ; and that in opposition to them, neither the archduke, nor any member of the House of Austria, has the smallest

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legitimate pretension. In proportion to the importance of the succession, the more crying will be the injustice of excluding the rightful heirs, and the more will you draw on your devoted head the vengeance of Heaven. It is therefore incumbent on you to omit no precaution which your wisdom can suggest, to render justice where justice is due, and to secure, as far as lies in your power, the undivided inheritance of the spanish monarchy to a son of the dauphin."

Even the sacred authority of the pontiff could not wholly silence the yearning of Charles towards his family. After privately consulting several of the grandes, he submitted the question to the council of Castile. Arias, the president, and the creature of Portocarrero, presented a report coinciding with the decision from Rome; and the same sentiments were re-echoed from all the public authorities. But the influence of the queen was now exerted with redoubled effect. She secretly promoted a reconciliation with the maritime powers, to whom she naturally looked as the firmest support of an austrian prince. The usual intercourse between the different courts was renewed; and at her instigation, military preparations were made in Spain, to give weight to the expected bequest of her husband,

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The french party were not idle. In September, Louis issued a memorial, arguing, that the adoption of the partition treaty was the only expedient to maintain the public tranquillity, and threatening to prevent by force the passage of the imperial troops into any part of the spanish dominions. By this well timed menace, Charles was thrown into all his former perplexity. His affection for his family was lost in his superior regard for the welfare of his people; and he became apprehensive lest the french king, instead of accepting a will in favour of a bourbon prince, should pursue the design of dismembering the monarchy, according to the recent treaty of partition. He proposed this doubt to Louis, by means of his ambassador at Paris, and a similar question was put to Blécourt, at Madrid, by the duke of Medina Sidonia, in the name of the grandes in the french interest. Nothing, it was added, but a positive assurance on this point could induce them to recommend the nomination of a bourbon prince.

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In the situation in which Louis then stood, and interested as he was to cajole the maritime powers, it was impossible to give a public and positive answer. There can, however, be little doubt that he privately signified his intention to accept the bequest, although Torcy disinge-

SECT. III. <sup>1692—1700.</sup> nuously glosses over this important point without acquainting us with the reply.\*

At length the question was finally referred to the council of state, the highest deliberative body of the monarchy. The members present were, Portocarrero, Mancera, del Fresno, Villa Franca, Medina Sidonia, Fuensalida, Montijo, and Fregiliana. The three first produced each a memorial, containing an argument nearly the same in substance. "The kingdom, almost destroyed by the rigours of fortune, requires to be restored. It will be dangerous to defer the choice of a successor; because, if in the present circumstances, the king should die, every prince will grasp a portion of the monarchy, whose strength will thus be exhausted in civil wars, by the natural hatred which the Arragonese, the Catalans, and the Valencians, bear to the Castilians; and the majesty and splendour of a throne so august, will be overwhelmed by tyranny and ambition.

"Nor is it sufficient to nominate an heir, if he who is chosen be not in a state to support the weighty machine of so great an empire. It is necessary that he should possess rights, lest

\* He says, indeed, if we can penetrate his affected obscurity, "the assertion that Louis intended to refuse the bequest was false," "un tel discours quoique faux," t. 1, p. 143. We may therefore conclude that he acceded to it.

usurpation should draw on misfortunes ; and lest power, without right, should be confounded with tyranny. In so great a number of evils, divine Providence leaves us only the choice of a single remedy. This remedy is in the House of Bourbon, so powerful and so fortunate, and possessing such incontestible pretensions to the succession ; by employing any other, the monarchy will be destroyed, and become a province of France. We should, therefore, speedily name, as heir to the crown, the duke of Anjou, second son to the dauphin, with the condition that at no future time the two sceptres be united in the same hand. Under this new king, our faded glory will shine forth with new lustre, not only because we shall cease to have a formidable enemy, but shall gain a powerful protector.” \*

SECT. III.  
1692—1700.

Two voices alone were opposed to the prevailing sentiment. The counts of Fuensalida and Frigiliana † urged the necessity of appealing to the national Cortes, as the only legitimate body, competent to decide this important question ; but their opinion was overruled, and the report was presented to the king by Portocarrero. Still, however, the court and capital were divided into parties, and their clamorous disputes were heard even in the anti-chamber of the sick monarch.

\* *Memoires de St. Philippe*, t. 1, p. 32.

† Afterwards called the count of Aguilar.

SECT. III.  
1692—1700.

Pressed on one side by the french, and importuned on the other by the queen and austrian partisans, the debilitated frame of Charles sunk under the struggle of contending passions, and a crisis in his disorder announced his approaching dissolution. With a view still further to stimulate his tender conscience, Portocarrero exposed to him his awful situation on the verge of eternity ; and persuaded him to receive the spiritual counsels of the most pious divines, to assist his devotions and prepare him to die with resignation. In the midst of those lugubrious ceremonies with which the catholic church appals the minds of the dying, these divines represented the danger of his soul should he not dispose of his crown by will, and should entail on his country the horrors of civil war. They held forth the vengeance of an offended deity, if he suffered himself to be swayed by mortal love or hatred ; if he consulted the affections of that body, which must shortly moulder into dust. The austrians, they urged, were not the relations, nor the bourbons the enemies of his soul ; and it was his duty to conform himself to the opinion of the majority of his council, the disinterested advocates of justice, and the organs of the national voice.

This trying scene decided the long pending struggle. Charles dismissed his attendants, and

in the presence of Portocarrero and Arias, dictated his final disposition to Ubilla, secretary of the despacho, whom he constituted notary public for the purpose. The testament was speedily drawn up, and on the second of October presented for his signature. It was read, and duly executed; and being attested by Ubilla, was inclosed in a cover, which was signed and sealed according to custom, by the great officers of state. At this moment the thought of having disinherited his family, wrung from Charles an affecting testimony of sorrow and regret. He burst into tears, exclaiming as he signed, "God is the disposer of kingdoms!" and when the ceremony was concluded, he added; "I am already nothing!" Two days afterwards, he added a codicil, confirming the will, and comprising some ulterior dispositions. In consequence of his total incapacity for business, he consigned the reins of government entirely to Portocarrero.

SECT. III.  
1692—1700.

The contents of this testament were carefully concealed from the queen and austrian party, but proper information was the same evening communicated to Blécourt, and by him transmitted to his court through the channel of Harcourt.

"M. de Blécourt," writes Harcourt to Torci, "has sent a courier to inform his majesty that the catholic king has made and signed a codicil, which confirms a will made the third of this

SECT. III. month, in favour of a french prince. He was  
1698—1700. informed of it by the duke of Medina Sidonia,  
the count of St. Estevan and the duke of Sessa."

After this information, he entered into a series of reflections relative to the acceptance of the will, and deciding in favour of the acceptance, proceeded to suggest such arrangements as his experience and knowledge of the country enabled him to furnish for securing success.

"If," he said, "the will be accepted and the spaniards are unanimous, the duke of Anjou will be established in as little time as will be requisite for his journey; but the rest of the winter we shall be prepared to see what the allied princes will do. I can, however, scarcely believe, that if they once see the prince established at Madrid, they will venture to expose their commerce and their tranquillity, with the evident certainty of not being able to expel him from Spain. The first movement may be violent; but reflection will appease that anger which will only arise among individuals, and not in states, particularly among different people.\*

Harcourt immediately proceeded to Bayonne, to be ready to move at a moment's notice, with orders to open the dispatches from Madrid, and act according to circumstances.

\* Bourdeaux, Oct. 30, 1700. Harcourt to Torcy. This interesting dispatch, and some others, are preserved in the Hardwicke Collection of State Papers.

During the contest of parties at Madrid, the confident reports prevailing in every quarter that the succession was to be entailed on a french prince, alarmed the maritime powers, and they made strong representations to discover the real intentions of Louis. But he quieted their apprehensions, or at least evaded their importunities.\* He; however, continued his naval and military preparations, and William and the dutch government, unable to take the requisite precautions against the impending danger, waited in awful suspense the approaching crisis.

SECT. III.  
1692—1700.

The contest at Madrid was, however, not yet entirely terminated. A return of momentary ease revived the affection of the king towards his family ; the queen and her partisans resuming their efforts, extorted from him a promise to execute a will in favour of the archduke Charles.†

\* Tindal.

† Tindal.—Schomberg's letter, Madrid, Oct. 21.

Ortiz, t. 6.—Desormeaux Hist. d'Espagne, t. 5, p. 147—174.  
 —Tindal.—Ottieri Historia della Guerra per la Successione alla Monarchia di Spagna.—Targe Histoire de l'avenement de la Maison de Bourbon au trone d'Espagne, liv. 1, c. 1.—Saint Philippe, t. 1, p. 1—61.—Memoires du Comte d'Harrach, et de la Torre.—Mem. Historique sur le Testament de Charles II, roi d'Espagne, in Mem. de Tessé.—Memoires de St. Simon, liv. 6.  
 —Lamberty, t. 1, passim.—Milbiller's Continuation of Schmidt, b. 9, chap. 19, 22—b. 10, chap. 1.—Henrich, v. 7, p. 367—422.  
 —Malby and Koch, art. de la Succession d'Espagne.—Diplomatie françoise, t. 6.—Oeuvres de Louis 14, passim.—Official letters from count Schomberg at Lisbon, and the earl of Manchester at Paris, 1700.—In Cole's Memoirs of Affairs of State:  
 —History of the House of Austria, ch. 67. We

SECT. III. 1692—1700. **Messengers were dispatched with the welcome intelligence to Vienna. But it was too late to**

We cannot quit this subject without adverting more particularly to the "Memoirs of the marquis de Torcy," whose share in this transaction, as secretary of state, and whose apparent candour, and affectation of good faith, have given him a higher degree of authority than he deserved. Indeed the intent of this celebrated work was evidently to palliate the usurpations, and justify the sincerity of his master, and more particularly to vindicate him against the accusations to which he was exposed, in consequence of the nomination of his grandson to the throne of Spain.

The author liberally bestows the imputations of partiality, injustice, and ignorance, on those who question the good faith of Louis; and declares, with a solemnity which nothing but truth could justify, that the whole affair was arranged without intrigues, and without negotiations on the part of man, to engage the king of Spain to nominate a successor.

We trust the preceding narrative will sufficiently prove these asseverations to be totally unfounded. Indeed a few remarks will clearly shew that the french secretary contradicts himself, and that he is involved in the embarrassment of a man who is conscious of the truth, but unwilling to avow it.

1. He describes Portocarrero as principally instrumental in extorting the will from Charles.
2. He owns that Portocarrero had zealously devoted himself to France, even before the death of the bavarian prince, (t. 1, p. 58) and mentions his repeated professions of attachment to that cause, which he (the cardinal) called the cause of truth and justice.
3. That Harcourt exactly informed the king of the state of the spanish court and nation.
4. That Harcourt maintained a constant communication with Portocarrero, and among other instances in which he referred to the approbation or advice of the cardinal, mentions the celebrated *mémorial* in favour of the bourbon claims, (t. 1, p. 85).
5. That after the departure of Harcourt, Portocarrero promised to communicate to Blécourt every thing which might contribute to facilitate the nomination of a french prince (t. 1, p. 141.)
6. That Louis was acquainted with the intentions of Charles, in favour of his family, by means of cardinal Janson, who was charged with the affairs of France at Rome, (t. 1, p. 141.)
7. That Blécourt wrote to his court, "that, according to the

carry this design into execution. The change which had revived the hopes of the monarch, was but the temporary and feverish gleam which precedes dissolution. He rapidly declined, and after a short struggle closed his life on the 3d of November, in the thirty-ninth year of his age, and the thirty-seventh of his unfortunate and inglorious reign.

SECT. III.  
1692—1700.

*reports at Madrid*, a son of the dauphin was called to the throne, and that Portocarrero had constantly and usefully laboured for this end."

Without adverting to other facts of a similar nature, which it would be easy to adduce, we may from these avowals appeal to the impartial judgment of the reader, whether Louis could be ignorant of the machinations at Madrid, in favour of his grandson; whether he could be unacquainted with the execution and contents of the will; and lastly, whether the transfer of the crown, to a bourbon prince, can be said to have been effected without intrigues, and without human intervention.

Indeed, since this transaction has ceased to have a national and personal interest, the authority of Torcy has chiefly weighed with those English authors who still make it a question of party; for the most intelligent foreign writers, not excepting even the French themselves, admit the intrigues of Louis, and describe his conduct as the result of a systematic design to raise a prince of his own blood to the Spanish throne.

It would be tedious to cite a variety of authorities on this point, but we cannot omit to call the attention of the reader to the intelligent author of the *Diplomatie Françoise*, as the most modern, and as a writer who has thrown new and valuable lights on the policy of the French court. *Flassan, Dip. Françoise*, t. 4, p. 206 — 208.




## **M E M O I R S.**

**G 2**

*Genealogical Table of the Kings of SPAIN of the House of BOURBON.*

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## MEMOIRS, &c.

### CHAPTER THE FIRST.

1700—1701.

*Death and testament of Charles the second—Philip duke of Anjou appointed his successor—The junta assumes the administration—Louis the fourteenth accepts the will—Philip departs from Paris and arrives at Madrid—His character—Instructions for his conduct and government given by Louis.*

ON the third of November, 1700, died Charles the Second, the last male of the austrian dynasty, which had governed Spain from the death of Ferdinand and Isabella to the period at which these Memoirs commence.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

The king had scarcely expired, before the ministers and officers of state assembled, according to antient custom, to examine and publish the royal testament. As this was a new æra in the History of Spain, and as general anxiety prevailed to know the new sovereign, the palace was crowded with people of all ranks, and the antichamber filled with the foreign ministers and principal courtiers, all eager to receive the earliest intelligence. At length the folding doors being thrown open, the duke of Abrantes appeared, and a general silence ensued to hear the nomination. Near the door stood the two ministers of France and Austria, Blécourt and Harrach.



CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

Blecourt advanced with the confidence of a man who expected a declaration in his favour; but the Spaniard, casting on him a look of indifference, advanced to Harrach and embraced him with a fervour which announced the most joyful tidings. Maliciously prolonging his compliment, and repeating his embrace, he said, “Sir, it is “with the greatest pleasure—Sir, it is with the “greatest satisfaction—for my whole life—I take “my leave of the most illustrious House of “Austria.”\* The ambassador, who during this strange address had already begun to express his own satisfaction and promise the future favour of his sovereign, was thunderstruck with the malicious unexpected insult; and it required all his firmness to remain and hear the contents of the will, which overthrew the hopes and baffled the plans of his imperial master.

Blecourt retired exultingly to announce the joyful news of the nomination of a french prince, and the same day dispatched an abstract of the will, with which he was instantly supplied by the zealous care of Portocarrero†.

This celebrated testament consisted of fifty-nine articles. The first eleven related to matters of religion and internal government; the twelfth to the succession of the issue of Charles should

\* St. Simon, t. 3, p. 151.

† Duke of Manchester to Vernon. From Cole's Memoirs,

he leave heirs. This served as an introductory clause to the thirteenth and fourteenth articles, which contained the dispositions for the transfer of the monarchy to a new sovereign.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

The will declared Philip duke of Anjou, second son of the dauphin, heir of the whole Spanish monarchy; in case of his death without issue, or accession to the French crown, entailed it on his brother the duke of Berry, on the same condition; next on the archduke Charles, second son of the Emperor, with a similar provision against its union with the Austrian dominions; and finally on the duke of Savoy and his heirs. The testament recommended the immediate successor to espouse one of the archduchesses. Should the new king be a minor or absent, the administration was vested in a junta or council of regency, consisting, as was customary, of the queen as president, and the principal members of the church and state; namely, the primate archbishop of Toledo, cardinal Portocarrero; the inquisitor-general, Don Balthazar de Mendoza; the presidents of Castile and Aragon, Don Manuel Arias, and the duke of Montalto; and the representatives of the grandees and council of state, the counts of Benevente and Frigiliana.

The object of the will was evidently three-fold: to prevent the dismemberment of the

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

spanish monarchy ; to obviate the danger of uniting the two crowns of France and Spain on the same head ; lastly, to preserve the natural order of succession. The choice of a french prince was supported on the principle, that the renunciations of the two infantas, aunt and sister of the testator, were merely intended to prevent the union of the two crowns of France and Spain ; and that danger being obviated by the dispositions of the will, the natural right of succession necessarily took place.

By an article of the testament, and a codicil executed on the 5th of October, a proper maintenance was assigned to the widow queen ; and the successor of the monarchy was enjoined to confide to her the government of the Netherlands or any part of the Italian provinces at her choice ; or, if she preferred remaining in Spain, to grant her the government and jurisdiction of the place where she might establish her residence.\*

The junta of regency instantly assumed the functions of government ; and their first care was to announce to the king of France the decease of their sovereign and the nomination of Philip duke of Anjou. With this communication and a copy of the will, a messenger was dispatched to France ; and he was enjoined, if the testament was refused by the french court, to

\* Ortiz Compendio de la Historia de España, t. 6. Lamberty, t. 1.

proceed to Vienna and offer the succession to the archduke Charles, in conformity with the dispositions of the deceased prince. Meanwhile the change of government was received in Spain with all the national sedateness ; and the people waited with anxiety, though in tranquillity, the decision which was to give them a new sovereign

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

The copy of the will was accompanied with letters from the junta, requesting Louis to acknowledge the new monarch, and send him without delay to take possession of the throne. The king of France had already time to form his resolution on this important occasion ; for he had been regularly acquainted with the progress of the whole transaction, and the intrigues of his partizans ; and recent messengers had arrived from Blecourt at Madrid, and Harcourt on the frontiers, announcing the contents and signature of the will.\*

The court was at Fontainebleau when the Spanish messenger arrived with the communication of the junta. After the solemn professions, and engagements of Louis with the maritime powers, he deemed it necessary to affect some little prudery, in order to justify his conduct in the face of Europe. He therefore declined receiving the Spanish ambassador who

Nov. 9.

\* See the Historical Memoir, on the Testament and Death of Charles.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

was to present the will, till he had taken the advice of his council. This body was accordingly assembled, and consisted of the dauphin, the chancellor Pontchartrain, the duke of Beauvilliers, chief of the council of finance and governor of the duke of Anjou, and the marquis of Torci, secretary of foreign affairs. The question was agitated with the same seriousness, as if it had been a matter of real deliberation. The solitary voice of the duke of Beauvilliers was alone heard in favour of the treaty of partition ; the chancellor with due legal formality contented himself with a simple exposition of the case ; Torci calmly urged the necessity of accepting the will ; and his sentiment was briefly but strongly supported by the dauphin, who after adverting to his own rights, declared that his highest ambition would be gratified by being at once the son and father of a King.\*

Louis, after listening with attention and complacency to these deliberations, affected to concur in the opinion of his son, and announced his resolution to accept the will. He communicated his determination to the spanish embassador in a private audience, and transmitted a speedy answer to the junta.

" The marquis of Castel Rios,† has trans-

\* Torci, t. 1, p. 150—157.—Memoires de St. Simon, v. 3, p. 158.

† The spanish embassador at Paris.

mitted to us the clauses of the testament, which relate to the succession, and the wise dispositions for the government of the kingdom till the arrival or majority of the successor.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

" The sensible grief which we feel for the loss of a prince, whom his excellent qualities, and the strict ties of blood, rendered most dear to us, is infinitely increased by the proofs which he gave us at his death, of his justice and love for his faithful subjects, and the desire he shewed to maintain after his decease the general quiet of Europe and the happiness of his kingdoms. We will on our part contribute to both, answering the confidence he always reposed in us, and conforming ourself to his intentions expressed on the will. All our care henceforth will be to raise, by an inviolable and strict correspondence, the spanish monarchy to the highest pitch of grandeur. We accept in favour of our grandson the duke of Anjou, the will of the deceased Catholic king; our only son the dauphin accepts it also, yielding without any reluctance the just rights of the deceased queen his mother, and our dear spouse, as well as those of the deceased queen our most honour'd lady and mother, which were indisputably acknowledged by the opinion of the several ministers of state and justice, consulted by the deceased king of Spain. Far from reserving to himself any part of the monarchy, he

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

sacrifices his own interest to the desire of re-establishing the antient lustre of a crown, which the will of the late Catholic king, and the voice of his people have unanimously given to our grandson. We will cause the duke of Anjou immediately to depart, that he may the sooner give his subjects the satisfaction of receiving a king, whom they are persuaded God has called to their throne. His first duty ought to be, to cause virtue, justice, and religion to reign with him, and wholly to apply himself to promote the happiness of his people, to raise and maintain the grandeur of so mighty a monarchy, to chuse always, and reward those whom he shall find in a nation so valiant and wise, capable of serving him in his councils and his armies, and the different departments of the church and state. We will instruct him further in what he owes to his subjects so inviolably devoted to their king; and what to his own proper glory. We will enjoin him to remember his birth, to preserve the love of his country, but above all, to maintain for ever that peace and perfect good understanding so necessary to the common happiness of our subjects and of his own, which has always been the principal object of our wishes; and if the misfortunes of past conjunctures have hindered us from making it appear, we are persuaded this great event will so alter the state of

things, that every future day will produce new occasions to shew our esteem and particular good will to the whole Spanish nation."\*

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

This communication was accompanied with a private letter written by Louis himself, acknowledging the services of Portocarrero with the strongest expressions of gratitude and regard, as the person to whom his grandson principally owed his crown. He promised his future protection and aid, and concluded with assurances, that the young sovereign should be guided by his counsels.†

The political farce on the acceptance of the will was acted at Fontainebleau ; but the more pompous part of the representation was reserved for Versailles. The king summoned the dauphin, with his children, the dukes of Burgundy, Anjou and Berry, and the Spanish ambassador, into his cabinet, and briefly addressed the young duke of Anjou : "Sir ; the king of Spain has made you a king. The nobles demand you, the people desire you, and I give my consent. You are going to reign over the greatest monarchy in the world, and over a brave people who have been ever distinguished for their honour and loyalty. I recommend you to love them, and gain their affection by the mildness of your government."

Dec. 16.

\* Oeuvres de Louis XIV. t. 6, p. 31.—State of Europe for 1700.

† St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 59.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

Turning to the ambassador, he added “ Sir, salute your king : ” and the ambassador, kneeling down, expressed his homage in a long compliment.

The folding doors being then thrown open, Louis advanced with that air of majesty which he knew how to assume, and addressed the courtly crowd. “ Sirs,” he said, “ behold the king of Spain : his birth and the will of the late monarch have called him to the throne. The whole Spanish nation demand him ; it is the decree of Heaven, and I yield to it with pleasure.” Again directing his speech to the young prince, he continued, “ Be a good Spaniard ; this is your first duty. But remember that you were born a Frenchman to maintain the union between the two crowns. You will thus render both nations happy, and preserve the peace of Europe.”\*

The young prince immediately received the customary honours of royalty, with the congratulations of his family and the court : and the short interval before his departure was employed by Louis in preparing him for the duties of his new station.

Repeated solicitations from the regency announced the impatience of the nation to hail their new monarch, and expatiated on the danger

\* St. Simon.

of giving time to the austrian adherents to recover from their surprise and consternation ; and Philip was publicly proclaimed at Madrid as soon as the acceptance of the will was notified. These representations induced Louis to hasten his departure.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

On the fourth of January the new sovereign departed from a court which he was never more to revisit. He had a long conference with his grandfather, and afterwards attended the solemn celebration of mass, with the whole royal family, amidst a vast concourse of spectators. After this ceremony, the royal party quitted Paris in the same carriage, with a cavalcade unusually numerous, and proceeded through applauding multitudes to Sceaux, which was destined as the place of separation. At taking their last leave, the force of nature overbore all the dictates and forms of policy, and the parting was long, affecting, and tender, accompanied with tears and expressions of mutual sorrow.

At the moment of separation Louis presented the princes of the royal house to Philip with the memorable address. "Behold," he said, "the princes of my blood and of yours. The two nations should consider themselves but as one ; they ought to have the same interests ; and therefore I hope that these princes will be as much attached to you as to me. Henceforward

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

there will be no Pyrenees." Words which announced to Europe the alarming effects to be expected from the union of these two great monarchies in the same family.

After a short retirement to calm their emotion, Louis returned to Versailles, and the dauphin repaired to Meudon. Philip took the route to Spain, accompanied by his two brothers till he reached his own frontier. Their progress was marked with all the honours which a loyal nation could pay to the grandson of its sovereign, and to a prince who added the lustre of a second crown to the splendour of the House of Bourbon. The royal party descended the Garonne in magnificent barges to Bourdeaux, where the constable of Castile, deputed as extraordinary ambassador from the new government to Louis, presented his respects and homage to his future sovereign. From hence they proceeded by Bayonne and St. Jean de Luz, and took leave of each other in the Isle of Pheasants, that memorable spot where the treaty was executed with such solemnity, which was to exclude the House of Bourbon for ever from Spain, but which now witnessed the breach of that solemn engagement.\*

Here all the french took their departure,

\* Memoires de Torci, t. 1.—St. Simon, t. 3, p. 150—172.—Larrey, t. 7.

except the duke of Harcourt, the marquis de Louville, and the count d'Ayen ; and the young monarch, on the limits of his new kingdom, was surrounded by a splendid suite of spanish courtiers, who conveyed him in a magnificent barge across the Bidassoa.

CHAP. I.  
1700—1701.

It is a singular proof of the nature of the government and the situation and temper of the people, to observe, that amidst all this splendour, the royal equipage was not only deficient in magnificence, but even in convenience ; and that the king received only 1,000 pistoles for his journey, while 12,000 had been granted at the same moment to the constable ambassador. Curiosity, respect, and affection, in some degree, compensated for this deficiency ; for in every part of his passage he was greeted by exulting and admiring crowds, who were captivated by his youth and animated countenance, which formed a pleasing contrast to the premature decrepitude and doleful appearance of the deceased sovereign.

During his journey he followed the injunction which he had received from Louis, to take an opportunity of discarding the widow queen. The pretext for her dismission was furnished by a quarrel between her and the leading members of the junta. To her complaints Philip returned a cold and formal answer. “ Some persons,”

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

he observed, “ having attempted by different methods to disturb the good intelligence which I hope to maintain with your majesty, I deem it necessary for the quiet of both that you should quit the court till I have investigated the matter. I have given orders that you shall be treated with all due respect ; you shall receive the dowry assigned to you by the late king, and you have my permission to chuse any town of Spain for your residence.” She lingered for some time, but the continual mortifications which she received from Portocarrero drove her to Toledo before Philip reached the capital.

Philip arrived at Madrid on the 18th of February, but as the preparations for his public assumption of the government were not completed, he took up his temporary residence at the palace of Buen Retiro. On the 21st of April he made a triumphal entry, with a magnificence calculated to flatter a chivalrous and high spirited nation, and to display all the splendour of a crown esteemed by its subjects the most powerful in the whole christian world.\*

The eyes of Spain and of Europe were turned to the young king, who was to form the commencement of a new dynasty, and whose

\* Ortiz.—*Memoires de St. Philippe*, v. 1, p. 50—85.—Larrey *Histoire de Louis XIV.* v. 7, p. 305—374.—Targe *Histoire de l'Avenement de la Maison de Bourbon au Trone d'Espagne*. T. 1, *passim*.—Desormeaux *Hist. d'Espagne*, t. 5, p. 201, &c.

accession was a new æra in the political history of modern times. Philip had just entered the seventeenth year of his age, and at a time when the ardour and petulance of youth exert their full force, was of so sedate or so docile a character, as to justify the remark of his governor the duke of Beauvilliers, that his royal pupil had never given him a moment of uneasiness or contradiction. With this pliant disposition, bred up in a bigotted and monotonous court, where every thing bore the stamp of submission, and bent before the nod of the great monarch, Philip had learnt to regard the person and will of his grandfather with a respect almost bordering on adoration. He had imbibed also a deep and awful sense of religion, and in his whole conduct and deportment displayed a moral purity and scrupulous decorum, which are rarely found in courts. A slight deformity of person was compensated by his prepossessing countenance ; but he was stiff in his manners, and his good qualities were concealed by extreme timidity, and ignorance of the world. The difficulties and dangers of his situation were too mighty even for a prince of superior capacity and maturer age ; and therefore, as the defects of his character were known, every precaution was necessary to watch over and direct his conduct.

As the primary object of Louis was not a

CHAP. I.  
1700—1701.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

mere disinterested regard for the elevation of his grandson, but a desire to exclude a hostile family, and employ the power, resources, and territories of Spain for the aggrandizement of his own kingdom, the means and persons who were to direct the movements, and fashion the character of Philip, were all adapted to the attainment of this end. The first instructions given by the monarch to his pupil and grandson, amidst much trifling and common place advice, contain the outlines of that system which time and events were to mature and complete.

“ Fail in none of your duties, especially towards God. Preserve yourself in the same purity as you have been educated. Promote the honour of God wherever you have power, seek his glory, and give an example; this is one of the greatest benefits which kings can confer.

“ Declare always for virtue and against vice.

“ Have no attachment to any person.

“ Love your wife, live well with her, ask such a one of God as will suit you. I do not think you should take an austrian.

“ Love the spaniards, and all the subjects attached to your crown and person. Prefer not those who flatter you most, esteem those who for your good hazard your displeasure; these are your true friends.

“ Cultivate the happiness of your subjects,

and for this cause enter into no war except compelled, and after having well considered and weighed the motives of it in your council.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

“ Endeavour to restore your finances ; watch over your Indies and your fleets ; remember commerce ; live in a close union with France ; *nothing being so advantageous for our two powers as an union which nothing can resist.*”

“ If you are compelled to make war, head your armies. Endeavour to re-establish your troops every where, and commence with those of Flanders.

“ Never quit your business for your pleasure, but lay down rules to yourself which will give you time for liberty and recreation.

“ There is none more innocent than the chace, and a taste for a country residence, provided they lead you not into too great an expence.

“ Give great attention to business when you are spoken to ; at first listen much without deciding.

“ When you have acquired more knowledge, recollect that it is your business to decide, but whatever may be your experience, listen always to the advice and arguments of your council before you come to a decision.

“ Do every thing that is possible to discern the persons of most consideration, in order to employ them on proper occasions.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

“ Endeavour to employ spaniards as viceroys and governors.

“ Treat all well, say nothing unpleasant to any, but distinguish persons of quality and merit.

“ Shew your gratitude to the late king and those who were inclined to chuse you as his successor.

“ Place great confidence in cardinal Portocarrero, and testify to him your approbation of his past conduct.

“ I think you ought to do something considerable for the ambassador who has been so fortunate as to demand you, and to salute you first in quality of subject.

“ Do not forget Bedmar,\* who is a man of merit, and capable of serving you.

“ Place an entire confidence on the duke of Harcourt, he is a man of talents and probity, and will only advise you for your own sake.

“ Keep all the french in due order.

“ Treat your domestics well, but not with too much familiarity, and still less with confidence; employ them while they are prudent, dismiss them on the slightest fault, and never support them against the spaniards.

“ Have no intercourse with the queen dowager more than you can avoid; contrive that she may

\* Deputy governor of the Low Countries.

quit Madrid, but not retire from Spain. Wherever she may be, observe her conduct, and prevent her from interfering in any business ; suspect those who have too much intercourse with her.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

“ Love your relations, recollect their concern at losing you ; maintain an intimate connection with them both in important and little matters ; ask of us what you want or desire to have, which you do not find in Spain ; we will do the same towards you.

“ Never forget that you are a frenchman, and that which may happen to you.\* When you have children to secure the succession of Spain, go to Naples and Sicily, pass to Milan, and come into Flanders. This will be an opportunity to see each other again. Meanwhile visit Catalonia, Aragon, and other places ; see what is to be done for Ceuta.

“ Throw some money to the people when you are in Spain, and particularly on entering Madrid.

“ Do not appear to be struck with strange figures ; beware of ridiculing them ; each country has its own manners ; you will be soon accustomed to what at first appears the most surprising.

\* This hint doubtless alluded to the possibility of his being called to the french crown.

CHAP. 1.  
1700—1701.

"Avoid as much as possible conferring favours on those who give money to obtain them. Give at proper times liberally, and receive few presents, except trifles. If you cannot decline them, make more considerable ones in return, after an interval of a few days."

"Have a casket to hold particular things, and keep the keys yourself."

"I end with one of the most important precepts which I can give you. Suffer not yourself to be governed; be master; have neither favourite nor prime minister. Listen, consult your council, but decide. God, who has made you a king, will give you the necessary knowledge while you are guided by good intentions."\*

Philip literally obeyed these instructions. He placed his full confidence in Portocarrero; he suffered him to assume the power of forming the new ministry, of gratifying his personal or political antipathies, and filling at his pleasure all offices and appointments of state; and from the commencement of his reign Philip was the king of a party and the vassal of France, to whom he principally owed his crown.

\* It is evident that this precept was intended as a caution against being governed by Spaniards; while the conduct of the French court, and other precepts in these famous instructions, shew the purpose of France to appropriate the direction of affairs. These instructions are preserved in the *Memoires de Noailles*, v. 2, p. 4, 11.—and *Oeuvres de Louis XIV.* t. 2, p. 460.

## CHAPTER THE SECOND.

1700—1701.

*Means adopted by Louis to establish Philip in the possession of the spanish territories—Alliances with Portugal and Savoy—Communication and apology to king William and the dutch—Sentiments of the maritime powers—Occupation of the Netherlands by the french troops—Holland and England acknowledge Philip—Magnanimous conduct of the emperor Leopold—Prepares for war in Italy—Internal situation of Spain—Domingue spirit of Portocarrero—Causes and rise of the discontents against the new government—Disordered state of the country in regard to the police, finance, military and naval establishments—Financial reforms of Portocarrero—Misconduct of the french—Nomination of Orri to the direction of the finances—Demands for the convocation of the Cortes.*

**M E A N W H I L E** Louis had taken every imaginable precaution to prevent opposition on the part of the other powers of Europe, and to secure the acknowledgment of Philip in the Netherlands and in Italy. He had found means to gain the prince of Vaudemont, governor of the Milanese, though an austrian subject, and recommended by the king of England as a confidential general, whose assistance might contribute to secure that duchy for the House of Austria; he was equally successful with the duke of Popoli, viceroy of Naples, who owed his

CHAP. 2.

1700—1701.

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CHAP. 2. appointment to a similar motive; and he was  
1700—1701. assured of the fidelity of the elector of Bavaria,  
who exercised the government of the Netherlands. Philip was accordingly proclaimed in  
the exterior provinces with the same tranquillity  
as at Madrid.

Louis, however, was fully convinced that he could never pacify the emperor and the maritime powers, nor quiet the alarms which they justly conceived at the addition of the Spanish monarchy, to the overgrown power of France. As he foresaw, therefore, that the possession of the Spanish crown must ultimately depend on the decision of arms, he had spared no pains to commence a contest with advantage, even before the death of Charles; and he hoped by a prompt and vigorous effort to bring it to a speedy and successful issue. He had gradually collected a powerful army on the Spanish frontier; and the Duke of Harcourt, possessing the advantage of local knowledge and connections, was intrusted with the command, with orders to seize the frontier places, Pampeluna, Fuentarabia, and St. Sebastian; and force a way into the peninsula, should there be the slightest doubt of a peaceable submission to Philip. To maintain the internal tranquillity, and cut off all direct support of the disaffected, Louis by threats and promises prevailed on the King of Portugal

to acknowledge the new sovereign, and conclude an alliance with the House of Bourbon.

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

He at the same time secured an entrance into Italy by negotiating a marriage between Philip and a princess of Savoy, and by promising the duke the supreme command of the army which was to act in Italy. He likewise obtained permission to introduce a french garrison into Mantua, the citadel of Lombardy, and the key of the principal military passage from Germany.

But it was against the maritime powers and the emperor that he employed the best combined and profoundest precautions. As Holland and the Netherlands formed the connecting link between England and Austria, and as security on that vulnerable quarter of his empire would enable him to pour his principal force into Germany and Italy, he exerted all the resources of his policy to become master of the Netherlands, which opened a way into Holland, and gave him a valuable extent of coast on the channel. With this view he had secretly tampered with the elector of Bavaria, and even before the death of the late king had obtained his nomination to the government of the Netherlands, and had stationed an army on the frontier ready to invade them at the first signal.

It will be sufficient barely to mention that he was assured of deriving the usual advantages

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701. from the support of the electors and princes of the Rhine ; that he fomented the incurable jealousy of the german states against the emperor, and was secretly favoured by many who hoped to profit by times of confusion, and only waited for an opportunity to sell their services on the most advantageous terms.

He did not however so far despise public opinion as to suffer his glaring violation of the most solemn engagements to appear without justification. He notified in form the accession of Philip to the states of Europe ; and in particular he addressed a private letter written with his own hand to William, whom he had duped and betrayed to the last moment, by declaring that he would abide by the treaty of partition whatever might be the disposition of the king of Spain. This artful and plausible apology contained the substance of the arguments which he advanced on this memorable occasion. He justified his acceptance of the will by declaring that the treaty of partition was not calculated to answer the view with which it had been concluded, the maintenance of public tranquillity. It had, he urged, been rejected by the emperor, one of the principal parties, and was scarcely approved even by those who were eager for its ratification. The english and dutch had expressed strong dissatisfaction with its general

tenour, and in particular with the union of Naples and Sicily to France, as highly detrimental to their commerce. If he had rejected the will, the whole succession would have instantly devolved on the archduke Charles; who was eager to accept it ; and the spaniards were so unanimously determined to oppose the dismemberment of their monarchy, that it would be necessary to extort their acquiescence by force. Hence a war must have been undertaken not only to wrest the crown from the archduke, supported by the whole spanish nation, but to secure the share of the dauphin, and to fulfil the other provisions of the treaty. The quota of ships to be supplied by the maritime powers, would not suffice for this purpose ; and it was doubtful whether they would incur additional expence, or furnish a more effectual support. The treaty of partition, he added, was more advantageous for France than the acceptance of the will ; and therefore he hoped and trusted that the same good understanding would continue to subsist between him and the maritime powers, and that he should not incur blame by adhering to the spirit, rather than the letter of the treaty ; because the acceptance of the will tended more to the maintenance of the general peace, and obviated that danger to the balance

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

CHAP. 2. of power, which would have resulted from a  
1700—1701. partition.

A similar apology was at the same time addressed to the dutch, accompanied by a letter to the french ambassador the count de Briord, in which the same arguments are repeated, and accompanied by suggestions calculated to raise disunion between the maritime powers and Austria.

" You will speak in the same manner to the pensionary as to the english ambassador. Shew him that, as the emperor is not engaged, there can be no security for the execution of the treaty. And truly this embarrassment would never have occurred, if the king of England and the States General had strongly pressed the emperor to sign, instead of flattering him with secret hopes that he would not be forced to comply ; if they had taken more active measures towards the duke of Savoy ; if they had acted with better faith in causing the princes of the north and of the empire to enter into the guaranty ; finally, if they had settled in time the aids necessary for the execution of the treaty.

" But we must not yet reproach them ; it will suffice to speak to the pensionary as I mark to you in this letter ; and to follow the sense of the memorial. You may even shew him this paper without leaving a copy.

" You will inform the Spanish ambassador at the Hague that I enjoin you to communicate the orders you have received, to him. The zeal which he has always shewn for the service of his sovereign, leaves me no reason to doubt that he will join with you and give you all the necessary information for the good of the Spanish monarchy. Assure him that I have at present nothing in view but to maintain its perfect integrity in all its parts ; communicate to him also the copy of my answer to the council of regency."\*

Such flimsy apologies were not however sufficient to pacify the resentment of William, nor to dissipate the alarms of both the maritime powers ; lest the accession of Philip should furnish an opportunity for the usurpation of the Spanish Netherlands by France. The correspondence of William, with his friend the pensionary, displays his feeling under the impression of the moment, and shews his motives for concluding the treaties of partition, which were long considered as the reproach of his policy.†

The unexpected tenor of the Spanish testament, and the foresight and promptitude of Louis, struck a temporary panic into the principal courts of Europe. In England he found a violent and

\* Oeuvres de Louis XIV. t. 6, p. 37.

† See this interesting Series of Letters in Lord Hardwicke's collection of State Papers, vol. 2. particularly that in p. 293, written immediately after the acceptance of the testament.

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

clamorous faction ready to aid his views, re-echoing his fallacious arguments, drowning all consideration of honour or policy with the cry of peace, and baffling all the attempts of William to rouse the people to a sense of their danger.

In Holland the dread of impending ruin excited an unanimous sentiment of indignation against France. Preparations were made for hostilities; and subsidiary alliances concluded with Denmark, the elector Palatine, and several of the german states. But Louis had too perfectly matured his schemes to give time for this spirit to acquire strength and consistence. By the connivance of the elector of Bavaria he introduced his army into the Netherlands; he surprised all the frontier fortresses, and captured 15,000 dutch troops by whom they were garrisoned in virtue of the barrier treaty with Spain. With this advantage, it was not difficult to negotiate with a rich and timid nation. The fear of an immediate invasion, and an anxiety to liberate the captured troops, extorted from the dutch government an acknowledgment of Philip as sovereign of the whole spanish monarchy. The parliament and nation of England constrained William to follow this example.

In the midst of this universal submission, the emperor alone displayed a spirit worthy of a powerful and enlightened sovereign. Leopold

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

was confounded at the bequest of Charles, which he confidently expected would prove in favour of the archduke Charles ; but he expressed his indignation with more vehemence than seemed congenial with his character ; and his resentment was rapidly communicated to his subjects, who respected his dignified feeling, and shared in his disappointment.

He issued a bold and vehement remonstrance against the usurpation of the Spanish monarchy by a French prince, and at once questioned the authenticity of the will itself, and the right of the deceased monarch to make a disposition contrary to the acknowledged claims of his family and the solemn obligation of treaties. The imperial ambassador, Harrach, after presenting this protest, immediately withdrew from Madrid.

The court of Vienna made vigorous preparations to bring the dispute to the test of arms. Levies took place in every part of the hereditary dominions, and ministers were dispatched to rouse the maritime powers and the princes of the empire. As Italy was considered the only theatre where Austria could contend with France on equal terms, troops were collected in the Trentin and the neighbouring districts ; and emissaries sent to form an imperial party in the Milanese, to excite an insurrection in Naples, and to prepare the way for the military operations. Al-

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

though these efforts failed in their immediate effect, yet the emperor confided in their eventual success. He was encouraged also by the rising discontents in Spain, and the secret suggestions of William and the dutch ; he hoped by a bold and fortunate effort to dissipate the general alarm, and rouse the other powers of Europe to a sense of their honour and interest.\*

Meanwhile the internal situation of Spain began to attract the attention of the different powers who were likely to be involved in the impending conflict. Portocarrero had actively employed the interval since the accession of Philip to strengthen his influence, and disgrace those whom he either feared or disliked, under the pretext of partiality to the cause of Austria. Besides the forced retreat of the widow queen, he had induced Philip to confirm the exile of Oropesa, procured the disgrace of the grand inquisitor, deprived the admiral of Castile of his office of mayor domo mayor, in favour of the duke of Medina Sidonia, and repulsed all his overtures for an accommodation with the new government. He transferred the different provinces to his creatures or flatterers, and particularly that of Catalonia, from the prince of Darmstadt to his nephew, the count of Palma. He urged Philip to exile many of the grandees who

\* History of the House of Austria, vol. 1, ch. 68.

were obnoxious to his power, and he did not disdain to comprise in his list of proscriptions, the confessors of the late king, and of the widow queen. Lastly, he extended his system of patronage over every department, and placed his dependent ecclesiastics in situations for which their acquirements and character were totally unfit. On this subject Louville sarcastically observed to Torcy, "Remember you will have priests proposed for the presidency of Castile. We have a priest governor of Mexico, and one aged seventy, who conducts our commerce at Seville, with the success which you see. As the presidencies of the councils become vacant, priests will be proposed to fill them, and I do not despair of seeing a similar nomination to the command of armies and fleets, when we have them."\*

CHAP. 2.

1700—1701.

Although the accession of Philip had been unexpectedly tranquil, a spirit of opposition soon manifested itself against the new government. While Portocarrero was giving the reins to his ambition and vengeance, the french king was employed with equal activity to consolidate and extend his influence, by a change in the general system of administration. Under the austrian sovereigns the operations of the government had been conducted by the respective councils or

\* Mémoires de Noailles, t. 2, p. 180.

CHAP. 2.  
1701—1701.

boards of Castile, War, Finance, the Indies, Marine, Grace, and Justice ; and the chiefs of these boards formed a species of cabinet council, called the *Universal Despacho*. This body however was not assembled in the presence of the king ; but the real organ of the sovereign will, and consequently the prime minister of Spain, if we may use the term, was the principal secretary of the Despacho, whose office was to register the result of its deliberations, submit it to the king, and announce the royal pleasure. The person who now filled this office was Ubilla, who acted so important a part in the arrangement of the late testament.

A native Spaniard, who possessed all the advantages attached to this office, under a young and inexperienced sovereign, could not fail of becoming the real spring of the government. To obviate the danger, Portocarrero and the president of Castile were admitted into the royal presence, when the secretary of the Despacho made his reports, and soon afterwards it was proposed to extend the same privilege to Harcourt, the French ambassador. Louis, either confiding in the attachment of the cardinal, or willing to shew the appearance of disinterestedness, affected to decline the proposal ; but his prudery was overcome by the repeated instances of Portocarrero, and the conviction, that without this

expedient, no human contrivance could prevent the government from becoming purely spanish.\*

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

In the first novelty of a new reign the whole court, and a considerable part of the nation, vied in their adulation of the french monarch. Portocarrero and Arias hailed him as the regenerator of Spain ; he was requested to repair to Madrid, and assume the administration in person ; and he was respectfully informed that the air of the country would produce a salutary effect on his health, while, in the present tranquil state of Europe, he might govern France by means of messengers. The same language of servility was heard in all quarters : the inhabitants of Burgos in particular, humbly requested that he would honour them with a visit in the spring, when their bulls were in high spirit, that they might gratify him with the national solemnity of a bull-feast.†

Louis received this torrent of flattery with pleasantry, observing that the spaniards had constituted him prime minister to his grandson. But notwithstanding his deep knowledge of human nature, and perfect acquaintance with court homage, it produced the effect of deceiving him, as well as his ministers, into the notion that he could exercise the same absolute sway in Spain

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 31.—St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 80.

† Memoires de Noailles, t. 2, p. 35.

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1700—1701.

as in his own kingdom. On the other hand, the sanguine expectations which the nation had formed of the wisdom, perfection, and energy, of the new government, were too extravagant to be realised; and it was the just remark of the shrewd Louville, that even should an angel descend from Heaven to take the reins, the public hopes must be disappointed in the existing state of Spain, gangrened as it is from one extremity to the other.\*

The police and internal government were sunk into the most deplorable disorder. Even in the very capital itself, the neglect or incapacity of past governments had given the reins to every species of licentiousness. The palaces of the grandes, and even the churches, were become the asylum of crimes; the slightest rise in the price of provisions excited the deepest alarm; every street and square was filled with armed vagabonds, discarded domestics, people without occupation or means of subsistence; the establishments destined to maintain the respect due to royalty were sunk into a mere empty form, and all the dignity of the crown had not been sufficient to preserve the late monarch from the most mortifying insults both to his person and authority.

Similar disorder reigned in the finances. The

\* Memoires de Noailles, t. 2. p. 50.

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royal revenues were absorbed by the servants of government, or the farmers and agents on whom its necessities reduced it to depend for supplies ; and at the same time, the people, both in the capital and provinces, were loaded with every species of monopoly and extortion. The vast revenues of the new world were still worse administered ; the viceroys and governors, after defrauding the crown and oppressing the subject, were suffered to return from their governments, and enjoy with impunity the fruits of their peculation and venality.

The crown was thus not only robbed of its splendour, but reduced to inconceivable penury. The same difficulties occurred in raising ten pistoles as ten thousand ; the salaries of the royal household were unpaid ; the pay of the troops was in constant arrears, and the royal guards were often reduced to share with mendicants the charitable donations of convents and hospitals.\*

Wretched as was the internal situation of Spain, the naval and military establishments were equally deplorable.

The two treaties contracted with Portugal and Savoy, which were intended to secure the throne and maintain tranquillity, were the principal causes of her ruin, from the imprudent security which they inspired. Hence both the frontiers

\* Memoires de Noailles, t. 2. p. 63, 68.

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1700—1701.

and distant provinces were neglected. No care had been employed to fortify the frontiers of Andalusia, Valencia, and Catalonia, justly considered as the keys of the peninsula. As if there had been no prospect of war, these provinces were without garrisons and magazines ; the fortifications dilapidated, even the breaches which Vendome had made in the former siege of Barcelona were not repaired, and from Roses to Cadiz scarcely a single fort or castle was garrisoned or mounted with artillery. The same negligence prevailed in the ports of Galicia and Biscay ; the magazines were without ammunition ; the arsenals and work-shops empty ; the art of constructing ships was lost ; the royal navy consisted only of those armed vessels which were employed in the trade to South America, and a few gallions ; six gallies, decayed with age, were anchored in the bay of Carthagena, and seven were kept in the ports of the genoese territory. The distant provinces were equally defenceless. In Naples were only six complete companies, in Sicily 500 men, scarcely 300 in Sardinia and the Balearic Isles ; and in the Netherlands and Milan, the countries the best provided against an attack, were no more than 8,000 troops in the former, and 6,000 in the latter.

The militia appeared only on the muster roll,

M. 1701

and were inexperienced and undisciplined, and the peasantry were alone obliged to provide themselves with muskets. The whole army did not exceed 20,000 men.\*

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

Thus totally ruined within, and unprovided for war without, it was evident that the preservation of the crown must solely depend on the exertions of Louis, and the measures which were necessary to attain this object, soon dissipated the fallacious hopes inspired by the accession of a new dynasty.

To make a merit of zeal for the public service, and to supply the deficiency in the revenue, many places and offices in the royal household were suppressed by Portocarrero, and among the rest, the number of gentlemen of the bed-chamber was reduced from forty-two to six. He likewise abolished various offices in the treasury, and the different tribunals and councils. But these reforms were more specious than real; for the whole saving did not amount to 200,000 crowns, while it involved numerous families in embarrassment or ruin. The reform was therefore too contracted to produce any essential utility, and too general not to alienate numbers attached by interest to the government, besides weakening the bond of union, which connected numerous branches of the inferior nobility with the throne;

\* *Memoires de St. Philippe*, t. 1. p. 101—103.

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

and the biographer of Philip justly observes; “from this period the nobles began to assume more independence, and to be less under the controul of the court.”\*

In this career of reform, the sweeping hand of Portocarrero did not spare even the pensions which the piety of former sovereigns had granted for the subsistence of poor widows, and the maintenance of charitable institutions. To complete the series of these obnoxious defalcations, the soldiers, far from being won over to the new government by the usual graces, not only derived no benefit from the change of sovereigns, but saw even the regular payment of their scanty pittance suspended. Such impolitic parsimony damped the sanguine hopes of a people who expected that the accession of a new dynasty would be marked by a profusion of benefits, and who flattered themselves that their country would resume all its pristine splendour without sweeping away those abuses and incumbrances which had been accumulating for ages.

The pride and dignity of the Spanish nation were deeply wounded by an order which imparted to the peers of France the same rank and honours as were enjoyed by the grandees of Castile; and it required all the influence and even the threats of Philip to extort the acquies-

\* St. Philippe.

cence of his high spirited nobles in this odious measure.

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1700—1701.

The dissatisfaction of the natives was aggravated by the petulance of ridicule, and by the eagerness of the french to domineer in the trivial concerns of customs, manners, and fashions ; by the reform of the royal kitchen, and the introduction of french cookery ; the occasional use of the french costume, and the abrogation of many parts of the antient etiquette. The impression which these trifling innovations made on a people bigotted to their own usages, will appear from an incident which occurred during the preparations for the marriage.

Philip ordered the marquis of Villafranca, to whose department the direction of such matters belonged, to deliver to a french upholsterer the tapestry, hangings, and other ornaments used on this occasion. The rigid spaniard did not suffer his devotion to France to outweigh his national prejudices. He refused compliance, and to the remonstrances of the upholsterer, replied “ we must live in Spain, as they do in Spain ;” and nothing but a new and positive order from the king could induce him to obey.\*

The change of sovereigns led to other mischiefs, which all the vigilance of the french court was in vain exerted to prevent. On the

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 192.

CHAP. 2. accession of a french prince, Madrid was crowded  
 1700—1701. with swarms of frenchmen, of the most despicable,  
 and abandoned characters, who were eager to  
 gather the fruits of the promised land. Whole  
 tribes of harlots, swindlers, gamesters, pick-  
 pockets, and projectors, allured thither by the  
 lucre of gain, vilified by their infamous con-  
 duct their native country, and gave new force  
 to that odium which had hitherto operated  
 as an insuperable barrier between the two  
 nations.\*

The seeds of rebellion were diffused, and the  
 public grievances aggravated by the fanaticism  
 of the clergy. The priests abused the sacred  
 office of confession to excite discontent, the  
 french were stigmatised as heretics, those who  
 were connected with them were accused of irre-  
 ligion, and even the authority of the pope was  
 falsely employed to give new strength to the  
 pretensions of an austrian prince.†

All these causes contributed to excite discon-  
 tent in a nation wedded to antient establishments,  
 and proud of former magnificence. But the  
 general odium was still further aggravated by  
 the appointment of a frenchman to the manage-  
 ment of the finances. As Portocarrero was  
 himself unequal to the task of new modelling the  
 revenue, Louis, at the instigation of the council,

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 142. † Ibid. p. 121.

sent Orri, a man of obscure birth, who in a subordinate branch of the finances in France had acquired a superior knowledge of political œconomy. He had first emerged into notice in a situation similar to that of our excisemen. He afterwards became steward to the duchess of Portsmouth, and being dismissed returned to his original situation in the excise. Possessing great acuteness and activity, he found means to render himself useful to some of the farmers general, was employed in several commissions of great delicacy, which he fulfilled to the satisfaction of his superiors, and finally attracted the notice and obtained the patronage of the minister Chamil-lart. His knowledge and talents were duly appreciated, and it was hoped that his native obscurity would shield him from the jealousy of Portocarrero and the princess Orsini. He was therefore selected as a proper person to investigate the spanish finances, and form the plan for a new system of administration. But had it been possible for any foreigner to become popular in so odious an office, the requisite qualities were not found in Orri. Though servile and officious to those on whom he depended, he was haughty and imperious to others, of an irritable and impetuous temper, and ignorant of the manners, prejudices, and feelings of the spanish people.

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The new minister proposed extensive reforms both in the nature and perception of the revenue, and endeavoured to model it on that of France, with a precipitancy and want of address or discretion ill calculated to conciliate the unbending firmness of the Spanish character. This abrupt attempt to lay the axe at once to the root of all abuses, gave great offence to every class of the nation ; and the clamour was heightened by his plans for resuming the fiefs extorted by the nobles from the crown in times of trouble and confusion. The nobles imperiously demanded the convocation of the cortes of Castile, the only legitimate assembly which could authorise these innovations, and as an additional argument, they urged the necessity of exchanging the customary pledges between the monarch and the people, by the confirmation of the national privileges on one side, and the oath of allegiance on the other. The demand was supported by the more independent members of the cabinet ; and loudly re-echoed by the people, who looked with peculiar confidence and affection to this neglected assembly. A proposal to convene a body, which had essentially curbed the royal authority, embarrassed the king and his personal friends and adherents. It was referred to Louis, but he prudently declined interfering, and Philip, after long deliberation, endeavoured to evade it by

declaring that the journey which he was about to make to Catalonia to receive his bride, rendered it necessary to defer the convocation till after his return. But this promise, though given with all the publicity of a royal decree, scarcely sufficed to allay the national impatience.\*

CHAP. 2.  
1700—1701.

\* Ortiz Compendio de la Historia de España, t. 7, ch. 3.—  
Memoires de St. Philippe—Mem. de Noailles, *passim*.—  
Mem. de St. Simon, t. 11, p. 90.

## CHAPTER THE THIRD.

1701.

*Discordant characters of Portocarrero and Arias—New members introduced into the cabinet council—Increasing embarrassments and indolence of Philip—Count Marsin appointed new ambassador in consequence of the illness of Harcourt—His instructions—Philip departs from Madrid—The administration intrusted in his absence to Portocarrero—Philip meets his bride at Figueras—Character of the young queen—Dismission of her piedmontese adherents—Jealous precautions of the french court—Louis exhorts Philip not to be governed by his queen.*

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THE characters and conduct of the two principal ministers, Portocarrero and Arias, contributed to aggravate the difficulties of Philip.

Portocarrero, proud of his important services to the House of Bourbon, grasped at all the power of the state, and deemed no reward too great for his merits. Though an adroit intriguer, and versed in all the arts of petty cunning, he was slow in the transaction of business, and inexperienced in the great duties of government; yet he was presumptuous and opiniative, stern and supercilious, when he had no personal interest to consult; supple and fawning when he hoped or feared. Jealous of his ascendancy, he secluded the king in the interior of the palace,

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inspired him with distrust of the nobles, whom he represented as enemies of the royal authority, and filled him with the constant dread of being treated as a dignified slave, like Charles the second. He at the same time employed his artifices with equal success among the nobles ; and widened the distance between them and the court, by inspiring them with a similar jealousy of the person and power of the sovereign. His flattery of the king of France was in the highest degree extravagant ; and he eagerly proposed or supported every measure which appeared agreeable to the court of Versailles, however contrary to the interests or prejudices of his country. Yet with the same selfish spirit which directed his actions in other instances, he no sooner perceived the revival of the national antipathy to foreigners, than he began to complain of being overruled by orders from Versailles, and threw on the french councils and nation the odium which he had excited by his own rigour and servility.

Don Manuel Arias, president of the council of Castile, possessed more intelligence and capacity for business than Portocarrero, but was equally stern and unconciliating. He was originally a knight of Malta ; and at the age of fifty was prompted, by lucre or ambition, to assume the clerical habit. He had been recently

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appointed archbishop of Seville ; but the proud fame of Ximenes had not ceased to present a temptation to spanish prelates ; and Arias looked forward to the time when he hoped to unite the roman purple with the primacy of Spain and the high office of Grand Inquisitor. Harsh and overbearing to inferiors, he surpassed even Portocarrero in servility to those from whom he hoped for advancement. His language on the prerogative of a spanish monarch assumed the florid colouring of eastern adulation. "God," he said, "had placed Philip at the head of a government not only monarchical but more despotic than any other christian kingdom ; even the right of remonstrance not belonging to his subjects without his permission. The cardinal archbishop of Toledo," he added, "had but one guardian angel to direct him, but to every king two tutelary angels were assigned, one for their private conduct, and one more able for the government of their states." By the illumination derived from this guardian spirit, he inferred, "that any king, though of the most moderate capacity, must be more capable of governing than the ablest minister."\*

Two men of such characters, and influenced by rival interests, could not long act together with cordiality. Accordingly they were soon

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 71.

involved in disputes and jealousies, and never united except to promote a common interest, or to ruin a common enemy. The pressure of affairs, and still more the hope of throwing on others a share of the public odium, induced them both to propose the admission of two additional members into the junta of government. Their choice proved the motives of the appointment, for these were the superannuated marquis of Mancera, and the duke of Montalto, a character equally inefficient.

In the midst of these embarrassments the temper and constitution of Philip began to change, and he sunk under the weight of difficulties too great for the strength of an ordinary capacity at so early an age. He, who at his first arrival in Spain had been lauded for his industry, capacity, and intelligence,\* now fell into the extreme of inattention and indolence. He no longer observed regular and early hours ; but indulged himself in midnight suppers, and on the ensuing days kept the members of the council in waiting whole hours for his appearance, at a time when the most urgent business was depending. It was justly said of him, “ he goes to council because he must go ; and in coming out, forgets what has passed there ; he keeps letters of business whole days unopened, and never speaks of

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 43. *Memoires de St. Philippe*, t. 1, p. 85.

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them." The example of the monarch produced a similar effect on his counsellors ; and a grandee who had presented a memorial in succession to the king, the leading ministers, and the french ambassador, said, with as much wit as justice, " What a government is ours ! a king who speaks not ; a cardinal who listens not ; a president of Castile who can not, and a french ambassador who will not."\*

All attempts to rouse Philip failing of success, the council had recourse to Louis, and intreated him to recommend to his grandson the same punctuality with which he regulated his own time, and transacted the business of France. Louis accordingly made frequent and urgent remonstrances ; but the seproduced only a temporary effect, for after a momentary struggle, while the remonstrance was yet fresh in his memory, Philip again relapsed into his habitual indolence.

The serious illness of Harcourt, the effect of anxiety and application, augmented the disorder of the government. Blecourt, the subordinate minister, was from birth and situation unable to supply the place of his principal : he could neither overcome the apathy of the monarch, nor the slowness of the government, and his well intended remonstrances only drew on him the

\* Mémoires de Noailles, t. 2, p. 54.

indignation and insults of the ministers. All business was suspended ; and the most urgent representations were made for a new ambassador of rank, talents, and military skill, to give motion to the sluggish machine. The duke of Beauvilliers, the former preceptor of Philip, was designated both by the king and his ministers, but he was too discreet to accept so arduous and ungrateful an office : and at length Harcourt was replaced by the count de Marsin, a nobleman of great political capacity and military talents, yet without the discretion and winning address of his predecessor.

The instructions which he brought from Versailles as the rule of his conduct, display the minute attention of Louis to the movements of the Spanish court, unfold his views, and present a lively picture of the wretched state to which the government and nation were reduced, and the bondage in which the young monarch was held.

" For the purpose of rendering useful the disinterested succours which the king sends to Spain, the abuses of the monarchy must be instantly corrected. His majesty has seen the necessity of deputing a confidential person during the illness of the duke of Harcourt, to act in concert with him, if his health does not

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permit him to apply to business. As the count of Marsin has on every occasion given proofs of his discretion, disinterestedness, and military capacity, qualities at present much more necessary in Spain than experience in negotiation, the king has selected him for this mission. It will be sufficient to acquaint him with the general state of affairs, the peculiarities which regard the person and court of the sovereign, and the conduct to be observed towards those who are considered as disaffected ; with the principal abuses of the government, which it would be impossible to detail, and the remedies which time may furnish ; for it would be in vain to hope to correct them in the beginning of a new reign.

" Equal disorder reigns in all affairs. It would seem that the successors of Charles the fifth have been more employed in destroying their monarchy by bad conduct, than in maintaining its splendour. The confusion became still greater during the last reign, and the Spaniards observed, that after a century of bad government, they had no government at all. The principal employments were sold, and this abuse has given such encouragement to idleness that the military life is utterly disliked. The rights of the crown in the West Indies have been sacrificed to the avarice of viceroys,

governors, and inferior officers. They have ruined commerce, and left it a prey to strangers, the greatest enemies of Spain.

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" Incapacity and the interest of the administrators have kept up the disorder in the finances. Besides, in Spain when they find a custom established, it is a sufficient reason to follow it scrupulously, without examining whether that is proper at one time, which was so at another.

" The royal authority has grown weaker in proportion as the means of rendering it respected have failed. Hence the commotions of the populace at Madrid. Nor is it strange that disorder should reign in matters of justice; so certain is impunity, that murders are daily committed without the slightest inquiry after the guilty. The clergy, particularly the monks, are not better regulated.

" The power of the kings has always been absolute.\* The people, although impatient for relief, are very submissive; the great, divided among themselves, are unpopular, without adherents, tremble for fear of being removed from Madrid, and are too indolent to be dangerous. If order can be introduced into the finances, and the troops maintained about the person of the king, all difficulties will be surmounted.

\* This remark is a proof of the mischievous impression derived from the conduct and language of Portocarrero and Arias.

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" His character is excellent ; he is well inclined ; his only defect is the fear of doing ill, and this timidity\* renders him indecisive in the most trifling matters. It is necessary to encourage him to decide and make him feel that he is master. Affairs being in so bad a state, it is no wonder that he is disgusted, and at his age seeks occupations less embarrassing. It would however be very dangerous, if his disgust should produce an aversion to his duty. He cannot be too much spurred to govern by himself, to learn every thing, to become acquainted with what a king ought to know for the happiness of his subjects.

" The Spaniards themselves are persuaded that the etiquette has been always an insurmountable barrier between the prince and his subjects. His majesty desires that his grandson should free himself from this restraint ; but hitherto he has been prevented by the interest of his principal domestics and that of the nobles. The example of the late kings is not a reason for maintaining

\* A letter from the queen to Louis, furnishes a curious proof of this well meaning, but injurious timidity.

" I humbly request your majesty, to employ all the authority which you have, from so many motives, over the king your grandson, that he may accustom himself to say with a firm tone *I will* or *I will not* ; finally, that he may endeavour to imitate you. He would be a perfect prince if he could attain this. I see in that case only one thing which ought to give me pain, it is that I should love him too much, for you know even in things the most allowable, there ought to be moderation." Nov. 24, 1702.

this etiquette. The misfortunes of Spain are attributed to their seclusion, and an opposite conduct would be applauded by the people; they would wish their monarch to follow the example of the king of France rather than that of his austrian predecessors. If any of them must be imitated, the model of Charles the fifth is better than that of his descendants.

"It is essential to establish as soon as possible such a guard as the king ought to have. It should be composed of three regiments, one of cavalry and two of infantry; one of the last should be flemings, the others spaniards. The archers of the german guard should be dismissed, because it is necessary to suppress the german name in every thing, and to render it odious in Spain. If distinguished persons can be found for officers, the guard will be on a better footing, and will perhaps excite the nobles to embrace the military service."

After tracing the conduct to be observed with the royal household, and the french adherents, and particularly the motives for the appointment of the princess Orsini camerara-mayor,\* he continues,

"These details would be foreign to the functions of an ambassador in any court except that of Madrid. But it is at present necessary that

\* See Chapter 5.

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the ambassador of France should be the minister of his catholic majesty ; that without the title he should exercise the functions of that office ; that he should contribute to render the king of Spain acquainted with the state of his affairs, and assist him in governing by himself. For there is reason to believe from the good sense of that prince and the education he has received, that he will rather follow the example of the king of France, than imitate his predecessors, in throwing his power into the hands of a single minister, and submitting entirely to his direction. He sees by the effects the difference between the two examples.

" The opinion that it is the interest of France to prevent the re-establishment of Spain, far from being a good maxim, ought to be regarded as an artifice advanced by the common enemies of both crowns. The french and spaniards should in future divide with each other the advantages which the english and dutch have long enjoyed at the expence of Spain.

" If the duke of Harcourt can no longer assist at the councils, the count de Marsin must take a share in them ; and this custom must be established with regard to future ambassadors. It is no longer necessary to inquire if such an union will cause umbrage among other powers of Europe ; half measures will not appease jealousy. The french armies in Flanders and Italy,

the fleets of France received in the Spanish ports of the old and new world for their defence; the authority given to his majesty to command in all the states of his grandson; these things excite the fear of other powers. The admission of the French ambassador into the Spanish cabinet would not raise in them greater apprehension than what they already see. For the sake of reciprocal confidence the ambassador ought to communicate his orders to the king of Spain, and all affairs should be transacted in perfect concert.

"Spain is not in a condition to recompense his majesty for the expences he has incurred on her account. *The ambassador must however keep such a recompense always in view, and reflect on the means of obtaining it at some future day.*\* Consequently without estimating the expences of a war, with this instruction is joined an account of those incurred for alliances.

"The king of Spain is scarcely less uncertain in his habits and hours of business than in the most important affairs. He must be insensibly accustomed to decide by himself; all his hours must be regulated; his time must be employed as much as possible, and the *ennui* he already feels diminished by constant employment.

\* We request the reader to bear this passage in mind; he will soon perceive that the recompense the remark alludes to was no less than the Spanish Netherlands.

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“ No one more contributed to the testament of Charles the second, in favour of the duke of Anjou, than cardinal Portocarrero. For this reason he has been placed at the head of affairs. His intentions are thought to be good ; but his incapacity is well known, and the nation despises him. If he really wishes to retire under the pretext of age and health, as he has written to the king, his retreat does not seem likely to be detrimental to the royal service. It is said that ambition united him with the president of Castile, and that ambition has divided them. The president also desires leave to retire, though no one believes he is sincere in his request.

“ The other counsellors of state,\* whom it is most important to know, are the marquis of Mancera, the marquis of Villafranca, the duke of Montalto, the count of San Estevan, the marquis del Fresno, the admiral, and the count of Aguilar.† Mancera, president of the council of Italy, has no other guide than his duty ; but at the age of eighty-six, we can rely but little on his services.

\* The council of state must not be mistaken for the cabinet council, or ministry. It was the supreme deliberative body, resorting to on extraordinary occasions, and composed something like our privy council.

† Don Roderic Emanuel Manrique de Lara, before mentioned under the title of count of Frigiliana. He assumed that of Aguilar, in virtue of his marriage with Donna Maria Antonietta Ramirez de Arellano, countess of Aguilar. We always designate him as count of Frigiliana, to distinguish him from his son, who is called, by the spanish writers, count of Aguilar. Vayrac, t. 3, p. 8.

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Villafranca possesses the charge of grand master of the royal household. He deserves a reward, because he was the first of the council who gave his opinion for a prince of France. His austere character, and extreme attachment to etiquette, produce inconveniences with a young prince. Montalto, president of the council of Aragon, is a worthy man, and appears well intentioned. Unquiet, though indolent, and of a confined understanding, he may be led into engagements contrary to his duty, merely from opposition to the cardinal, whom he utterly dislikes. San Estevan has shewn more inclination for France than any other person. Del Fresno and his son appear full of probity and zeal.

"The admiral of Castile has a good understanding, speaks and writes well, affects a love of literature, and maintains four jesuits, who are admitted to his table; but he owes nothing to study. He is esteemed a miser, and yet would appear profuse, entering into all kinds of expence, without taste and without discernment, merely from vanity. He has never had any view but his own interest: he has consequently no friend. Loving his ease and his pleasure, he will probably be more intent to efface the impressions made by his misconduct, than to form parties in the state. It would be dangerous to place him in the higher posts; but in spite of the representations of the

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cardinal, it would be prudent to take advantage of his apparent desire to justify himself towards his sovereign.

" Aguilar has a better understanding than the admiral ; more knowledge and capacity ; more experience in business : but his probity and honour are doubtful. He is said to be bold and enterprising : ambition will be the rule of his conduct. He has lost nearly thirty thousand crowns of his income. He and the admiral have been imprudently left in the council. The people hate them both ; they have no party ; but they must be watched.

" The different councils of Madrid are full of abuses, and that of the Indies more than all the rest. In that council, far from punishing malversations, the guilty are supported in proportion to their bribes. The excesses of the viceroys and other officers remain unpunished : this impunity, and the immense property which they bring back, encourage their successors to follow the same example. On the contrary, if any one, from a principle of honour, pursues a different course, his disinterestedness is punished by a shameful poverty. If he is a subaltern, the reproach which his conduct draws on his superiors, or the attention he bestows to throw a light on theirs, exposes him to hatred. He soon feels the effects in the loss of his employments ; for truth

never reaches the king of Spain ; distance gives facility for disguising it, and timely presents can always obscure it.

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" The dilapidated state of the finances is well known. One of the chief abuses is the principle, that past examples are inviolable, and the consequent fear of proposing the slightest novelty. Every province knows its contribution, and where the money ought to be employed. Aragon, for example, would not afford the most trifling relief to the wants of Castile.

" The churches of Spain are immensely rich in gold and silver, which augments daily from the credit of the monks, and consequently specie is rendered extremely rare in commerce. It is proposed to oblige the clergy to sell a part of this plate. Before taking this resolution, it is necessary to examine, not merely the evident utility, but the inconveniences of this plan. The revenues of the crusada would be of service if they were well administered. He who is the president or master, will not easily give information : he is supported by the cardinal.

" Although the king ought to have many favours to dispose of, he has scarcely any. Governments, charges, and commanderies, are entailed on several lives ; the viceroys and chief governors fill the principal employments, and chuse those whom the king nominates to the rest.

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The chief honours and places are reserved to Castilians. This abuse is derived from the long residence of the kings at Madrid. Other Spaniards are considered as foreigners: an error in which Portocarrero is particularly interested.

"One of the principal remedies to these disorders, would be to establish a body of troops. It would be proper to commence with the king's guards. His intended journey to Saragossa to confirm the privileges and receive the homage of Aragon, would be a favourable opportunity; for his dignity requires an escort. He may visit the different provinces, reside in the principal towns, and shew himself to his people. If order is to be introduced into the finances, the abuses of the councils corrected, etiquette abolished, reversions suppressed, and justice maintained: the king of Spain may do it best, and with most authority, out of Madrid."\*

Meanwhile the negotiations had been carried on for the marriage of the young monarch with the princess Maria Louisa of Savoy, and the equivocating and interested conduct of Victor Amadeus prolonged the discussion, till the impatience of Philip was wrought to the highest pitch. At length the arrangements were completed, and Philip had the gratification to hear that the usual ceremony had taken place by his

Sept. 11.

\* Memoires de Noailles, t. 2, p. 89—111.

proxy, the marquis of Castel Rodrigo, and that his future bride was on the point of taking her departure from Turin. His desire to solemnize his marriage, and anxiety to escape from the intrigues and dissensions of his court, extorted the consent of Louis to his departure ; and the only difficulty remaining, related to the establishment of an administration during his absence. After much consultation and many contradictory proposals, the administration was intrusted to Portocarrero, with the title of governor of the kingdom, and the same absolute authority as during the last malady of Charles the second. Philip was accompanied by a cabinet council, consisting of the duke of Medina Sidonia, the count of San Estevan, both devoted to France, and the secretary Ubilla, who had been recently created marquis of Rivas. For the purpose of directing his conduct, according to the views of Louis, Marsin followed him in the capacity of french agent, without the title of ambassador, to avoid those disputes of etiquette, which would have precluded him from a constant and confidential intercourse with the king.

With the most heartfelt satisfaction, the young monarch at length took his departure from a capital which St. Philippe justly calls “the temple of discord.” As a proof of the imbecility of the government, a troop of mendicants were

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allowed to insult him with impunity at the moment of his departure, and in the very presence of the cardinal.

In his passage through Aragon he was every where received with the most zealous proofs of popular regard. He entered Saragossa in state, and the people, who had been singularly misled by aggravated descriptions of his personal and mental defects, were struck with his pleasing physiognomy ; they proved their change of sentiment by crowding about his person, and by the most extravagant marks of adulation, touching his horse and clothes, and pressing their hands to their eyes and lips. But in Catalonia, among a people ever turbulent and jealous of their liberties, he experienced the effects of that antipathy which they fostered against his loyal subjects of Castile.

After a short stay at Barcelona, he hurried forward to Figueras, to receive his long expected bride, and their union was ratified on the 3rd of October, before the patriarch of the Indies.\* But the joy of their first interview was overclouded by an incident derived from the jealousy of french policy.

Maria Louisa had scarcely entered her fourteenth year, and appeared still more youthful from the smallness of her stature ; but her spirit and

\* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 5.

understanding partook of the early maturity of her native climate, and to exquisite beauty of person and countenance she united the most captivating manners and graceful deportment. Her character and disposition had been keenly scrutinized ; and as her father's wily and ambitious spirit had become proverbial, Louis dreaded lest a court, the most adroit, refined, and enterprising in Italy, should attempt to rule by her agency. To prevent therefore the effects which might result from a confidential intercourse with Turin, the strictest though secret orders were given to dismiss all her piedmontese attendants when she reached the spanish frontier, and to place her under the direction of her camerara-mayor, the princess Orsini, who had previously joined her on board of the galley in which she had sailed from the coast of Genoa. The execution of this unwelcome order made a deep impression on the mind of the young princess, who was sensibly affected by the sorrow of her attendants, and gave way to the most bitter lamentations. Her excessive grief confirmed the vigilant jealousy of the french court ; in conformity with their previous orders, the princess and Marsin restrained the impatience of the youthful bridegroom ; and even after the solemnization of the nuptials extorted his consent to a temporary separation, till

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the spirit of the queen was subdued. The expedient producing effect, Louville was dispatched to France to announce the marriage, as well as the victory which was thus supposed to have been gained over the machinations of the court of Turin.

The reply of Louis to this communication contained a series of counsels calculated to strengthen the mind of Philip against the dreaded ascendancy of the young queen.

"I expected," he said, "with impatience, the news of your marriage, of which I was apprised by your letter, and the information of Louville. He has expatiated on the excellent qualities of the queen. They may render you happy, if she makes a good use of them. I hope so; although she has begun ill. I attribute her conduct to bad advice, and you may perceive, from this example, the necessity of dismissing all the piedmontese attendants. She is sensible; she will see that she ought to think only of pleasing you; I am persuaded she will do so, when she acts from herself; but for your happiness as well as her own, she must renounce all the plans which have been suggested to her to govern you. Your majesty will not suffer it; you must feel too deeply the dishonour of such a weakness, which is not excusable in subjects, but

in kings, who are exposed to the public gaze, contemptible. You have before you the example of your predecessor.

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"The queen is the first of your subjects, in which quality, as well as in that of your wife, she is bound to obey you. You are bound to love her ; but you will never love her as you ought, if her tears have power to extort from you indulgences derogatory to your glory. Be firm then at first. I well know that the first refusals will grieve you, and are repugnant to your natural mildness ; but fear not to give a slight uneasiness, to spare real chagrin in future. By such conduct alone you will prevent disputes which would become insupportable. Shall your domestic dissensions be the subject of conversation to your people and to Europe ? Render the queen happy, if necessary, in despite of herself. Restraine her at first ; she will be obliged to you in the end ; and this violence over yourself will furnish the most solid proof of your affection for her. Read over, I intreat you, my former instructions on this subject. Believe that my love for you dictates this advice, which, were I in your place, I should receive from a father as the most convincing proof of his regard."

To prevent the effects of this influence, orders were sent, not to permit the queen to speak to the piedmontese minister except in a public

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audience; and for greater security the princess Orsini was to be always present whenever she received foreign ambassadors, and her youth and inexperience were to be alledged as an excuse for this innovation.\*

Louis and his agents, however, soon discovered that all these suspicions were groundless; and that the grief of the queen, far from being an artifice of studied policy, was the sorrow natural to her youth and lively temper on being separated from her early associates. But being equally convinced that no expedient could prevent her amiable qualities from gaining an uncontroulable ascendancy over the mind of her doting and pliant husband, their next care was employed to manage Philip by her agency, and direct her conduct by means of the princess Orsini, of whose zeal and attachment they were well assured.

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 165—170.

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*Family connections, early life, and character, of the princess Orsini—Connections with Madame de Maintenon and the family of Noailles—Her appointment as camerara mayor to the young queen of Spain—Extracts from her correspondence.*

THE marriage of Philip being arranged, as his pliant and amorous character rendered it highly probable that he would be governed by his future queen, the attention of Louis had been employed to place at the head of her household persons of assured fidelity and confidence.

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The count of San Estevan del Puerto was nominated to the post of grand master, as well on account of his attachment to France and his zeal in promoting the succession of a bourbon prince; as, because from his moderation, prudence, and disinterestedness, he was not likely to engage in a contest for authority with the cardinal minister.

But a still greater difficulty occurred in the choice of a camerara-mayor, or superintendant of the queen's household, who in virtue of her high office enjoyed a constant and intimate

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access to the royal presence, and was to be a species of guardian to her youthful mistress. From these circumstances the cameraras-mayores in former times had not unfrequently governed both the court and nation.

To fill this delicate post at the present period, many rare and even contradictory requisites were to unite. It was necessary to chuse a lady of the highest rank and character, to give dignity to the office ; yet it was equally necessary that with a predominant influence over the queen, she should submit to be guided by the french minister. She could not be a spaniard, because Portocarrero and Arias were jealous lest a native should labour for the advancement of her own family and friends ; and because the french monarch was no less apprehensive that a native would not be sufficiently obedient to his controul. She could not, however, be sent directly from the french court ; for, besides the want of an acquaintance with the language, customs, and etiquette, a person so circumstanced would infallibly excite the jealousy of the nation. Still stronger though different objections occurred against making the choice at the court of Turin. By a singular coincidence of circumstances all these requisites appeared to center in the princess Orsini, who from this period became one of

the most prominent figures in the history of Spain during the war of the succession.

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Anne Marie of the illustrious family of La Tremouille, was daughter of Louis duke of Noirmoutier, whose military services during the minority of Louis the fourteenth had been rewarded with the rank of a duke and peer. She espoused at an early age,\* Adrian Blaise de Taleyrand prince of Chalais. Her husband being engaged in the celebrated duel with the family of La Fret, in which one of the parties was killed, was driven into exile. Having taken refuge in Spain, he was followed by his young wife, who had thus an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the spanish language and manners. They afterwards removed into Italy, and while he found an asylum in the venetian territories, she repaired to Rome to solicit the protection of the french cardinals Bouillon and d'Estrees. Her charms are said to have made an impression on her two protectors, as well as on cardinal Portocarrero, then spanish minister at Rome; and her husband dying soon after-

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1670.

\* The exact age of this extraordinary woman is not known. But from the period of her father's marriage, and a comparison of the births of her two brothers in 1642 and 1652, and her own marriage in 1659, we are inclined to think she was about the age of 53 when she was appointed camerara mayor. Duclos is evidently mistaken in making her above 80 at the time of her death. Duclos Memoires Secrets, t. 1, p. 83.—P. Anselme Histoire Genealogique de France, &c. t. 4, p. 178.—Moreri.

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wards, she remained with no other resource than their bounty. By the recommendation of the two french cardinals and the approbation of the french court, a marriage was negotiated between her and Flavio dei Orsini,\* of the illustrious family of Orsini, duke of Bracciano and grandee of Spain, who was consequently recompensed with the french order of the Holy Ghost, an honour rarely bestowed on foreigners, however distinguished.

This connection produced the usual effects of interested and ill-assorted matches ; but the duchess shone in all the pride of rank and affluence, and supplied the want of matrimonial felicity, by uniting in her society the most distinguished characters at Rome, as well as by frequent visits to her native country. With such opportunities for improvement, her talents, manners, and understanding acquired the highest polish, and she soon figured as one of the brightest ornaments at Rome and Versailles.

In one of her visits to Versailles, which was lengthened to the space of five years, she improved a former acquaintance which she had formed with Madame de Maintenon, into the strictest intimacy ; and became the admiration of

\* The french, according to their custom, have corrupted this name into des Ursins, by which title she is known in the french histories and memoirs.

the king and court. Her husband dying in 1698, she assumed his family name of Orsini, to gratify the nephew of Pope Innocent the twelfth, who having purchased the duchy of Bracciano, was desirous to appropriate the title. Ambitious to figure in a still higher sphere than in the court of Rome, the faintest gleam of advancement could not escape her vigilant attention ; and the expected marriage between Philip and a piedmontese princess, presented an opportunity of which she adroitly availed herself.

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When therefore the choice of a queen for Philip was decided, she succeeded in drawing on herself the attention of the french court. She was too deeply versed in the arts of intrigue, to shew great anxiety for the important post of camerara mayor, but confined her solicitation to the honour of accompanying the new queen to Madrid. She imparted this wish to Madame de Maintenon, and it being favourably received, she employed all her address to interest in her cause the family of Noailles, who were allied, by friendship and marriage, with the favourite.

She wrote to the duchess, affecting to solicit her interest with Madame de Maintenon, and artfully displayed her own character and qualifications.

" My intention," she said, " is only to go to Madrid, and remain there as long as the king

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chuses, and afterwards to return to Versailles, and give an account of my journey." "I am," she added, "the widow of a grandee, and acquainted with the Spanish language; I am beloved and esteemed in the country; I have numerous friends, and particularly cardinal Portocarrero; with these advantages, judge whether I shall not cause both rain and sunshine at Madrid, and whether I shall incur the imputation of vanity in offering my services."\*

She supported this application by a letter to the count d'Ayen, son of the duke of Noailles, who had recently espoused a niece of Madame de Maintenon, and held a distinguished place in the household of Philip.

"What opinion, Sir," she said, "will you have of us Roman dames, when you see that I attack you at a distance, and assume the honour of writing to you before you have deserved it. I fear the ladies of modern Rome will appear to have too little pride, and that you will doubt, in spite of your reading, whether those of ancient Rome had more. But not to inspire you with sentiments still more unfavourable, I will not say, Sir, that I have been long tempted to cultivate your friendship, on account of the high praises which are bestowed upon you. I will take, as the pretext of this letter, the necessity of writing

\* Memoires de Noailles, t: 2, p. 161.

to you on a subject which, your mother informs me, she has already imparted to you. I have confided to her the desire I have to accompany as far as Madrid the princess, who is destined to be queen of Spain ; and Madame de Maintenon has had the goodness to speak of it to the king our master, who replied that he was willing I should have that honour, and would nominate me if his opinion was asked. The appointment does not entirely depend on the catholic king; for it is to the father of the princess that this choice belongs. However, I humbly request you, Sir, to prepossess his majesty in my favour. That will not be difficult, if you will please to inform him of the protection with which the king of France honours me ; the kindness which all your house have for me ; and if you will act in concert with cardinal Portocarrero, on whose friendship I much rely. The acquiescence of his majesty would render this journey more desirable to me ; besides, the duke of Savoy would be more easily disposed to grant me this favour, if his majesty would have the goodness to cause insinuations to be made by his ministers at Madrid and Turin, that it would give him pleasure. I have, over all those ladies, who may aspire to this honour, the advantage of being a grandee of Spain ; and this quality, joined to my natural

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inclination to render service to the grandson of my sovereign, induces me to solicit it with the greatest earnestness."

This application sufficed to draw the attention of the french king to her merits and character, and he soon afterwards, in his instructions to Marsin, announced her appointment to the office of camerara mayor, and designated her as a woman not likely to take any share in the cabals of the court.

"As the king of Spain," Torci observed, "is of a mild character, it will be easy for the queen to acquire an ascendancy over his mind; and consequently it would be highly dangerous to place about her persons of suspicious intentions. The choice of camerara mayor has appeared very important, and his majesty thinks that this post cannot be better filled than by the princess Orsini. The late duke of Bracciano, her husband, chief of the family of Orsini, was a grandee of Spain; she has passed a part of her life in foreign countries; she is acquainted with the usages of Spain, and joining to those advantages great sense and politeness, she appears better adapted than any one else, to instruct the young princess in the art of keeping her court with dignity. She will not be regarded as a foreigner, and yet she is sufficiently so to take

no share in the cabals and intrigues of the government.”\*

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Her nomination being thus secured, and the resolution adopted for the dismission of the piedmontese attendants, the princess joined her royal mistress in the galley which conveyed her to Spain.

The just and lively portrait of this extraordinary woman, drawn by St. Simon from actual acquaintance, will form an appropriate introduction to her political history.

“ She was above the middle size, a brunette, with expressive blue eyes ; and her face, though without pretensions to beauty, was uncommonly interesting. She had a fine shape, a majestic and dignified air, rather attractive than intimidating, and united with such numberless graces, even in trifles, that I have never seen her equal either in person or mind. Flattering, engaging, and discreet, anxious to please for the sake of pleasing, and irresistible when she wished to persuade or conciliate : she had an agreeable tone of voice and manner, and an inexhaustible fund of conversation, which was rendered highly entertaining by accounts of the different countries she had visited, and anecdotes of the distinguished persons whom she had known and frequented. She had been habituated to the best company ;

\* *Memoires de Noailles*, t. 2, p. 97.



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was extremely polite and affable to all, yet peculiarly engaging with those whom she wished to distinguish, and equally skilful in displaying her own graces and qualifications. She was adapted by nature for the meridian of courts, and versed in all the intrigues of cabinets, from her long residence at Rome, where she maintained a princely establishment. She was vain of her person and fond of admiration, foibles which never left her ; and hence her dress, in every season of life, was too youthful for her age, and sometimes even ridiculous.

" She possessed a simple and natural eloquence, saying always what she chose, and how she chose, and nothing more. Secret with regard to herself ; faithful to the confidence of others ; gifted with an exterior, nay an interior of gaiety, good humour, and evenness of temper, which rendered her perfectly mistress of herself at all times, and in all circumstances.

" Never did any woman possess more art, without the appearance of art ; never was a more fertile head, nor superior knowledge of the human heart, and the means of ruling it. She was however proud and haughty ; hurrying forward directly to her ends, without regard to the means ; but still, if possible, clothing them with a mild and plausible exterior. She was nothing by halves : jealous and imperious in her attach-

ménts ; a zealous friend, unchangeable by time or absence, and a most implacable and inveterate enemy. Finally, her love of existence was not greater than her love of power; but her ambition was of that towering kind which women seldom feel, and superior even to the ordinary spirit of man.”\*

A few passages from her confidential correspondence, after the assumption of her post, will serve to display her own spirit and character, and the constitution of the Spanish court.

“ Good God,” she observed, to the duchess of Noailles, “ in what an employment have you placed me ! I have not the least quiet, not even time to speak to my secretary. As to reposing myself after dinner, or eating when I am hungry, they are out of the question. I am too happy if I can catch a miserable repast running ; and it seldom happens that I am not called away at the

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\* Mémoires de St. Simon, t. 3, p. 175—182.

See also t. 5, p. 249.—“ Cette femme également connue par son élévation et par sa châtel, étoit aussi aimable par ses agréments, qu'elle fut redoutable par ses passions, à M. le Duc d'Orléans. Une naissance illustre se trouva, soutenue en elle de toutes les qualités de l'esprit, et de toutes les grâces du corps, qui pouvoient en relever les avantages : sa capacité pour les affaires étoit au dessus de son sexe ; un air ouvert, des manières nobles et engageantes, prévenoient ceux qui l'approchoient, et les lui gagnoit ; mais un désir de commander toujours ardent, les lui faisoit bientôt perdre. Près d'elle l'inferieur, l'égal et le supérieur devoient subir la même loi ; si quelqu'un refusoit d'entrer dans ses vues, quelques injustes quelques violentes qu'elles fussent, elle le jugeoit digne des plus affreuses disgraces.” See also Duclos, t. 1. p. 64.

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moment I sit down to table. Truly Madame de Maintenon would laugh, did she know the details of my charge. Tell her, I beg, that it is I who have the honour to take the king of Spain's night gown when he retires to rest, and to give it to him with his slippers when he rises. Thus far I should have patience; but every night, when the king goes to bed in the queen's apartment, the count of Benevente loads me with the sword of his majesty, a pot de chambre, and a lamp, which I generally overturn on my clothes: this is too grotesque.

"The king would never rise did I not draw his curtains; and it would be a sacrilege should any other person enter the queen's chamber when they are in bed. Lately the lamp went out because I had spilled half the oil. I knew not where the windows were, because it was night when we reached the place; I was near breaking my nose against the wall; and I and the king were a quarter of an hour running against each other in endeavouring to discover them. His majesty finds me so useful, that he has sometimes the goodness to ask for me two hours before I would willingly rise. The queen takes a share in these pleasantries; but I have not yet gained the confidence which she placed in her piedmontese attendants. I wonder at it, because I serve her better than they; and I am sure they did not

undress her and wash her feet so handily as I do."\*

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In a letter to Torci, she detailed her contests with the formal attendants of the king, on matters of etiquette.

" Barcelona, Dec. 16, 1701.—I believe, Sir, that you are never in better humour than when you do me the honour to write to me, and I assure you that I am not less pleased when I reply. Who has so well informed you of my awkwardness in carrying the lamp which the count of Benevente puts into my hands so gravely every evening? Doubtless the duchess of Noailles, who is a tattler, and never more pleased than when she can make one appear ridiculous. Has she not given you other proofs of my awkwardness? \* \* \*

" It consoles me, however, to think that you would be as much embarrassed as I am, were you loaded with a similar burden, for two hands assuredly are not sufficient. No alteration can be made in this ceremony. The king himself would not be obeyed, and I should be involved in such a squabble, as happened a few days ago in a thing much more serious. Although the count de Marsin will apprise you of it, I will relate it, if it be only to have the pleasure of writing to you about a little malicious

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 172.

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" On the feast of the Conception the king and queen paid their devotions at the principal church. The preceding evening was employed in regulating the ceremony ; and at the moment when their majesties did me the honour to speak of it, my little monkey entered. The king asked who was to present the napkin. He replied, that the late king having always received the communion alone, the lord chamberlain performed that office ; but the queen being present, it was he and I who were to have that honour, though it was still his business to offer the chalice. After his departure, I represented to their majesties that it did not appear becoming in me to figure at the altar, and in public with the patriarch. If this function was ecclesiastical, I ought not to be employed, and if not, it seemed much more proper for me to be joined with the chamberlain. The king approved this remark, and immediately sent his confessor to tell the patriarch, that he should present the chalice, and that the count of Benevente and myself should hold the napkin.

" The patriarch returned for answer that this could not be, without giving any reason or making any remonstrance. On the morrow at the communion the count of Benevente took the

napkin, and I advanced towards my mistress. But the little prelate, more nimble, gained the upper-hand, and presented to the king another napkin which he apparently drew from his pocket, though so scanty that the extremity scarcely reached to the queen.

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" The king did not observe it, but the queen by an obliging sign directed my notice to this ridiculous incident. On returning to the palace the king expressed his displeasure, because the patriarch had not obeyed him. I met the prelate some moments afterwards, and could not avoid signifying to him, with all due respect, my astonishment that he had not obeyed the king's orders, and had deprived me of a service, which according to his own avowal belonged to my charge. The affair was spoken of in the council in the evening ; and it was resolved that I should write to cardinal Portocarrero on the subject, the king being unwilling to take any resolution without his previous advice.

" The patriarch has since sent father Daubenton to justify himself as to what regards me ; but besides that the confessor himself approves my opinion, I have ordered him to observe that I am of little consequence in this affair, and that the material consideration was the disobedience to the king's orders. This day was full of inci-

CHAP. 4. dents. Another happened in which I bore no  
1701. part except as a witness.

" It being necessary to draw the king's chair nearer to the praying desk, where their majesties were kneeling, the count of Priego, mayor-domo, took it ; the duke of Ossuna rose to wrest it from him. This gave rise to a little skirmish almost at the foot of the altar ; for the first would not give it up, and the last would have it, both thinking that the service was a part of their charge. The first, however, gained the day by dint of elbowing, and by the complaisance of the other. During the squabble, I saw that the duke of Ossuna, who as you know is no bigger than a rat, was nearly overturned with the chair on the persons of the king and queen. Before we quitted the church, I thought it proper to acquaint the king with the affair, lest it should produce a duel between the two noblemen. His majesty spoke in the church to the duke of Ossuna, and in the palace to the count. That very evening the dispute was arranged in the council. It was decided that the duke was in the wrong ; and the king speaking properly to both a second time, reconciled them. I think, however, these noblemen, who are pacific both in heart and soul, had no inclination to fight except in the church.

" The cause of this incident was the absence of the high-steward, in which case the duke, as first gentleman of the chamber, considered this service as his duty.

" Further, Sir, their majesties appeared at church both in the morning and afternoon without curtains. As there were none, the spaniards declared that this ceremony could not take place. But we were happy to make this breach in the etiquette, and even had there been any curtains we should not have used them ; for the whim of concealing an amiable sovereign from his people, is in my opinion one of the least wise whims of Philip the second.

" I converse with you only on trifles, my matter being exhausted when I have spoken of the perfect union between their majesties. Our court is almost always the same from the beginning to the end of the month ; and I can contrive nothing to diversify it in a country where there is absolutely nothing for the purpose. Cardinal Portocarrero is always pressing me to represent to the king the necessity of his return to Madrid. If these people, who are spoiled children, do not finish their cortes to the wish of his majesty, those who have advised us to remain so long at Barcelona, will be good for nothing on our return. The king is displeased with the boldness and ill intentions of certain Catalans,

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who assist at the states. I said to him the other day, on this subject, in the presence of some Spaniards, whom we suspected a little, that it was rashness to expect from a king of eighteen, in the beginning of his reign, a thing which four of his predecessors, among whom was the famous author of etiquette,\* had attempted in vain.

" We have received the answer of cardinal Portocarrero. It is impossible to shew more respect towards me, and more zeal and submission to the king. His advice is that his majesty should command the patriarch to go and wait for him at some leagues from Madrid. This will be executed."†

In the discharge of menial duties, the princess displayed all her talents, graces, and address, and soon became the confidential favourite and directress of the queen, who amidst the *sombre* etiquette of this solemn court, was happy to indulge her natural vivacity in the society of her amiable camerara-mayor. The petty squabble relative to the dismission of the piedmontese attendants, and the temporary coolness which ensued, were both speedily forgotten.

One of the principal injunctions with which the princess was charged, was to break the shackles of the national etiquette, and accustom the nobles to the person and society of their

\* Philip II.    † Memoires de Noailles, t. 2, p. 401.

sovereigns. In this object, she gradually succeeded; she removed the barrier with which Spanish formality and jealousy had for ages environed the queens, by insinuating to the nobles that they deprived themselves of the honour of her notice by erroneous notions of respect. She so far introduced the French style, as to induce them to attend the queen's toilet, where the king frequently appeared. On these occasions she prevailed on the king and queen to dance; and persuaded his majesty to lead out some ladies of the court. She thus brought the nobles into a more familiar intercourse with the sovereigns and the French agents, and endeavoured to produce a cordial union of the two nations.

The growing ascendancy of the queen over the mind of her husband, gave additional importance to the princess. The French ambassador wrote to his court, "I see the queen will infallibly govern her husband; and therefore we must be careful that she governs him well. For this object, the intervention of the princess is absolutely necessary; her progress is considerable; and we have no other means to influence her royal mistress, who begins to shew that she will not be treated as a child."\*

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 175.

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In consequence of her increasing influence, she was more and more honoured with the confidence of the court of Versailles ; and one of her letters to Torci displayed a proper sense of her own consequence, amidst professions of affected modesty.

April 3.

" Always submissive to the will of the king, I will execute the orders with which you honour me, without claiming any merit ; for what merit is there in doing one's duty ? But consider, Sir, if you please, that I am a woman, and in the absence of count Marsin, shall have no person here on whom I can rely. You cannot therefore favour me with too many instructions in the state of embarrassment in which I am about to be placed. All the letters from France announce to me some new monster which I am to combat at Madrid. I myself foresee numerous contradictions among a people ignorant, disaffected, and solicitous only to overturn the state ; but I still entertain hopes that I shall compel the most malicious to acknowledge the purity of my intentions. You formerly piqued yourself on being my scholar ; now I cannot venture to move a step without your advice. I hope so to act as to gain the good will of the spaniards, and without blindly entering into the enmities of cardinal Portocarrero, shall always consider him

as my principal friend. I shall be obliged to receive every individual who will open his heart to me ; I shall accordingly, if my efforts are approved, endeavour to win over those who are inclined to the opposite side."\*

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\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 230.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTH.

1701—1702.

*Return of Philip to Barcelona with his queen—Convocation and proceedings of the cortes of Catalonia—Attempts of Louis to obtain the cession of the Netherlands—Design of Philip to visit Italy—Difficulties relative to this expedition, and to the formation of a regency—Correspondence of Philip and his queen with the king of France—Philip embarks for Naples—The queen holds the cortes of Aragon—Repairs to Madrid—Embarrassments of the regency.*

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BEFORE the return of Philip to Barcelona the cortes of Catalonia had opened their sittings. He seems to have convoked this assembly, with the view of prolonging his absence from Madrid, and the hope of drawing a temporary supply from the province. Nothing however but the most imperious necessity could justify the policy of resorting to the representatives of a people, irritated by past oppression, and indignant against the Castilian government ; rendered turbulent by a long series of intestine commotions, and foreign wars, and eager to regain those privileges which had been abolished or fallen into disuse, in consequence of the suspension of the cortes since the administration of

Olivarez. The constitution of these states added to the danger of the experiment; for the assembly was composed of three orders; of which that of hidalgos was needy and turbulent, and too numerous to be easily swayed.

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The result therefore of this imprudent attempt was such as might have been foreseen. Demands rose on demands; delays followed delays; and three months were wasted in mutual propositions, and mutual refusals between the sovereign and the assembly. At length a compromise was effected; the more turbulent were overawed by the menaces of the loyalists, and a donative was voted to the amount of only three millions of french livres\* payable within the term of six years. In return for this scanty contribution, which never reached the royal treasury, Philip relieved the province from the onerous duty of lodging the royal cavalry, and granted some other concessions of inferior importance: thus this stormy assembly closed its deliberations, if so they may be called, on the 12th of January, after swearing fidelity to the new sovereign, and obtaining the confirmation of the national privileges.†

The embarrassments of Philip at this juncture,

\* £.120,000 sterling.

† Memoires de St. Philippe, t. 1, An. 1702.—Noailles, t. 2, p. 178—188.—Ortiz, Hist. España, t. 7, p. 5.

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1701—1702. were not, however, wholly derived from the demands of his turbulent subjects, or the dissensions of his ministers.

When we read the specious assurances of Louis the fourteenth, that he accepted the testament of Charles the second from disinterested motives only, and that it would have been more advantageous to France to fulfil the second treaty of partition ; we may justly feel some surprise at the effrontery which could hold such language in the face of indignant Europe. But it is a matter of still greater astonishment, that modern writers should be found to give credit to these and similar assertions, when the whole of his subsequent conduct has proved their falsity.

In reality, without estimating the advantages which the occupation of the spanish throne by a bourbon prince would afford on the side of the peninsula, and without considering the privilege of exclusive trade to the american colonies, which was immediately grasped by France, the possession of the Netherlands alone was a more important object to Louis, than all the cessions comprised in the treaty of partition. A sovereign of France, as Europe was then circumstanced, could not have retained the Milanese or the two Sicilies, without the acquiescence of Savoy and Austria, and the connivance of the maritime powers ; nor any footing beyond the Pyrenees

without that of Spain. Whereas the possession of the Netherlands, at the same time that it was easily maintained, enabled France to turn her whole force against Germany and Italy, covered the frontier on the north east, assured at least the submission of Holland ; and was expected to open the way for the invasion of England, or at all events for straitening her connections with the continent. Indeed the solicitude of the french government to obtain this object sufficiently shews its importance.

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Louis, whose grand object had been the possession of the Netherlands, and who had already tampered with the elector of Bavaria, embraced the first opportunity when Philip was removed from Madrid, to require this cession. Hints were previously thrown out, to prepare the way by representations of the danger and expence which France had incurred in placing him on the throne, and the justice of some indemnification. At length the time arrived, when the ill success of the french arms in Italy, and the hostile aspect of the maritime powers,\* gave new force to these representations, and the subject was brought forward in a preparatory letter, written by Louis to his ambassador.

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“ Money,” he said, “ is wanting in Spain even for the necessary expences; none can be

\* See next Chapter.

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found to support the war in Italy, fulfil treaties, and maintain alliances. From the conduct of the Spaniards it should seem that the preservation of the territories, for which we are now contending, is indifferent to their monarchy; and they will not without much difficulty permit me to interfere in the government of the Netherlands. In a word, I support in all quarters the expences of the war; these expences are immense, from the distance of the countries whither I send my armies; and instead of deriving aid from Spain in the defence of her own states, I experience nothing but contradictions on her part, in things which are most for her own advantage. Although the zeal of my subjects is unbounded, their means of assisting me will at last be circumscribed. I cannot hold out till I reach that extremity, either for my own interest or theirs; and I should deceive the king of Spain, were I not to lay before him the real situation of his affairs.

" It is time then to inform him in confidence, that hitherto I have only consulted my affection for him, and from that motive have exerted my utmost efforts to defend his territories. I wish it was in my power to continue them; I would do it with the same earnestness. I had reason to hope that the assistance of Spain would enable me to fulfil this object; but he well knows, she

affords me none ; nor can I flatter myself that she will furnish any aid, either for the current expences, or the payment of those I have already incurred.

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“ You will display to him the heavy burthens of the war in Italy, and the immense drains of men and treasure which it occasions. I had indeed foreseen this, before I sent my troops thither ; but this consideration did not restrain me ; because I then thought, that a single campaign would suffice to drive out the germans. On the contrary, we have now no other prospect but a long war in Italy, which it is impossible to maintain with my own forces alone, as I am obliged to form considerable armies on the Rhine, and in the Netherlands.

“ This would be only to ruin France without saving Spain. Consequently we must think on the means of effecting a speedy peace. I foresee, with concern, that it must be purchased with the cession of some of the dependent states of the spanish monarchy ; but we must take this resolution. We must however keep it secret ; for the knowledge of it would only render the enemy more untractable, and give rise to demands with which the king of Spain could not comply.”\*

When this letter had produced its effect, the

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 152.

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french embassador received from Torcy instructions to make the proposal to Philip with all proper caution, as a suggestion from himself, of a project which he considered as equally advantageous both to France and Spain. "If Philip," it was observed, "would yield the Netherlands, Louis would in return charge himself with defending the rest of the spanish monarchy. Thus the war might be more easily maintained, and peace as easily made. Much difficulty ought not to be expected on the part of Spain; *for can Philip feel more chagrin to cede those provinces to his grandfather and his own house, than to Austria? Is it just that France should carry on war without a compensation? And can any be imagined more natural?*"\*

The acquiescence of Philip was already anticipated; but it was not so easy to vanquish the repugnance of the spanish nation. Marsin, whose residence in Spain enabled him better to estimate this difficulty, replied, "Philip, far from being able of his own authority to decide on so important a matter, has not even the power to will any thing: for, except himself and his french attendants, *there is not perhaps a single person in Spain who will be convinced that such a proposal is founded on reason and justice.* The disaffected will accuse France of having no

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 156.

other view than to profit by the dismemberment of Spain ; national jealousy will be awakened into animosity ; the enemy will have a specious pretext for invective, and a war must be expected, into which all the powers, who have not already taken part, will enter.”\*

These arguments suspended the design ; but it was suspended only to be produced in different, and more practicable shapes.

The arrangements with the elector of Bavaria, as governor of these provinces ; the occupation of the fortresses by french troops, and the following negotiations, proved the perseverance and success with which it was pursued ; and indeed nothing but the subsequent ascendancy of the allied arms, prevented the annexation of these important provinces to France.

As the business of the catalonian cortes drew to a conclusion, Philip was anxious for new pretexts to defer his return to Madrid, where he would be again exposed to the tyranny of Portocarrero and Arias, and to the multiplied embarrassments which he had already experienced. He therefore formed the resolution of visiting his Italian dominions, and joining the army in Lombardy. The intelligence of a recent conspiracy at Naples furnished the pretext, if it did not suggest the design.

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 157.

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The defenceless state of that kingdom, and the weakness of the military establishment, have been already mentioned. It is no wonder therefore that in a country continually the scene of troubles and revolutions, and among a people proverbially fond of change, some attempt should be made to transfer the sovereignty from the House of Bourbon to that of Austria.

Although the address and firmness of the viceroy, the duke of Medina Celi, had obtained the acknowledgment of Philip; yet he offended the neapolitans, by his austerity and exactions. The numerous partisans of the House of Austria established a secret correspondence with cardinal Grimani, the austrian agent at Rome, as well as with the disaffected exiles; and a regular plan was formed, in conjunction with prince Eugene, the imperial commander in Italy, to excite a general insurrection, and transfer the crown to the archduke Charles.

Although the pope was favourably inclined to the House of Bourbon, the presence of an imperial army in Lombardy deterred him from accepting the customary tribute from Philip, or granting the usual investiture as liege lord of the two Sicilies. Of this informality, the austrian adherents availed themselves, roused a superstitious and volatile populace to revolt, and the very streets of the capital became a scene of

contest between the austrian and bourbon parties. The explosion of the whole conspiracy was prevented by a timely discovery, and by the arrival of some spanish regiments, under the duke of Popoli ; but the general discontent was too deeply rooted to be easily eradicated, and the conspirators, foiled, but not discouraged, were watchful for a new opportunity to repeat their attempt with a more assured prospect of success.

This conspiracy, though discovered and suppressed, increased the impatience of Philip to visit his italian dominions ; and in requesting the consent of Louis, he urged with equal spirit and judgment, “ I feel more and more the necessity of passing into Italy and heading the army. Philip the second lost the Netherlands because he delayed visiting them till it was too late. With regard to myself, I assure you I will lose none of my territories for the same reason.”\*

This motive, and the impatience of Philip, outweighed the objections of Louis ; and he consented, though with reluctance, to a journey of which he foresaw the inconveniences. When therefore the business of Catalonia was concluded, he announced his acquiescence in a letter of advice.

“ I have always approved your design to go to Italy, and wish to see it executed. But the

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1702.

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 147.

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1701—1702.

more I am interested in your glory, the more I ought to reflect on the difficulties which it would not become you to foresee as I do. I have examined them all; and you have seen them in the memorial which Marsin read to you. I learn, with pleasure, that it has not dissuaded you from a design so worthy of your birth, as that of defending in person your Italian states. There are occasions in which every one ought to decide for himself. Since the obstacles which have been represented to you, do not move you, I applaud your firmness, and confirm your decision. I am persuaded that your subjects will love you more, and serve you more faithfully, when they see you answer their expectations; and that far from imitating the indolence of your predecessors, you expose your person to defend the most considerable states of your monarchy.

" As my affection for you increases, in proportion as you merit it, I forget nothing which tends to your advantage. You will see the efforts I make to drive your enemies from Italy. If the troops I destine for that country are arrived, I advise you to repair to Milan, and head my army. But as we must first have a force superior to that of the emperor, I think you may previously pass over to Naples, where your presence is more necessary than at Milan. You will there wait for the opening of the campaign,

and calm the agitation of the people. They ardently desire to see their sovereign; and are excited to revolt only by the hope of having a king of their own. Treat the nobles well; hold forth to the people the hope of relief, when the state of affairs will permit, listen to complaints, render justice, and display your goodness without losing sight of your dignity; distinguish those who have manifested their zeal in the late troubles; you will soon perceive the advantage of your voyage, and the good effect produced by your presence.

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"I have fitted out four ships at Toulon; they will sail to Barcelona to convey you and the queen to Naples. I see that your affection for her will not allow you to separate."\*

With this letter he detailed many necessary precautions for the journey, and hints for the arrangement of the government. As the Spanish ministers vehemently opposed the departure of Philip, both on account of the expences which it would occasion, and the danger of leaving Spain without the presence of the sovereign, before the new domination was perfectly established, Louis himself wrote to Portocarrero and his colleagues to obviate their objections.

Philip was eager to depart; and his impa-

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 189.

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1701—1702.

tience was heightened by the representations of the princess Orsini, and the importunities of the queen, who, with a pardonable vanity, was anxious to exhibit the splendour of her new state in her native country. But the difficulty of finding resources to maintain the expence of a regular court, the increasing discontents in the nation, the apprehension that the king and queen intended to abandon the country; the incessant objections of the spanish ministers, and particularly the secret jealousy of Louis himself, prevented the queen from accompanying her husband. It was resolved that she should remain in Spain, as a pledge for the return of Philip, and as a visible head to give more authority to the government of the regency.

Marsin was charged to announce this determination to the young couple, and obtain their consent; his instances were supported by a decisive letter from Louis. After expatiating on the various objections to the departure of the queen, he added, " if I loved you less, my complaisance would be unbounded. I should suppress the advice of a father when contrary to your wishes; what I now urge is the mere effect of my affection, and you must follow my counsel. It is better not to go into Italy than to carry the queen with you. You see the reasons, which I

March 3.

have duly weighed ; you will, I doubt not, take the proper resolution, and depart alone.”\*

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The advice of Louis was obeyed ; and the queen justified the favourable opinion which she had already inspired by submitting, though with unfeigned sorrow, to a separation highly painful to both. Her spirit and conduct drew forth the eulogium even of the caustic Louville, who expressed his surprise to see, in so young a person, the union of so much love, such reason, and such strength of mind, accompanied with so little ill humour, and spirit of contradiction ; and he quoted, with pleasure, her frequent declaration, “ I have no will contrary to my duty.”

Philip was not less affected than the queen. The letter of Louis excited a struggle of contending passions in his mind. He traversed the apartment with hasty strides, repeating the expression, “ I would rather you did not go to Italy than take the queen.” But he felt the suspicion which had been entertained of his firmness, and he disdained to display less decision than a princess of fourteen. The two letters written by the royal pair to the king of France, display a pleasing picture of the natural combat between affection and duty, in youthful and candid minds.

“ I think, Sir,” observed the queen, “ without

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 203.

†

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offence to decorum, that I may say, I love the king passionately, and therefore I cannot think of a separation from him without the greatest grief. However, I know that I ought to make this sacrifice for his glory, and remain in Spain to engage his subjects, who so ardently desire my presence, to maintain their fidelity, and furnish the necessary supplies for carrying on the war. I hope, that with the good advice of your majesty, and the strong force you have sent into Italy, he will beat the enemy, and I shall have the consolation to see him return victorious, to a country where we shall have only agreeable prospects. As it will be to your kindness and generosity he will owe his repose, permit me beforehand, to present you my humble thanks. Meanwhile, I beg of you the favour to give me the necessary advice for the conduct you think I ought to pursue in the absence of my amiable king: I assure you, Sir, I will follow it like an affectionate daughter, perfectly submissive to your will."

March 10.

Philip displayed considerable anxiety to justify his temporary weakness. "I have been much mortified because your majesty appeared to think I should hesitate to separate from the queen, when it was necessary to repair to Italy. Louville can tell you that having, two days after his arrival, represented every thing which would be

said here and at Madrid on the departure of the queen, and having asked me whether, if your majesty thought it advantageous for my affairs, I could leave her in Spain? I answered, though such a separation would be painful, from the tenderness I bear her, which is extreme, and which she fully merits, I would leave her, if necessary, for ten years; and that there is no satisfaction or pleasure which I would not sacrifice to drive the germans from Italy, the sole object of my thoughts and desires.

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"It is true, I was a little embarrassed, to know how the queen would receive a resolution which certainly could not be agreeable to her; but I have found that in spite of her affection for me, she has no other will than mine. So she determined to follow the advice of your majesty without repugnance, and even endeavours to console me. Her resolution is taken, as I have taken mine. I instantly declared that I would separate from the queen to satisfy the spaniards, since they so ardently desired it; but at the same time would inform my ministers at Madrid, that after having granted them every thing which they could reasonably expect, they should not presume to make further representations against my journey. I wait the arrival of the squadron with impatience."

The success, however, of this opposition to

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the journey of the queen, encouraged Portocarrero to persist in thwarting the design of Philip ; and he threw every possible obstacle in the way of the necessary arrangements, with the hope that chagrin and impatience would at length induce him to abandon it. But the crafty politician had widely miscalculated his project ; for Philip, after resisting the tears of the queen, pursued his design with a degree of firmness beyond his natural character. In vain expedients were devised to check his ardour, or difficulties raised with regard to money for supplying his expences ; he opposed decision to procrastination, perseverance to obstinacy ; and at length wrote to the cardinal in a style which announced his

March 8, 11. resolution to be obeyed ; “ I can give no better proof of my desire to satisfy the spaniards, than by leaving my queen. It is the greatest sacrifice I can make. I rely on the zeal of my ministers ; while I am ready to shed the last drop of my blood to prevent the dismemberment of the monarchy. Make no more remonstrances against a design so glorious and necessary ; from which I will never recede.

“ I have,” he added, “ too good an opinion of you to believe that because you disapprove my journey, you endeavour to frustrate it by withholding the necessary means. But if the people, on whom these supplies depend, should have such

views contrary to your intention, inform them in my name, that they will not succeed, for I will dispense with money and attendance. I will embark within two days after the arrival of the vessels destined for my passage.”\*

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It was in vain to oppose a determination so firmly fixed, and Portocarrero and the council reluctantly consented.

This delicate business being settled, other difficulties arose with regard to the form of the government, which was to be established during the absence of the sovereign. It was not thought prudent to leave the reins entirely in the hands of Portocarrero, because he was of so impracticable a character, and communicated with no one except Arias, and an obscure priest employed as his private secretary ; and because while he importuned Louis with the minutest details of government, he set the example in murmuring against the interference of France. He was besides so ungracious and unpopular, that it was the common phrase of the nobles, “ If the king or queen must be put to nurse, let the nurse herself rather govern, than one of our equals.”

Similar objections occurred against placing the supreme authority in the hands of the queen without limitation ; because from her extreme youth it was possible she might be influenced by

\* Noailles, v. 2, p. 200—215.

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1701—1702.

her own family, and at all events it would expose her to the odium of failure without securing to her the merit of success. Equal difficulties were started with regard to the form of the regency. She could not be made regent under the guidance of a single minister, for that minister must necessarily be Portocarrero. It was therefore finally decided that the government should be vested in a junta, or council, consisting of Portocarrero; Arias; the marquis of Villafranca, high steward; the duke of Montalto, president of Aragon; the duke of Medina Celi, minister for the department of the Indies, and the count of Monterey, president of Flanders. Of this body the queen was to be the head, with the title of regent, and the casting voice; and till her arrival in the capital, the conduct of affairs was left to Portocarrero. The three members of the cabinet who had attended Philip in Catalonia, were to proceed with him to Italy;\* and in the absence of the count of San Estevan del Puerto, his office of grand master of the queen's household was filled by the count of Montellano, a nobleman whose judgment, moderation, probity, and conciliating manners, had secured the recommendation of both Portocarrero and the princess.

In the midst of these vacillations, and at the application of the archbishop of Saragossa, the

\* *Mémoires de Noailles*, t. 2, p. 220.—*Ortiz*, t. 7, p. 7.

queen was appointed lieutenant-general of the province of Aragon, and commissioned to preside in the assembly of the cortes, both with a view to conciliate the aragonese, and remove her from the cabals and confusion of the capital.

At length all arrangements being completed, Philip departed for Naples ; and the queen repaired to Saragossa, having previously issued the summons to the states.

Although the people of Aragon testified more affection for the person of the queen, than the catalans had shewn towards the king ; yet the cortes were not less stormy and refractory than those of Barcelona. They indeed expressed great inclination to accede to the royal demand of a donative ; but they evinced peculiar jealousy in the most trifling forms, which regarded their own privileges ; they opposed every proposal which did not accord with their national prejudices and jealousy of the royal authority ; and the order of hidalgos, or gentry, in particular, which amounted to eight hundred members, might be compared in turbulence to a polish diet. From the accounts of the princess to the court of Versailles, we learn that this branch of the states was equally needy and venal, that a compliance with the demand of the court for a donative of 500,000 crowns would be almost a miracle.

But while the queen and her able adviser were

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April 9.

April 25.

May.

June.

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struggling against this factious spirit, the unpopularity of Portocarrero and the defects of the government called for their presence in the capital. In consequence of an order from Versailles, the proceedings of the cortes were hurried to a close. Some of the chiefs were gained, the disputes relative to privileges were suspended; the assembly was prorogued, and a verbal donative of 100,000 crowns was voted, not to the king, to avoid the delicate question of privileges, but to the queen. She sent this trifling supply to Philip, and took her leave of the cortes, from whom, amidst all this political discord, she had experienced much personal respect, with the semblance of good humour and satisfaction.

June 17.

"Here I am," she wrote to Louis, "out of Saragossa; and in the way to Madrid, in obedience to your majesty's commands. If I had remained a fortnight longer in Aragon, I should have succeeded in closing the assembly of the states, and sent 500,000 crowns to the king. But I was obliged to content myself with 100,000, and I sent them with much pleasure. I have great reason to be satisfied with the affection which the aragonese have shewn me; as it was impossible to transact the business with more appearance of respect and a wish to oblige me than they have done.

"I have learnt by a messenger whom the king

has dispatched from Naples, that he is gone to the army which he is to command. You may judge of my anxiety. I pity my sister, who is in a similar situation ; she has, however, the consolation to receive more frequent news from the duke of Burgundy than I have from Italy. Your majesty, who governs every thing with so much glory, has so much occupation that I will not make my letter longer."\*

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1701—1702.

Louis had already done justice to the meritorious character of the queen for his past suspicions. He had told Philip that his marriage was the greatest blessing of his life ; that so much good sense, meekness, and complaisance were never before found in so young a person as his consort. His letters to her testified the same admiration, joined with that affectionate esteem which she so highly deserved. To her request for his advice he replied, "I ought rather to give you the praises which you so well merit, than the advice you ask for your future conduct. I am persuaded that you need only follow your own inclinations ; but I will not withhold from you the information which I have drawn from my experience, though I am satisfied you will yourself anticipate my counsels, and leave me only to admire and assure you of my affection."

The queen was received at Madrid with a joy

\* Neailles, t. 2, p. 271.

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amounting almost to enthusiasm ; but with the exultation of this reception ended all her unmixed satisfaction. She immediately devoted herself to the duties of government, and assisted several hours daily at the deliberations of the junta ; yet great as her difficulties had been at Saragossa, they were still greater at Madrid. With that alacrity of spirit which she never lost, she observes, “ This occupation is most honourable, though not very amusing for so young a head as mine, particularly as I hear of nothing but pressing wants and the impossibility of satisfying them.”

July 8.

Indeed the difficulties of her situation would have embarrassed a masculine spirit and matured understanding. Portocarrero, though unequal to the weight of business, was yet unwilling to divide his power with others ; and displayed on numerous occasions all the obstinacy and impracticability which natural temper and disappointed ambition could inspire. The same endless jarrings as on former occasions existed among the other ministers ; and the admiral of Castile drew on himself the hostility of the whole body, by appearing to ingratiate himself with the queen and princess. That fulsome adulation which in the first moments of hope and exultation had been bestowed on every thing which bore the name of french, was now exchanged for the lan-

guage of complaint and prejudice; even the respect due to the person and sex of the queen was not sufficient to restrain those members who had been appointed at the instigation of Louis, from accusing France as the cause of all their national misfortunes, and declaring that in defending Spain on one side she ruined her on the other.\* This general dissatisfaction hourly gained new force from the precipitate reforms of Orri, and the public interference of the princess in affairs of state; while the embarrassments were increased by the necessity of continual reference to Louis at Versailles, and Philip in Italy, in affairs of the most trifling importance.

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\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 294.—Targe.—Ortiz. libro 22, cap. 1.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTH.

1702.

*Expedition of Philip to Italy—Transactions at Naples—Discontents of the natives—Not acknowledged by the pope—Repairs to the army—Events of the campaign—Battle of Luzzara—Hypochondriac malady of Philip—Letter of consolation and advice from Louis.*

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1702.

MEANWHILE Philip experienced scarcely less difficulty and chagrin in his expedition to Italy.

He embarked at Barcelona, and after a passage of seven days, landing at Baiæ, renowned in classic writ, made his triumphal entry into Naples on Easter-day. But his arrival was hailed by none of those acclamations or testimonies of joy which spontaneously proclaim the general affection ; for the crowds, who collected on the occasion, were rather drawn together by idle curiosity, than by respect or attachment to their new sovereign.

Even St. Januarius, the popular saint of Naples, or rather the spiritual guardians of his venerated relics, appeared to regard the accession of Philip with a sinister aspect. It is well known that the blood of the saint, preserved in a crystal phial, generally liquifies on being brought near

the shrine which incloses his head; and this ceremony, which is annually performed on his festival, is considered as a periodical oracle by a superstitious people, who regard the recurrence or failure of the usual miracle, as indicative of the pleasure or displeasure of Heaven.

Cardinal Cantelmi, archbishop of Naples, considering that the exhibition of this miracle would produce a favourable effect on the people, induced the king publicly to visit the shrine, in order to witness the liquefaction. But, notwithstanding the efficacy of repeated masses, the miraculous blood still preserved its solidity; and after waiting several hours in anxious expectation, Philip was obliged to retire without witnessing the usual token of supernatural approbation.\* To add to his mortification and disappointment, the liquefaction took place soon after he had quitted the church. This failure made a deep impression on the minds of the Neapolitans, nor was it wholly removed, notwithstanding the zeal of Philip led him a second time to the shrine, though in a less public manner, and the miracle was performed with the usual success.

Philip proclaimed a general amnesty to all concerned in the late insurrection. He diminished some imposts, reformed various abuses in the administration of justice, and procured a

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 236.—Targe, t. 2, p. 125.

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decree from the pope, uniting St. Januarius with St. James in the spiritual guardianship of the Spanish monarchy.\* He also heaped his favours on many of the nobles; and throwing off his natural reserve, endeavoured to captivate the people by frequent and public exhibitions of his person, and by joining in the royal diversion of the chace.

But nothing could warm the hearts of the people, or win the affection of the nobles. His reforms only spread dissatisfaction; his favours only occasioned selfish disputes and party feuds. He experienced as little encouragement from the head of the church, the feudal lord of Naples, whose approbation has generally been deemed, by the Neapolitan sovereigns, a necessary confirmation of their title, and a useful expedient to retain the fidelity of a people equally devout and changeable.

Louville was dispatched to Rome to announce the accession of Philip, and request the papal approbation. But Clement the eleventh, however favourably inclined to the House of Bourbon, was overawed by the vicinity of the imperial army, and declined taking a step which might compromise his authority, or expose him to the resentment of the emperor. He, indeed,

\* Memorial of the Chapter of St. Jago to Charles 3, on the Patronate of the Virgin Mary.—Busching's Mag. vol. 1, p. 202.

acknowledged Philip as catholic king, sent a legate to present the customary compliments, and received his agents and ministers; but no argument could induce him to accept the usual tribute, or grant the formal investiture of the kingdom of the two Sicilies. To give, however, a public proof of good understanding with the head of the church, Philip himself, at the head of a numerous cavalcade, met the legate without the gate of the city, accompanied him on horseback under the same canopy, and attended with him the public celebration of mass in the cathedral.

Notwithstanding all these demonstrations, the king and his adherents were fully sensible of the frail tenure on which he held this precarious throne. Popular discontent excited suspicion in the government; the suspicion of the government, in return, aggravated the popular discontent; rumours were continually spread of plots and conspiracies, and even an accidental whisper, or slight denunciation, was sufficient to spread alarm into the very cabinet. Many persons were arrested, and precautions on precautions were employed to secure the personal safety of the king; but from the fear of public resentment, or want of substantial proofs, no execution took place, and only a few were banished, or incurred the displeasure of the court.\*

\* Ortiz, lib. 22, c. 1.—St. Philippe, vol. 1, p. 155—160.

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1702.

The season for military operations returning; Philip with alacrity quitted Naples, where he had experienced only ingratitude, mortification, and apprehension, to take the command of the army in Lombardy. On the second of June, he embarked on board a galley; and after visiting the Spanish presidii, or garrisons, on the coast and isles of Tuscany, landed at Finale, in the Genoese territories, and was welcomed by that republic, with the honours paid to crowned heads. Here he received the homage of the prince of Vaudemont and the nobles of the Milanese; and gave an instance of his magnanimity. Some German officers, recently made prisoners, being presented to him, he said, "I should regret that my presence should be of no advantage to you. I restore you to liberty; return to the imperial army; tell my cousin, prince Eugene, that he will soon see me at the head of my troops."

After passing the Appenines, he held a conference with his father in law, the duke of Savoy, and at Alessandria, was welcomed by the duchess and the count of Turin. But harmony was banished from these meetings by the rigid rules of etiquette. In consequence of a dispute, on matters of ceremony, the duke captiously refused to assist at a public entertainment given to Philip, and the next morning returned in disgust to

Turin. From Alessandria, Philip repaired to Milan, and after taking possession of the government, went to join the army, which was already in motion to expel the imperialists from the duchy of Mantua.\*

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1702.

By a happy effort of spirit and skill, Eugene, the imperial general, in the spring of 1701, had traversed the mountains bordering the Vicentino, driven the united french and sardinians beyond the Oglio, and established himself in Lombardy; and the winter was passed by both armies in a vigorous struggle for the possession of Mantua, which was defended by Tessé with equal capacity and resolution. Eugene made a bold attempt to surprise Cremona, the french head quarters, forced his way into the town, and captured the general, marshal Villeroy; but this design was foiled by an error in the march of one of his columns, and by the spirited resistance of the french troops. After this failure he redoubled his exertions for the reduction of Mantua, occupied the principal posts along the course of the Oglio, and the northern part of the duchy, and gradually circumscribed the french garrisons to the two fortresses of Mantua and Goito.

Feb. 1.

In this situation, the enterprising Vendome was sent to replace Villeroy; and an army of

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 155—161.—St. Simon, t. 3, p. 183.—Targe, t. 2, p. 120—134.

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1702.

May 23.

50,000 men poured into Italy. When the season would allow him to act, he advanced towards the imperialists, drove them from the banks of the Mincio, relieved Mantua and Goito, and reduced Eugene to concentrate his force in the Seraglio, or territory between Mantua and the Po.

June 11.

Confiding in his superiority, he made active preparations to expel the imperialists from Italy. He left a corps in the north of the Mantuan, to divide the attention of Eugene, and cut off his communication with Germany ; and then directed his march to make himself master of the district south of the Po, from whence the imperialists drew their principal supplies. Here Philip, joining the army, assumed the nominal command ; and new enterprises were formed to grace the presence of the spanish monarch.

July 18.

The army crossed to the south of the Po, and descending its course, obliged a corps of imperialists posted near Bercello, to withdraw to Vittoria. A detachment was sent against this corps, and by a rapid march, under the most intense heat, succeeded in surprising them, and, after an obstinate skirmish, killed, captured or dispersed the whole. Of this action Philip sent a modest account to Versailles, which was eagerly published by the court as the first proof of his spirit.\*

\* Hist. of Europe, 1702, p. 286.

Every movement now became of increasing importance. The french detachments reduced the posts in the Modenese; and the army re-united at Testa to the number of 35,000 men. As these movements induced Eugene to pass the Po, and concentrate his whole force, amounting to 25,000 men, at Sallietto, Vendome resolved to profit by his superiority, and risk an engagement, or compel his antagonist to fall back into the Mantuan. With this view the french army quitted Testa at midnight, passed the Parmigiana and the Tagliata, and proceeded in two columns, the right conducted by Crequi, the left by Tessé. Vendome himself headed the advanced guard, which was detached to mark out the camp, and the cavalry scoured the country on the flanks. Arriving at the castle of Luzzara, which was garrisoned by 500 austrians, Vendome summoned it to surrender, but was answered by a discharge of musketry. Not inclined however to employ himself in reducing a petty post which must fall in a few hours, he proceeded forward, and ordered the encampment to be marked out between Luzzara, and a large dike bordering the canal of the Zero, intending the next morning to pursue his march against the imperialists, who, as he supposed, were still posted on the southern bank of the Po.

Meanwhile Eugene was accurately apprized Aug. 14—15.

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1702.

Aug. 1.

Aug. 15.

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1702.

of his movements, and formed the bold design of surprising the bourbon army, after it had occupied its encampment, at the moment when the arms were piled, and the troops dispersed for forage and refreshment. Such a surprise would have led to their total ruin, and chance alone prevented its success. When the camp was marked out, an adjutant mounted the dike from mere curiosity, and observed the imperialists disposed for the attack, the infantry lying on their faces, and the cavalry beyond in order of battle, partly exposed to view, partly covered by the intervening dikes and inclosures.

The alarm was instantly given ; the advanced guard resumed the arms which they had already begun to pile ; and Vendome sent pressing orders to hasten the march of the columns. The troops were ranged as they arrived, the left supported on the Po ; the right, where Philip assisted in person, extending nearly parallel to the Zero, and the principal part of the cavalry in an open space beyond.

Eugene, though discovered at the very moment of success, was not daunted or embarrassed by this untoward event. Aware that the broken nature of the ground would confine the conflict principally to infantry, and relying on the confusion which so sudden an onset must occasion, he ordered his troops to advance, traversed the

Zero over five bridges previously constructed, scaled the dike, and while he occupied the right of the bourbon army with a false attack, directed his principal effort against their left, with the intention of cutting them off from the Po, and charging that wing in front, flank, and rear.

Between six and seven in the evening the engagement began, and was vigorously sustained by both sides. Alternate charges and retreats took place, the troops joining wherever the ground would permit, with little attention to order, and in one instance they were so closely wedged together as scarcely to be able to employ the bayonet. The conflict raged with great fury, till night and fatigue separated the combatants. Eugene intrenched himself in front of the Zero, and the combined army followed his example, at a small distance behind the field of battle.

The duke of Savoy, who headed his own troops, fought with his usual bravery, and Vendome, who performed the part of a general and soldier, by his skill and activity turned the fortune of the day. If we may give credit also to the french and spanish writers, Philip in this first essay of his arms gave proofs of great personal bravery, as well as patience of fatigue. He exposed himself to the hottest fire, with such rashness, that after ineffectual intreaties, his

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1702.

attendants hurried him away to a place of greater safety. But he still hovered near the contending ranks ; continued forty hours without sleep, and almost without refreshment, and when at length he retired to repose, an officer was killed by a random shot in the adjoining apartment.

Both sides claimed the honours of the day, and both returned public thanksgivings for a victory. The number of killed and wounded, in each army, was nearly equal, and the loss in superior officers peculiarly severe ; Crequi and three french generals being killed, and Tessé wounded, besides many of inferior rank ; of the imperialists several valuable officers fell in the engagement, among whom Eugene laments the prince of Commerci as his best friend and ablest general.

Eugene indeed remained last on the field, but the fruits of victory were reaped by the combined army ; for the capture of Luzzara, Borgoforte and Guastalla, decided the advantage in their favour.

At the siege of Borgoforte the young king particularly distinguished himself. He visited the trenches, animated the soldiers by his presence and bounty, and had the satisfaction to witness the surrender. The remainder of the season was employed in reducing the other places held by the imperialists south of the Po ; and at

Aug. 17.  
Sept. 9.

the close of the campaign, the reduction of Governolo, by the prince of Vaudemont, cut off their only communication with the country on the north.

Two days after the battle of Luzzara, Philip quitted the army and repaired to Milan, on his return to his own kingdom.\*

During this expedition he experienced the first symptoms of that hypochondriac malady to which he was afterwards subject. This disorder, which was originally derived from an hereditary defect of constitution, was aggravated by his absence from his queen,† and by the chagrin and anxiety which he experienced during his stay at Naples. It was accompanied by the usual symptoms, a disgust for life, yet dread of death, with the illusions of a disordered imagination, which all the care and solicitude of his attendants, and the consolations of Louis, could not conquer. The occupations of the campaign produced a temporary relief; but at Milan the malady returned, and he carried into Spain the seeds of a disorder, which was never eradicated from his constitution.

Indolence and apathy were the natural companions of this distressing malady, and they

\* Different accounts in the State of Europe for 1702, p. 307, 340.—St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 168.—Memoires de Tessé, t. 1, ch. 6.—Memoires de Fenquieres, t. 3, p. 336.

† St. Simon, t. 3, p. 189.

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1702.

became still stronger, because from constitution and habit, he was taciturn and reserved. "Philip," it was justly said by a female relative who knew him well in his early youth, "has a good disposition, and is an excellent prince; but he is subject to melancholy, and ought to have about him persons of understanding; for the qualities of the heart do not always supply the want of those of the head. If you wish to make him speak you must importune, and even vex him, otherwise he says nothing,"\*

With a prince of such a character and disposition, Louis the fourteenth in vain employed parental authority and affectionate exhortation.

The following letter is one among the number of these earnest, but ineffectual remonstrances. "During the campaign, you have answered all the expectations I had formed of your courage; and, indeed, the proofs you have given, shew you worthy of the blood from which you are derived, and of the throne on which God has placed you. The zeal of the spaniards seems to augment in proportion to the glory you have acquired; and I give you with pleasure, before your return to Spain, those praises which I was previously persuaded you would deserve, whenever you made yourself

\* Fragmens des Lettres originales de Mad. la Duchesse d'Orleans.

known. From me such praises will not be suspected.

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" But while I praise your deserts, I am no less bound to acquaint you with your defects ; my regard for you, as well as your confidence in me, require it. No other person will tell you what I can say to you ; therefore you would have just reason to complain of my silence, if I did not lay before you the evil which you have it in your power to correct. We must only maintain strict silence with regard to what passes between us on this subject.

" It is not sufficient that you have displayed valour at the head of your armies, you must also, for your own glory, strive to re-establish your affairs, and will never succeed without great pains and extreme application. You yourself are witness of the numerous disorders originating in the indolence of the kings, your predecessors ; take warning by their example, and remedy, by an opposite conduct, the ruinous effects which they have intailed on the spanish monarchy.

" But I confess to you with concern, that while you freely expose yourself to the perils of war, you want courage to combat this odious vice, which overpowers and prevents you from applying to business. In a word, I speak it with pain, but I am informed that your letters to

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me as well as those to the queen are written by Louville. While he was here, I received several from you, and so I know you do not stand in need of assistance to write well. But the public will think differently; and you must not flatter yourself that the public will remain ignorant of such reports, which must be generally known before they can reach me; for none will be anxious to convey similar intelligence. Judge then how these reports will injure your reputation; reflect on the chagrin of the queen should she be informed of this want of your confidence and affection.

“ You have no enemy so great as idleness; if it overpowers you, your affairs are ruined; and then you will lose the reputation you have already acquired by your courage. These hints I ought to give you as well from my affection, as to remind you of your duty to call forth your own application, if you expect me to continue my succours. Be convinced then that I shall never feel greater joy, than when I see you, in every particular, such as I have always anxiously desired.”\*

\* Memoires de Noailles, t. 2, p. 255, 308.

## CHAPTER THE SEVENTH.

1701—1702.

*Impolitic conduct of Louis towards the maritime powers—Mission of d'Avaux to Holland—Origin and formation of the grand alliance between England, Austria, and Holland—Death of William—Declaration of war against France and Spain—Campaign in the Netherlands and Germany—Expedition of the allies against Cadiz—Destruction of the flota at Vigo—Defection of the admiral of Castile—Discontents in Spain—Recal of Marsin and appointment of the cardinal d'Estrees as ambassador to Philip—His instructions.*

PHILIP did not continue with the army till the close of the campaign ; for his presence became again necessary at Madrid, in consequence of the change which had taken place in Europe in general, and Spain in particular.

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When Louis accepted the testament of Charles the second, and placed his grandson on the throne of Spain ; it became his interest by a prudent and moderate conduct to obviate the jealousy of other states, as well as to lessen those apprehensions which his past aggressions had excited, and which were now aggravated by the union of two powerful crowns in the same family. But, fortunately for the independence of Europe, he haughtily despised this obvious policy ; he

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disdained to regard the feelings of other nations, and hurried forward to accomplish his project of universal dominion, equally inattentive to the maxims of prudence, and the respect due to the most solemn engagements.

Before the departure of Philip for Spain, Louis issued a formal act reserving all the rights of his grandson to the crown of France, in default of issue male to his brother, without adverting to past renunciations, or indicating the slightest precaution to prevent the union of the two crowns on the same head.\*

Louis was aware that nothing could more alarm the dutch than the prospect, however distant, that the spanish Netherlands would fall under the domination of France. Yet instead of sooth ing their alarm, he had not only taken forcible possession of the Netherlands, and obtained an injunction from the court of Madrid placing those important provinces at his disposition ; but he constructed new works even within sight of their fortresses, collected magazines, increased his army, and displayed proofs of a resolution to resume his former hostile designs against the republic.†

Above all, it was his interest to avoid irritating

\* History of Europe, for 1701, p. 2.

† Lamberti, t. 1, p. 475. Letter from the states general to the King of Great Britain, April 13, 1701.

England, from whose neutrality under the venal reign of Charles, he had derived such essential advantages, in his wars against the House of Austria ; and from whose complicated government and contending parties, he had little to fear, while he disguised his ambitious designs, or avoided trenching on her commercial interests. So far indeed had this maxim been successful, that he had seen a powerful and high-minded nation waste its strength and resources in internal struggles ; and all the abilities and spirit of his able and inveterate enemy, William, obliged to bend to the rule of a predominant party.

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Instead, however, of pursuing this judicious system, he displayed his controul over the spanish counsels by appropriating those sources of commercial wealth, which the two maritime powers had hitherto exclusively enjoyed or shared, by establishing french companies trading to Peru and Mexico ; by wresting from the dutch the Asiento for the supply of negroes to the spanish colonies, and by excluding the ships of both the maritime powers from the ports of Spain.

Interest and apprehension roused that feeling which had slumbered at the calls of honour and policy. The english began to tremble for the loss of their commercial profits ; the forcible occupation of the Netherlands at once called

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forth a sentiment of alarm and indignation ; the people, as if awakened from a deep lethargy, began to appreciate the danger, arising from the union of the two great and powerful monarchies, formerly rivals, but now directed by the same head, and actuated by the same spirit.

William profited by this change in the public sentiment, and though shackled by a tory parliament, and thwarted by perverse factions, found means to obtain supplies, and to mature the preparations for a contest which he foresaw was inevitable. By his influence, subsidiary treaties were concluded with Denmark, Holland, and Brandenburg, and essential aid given to Leopold in combating the french influence in the empire.

Louis hoped to weaken or divert this rising spirit, by recurring to his usual artifice, and sent his minister d'Avaux to the Hague to enter into a negociation with the states general. But times and circumstances were changed. The hopes of the monarch and the address of the minister were baffled by the cordial union of the maritime powers, and by a clear and positive demand of cessions, which would have frustrated all the plans of France. Satisfaction was required for the emperor according to the treaty of partition ; the french troops were to be withdrawn from the Netherlands, and replaced by spaniards, walloons, or natives, or by those of the maritime

Feb. 1701.

June.

†

powers, at the option of the king of Spain ; Luxemburg, Namur, Charleroi, Mons, and other principal fortresses, to be occupied by the dutch ; Ostend and Neuport by the english ; and the crown of France was to be precluded from acquiring under any title or pretence, any place or territory belonging to Spain, particularly in the Low Countries. Finally, the dutch were to be restored to the same footing in Spain, as in the reign of Charles the second, and a power was reserved to change or amplify these demands, if necessary, in the future negociation.

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At the moment when the french minister took his departure, William repaired to Holland, and speedily united the different branches of his great political system, by the grand alliance, concluded at the Hague between England, Austria, and the states general. The public mind was not yet sufficiently prepared for the developement of that plan, which involved the safety and interest of all parties at issue against France. Therefore this treaty was conceived in cautious and general terms : to secure satisfaction to the House of Austria for its claims on the spanish monarchy ; to wrest the Netherlands from France ; to prevent the union of the two crowns under the same government, and to hinder France from appropriating any part of the spanish West Indies.

June 14.

A few days after the signature of this treaty,

Sept. 7.

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Sept. 17.

Louis gave a new and public insult to the people of England, by acknowledging the pretended prince of Wales as king of England, on the death of his father, James the second, in breach of his solemn promise at the peace of Ryswick.

Dec.

This outrage kindled the national feeling into enthusiasm. William, returning to England, dissolved the tory parliament, and appealed with success to the people : at length the british monarch and parliament ventured to avow the objects of their policy, and to speak a language becoming a great and injured nation. Liberal succours of men and money were granted ; the recent treaties were approved ; the pretended prince of Wales attainted, and the celebrated act of abjuration passed, to exclude for ever the re-establishment of a family supported by the public enemy.

March 19,  
1702.

William, though declining in health, did not suffer this spirit to subside, nor the enemy to anticipate him at the commencement of the contest. He sent 10,000 men to Holland, under the command of the earl of Marlborough, and was preparing to organize and direct the operations of the war in person, when his death robbed the british nation of one of the ablest princes who had ever worn its diadem.

This event, however, did not frustrate the

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plan which he had so essentially contributed to mature: for the power was transferred to those who were equally able to fulfil his designs, and who, however differing on petty and secondary questions, unanimously felt the necessity of reducing the overgrown power of the french monarchy, and establishing an effectual barrier against its future aggrandizement. Anne, the successor of William, a princess of weak understanding, and secretly attached to the claims of her family, was induced by personal esteem, and partiality, to entrust the whole administration to Marlborough and Godolphin, one as profound in the details of finance and internal government, as the other was distinguished in foreign policy and the art of war. They found a statesman guided by their own principles in pensionary Heinsius, and, by his intervention, England and Holland continued as cordially united, as when governed by the same head.

At the same time, the emperor employed all his resources to forward the objects of the grand alliance. He gradually gained the majority of the german princes, forced the elector of Bavaria to enter into a treaty of neutrality, and drew from the diet of Ratisbon a declaration of war against Louis the fourteenth, and against Philip, as the usurper of the spanish throne.

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May 15,  
1702.

The same day witnessed a similar denunciation at London, Vienna, and the Hague.

France and Spain were not less active than their antagonists, in preparing for hostilities. Reinforcements were detached into Italy, and an army of 45,000 men collected to cover the frontier, on the side of Germany; but in the Netherlands, the most vigorous efforts were made for offensive operations, and the duke of Burgundy, assisted by marshal Boufflers, was appointed to the command of the army, which amounted to 60,000 men.

The promptitude of the allies, however, deranged all the measures of the bourbon courts, and prevented them from gaining those decisive advantages, which France had hitherto acquired, by a rapid and vigorous aggression, at the commencement of a war.

At the opening of the campaign, the duke of Burgundy made a movement against Nimeguen. But being forced to retire before Marlborough, at the head of 60,000 allies, he returned to court to avoid the dishonour of a defeat; and in the course of the campaign, Kaiserswerth, Venloo, Ruremond, Sevenswerth, Maseich, and Liege, were wrested from the french.

While the allies were thus successful in the Netherlands, the french army in Alsace wit-

nessed the capture of Landau, which, after an obstinate defence of forty days, surrendered to the king of the romans. It seemed probable that the imperialists would take up their winter quarters in Alsace, and that in the ensuing campaign, the whole force of the allies would have united in Lorraine, to assail the most vulnerable part of the french frontier. But at this juncture, the fortune of the war was turned by an irruption of the elector of Bavaria, who broke his constrained neutrality, and occupying Ulm and Memmingen, endeavoured to open a communication with the french army in Alsace. The danger arising from this sudden irruption was indeed diverted by the skill of the german commanders, and by the refusal of the swiss to allow the bavarian troops to traverse their territories ; but the plan of operations was frustrated ; the imperialists were forced to winter in Suabia, while the french secured themselves in Alsace, and detached a body of troops to cover their frontier on the side of the Moselle.

While these efforts were made in the Netherlands and Germany, a powerful expedition was fitted out, to execute a plan formed under the auspices of William, at the suggestion of the admiral of Castile, and the prince of Darmstadt. This design was to effect a landing near Cadiz, to reduce that fortress and the Isle of Leon ;

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Sept. 10.

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and, having formed a place of arms, to penetrate into the neighbouring districts, and rouse the people against a bourbon prince. The influence of the admiral, the connections formed in the southern provinces, as well as the general discontent, justified the hope that the allies would soon be joined by a numerous party, who only wanted the security of a protecting force to declare themselves. The fleet consisted of fifty ships of war, english and dutch, with a numerous convoy of transports, carrying 14,000 troops of the two nations, provided with every requisite for the enterprise. The command of the fleet was intrusted to sir George Rooke for the english, and admiral Allemond for the dutch ; of the land forces to sir Harry Bellasis and general Sparre ; the supreme direction was vested in the duke of Ormond. They sailed on the 1st of July, were joined by the prince of Darmstadt from Lisbon, and anchoring in the bay of Cadiz, endeavoured to gain the chief officers of the neighbouring districts, particularly the marquis of Villadarias, governor of Andalusia, Don Scipio Brancaccio, governor of Cadiz, and Don Felix Vallaro, commandant of the cavalry.

Notwithstanding the extensive preparations of the maritime powers, so great was the apathy of the nation, or the improvidence of the government, that in the first moment of alarm, the

marquis of Villadarias could only collect 150 foot and 30 horse ; the garrison of Cadiz amounted to no more than 300 men, without provisions or stores ; no magazines were formed for assembling the militia. In a word, at the approach of a bloody war, and at the eve of a dangerous attack, the country was in a more unprovided state, than an internal province in the midst of the most profound peace.

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But the queen, though only in her fourteenth year, and at the head of a weak and distracted government, displayed a spirit and resources worthy of a mature age. She convoked the cabinet, declared that she would herself repair to Andalusia, and perish in its defence ; she offered her jewels for sale, and by her eloquence and example, infused animation into the most sluggish of her ministers. All vied in offering their lives and property ; even the admiral of Castile, to avoid suspicion, found it necessary to make a tender of his services. Portocarrero raised and maintained six squadrons of horse ; the bishop of Cordova a regiment of infantry, and the nobles, ecclesiastics, and people, followed the example. Supplies were thrown into Cadiz, the militia armed by private persons, and a general rising took place throughout the country more immediately threatened with an attack.

All these exertions, however, would have been

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too late, had the powerful armament of the allies been promptly brought into action, or directed with spirit and prudence. But the very commencement of the expedition proved that the chiefs were ill adapted to the delicate task of raising and forming a party against an established government; and that the original planners of the design had been equally deceived with regard to the dispositions of the people. The British admiral was avowedly hostile to the expedition, and the principal officers were without concert or cordiality. As the whole progress of the armament had been marked by delays and hesitation, so long debates and tedious examinations preceded the debarkation, which was effected in the Bay of Bulls. The Prince of Darmstadt was the first who set foot on shore, exclaiming, "I swore to enter by Catalonia into Madrid; now I will go by Madrid to Catalonia:"\* and a manifesto was published, declaring that the allies came not as enemies, but to deliver the people of Spain from the dominion of a Bourbon prince.

The event shewed, however, that the object of the commanders was rather plunder than glory: The village of St. Mary, whither the citizens of Cadiz had removed their most valuable effects, became the first object of cupidity; the chiefs themselves setting a dishonourable example.

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 184.

The churches were violated ; the images and sacred ornaments profaned ; and females dedicated to religion exposed to the brutal licentiousness of the soldiery. A similar fate attended Rota and Fort St. Catherine, and some faint attempts were made against Matagorda, and the forts on that side of the Bay.

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The consequences of these outrages, among a people who more patiently submit to injuries against their persons and property, than the profanation of their religion, might easily have been foreseen. Those who perhaps only waited for the first signal success to declare themselves, were deterred by the hesitation and disunion of the allied commanders, and the odium excited by their misconduct. The neighbouring peasantry were irritated by the exactions of the soldiery ; and still more by their outrages against the churches, and objects of worship. The delays of the allies afforded time to secure the ships and gallies in the inner harbour ; while, under the direction of count Ferdinand Nuñez, they essentially contributed to the defence. Measures were taken to secure the entrance of the port, and repair the works on the land side ; while the marquis of Villadarias, at the head of a small body of cavalry, which he had suddenly collected, hovered round the invaders, and prevented them from obtaining the slightest intelligence from the

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interior. In this situation, divided among themselves, baffled in their design, if any was really formed against Cadiz, execrated and shunned like a pestilence by the people, and alarmed by the inconsiderable but active force under Villadarias, success was hopeless. After a vain attempt to force a passage into the harbour, they re-embarked in disorder and disgrace, and directed their course towards England, leaving in the minds of the people an indelible prejudice against the cause and connections of the archduke. The governor of Rota, the only person who appears to have embraced their party, was negligently left behind, and made an immediate sacrifice by his offended countrymen.\*

In the passage of the allies off the coast of Portugal they were apprised of the arrival of the flota from America under the command of Don Manuel Velasco, which being excluded from the usual port of Cadiz, had directed its course to the coast of Galicia, under the convoy of a french fleet; and on the proximity of the allies took refuge in the open harbour of Vigo. A resolution was instantly taken to attack an armament, which offered an irresistible temptation to plunder.

The fleet in Vigo consisted of 10 french ships

\* St. Philippe, v. 1, p. 181—190.—Hist. of Europe for 1702, p. 310—348.

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of the line, forming part of the escort, besides the galleons, which were likewise armed, and the cargo was valued at £.3,500,000 sterling in bullion, exclusive of merchandise. This valuable property might have been secured, had not the chamber of Indian commerce at Cadiz, from a jealousy of its privileges, forbidden the disembarkation. Every precaution, however, which time and circumstances would permit, was taken for its security. The ships of war were moored in proper situations for defence; a boom was thrown across the harbour, and the dilapidated forts or castles which commanded it, were garrisoned by the military. But these precautions were insufficient to resist so powerful an armament as the combined fleet, and troops who were stimulated by the hopes of plunder, and eager to wipe off their recent disgrace. The boom was broken by the first effort, while a land force scaled the forts, and the fleet advanced against the ships moored in the passage. All hope of resistance or escape being vain, the French set fire to their ships and took refuge on shore, and a similar attempt was made to destroy the galleons. In the midst of the carnage and destruction, the victors succeeded in securing nine of the ships of war and six galleons; but a considerable portion of the property was either sunk or plundered by the peasantry after it was con-

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veyed on shore. Having made a vain attempt to recover a part of the effects, the victors completed the destruction of the ships, re-embarked, and directed their course to England.

Although some of the merchandise and bullion belonged to english and dutch merchants, yet the loss was of serious consequence to the king of Spain ; he was deprived of the principal part of his american revenue, at a moment of great distress, and having lost the last remnant of his naval force, he was reduced to throw the trade of the colonies into the hands of the french, to the great detriment of his own subjects.\*

These public disasters aggravated and inflamed the national discontents ; and the most fatal symptoms of alarm and disaffection were heightened by the open defection of some principal grandees. Among these the most remarkable was the admiral of Castile,† whose vast possessions, splendid talents, and high descent, rendered him one of the most powerful and distinguished members of the nobility. After figuring in the late reign as the dispenser of court favour, and the confidant of the queen ; and after contending with Portocarrero for superiority, the accession of the new sovereign had exposed him to the

\* St. Philippe, v. 1, p. 201—209.—History of Europe, p. 387.

† Don John Thomas Henrique de Cabrera, count of Melgar and duke of Medina de Rio Seco.

vengeance of his political rival. Under the pretext of his attachment to the House of Austria, he had been deprived of the office of master of the horse, and the opposition of the court of Versailles alone prevented his exile. Though he deeply felt these mortifications, and continued his correspondence with the court of Vienna, he made overtures either real or feigned to the new government, and even ingratiated himself with the queen and the princess Orsini.

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These symptoms of reviving favour alarmed Portocarrero, and occasioned his disgrace. To remove him from the center of his influence into a species of honourable exile, he was nominated ambassador to the court of Versailles, by the express order of Louis, at the suggestion of Portocarrero. The consciousness of his own duplicity, and of the implacable spirit of his antagonist, excited his apprehensions ; he considered this appointment as the prelude to arrest and imprisonment, in a country remote from his connections and influence. He affected to accept the office, made preparations for the journey, and collected money and jewels to a considerable amount. He took his departure towards Bayonne ; but on reaching the point where the road branches off to Portugal, he devised a pretext for changing his route, and turning into Portugal, entered Lisbon with a train of three hundred attendants

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and an hundred and fifty carriages, accompanied by his cousin the count of Corzana. He was received with the consideration due to his high rank and powerful influence, and after declaring the will of Charles the second a forgery by Portocarrero, he transferred his allegiance to the archduke, as Charles the third, and published, in justification of his conduct, a bitter satire against the bourbon government. His nephew, Don Pascal Henriquez, son of the marquis of Alcanizas, was alarmed at this decisive step, and quitted him at Zamora, to return to the court of Philip ; but the number of his partizans increased, and his example was followed by his friend and confidant the duke of Moles, who filled the spanish embassy at Vienna.

The conduct of this powerful noble, the number of his dependants, the extent of his influence, and the consequences expected from his example, excited the most serious alarm at the court of Madrid ; his flight was regarded by all parties as the signal for a general defection among the grandees, and the prelude to a civil war.\*

This series of unfortunate events rendered the presence of Philip necessary in his capital, and he received the usual mandate of the court of

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 72—200.—Desormeaux, t. 5, p. 224.  
—Ortiz, lib. 22, c. 1 and 2.—Targe.—History of Europe for 1702, p. 396, where the reader will find his Letter to the queen regent of Spain.

Versailles to accelerate his departure from Italy. But as the attempts of Louis to rouse him from his apathy were far from being intended to awaken a spirit of independence, new and more refined precautions were adopted to sway his mind, and maintain the influence of France over the Spanish counsels.

A new principle of policy was now adopted by the French monarch. Hitherto the misinformation and prejudices of his agents had given an erroneous impression of the Spanish character, as if capable of yielding to every species of contempt and insult, and tamely submitting to any hand which might direct the government. But the recent events in Europe, and still more the rising discontents in Spain, together with the spirit manifested during the late invasion, had taught Louis to respect the voice of a people whose character he had misunderstood and despised. Orders were accordingly given to repress the petulance of Louville; and Marsin, who had rendered himself obnoxious to the Spaniards, found it necessary to tender his resignation.

The precautions which accompanied the choice of the new ambassador shew, that the French were now as attentive, as they had been before indifferent, to the feelings of the Spaniards. The cardinal d'Estrées was selected for the mission, as well in consequence of the political talents

CHAP. 7. which he had manifested in the embassies of  
1701—1702. Rome and Venice, as on account of his former intimacy with the princess Orsini. He joined Philip, as if from a motive of respect, at Milan; and was invited to assist at the deliberations of the cabinet council. Philip seemed to be charmed with his talents and manners; offered him the place of ambassador; and condescended to employ his own influence in obtaining the acquiescence of the spanish ministers. The cardinal thus appeared to owe his nomination less to the choice of the court of Versailles, than to his superior merit, and to the request of Philip, sanctioned by the approbation of his principal courtiers.

The memoir of instructions to the new ambassador, forms a supplement to those of Marsin, and shews the essential change which was now introduced in the political relations of the two countries.

It commences with a reference to the complaints against Marsin and Louville. " Since the departure of Philip to Italy, the spaniards bitterly complain against Louville; they censure the violence of his temper, his pride, and particularly his contempt of their nation. You will examine into their complaints. Should Louville have abused the confidence of Philip; should he have alienated the people from their king, he must be recalled. If these complaints are merely

†

derived from envy, he must be charged to restrain himself in future ; and you may usefully employ his agency to convey to the king of Spain, what you cannot communicate in person.

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“ Although the count of Marsin unites to his prudence all the requisite qualities, he has not been able to prevent the spaniards from considering him as one of those who have most contributed to prejudice their sovereign against them ; and he himself avows that his return to Spain would injure the public service, because the warmth of his zeal has drawn on him the resentment of the whole spanish nation.

“ The king, it is said, estranges the spaniards from his service, by a marked preference to his countrymen. It seems as if his subjects are insupportable to him ; at least they complain of his indifference, and many adduce this reason to excuse their return to Madrid, instead of following him into the field. They declare that since Philip has quitted Madrid he has ceased to use their language, and has displayed an extreme contempt for their nation. He is cold, the spaniards are reserved, there is no band of union betwixt them ; and their national antipathy to the french is increased by this partiality.

\* \* \* \* \*

“ The king must exert himself to gain the friendship of the spaniards. If he feels little

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regard for them, he ought to conceal his sentiments ; to recollect that he must pass his life among them, that he reigns over them. He must endeavour to form them ; to call their talents into action. They will become still more incapable, and their zeal will be extinguished, if they are not supported by the hope of obtaining his approbation. Spain has produced as many great men as any other country, and may yet produce more. The king is young, and if he applies himself will soon see a favourable change of affairs. His friendship for the french is laudable ; for he must never forget his birth, and indeed it is just that he should love a people who shed their blood for him. But his friendship for France ought to inspire him with the desire of promoting the union between France and Spain, while by openly preferring the french he will increase the antipathy of the spaniards against them, which is already too strong."

After praising the queen as she deserved, and declaring that since Philip must be governed, he will be better governed by her than by another person ; it is represented as a fortunate circumstance that she is attached to the princess Orsini, than whom " no one is more worthy of confidence, or more fitted to inspire her with proper sentiments ;" a wish is also expressed that the cardinal should act in concert with the princess.

"Orri," it is added, "sees the necessity of relieving the people of Madrid from the imposts with which they are loaded, and he has proposed expedients to this effect. This is one of the resolutions which the king of Spain ought to adopt and execute without delay; for the ill effects of the early reforms in the commencement of his reign are evident. The abuses of the state must be corrected, but cannot be reformed at once: utter ruin is too often the consequence of precipitation."

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The memorial concludes with expressing a full conviction, that the cardinal will display the same zeal as in his former employments, and with stating the extreme delicacy and importance of the embassy, as the reasons which had induced the king of France to select him as the fittest and most able person in his whole kingdom.\*

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 334—340.

## CHAPTER THE EIGHTH.

1703.

*Philip returns to Madrid, accompanied by the new french embassador, the cardinal d'Estrées—Situation of the princess Orsini—Cabals of the cardinal and the french agents against her—Correspondence between the two courts on this subject—Recal of the cardinal d'Estrées, who is supplanted by his nephew the abbot—Retreat of Portocarrero and Arias; favour of Montellano; and change of the spanish ministry—Disputes between the new embassador and the princess—Displeasure of Louis—Philip's account of his court—Recal of the embassador and Louville—Resolution to recal the princess.*

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Jan. 27.

PHILIP, returning from Milan, received at Genoa the disastrous news of the destruction of the fleet at Vigo. He hastened his journey, landed at Antibes, and took the route through Catalonia to Saragossa. Here he was urged to close the cortes which had been opened by the queen; but he declined a measure which was probably expected to lead to a demand of further privileges, and by this refusal, left an unfavourable impression on the minds of his aragonese subjects.\* Being received at Madrid with every demonstration of joy and affection, he resumed the reins of government, and hopes were cherished that his presence would suppress the contending factions, soothe the public discon-

\* Ortiz.

tents, encourage the loyal, and give new energy to every branch of the state.

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The crisis was now arrived which proved the folly of the system, pursued by Louis with regard to Spain. To imagine that he could direct with absolute sway the court of Madrid; that the king would quietly submit to be governed by the queen; the queen by the princess Orsini; the princess herself be perfectly subservient to the french ambassador; that the ambassador would act with the princess in confidence and concert; finally, to suppose that the spaniards, a people zealously attached to their own customs and laws, and singularly jealous of foreign interference, would, without a murmur, see their government modeled and remodeled, their finances administered, their customs violated, their laws changed by the french, for whom they fostered a deep-rooted antipathy, was the height of weakness and absurdity. Yet such were the expectations of a monarch of no ordinary sagacity, whose judgment was perverted by long prosperity, and the habits of absolute sway, no less than by the misinformation of his agents.

During the absence of Philip, the extreme unpopularity of Portocarrero and Arias induced the princess to transfer her confidence to the count of Montellano, whose strong sense, integrity, and moderation, were universally acknow-

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ledged. His office of temporary master of the household, had given him frequent access to the royal apartments; while his supple and insinuating manners, the effects of confined circumstances, had won her confidence and esteem.

Assisted by this nobleman, the princess had taken on herself the principal direction of affairs, and exerted all her efforts to eradicate from the minds of the Spaniards, those prejudices which had been derived from the misconduct of the late administrations. Proud of her success, she boasted in a letter to Torci. "My favour with the queen daily increases; and I scarcely know which of their majesties honours me with most regard." Again, "all is now tranquil; and I trust that the cardinal d'Estrées by his talents will complete the work of conciliating the nobles, and use with more effect, the arguments I have already employed to remove their jealousies. Behold, thank Heaven! *my administration*, if I may use the words, terminated to the glory of the queen. Henceforward, till you think proper to recal me, I will interfere less in affairs which do not regard me."

In fact, the term '*my administration*' was not too strong. The princess wholly swayed the queen; she was alone intrusted with the secret instructions of Louis; and it was scarcely possible to execute a most delicate commission with

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**more address.** Such indeed were the sentiments entertained of her services by the french cabinet. “ You cannot,” observes Torci, in reply, “ better terminate ‘ your administration,’ than with the negotiation which you have so successfully employed to persuade the nobles to meet the king on his return to Madrid. You indeed give me an opportunity to praise you only on that article ; while you merit the highest eulogium for the judicious conduct of the queen since your arrival in Spain. Judge, madam, therefore, whether your proposal to retire from Madrid was likely to meet with the approbation of the king of France, when in consequence of your complete success, we should rather have exhorted you to return if you had retired. Notwithstanding your threats to write no more on affairs of state, I trust the good of the service will induce you to continue your communications.”\*

Doubtless the praises of the french cabinet were as sincere as they were well merited ; but the arrival of Philip introduced a different set of actors on the political scene, and placed the princess in a new and delicate situation.

The cardinal d’Estrées, the new ambassador, was a prelate illustrious by his family and rank, distinguished for erudition, elevation of mind, probity, and liberality. He possessed superior

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 358, 359.

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diplomatic knowledge, and had matured his talents in such perfect schools of intrigue as Rome and Venice; but his very rank, and even his splendid qualities, were ill adapted for the office of embassador in Spain. His ecclesiastical profession and dignity rendered it impossible to avoid contests with Portocarrero and Arias for precedence; while his proud consciousness of superior merit, too often disposed him to look with contempt on his associates, and his multifarious knowledge as often led him into an ostentatious display of his superiority. Above all, he considered himself as the sole representative of the king of France, and as deputed not to receive, or suggest advice, but to govern at his own will the counsels of Spain.

He was accompanied by his nephew the abbot d'Estrées, who to equal pride and ostentation, united the presumption and inconsiderate ambition of youth; whose views were directed to succeed, or even to supplant his uncle.

They were joined by Louville, the confidant of Philip, and one of the chief officers of his household. He was a man of wit, satirical, proud of the royal favour, and with the vanity and petulance of his countrymen, decrying and deriding every other nation. He fostered a personal antipathy against the princess; and as the constant and confidential agent of the french

cabinet, he, by his caustic representations, contributed more than any other person at the court of Philip, to mislead the king of France, to foment the quarrels among his countrymen, and to heighten the antipathy which reigned between the french and spaniards.

A more dangerous member of this cabal was d'Aubenton, a jesuit, the king's confessor, who was jealous of the favour enjoyed by the princess, and laboured to exaggerate her errors, and misrepresent her conduct, hoping by her disgrace to attain his share of political power.

It was impossible for persons of such discordant characters and clashing pretensions, to remain long in peace. Scarcely a week therefore elapsed before the whole court was involved in one common dispute ; each individual striving who should most thwart or calumniate the others.

The princess soon discovered the views of the cardinal d'Estrées, and retorted his machinations. Notwithstanding her professions of moderation, the recent exercise of power had only served to quicken her ambition, and she was little disposed to exert her influence for the honour or advantage of others. "I perceive," she wrote in one of her confidential communications to the duchess of Noailles, "that my continuance in this country is absolutely necessary ; for should the queen, and perhaps I may add, the king, fall

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into other hands, they may be involved in strange embarrassments. My fidelity, my zeal, and my continual application to their service, their security, and their glory, cannot be found in another woman ; and I frankly confess that, knowing this and the satisfaction it gives to the king of France, I have not the resolution to demand my dismission in the present state of affairs, notwithstanding the injury I suffer in my health. Indeed the queen, who has found me worthy of her confidence, would consider it as a great misfortune should I abandon her."

She ironically touched on the vanity and ostentation of the ambassador, and displayed her reluctance to admit him into a share of her authority. " It is my earnest desire, that his eminence should receive the satisfaction which he deserves and expects, that we may remedy the inveterate evils of this monarchy ; that his vast, transcendant, and enlightened understanding may be rather employed to conciliate the Spaniards than to win their admiration. But to speak freely, I will not warrant his success ; for I fear a nation naturally proud will consider it as a mark of contempt, that France should send one of the *greatest geniuses in the world*, not to advise but to govern them, and that this measure will increase their aversion. For my part, I must often oppose, if possible, without

offending. I must consider it as a miracle, if I am not detested ; and shall attribute it only to the conviction of the spaniards that I love their nation.”\*

The smothered jealousy of the hostile parties was soon called into action by the imprudent eagerness of the cardinal ambassador, to display his superiority, and appropriate the whole direction of affairs. He offended Portocarrero by insisting that affairs of state should no longer be transacted at his house, but transferred to the cabinet council. He also broke through the rules of spanish etiquette, by requiring the president of Castile to pay him the first visit, and bitterly complained of Philip himself for not enforcing this pretension. He confidently presented himself for admission into the royal apartment, when the king was engaged with the queen and ladies of the court ; and to the remonstrance of the princess, who refused to permit such a breach of established form, he indignantly exclaimed, “ another time I will bring my baptismal register with me, to prove who I am !” He even resented the refusal of the same privilege to his nephew, whose age and situation did not afford the slightest pretension to such a favour.

By this presumption he not only occasioned a

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 363.

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total suspension of business, but united all the spanish courtiers against himself. Portocarrero declined assisting at the deliberations of the cabinet, in presence of the embassador; while d'Estrées equally refused to communicate with the president of Castile, or the marquis of Rivas, the secretary of state. In this dilemma, Philip, by the advice of the princess, revived the custom of transacting business alone with the secretary, till the will of Louis could be known; though he offered the embassador the privilege of a previous communication. This was not only rejected, with reproaches and even with threats; but the embassador gave way to the most vehement invectives against the princess, stigmatizing her as the "woman who governed and beset the king." His whole party joined in supporting his complaints at the court of Versailles, and represented the prudent conduct of Philip and the firmness of the princess, as the result of a conspiracy to overthrow the french influence, and unite with the enemies of the two crowns.

These exaggerated representations received more credit than they deserved. Louis, who hoped that the return of Philip, and the arrival of an experienced embassador, would immediately restore tranquillity, and who calculated on the most perfect union between him and the princess, was equally vexed and disappointed at

their misintelligence. He soothed the discontent of the Spaniards, and particularly pacified Portocarrero ; he recommended caution to the ambassador, and enjoined him to submit to the formalities of the established etiquette ; but he withdrew his confidence from the princess, without deigning to listen to her justification, or to the representations of Philip and the queen. His letters to Philip prove the harshness with which he reprehended the slightest deviation from his views, or the faintest symptom of a spirit of independence.

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" During the two years which have elapsed since you began to reign, from too great distrust of yourself, you have never yet spoken as a master ; you have never been able to throw off your timidity, although you have braved the dangers of conspiracy and the perils of war. You have scarcely, however, reached Madrid, before you are persuaded that you are capable of governing a monarchy, of which you have hitherto only experienced the heavy burthen. You forget the embarrassment of your affairs ; and you pride yourself in directing your counsels alone. I was far from suspecting that such a snare would have been laid for you, or that you would have fallen into it.

Feb. 4.

" Consider well whether you make a proper return to my friendship, by employing your

CHAP. 8. authority, for the first time, in excluding from  
1703. your counsels the cardinal d'Estrées, whom I have chosen as my confidential ambassador, to relieve you from the weight of business; whose zeal for my service induces him to become one of your retinue, when he might have enjoyed in tranquillity the reputation and honours which he has acquired by his merits.

“ But I do not mean to reproach you. I know your heart; and the better I am assured of your sentiments, the more am I affected by the false measures in which you have suffered yourself to be entangled. It is not necessary to recal to your recollection all I have done for you; to tell you that I preferred placing you on the throne to my own interests, which I should have better consulted, by accepting the territories assigned to me in the treaties of partition. Those territories, you well know, could have made but a feeble resistance; and you are no less aware that I have *never attempted to acquire any advantage* for the succours which I have exhausted my own territories to furnish you. All Europe has leagued against me only to overwhelm you; and Spain, insensible to the evils which threaten her, contributes nothing for her own preservation. The labours, the expences, all fall on me, who have no other view than to support you against the efforts of your

†

enemies. At least, your resolutions should be taken in concert with me ; and it is asking little of you to request that a confidential person, on my part, should assist in your councils. You have, indeed, had sufficient prudence to desire it yourself. I chose the cardinal d'Estrées, a man well skilled in affairs, and the most enlightened whom I could place about you ; a man whose experience and abilities will be most useful to you. For my sake, he sacrifices his repose, his health, perhaps his life ; with no other view than to testify his gratitude and zeal. And when you have most need of his talents ; when it is most necessary to take prompt resolutions for your security, and that of your crown, you display a fatal facility of belief, that in a moment, you can govern a kingdom alone, which would have embarrassed the most skilful of your predecessors. I call that by the name of facility in you, which in another I should term presumption ; for I know you are far removed from presumption ; but the effects of facility are not less dangerous.

" For this reason, your conduct alarms me. I love you too tenderly to abandon you. I shall, however, be reduced to that sad necessity, if you cease to communicate to me what passes in your councils. Now, how can I receive authentic information, if you exclude the cardinal

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from that participation which you yourself granted to him, as well as to Harcourt and Marsin, his predecessors.

" I shall, therefore, be under the necessity of recalling him ; because an ordinary embassy is ill suited to his dignity and station. But in recalling him, I shall consider what my own kingdom requires : for it is not just that my subjects should be ruined to support Spain, in despite of herself. It will be a vain attempt, if I meet with nothing, on her part, but contradiction and apathy, and on yours a cessation of confidence in me and my ambassadors ; in a word, when our resolutions are no longer taken in concert.

" Chuse then whether you will prefer the continuance of my aid, or suffer yourself to be deluded by the interested advice of those who wish your ruin. If you chuse the former, order Portocarrero to be admitted into your council, though only for six months ; continue also to admit the cardinal d'Estrées and the president of Castile. Do not shut yourself up in *the disgraceful effeminaey of your palace* ; shew yourself to your subjects, listen to their demands, distribute justice, provide for the safety of your kingdom ; in a word, acquit yourself of all the duties to which God has called you, in placing you on the throne. If you adopt the latter

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alternative, I shall be deeply afflicted with your ruin, which I shall consider as certain. At least, acquaint me with your determination ; it will be a slight acknowledgment of your gratitude for my services, and will give me a considerable advantage by the facility which it will afford me in obtaining peace for my people."\*

Philip was deeply affected by these cruel reproaches ; and his chagrin broke forth in the midst of all the respect and deference of his reply.

" Your majesty's letter filled me with despair, and I cannot pardon the cardinal d'Estrées for the insinuations which have prejudiced you against me. I know I do not possess his abilities ; but I will venture to assert that I am frank and candid, and that what I have presumed to write is in the sincerity of my heart. The cardinal has deliberately insulted me ; first, in his suggestions to your majesty, that I have excluded him from my councils ; secondly, that from presumption, I have taken the resolution to govern alone, and have fallen into that snare by the advice of persons interested to ruin me.

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" If he speaks truth, I deserve your majesty's indignation ; but the fact is, I have never excluded him from my councils, nor has any one laid a snare to induce me to attempt governing

\* Mémoires de Noailles, t. 3, p. 23.

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alone. The unexpected resignation of Portocarrero, I do assure your majesty, has occasioned the whole embarrassment. For I could not suspend the meeting of the council ; the ambassador would not hear of the president, but wished to enter alone ; the princess Orsini, far from recommending his exclusion, was of opinion, that we ought to pass no act without consulting him. He himself came every evening to give instructions on the routine of business. In fact the ambassador ought rather to thank her for the part we have taken, since an insurrection would have been the consequence, if he had insisted on attending the council. He has nevertheless joyfully seized this pretext for attacking her with tales invented at pleasure ; and his violent behaviour was only derived from a mere matter of etiquette, namely, her refusing the abbot his nephew the entry of the queen's apartment."

The queen likewise expressed her poignant feelings in a manner still more spirited and undisguised : " To what, then, has your majesty exposed me in ordering the king your grandson to shew me your letter ! Is it possible that your majesty should be so much prejudiced as to suppose him presumptuous enough to undertake the task of governing alone, to exclude from his councils your ambassador, to forget all your tenderness ; and all this from the interested

advice of those who are desirous to ruin him, by shutting him up in the *effeminate and disgraceful retirement of his palace* ! How durst the cardinal d'Estrées presume to write such falsehoods ? Excuse me, if I use that term, but in the grief of my heart, I know no other ; in truth, it is the only one applicable to the suggestions which drew from your majesty the letter you have written ; for not a single circumstance is true. Where, I repeat, did he learn that the king, your grandson, had the presumption to think of governing alone ? Did he occasion the resignation of Portocarrero ? Could he foresee it ? Could he prevent it ? Indeed, what has he not done to induce him to return ? The cardinal d'Estrées himself knew and saw this."

After describing the quarrel in the same manner as Philip, she continued, " Can the conduct of the king your grandson be called presumptuous ; and could it authorise the cardinal to assert that the king of Spain had expelled him from his councils ? In truth the king is most unfortunate in being exposed to the direction of so malicious a man ; for not satisfied with the falsehoods he has spread, he even attacks the honour and probity of the king, in wickedly insinuating that he is unmindful of your kindness. What an outrage to a young prince !

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“The same may be said of what your majesty calls the counsels of those who wish to ruin the king, by shutting him up in the effeminate and disgraceful retirement of his palace. What can be meant by such expressions! If I am the person whom he attacks, consider, I beseech you, the height of his insolence? To say that I wish to ruin the king; that I hold him in a disgraceful retirement! Can I suffer such an insult; I, who possessing the most amiable prince on earth, gratefully place my whole happiness in his glory? I, who concealed my tears not to detain him when he departed for Italy! I, lastly, who knowing him exposed to conspiracies and the dangers of war, suppressed my sighs, that I might not shake his fortitude by my despondency.

“The cardinal is equally unjust in his accusations of the princess Orsini. It is no more than truth to declare that I have always found her advice beneficial, and that her good sense and conduct have won the esteem of this nation. I will even say more: her zeal for your majesty knows no bounds, and her principal anxiety is to impress the king and myself with a grateful sense of the affection with which you honour us both.”

After praising Philip for his affability and attention to business, she added, “He daily receives the nobles, is constant in the exercise

of the chace,\* regular in holding councils, and punctually transacts business with the ambassador. Where then could the cardinal have discovered in the few days since his arrival at Madrid, that the king lives in the effeminate and disgraceful retirement of his palace? Alas, I have scarcely enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing my amiable king, before I am forced to share his grief under your terrible displeasure. We have also the mortification to learn that the cardinal, not content with displaying his triumph, even boasts that he has drawn upon us the reproaches we receive from the king our grandfather. To speak the truth, I abhor him as a monster. He does nothing but excite discord, and by the haughtiness of his deportment draws down the general hatred. He has alienated more hearts in the short time since his arrival, than your goodness had won since you took the crown under your protection.

" You deprive me of the princess Orsini. However deeply I feel this stroke, I should have submitted without complaint, had it been inflicted by your own hand. But when I consider that it is occasioned by the artifices of the cardinal and abbot, I do not hesitate to avow my despair. I intreat you to deliver me from the

\* The chace forms a part of the etiquette of the Spanish court.

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sight of these two men, whom I shall always regard as my most cruel enemies."

Louis considered this zealous defence of the princess as an aggravation of her offence, and was still more irritated by a spirited memorial which she ventured to address to him in her own justification. In this memorial she frankly avowed that Philip had acted in conformity to her advice, justified his conduct as necessary to allay the jealousies of all parties, and even to prevent civil commotions, praised his capacity for business, and detailed the advantages which she expected to result from his decisions. After repelling the accusations against her, she expatiated on the presumption and vanity, as well as the folly and violence of the cardinal and his nephew. She declared, however, her resolution to unite, even with them, to promote the honour of the king of France, as far as was consistent with her duty to the king of Spain. She reprehended the folly of attempting to prejudice Philip against the queen; she urged that it was wiser and more natural to secure a permanent interest at Madrid by gaining her confidence, than to embroil her with her husband by the agency of an ambassador, whose continuance was merely temporary, and whose influence uncertain. She recommended a proper attention

to the feelings of Philip, and rather to instruct him in the duties of his station, by teaching him to decide for himself, than to extort from him a blind assent to things of which he had no previous knowledge. "In this manner," she justly observed, "with his application and understanding, he will soon become as able as his ministers; and render himself respectable to his subjects."\*

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She did not condescend to advert to the charge of a connection with the enemies of the two crowns. She concluded by requesting permission to retire from her painful situation, as the only means to give credit and consequence to the ambassador of France.

This spirited remonstrance increased the displeasure of a monarch peculiarly tenacious of his authority. He haughtily accepted her offer to retire, and accused her of ruining his affairs by want of cordiality with his minister.

But the spirit of discord could not be allayed by the commands or interference of the french monarch. The ambassador having, as he imagined, delivered himself from the controul of the princess, next endeavoured to obtain the dismission of Orri, whose talents and attachment to his patroness he duly appreciated. He therefore depicted him as corrupt, overbearing and vexatious to the spaniards; and with his characteristic

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 52.

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pride expressed indignation, that a man of his consequence, who had visited Spain to do honour to a post which neither suited his age or station, should be thwarted by an insolent upstart and his unworthy associates. Directing his spleen also against d'Aubigny, the secretary and supposed gallant of the princess; he asks, "Did you not send me hither to resist the grandees, not to enter the lists with two *freedmen*?" He affected to hold the king in tutelage, treated both him and the queen as children; and filled many important offices without consulting them, silencing the objections of Philip by the never failing argument, the will of his grandfather. He did not scruple even to employ the assistance of the confessor, in furtherance of his designs, and induced the obsequious jesuit to prostitute the duties of his sacred office in order to alienate the king from the queen, and prejudice him against the princess.

But the very means employed to subvert her influence only served to prove its strength, and the necessity of her intervention.

The health of the queen was affected by her chagrin at the expected removal of her favourite. Philip displayed unusual firmness in enforcing the necessity of her presence; and every manœuvre of the cardinal and his partisans evinced the falsehood of their representations,

that the Spanish court and nation might easily be governed by force.

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The king of France was now reduced to the most perplexing dilemma. He was sensible that the departure of the princess would give rise to new feuds and confusion, and increase instead of diminishing the difficulty of governing Philip. He wished her to remain; but he considered it as unbecoming his dignity to desert his ambassador, and disgraceful to recal him at so critical a juncture. To reconcile these two discordant objects was no easy task, and it must be confessed that the expedients adopted by the cabinet of Versailles reflect little honour on their policy and address.

Terci wrote an equivocating apology to the princess, censuring the imprudence of her conduct, and giving no hopes of satisfaction; but at the same time requesting her to remain at Madrid. This was accompanied by a letter from Louis to his grandson. After enjoining him to follow the advice of the ambassador, he continues: "In the midst of your affliction, I perceive that both your majesty and the queen desire the continuance of the princess Orsini. I do not oppose your wishes; but for your own service compel her to maintain a good intelligence with my ambassador; for it would be highly inconvenient, if not ridiculous in the face of Europe, to change

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my ministers in Spain every moment. Should the cardinal d'Estrées no longer occupy that post, you must, for my service, and your own, pay the same deference to his successor. I entreat you, speak to this effect to the queen ; she is more reasonable than any other person. Both of you may rely on my ardent affection, and I am much affected at the disapprobation and chagrin which I am compelled to express ; but I should not love you as I ought if I disguised my sentiments."

These half apologies were not however sufficient to soothe the resentment of this high-spirited woman, who felt her power, and determined to assert it. She retorted the censures of Torci, by complaints of the harshness with which he had treated her ; and in demanding satisfaction for the recent insults which she had suffered, declared that, as she had received the command of the french king to retire, she would not remain at her post without an order equally positive. She proudly affected to overlook her past mortifications ; while she displayed her own ascendancy, and the misconduct of her antagonists, by dictating to the court of Versailles a plan of conduct equally calculated to forward their views, and save the honour of Philip.

" Your injustice towards me does not affect

me, but it excites general alarm in this country. If you are desirous to subject the Spaniards by force, give yourself no further trouble; if to unite the two nations by mildness, such conduct will overthrow all your designs. Messieurs d'Estrées and Louville, whom I consider as people marked for the vengeance of Heaven, rather than as reasonable men, will ere long, perhaps, convince you of this truth, if they do not follow, when I quit Madrid, the very maxims which they now impute to me as a crime. With their conduct they would not succeed in any country; but of all others, the Spaniards are the least likely to submit to such oppressors."

She combated the principle that the king of France was bound in honour not to disavow his ambassador, by urging that he would thus render himself the accomplice of all the faults committed either by ignorance or treachery. She proceeded, "Nor can I conceal from you, that the health of the queen is deeply affected; that she does not cease to make reflections above her age, on the mischiefs which may ensue from giving credit, in preference to herself and the king, to people who are eager to become masters, and who are interested to render them suspected."

Convinced that she was too far advanced to retreat with honour, she acted with the same spirit as she wrote. She openly employed her influence.

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to heighten the resentment of the king and queen, against the insulting conduct of the ambassador; and she ultimately succeeded in convincing the french monarch that nothing but her intervention could maintain the cordiality between the two cabinets. Louis, therefore, himself condescended to appeal to the gratitude and attachment of his ambassador. He exhorted him to suppress his own feelings for the public good; and to make the first advance for a reconciliation with the princess. The cardinal could not refuse to obey; but the symptoms of reluctance and indignation, which he suffered to escape him, neither tended to restore harmony, nor to remove the prejudices of Philip and the queen.

When he officially communicated the resolution of Louis to defer the recal of the princess, he magisterially asked, "if the princess knew that your majesties did not desire her departure, why did she proffer her resignation?" Philip replying, "She was aware that we should not suffer her to go:" the cardinal sneeringly rejoined, "I thank you, Sire, from the bottom of my heart; it is the first instance of your confidence since my arrival at Madrid. But I will take care to keep the secret; and promise not to disclose it to the camerara mayor." He then adverted, in the same sarcastic tone, to a publication, called the "Memorial of the People," in

which the princess was compared with the most illustrious characters in holy writ, particularly Judith. He observed “ the comparison would alarm me, if it were just. I should dread the fate of Holofernes ; but I will save my head by the respectful visit which I will not fail to pay her.”\*

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This reluctant and ungracious homage on the part of the ambassador, was not sufficient to satisfy the princess. She maintained the same spirited and dignified language, and refused to recede from her demand of satisfaction ; till, at length, the hackneyed politicians and proud sovereign of France, were compelled to bend before a woman, who had foiled and schooled them in the very moment of her intended disgrace.

Louis himself condescended to solicit her good will, in a letter written with his own hand. “ If I had doubted of your zeal and fidelity, I would never have advised the king and queen of Spain to retain you at Madrid. But being assured of your attachment, I have reason to believe that your continuance will be for the good of my service, as well as for that of the king, my grandson. You cannot better confirm my good opinion than by a perfect union with the cardinal d’Estrées, who is honoured with my confidence, and charged with my orders in Spain ; and be

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 65.

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assured that I shall be happy to acknowledge my satisfaction with your conduct, by new marks of my esteem and affection."\*

By this honourable restoration to power and confidence, the pride and vanity of the princess were equally stimulated ; and she exerted all her zeal and resources to convince the french court of the value of her ascendancy. Among various instances, in which she promoted designs hitherto attempted in vain, she prevailed on the king and the spanish ministers to confiscate the foreign property saved from the galleons at Vigo, and to transmit part of the money to France ; she procured the condemnation of the admiral of Castile, which had been hitherto retarded by the cabals of his numerous partisans, and his powerful family interest. She also greatly assisted Orri, in the introduction of his financial reforms, and she promoted the augmentation of the army, and the formation of a body guard, which had been incessantly demanded by the court of Versailles, but as strenuously opposed by the spaniards ; lest the increase of the military force should encourage the king to extinguish the last remains of their liberty, instead of contributing to the defence of the country.

But she gave a still more convincing proof of her zeal and influence. We have already men-

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 68.

tioned the attempt of Louis to acquire the Netherlands ; and the motives which compelled him to suspend his design. He again brought it forward at this favourable crisis. To clothe it with the appearance of disinterestedness, he proposed the cession of those countries to the elector of Bavaria, in recompence for his alliance and services in Germany ; reserving to himself the fortresses of Luxemburg, Namur, Mons, and Charleroy, which assured to him the possession of the whole, even if he had been less convinced of the attachment of the elector.

The cardinal d'Estrées was charged to make the proposition to Philip, and to shew that the interests of Spain would be promoted by the transfer. "These provinces," it was observed, "only serve to ruin Spain, without producing the slightest advantage. The communication which they formerly opened with the austrian dominions, and the empire, is now not only useless, but prejudicial, from their vicinity to the states of the enemy. It is likewise to be apprehended that Spain, by retaining the Netherlands, may ultimately be involved in disputes with France. But even should this cession be deemed a *fatal* dismemberment, the loss cannot be put in competition with the advantages resulting from the alliance of the elector ; nor with the compensation which France ought to require in return."

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for her expences. This cession will, however, be accepted as an equivalent for every kind of compensation ; although the king of France is not assured that he can maintain possession of the towns reserved for himself. He recommends strict secrecy, and does not require the immediate cession, but merely a written promise under the hand of Philip himself."

The cardinal, however, was not suffered to acquire the honour of executing this important commission ; for, before he had an opportunity to display his address and eloquence, the princess was apprised of the views of Louis by the abbot, obtained the written promise from Philip, and transmitted it to France.

But at the very moment when the princess had triumphed over the court of Versailles, she was herself the dupe of an inferior cabal, which formed the under-plot of this political drama. Louville, the abbot d'Estrées, and the confessor, however discordant in characters, had united to undermine both the ambassador and the princess. They had, however, so artfully concealed their machinations, or so adroitly profited by her resentment against the cardinal, that the abbot was received into her full confidence, and Louville was joined with Orri in a mission to Versailles, to procure the recal of the ambassador, and the nomination of the abbot.

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June 3.

In her correspondence with Terci, she observed "they both agree in their representations, though different reasons have occasioned their mission. Our situation is too wretched, and the cause too evident, to occasion any difference of opinion. Since Louville has acknowledged his misbehaviour towards me, I cannot sufficiently praise him; and I trust that his conduct will be still more gratifying; for he candidly avows that he has no other dependence in this country than to follow my advice, which he considers as the best. The abbot also knows the right path, but he has too many obligations to his uncle not to deviate from it occasionally, in spite of himself, and this circumstance obliges me to say, that he would do better if he were alone. His catholic majesty has occasion for M. Orri; therefore, Sir, send him back immediately. But, in the name of God, give credit to what he will tell you; and adopt some decisive resolution; for the evil is so extremely pressing that the smallest delay may occasion infinite mischief."

The personal representations of Orri and Louville were supported by the letters of Philip himself, who, in terms respectful though firm, appealed to Louis against the persecutions which he had experienced both from the french ambassador and from Portocarrero. He lamented his embarrassment in being placed between two

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persons of such opposite principles, and obliged to dissemble what he knew, in order to draw from them the necessary information concerning the departments of finance and war. "Their principles," he said, "however different, are equally adverse to my interests; the general disorder increases, and the present situation of my affairs requires considerable changes. I intreat you to examine the plans which Orri will present. I request a rule of conduct; and as soon as I receive it, I will fulfil your orders; by acting with the authority of a master. In truth, Orri is a wonderful man, for your service, as well as for mine. The cardinal labours to ruin, Orri to retrieve, my affairs. I find also in Orri a man after my own heart; from whom I draw, without parade, all the necessary information, and by his accounts, am enabled to decide myself, a mode I could never before adopt. I intreat you to overcome his delicacy, and order him to impart to me all his views, into which I enter with real pleasure."\*

The representations of the two agents convinced Louis that it was necessary to sacrifice the cardinal. He charged him, therefore, to receive Orri, on his return to Spain, with cordiality. At the same time he secretly assured Philip of his intention to recall the ambassador at a proper

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 99—104.

time, and to comply with his request in appointing the abbot his successor. But the indignant prelate neither attended to the orders of his sovereign, nor the dictates of prudence. He treated Orri with every mark of contempt and resentment ; his dispatches were filled with accusations and invectives against the upstart financier, and the domineering princess ; he did not even spare the king and queen ; and his bitter censures were intermixed with exaggerated accounts of his own consequence and transcendent talents.

This indiscreet conduct induced Philip and the queen to redouble their instances for his recal. "Every day," said Philip, "which he remains at Madrid, will do irreparable injury to France and Spain." The queen, in still stronger terms, declared, "I and my husband detest him so much, that if we had the alternative to yield our crown, or suffer him to remain at Madrid, I scarcely know which we should prefer."

At length, the unceasing solicitations of all parties, joined to the imprudent conduct of the ambassador himself, induced Louis to hint to him the propriety of withdrawing from his unpleasant office, by a voluntary resignation. The cardinal accordingly made a reluctant application for his recal ; but he accompanied it with a detail of his long services, and a repetition of his invectives

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against the odious ingratitude of the princess, as well as of the injuries to which he had submitted from Orri. He concluded with requesting a delay of two months, as a proof that he did not wish to desert his post in the hour of danger, and was not dismissed in disgrace. He recommended as his successor, his nephew, of whose duplicity and success he was then ignorant.

Sept. 16.

The king acceded to his application ; but instead of granting the proposed delay, recommended him, though in obliging terms, to quit forthwith a station where his presence was disagreeable to the king and queen, as well as detrimental to the service of France. At the same time, he announced the appointment of his nephew.

Nov. 1.

The recal of the french embassador was accompanied by an essential change in the ministry of Spain. Portocarrero, disgusted with the decline of his influence, and wearied with acting as the mere instrument of french agents, gave in his resignation ; and Arias was remanded to his see, by a papal order, obtained through the application of Philip. Montellano was appointed chief of the council of Castile, with the appellation of governor, and a seat in the cabinet council, and under the direction of the princess, exercised the office of prime minister. Even the marquis of Rivas, who had opposed the plans of Orri,

was deprived of a part of his official functions by the transfer of the department of war to Canales, a more docile dependent of the princess.

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Assured of the cordial support of her sovereigns, mistress of a dependent cabinet, and triumphant over the arts and authority of the court of Versailles, the princess wielded the whole power of the state, and formed the plan of an administration, calculated, indeed, to promote the welfare and independence of Spain; but, consequently, adverse to that despotic controul which it had been invariably the object of the french monarch to acquire. She purposed to employ spaniards as the organs of the government, to level all the distinctions of austrian and bourbon partisans, and to admit into places of trust, persons of known talents and capacity. She formed the plan of a junta, or council, composed merely of spaniards, and while she reduced the new embassador to a state of nullity or dependence, she arranged with Orri, her confidant and counsellor, the measures to be pursued in every branch of administration, not excepting even those which are the farthest removed beyond the range of female capacity, finance and war.

The cardinal, at length, took his departure, and the abbot d'Estrées was established in the office of embassador; but he had scarcely time to

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enjoy the fruit of his intrigues, before his duplicity and imprudence precipitated him into the same disgrace as his uncle. At the commencement of his embassy, he affected unlimited deference to the princess and Orri. He carried his servility so far as to consult her on the functions of his office, and at length prevailed on her to sign, in conjunction with Orri and himself, one of the secret dispatches, in which he detailed the reforms intended to be introduced in the financial department.

So singular an informality in diplomatic correspondence was highly offensive to the court of Versailles, and drew from Torci a reprimand which alarmed the princess. She was instantly aware of her imprudence; and to exculpate herself threw the blame on the ambassador. She complained that since the departure of the cardinal, she had been importuned to interfere in state affairs; she expressed her disinclination to intermeddle with matters above her capacity; and hinted her suspicion that the abbot had employed this expedient, to represent her as an officious woman, who had intruded herself into the business of his department. She carried her affectation so far as to require a positive order, restricting her to her peculiar duties in the queen's household.\*

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 171.

This incident became the germ of new dissensions. The jealousy of the princess was roused by the communications of the cardinal, who from Versailles retaliated on his nephew, by informing her that while he loaded her with commendations in his public dispatches, he filled his private letters with the bitterest invectives against her character and conduct, and was leagued with the confessor and Louville to ruin her credit. These suggestions inflamed her resentment beyond the bounds of discretion; and she obtained from Philip an order for intercepting the dispatches of the ambassador. The substance of his confidential communications corroborated the information of the cardinal. It indeed appeared that at the very moment when he was cajoling the princess and affecting to extol the new arrangement, he had employed the most disrespectful language against the king and queen, and inveighed against the whole system of government. He had likewise advised the king of France to disregard the clamours of the Spaniards; to repress the endless bickerings which agitated the court, by declaring that on the first rise of new disputes he would recall all the French without exception.

But it was against the princess in particular, that he levelled the heaviest accusations. He represented her as usurping the paramount

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authority, and regulating her conduct solely by the advice of Orri. To render her person odious, ridiculous, and contemptible, he entered into the details of her private life, and expatiated on her gallantries and pretended marriage with d'Aubigny her confidant and secretary.

So glaring and offensive a piece of hypocrisy excited the anger of the king and queen, and the fury of the princess. Philip remonstrated with proper dignity against the calumnies of the abbot; but the princess, too highly irritated to act with her ordinary prudence, sent a copy of the dispatch to Versailles, through the channel of her brother the duke of Noirmoutiers, enriched with marginal remarks, not less abusive and virulent than the original text.\*

Perplexed and indignant at these incessant wranglings, and mutual criminations, Louis threatened to recal all the french at Madrid; and demanded from Philip a candid account of the real situation of his court. The reply opens a scene of intrigue and duplicity, which excites our regret, that a prince of a candid and upright character should have been so long the tool of a selfish and interested policy, and the victim of personal feuds and petty cabals.

\* Among other passages of this curious commentary, St. Simon relates, that to the imputation of her private marriage with d'Aubigny, "elle mit au marge de sa main *pour mariée non.*" T. 3, p. 199.—*Memoires de Berwick;* t. 1, p. 231.



" Your majesty deplores the melancholy effects of the divisions among the french, and represents the necessity of their union for the advantage of our mutual service. You likewise require me to state what I have myself witnessed of the situation of my court and kingdom.

" I am concerned that you should have had cause to press me on this subject, which I wished to keep from your knowledge. I must then inform you that the cardinal d'Estrées, having employed his nephew and Louville to excite a quarrel between d'Aubenton and the princess, and at the same time instigated him to prepossess me against her, and to alienate me from the queen, he had the mortification to find that his schemes produced a contrary effect. For Louville apprised me of his intrigues, and after having disclosed the mysterious conduct of the confessor, recommended me to dismiss him, as the only expedient to baffle the designs of the cardinal, and enable them to live in perfect union with the princess.

" The resolution I adopted to dismiss d'Aubenton, alarmed the cardinal. Suspecting the interference of his nephew, he avenged himself by secretly acquainting the princess with his treachery, in vilifying her in his daily dispatches. She informed the queen, and as the intelligence reached us the very day in which we had written,

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to request his admission into the cabinet council, I was desirous to be assured of the truth. I accordingly detained the courier, and opened the dispatches, which were written to Torci, and found that he had accused the princess of treachery and even of treason ; though he knew that he owed his appointment as ambassador, and his admission into the council, to her solicitations. But I was still more offended at his artifice in pressing you to menace with a recal, those who did not live in good intelligence with him ; for he thus acquired the power of directing his accusations, and calling forth your displeasure against all whom he thought proper.

" I speak thus freely, from my natural aversion to lies and liars. I do not, however, require you to recal him ; because, not to mention the mortification I myself feel at being duped, I am well aware of the detriment which would result from the smallest change in the present situation of affairs. But I intreat you to exhort him so to act in future, that I may have no cause to complain of his artifice. I demanded him for ambassador, let him be so ; I intreated his admission into the council, let him remain. But let him act for no other end than our mutual service ; let him renounce the intrigues which he has employed to discredit the princess Orsini, who is so necessary both to the

queen and myself, and to ruin Orri, whose labours are so useful and so generally approved.”\*

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This candid explanation and the disclosure of the cabals against the princess, did not suffice to excuse her conduct, nor restore her to favour and confidence. A deep impression to her prejudice was made by the representations of the cardinal d'Estrées, who in the interim had been received at the french court with marks of high distinction. Her haughtiness during her temporary disgrace, the airs of superiority which she assumed in arranging and controlling the affairs of every department, and lastly, her indiscretion in intercepting, copying, and commenting on a confidential dispatch from an ambassador to his court, gave great and indelible cause of offence. At the same time the endless squabbles of the french agents excited no less indignation. Louville was remanded in disgrace; a resolution was taken to recal the princess and her adherents on the first favourable opportunity; and in compliance with the urgent instances of Philip and his queen, the abbot was to be removed from his embassy.

The unworthy machinations of d'Aubenton would have drawn on him a similar fate, had he not made an ample confession to Philip, and

\* *Mémoires de Noailles*, t. 3, p. 173.

CHAP. 8. accused the abbot and Louville of having misled him by pretending that they were authorised by the king of France. This real or affected contrition of an old servant wrought on the easy temper of Philip, and the wily priest obtained the pardon of Louis, by the powerful interference of his brother jesuit, father de la Chaise.\*

\* Memoires de Noailles, t. 3, *passim*.—St. Simon, whose relations must however be received with caution, liv. 6, ch. 18, 19, 20.—St. Philippe.—Orta, t. 7, *passim*.

## CHAPTER THE NINTH.

1704.

*Invasion of Spain on the east and west—Campaign in Estremadura and Catalonia—Capture of Gibraltar—Sea-fight off Malaga—Defeat of the french at Blenheim.*

HITHERTO Spain had been contended for at a distance; but it now became the theatre of a long and bloody struggle, and in the first moment of danger seemed in too weak and exhausted a state to resist the threatened invasion.

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A British fleet under the command of Sir George Rook conveyed the archduke Charles to Lisbon, accompanied by 8,000 English and 6,000 Dutch troops. The competitor of Philip landed at Lisbon on the 4th of May, and was escorted by the king of Portugal himself, who paid him the first visit on board of the admiral's ship. Both monarchs passed hand in hand under triumphal arches, and through the crowded streets of the capital to the palace. The recent death of the infanta, who was betrothed to Charles, occasioned no change in the sentiments of the king; the court mourning was suspended

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for three days, during which time the illustrious stranger was welcomed with illuminations and every species of rejoicing.

After a short interval, a declaration of war was published by the king of Portugal, and by the archduke as rightful king of Spain.

Charles having detailed his pretensions to the spanish crown in a long and laboured manifesto, declared his resolution to assert them, and encounter every danger to deliver his subjects from the slavish yoke of unjust tyranny, and the usurpation of the House of Anjou. He concluded with offering a general amnesty to all who should return to their duty within thirty days after his entry into Spain ; and denounced exemplary punishment against all who should persist in their attachment to the bourbon monarch.

The manifesto of the king of Portugal was evidently penned under the auspices of the admiral of Castile, and calculated to operate on the disaffected spaniards by depicting, in strong colours, the grievances and oppressions of the french government. After justifying the conduct of Portugal in joining the grand alliance, to restore liberty to the spanish nation, and support the rightful claims of Charles the third, it launched out into a vehement invective against

the ambitious incroachments and domineering spirit of France.\*

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Charles had landed with the expectation of immediately taking the field, and penetrating into the defenceless provinces of Spain, before the enemy could be prepared to resist his attack. The army of Portugal was to amount to 28,000 men, which with the English and Dutch would form a force of 42,000; and it was proposed to open the campaign early in May, by invading Spanish Estremadura, where numbers of disaffected were expected to rally round the Austrian standard. But numerous obstacles occurred in the execution of this design. A long peace had enervated the Portuguese; their fortresses were in a state of dilapidation; their troops raw and undisciplined; their officers unskilful, and scarcely a general could be found capable of directing military operations, even in a subordinate situation.

In addition to these causes of imbecility, the King of Portugal, by the attack of an hypochondriac malady, had lost that vigour of intellect and bodily activity, which had given splendour and dignity to his hitherto successful administration. The tardy forms of the government

\* The reader will find these two manifestos in the numerous publications of the times, particularly in the History of Europe for 1704.

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clogged every operation ; the principal ministers were in the interest of France, and the indisposition of the sovereign furnished pretexts, as it gave opportunities for neglect and delay. The horses which the king had engaged to supply for the cavalry, had been all purchased by the french ambassador before his departure ; and as scarcely any could be found of sufficient strength for service, not more than one third of the troops were mounted during the whole campaign. The army could not be assembled for want of magazines ; while the greater part of the clergy employed their powerful influence to throw odium on a cause defended by heretics. These evils were aggravated by divisions among the leaders. Schomberg, the english general, was disgusted, because he was not raised to the supreme command. The equality of rank occasioned violent disputes between him and the dutch general, Fagel, and the portuguese themselves murmured, because foreigners were raised to that authority, which they considered as peculiarly their due.

While the allies wasted their time in disputes and inaction, the spanish government suddenly assumed an alacrity and decision which had been long absent from their counsels. As a war with Portugal had not been foreseen at the commencement of the year, few troops were collected ; these, without clothes or pay, were thinned by

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frequent desertion ; no magazines were formed ; no pecuniary resources provided. In this disastrous situation, the skill and uncontrolled interference of the french agents could alone have overcome the apathy and indolence of the natives. Spanish troops were drawn from the Netherlands ; the few regular regiments were embodied and organised ; new levies raised in every part of the country, and the frontier places fortified. By these exertions, a force of 40,000 men being speedily collected, and the duke of Berwick, who was nominated to the chief command, entered Spain at the head of 12,000 french. His subordinate generals were spanish subjects, the marquis of Villadarias, the count of Aguilar and the prince of Tzerclaes Tilly. While he was organising his forces and forming plans of operation, the industry and resources of Orri were employed to furnish the means of execution, by establishing magazines and collecting pecuniary supplies.\*

A body of 8,000 men was formed in the north to act against the portuguese in Beira under Las

\* St. Simon has written a whole chapter against what he calls *Les Friponneries d'Orri*, in which, on the authority of general Puysegur, he accuses him of rapacity and corruption ; but the testimony of Berwick himself does ample justice to the merits and services of Orri. This, with many similar examples, proves how much caution is necessary in believing the assertions of the caustic St. Simon. St. Simon, t. 3, p. 197.—*Memoires de Berwick*, t. 1, p. 227.

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Minas ; the principal force, amounting to 15,000 men, was collected in the center near Alcantara, and a third corps of 5,000 was formed in the south under the prince of Tzerclaes. While the northern corps made a diversion in Beira, it was intended, with the centre and left, to open the portuguese frontier by the capture of the principal fortresses above and below the Tagus ; to unite at Villavelha, and descend the Tagus towards the capital.

All things being ready for action, Philip, after publishing a declaration of war, joined Berwick, who commanded the principal army, near Alcantara, and the troops were put in motion in the beginning of May. Berwick captured, almost without resistance, Salvatierra, Peña Garcia, Segura, Rosmarinhos, Monte Santo, and Castel Branco. At the last place, a contest arose between the french and spaniards, for the division of the spoil, in which several soldiers were killed, and even the person of Philip was exposed to imminent danger. The tumult being happily checked, the central army pursued its progress ; but the prince of Tzerclaes failing to execute his part of the plan, Berwick left a corps of 3,000 men, under Ronquillo, on the side of Castel Branco, and, advancing across the Tagus, formed the intended junction near Abrantes. This fortress, the key of the Tagus, though stronger

than those already captured, was reduced with as little difficulty.

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The delay, however, occasioned by this want of concert, frustrated the whole design. While the dutch took up a strong position near Abrantes, and the english maintained themselves on the side of Elvas ; the portuguese not only repulsed the corps on the north, but suddenly advancing towards the Tagus, recovered Monte Santo, drove back the corps at Castel Branco, and endangered the communications of the gallo-spanish army. This movement again drew Berwick to the north of the Tagus ; and being unable to bring the enemy to an engagement, he confined his operations to the reduction of Castel Vida. The summer heats soon afterwards compelling both armies to retire into quarters, Philip returned to Madrid.

July 16.

After a repose of a few weeks, both parties were again called into action. A reinforcement of 4,000 english arrived, and Schomberg was superseded by the earl of Galway. Charles, and the king of Portugal, who had somewhat recovered from his infirmity, took the field, with the intention of pushing the war on the side of Almeida, and advancing through a rich and defenceless country directly to Madrid. They defeated the corps of observation on the north, with considerable loss ; captured Valencia de

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Alcantara, and directed their march through Guarda, towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Their measures were frustrated by the skill and activity of Berwick. He left a corps to cover the country on the side of the Tagus, anticipated the enemy at Ciudad Rodrigo, and though inferior in force, succeeded in guarding the banks of the Agueda. After a weak attempt, which can hardly be called an attack, the scarcity of provisions, joined with the autumnal rains, forced the allies to separate, and Berwick having maintained the safety of the Spanish frontier, followed their example.\*

May.

While these transactions were passing on the western frontier of Spain, the eastern and southern parts were exposed to similar dangers, and the fleets of England and France encountered in the Mediterranean. Encouraged by the representations of the prince of Darmstadt, that Catalonia was ripe for insurrection, and that Barcelona in particular waited only for the protection of a naval and military force to declare in favour of Charles, sir George Rook sailed from Lisbon, conveying the prince, with 4,000 troops, and appeared off the port. The prince landing with only 3,000 men, the austrian partisans, who had expected an army of 20,000 headed by Charles himself, were deterred from rising by the small-

\* Memoires de Berwick, t. 1, p. 227—270.—St. Simon, t. 1, p. 225—290.

ness of this force. Don Francisco Velasco, the viceroy, by his vigorous measures, not only checked the first symptoms of insurrection, but by his promises and threats even induced some of the discontented to betray the conspiracy, and many to join the party for the established government. The hopes which had given rise to this expedition being frustrated, the english admiral quitted a station where he had no prospect of success, and where he hourly expected to be attacked by a french squadron.

The satisfaction arising from this successful resistance, was soon damped by the capture of Gibraltar. This important fortress, which might have defied all attacks, was almost totally unprovided with artillery and ammunition, and guarded by a garrison of scarcely an hundred effective men, under D. Diego de Salmas. It was in this defenceless state when the english fleet appeared in the bay, on returning from Barcelona. The troops were landed on the neck to cut off all communication with the land, and, while batteries were opened against the town, a party of english sailors, with their characteristic agility, scaled a part of the rock which was deemed inaccessible, and by their unexpected appearance, struck a panic into the garrison. All resistance being deemed fruitless, the governor capitulated after a defence of only two days ; the fortress

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was occupied in the name of the queen of Great Britain ; the prince of Darmstadt, with 2,000 men, was left to guard the conquest ; and thus this important place, one of the bulwarks of Andalusia, and the key of the Mediterranean, was totally lost to Spain. They afterwards made an attempt against Ceuta ; but the marquis de Gironella, the governor, who had bravely repulsed the attacks of the moors, defended it with equal success against the english.\*

Aug. 24.

To protect the spanish coasts, and secure the navigation of the Mediterranean, Louis had fitted out a considerable squadron at Toulon, which was commanded by his natural son, the count of Toulouse, high admiral of France ; and he detached a second from Brest, which, escaping the english fleet, reached Toulon soon after the capture of Gibraltar. On this junction, the count of Toulouse sailed with fifty-two ships of the line, hoping to overpower the hostile fleet, or at least to recover Gibraltar. They met off Malaga, nearly equal in strength, and the long expected engagement took place. But neither seemed anxious to engage in a close fight, and after a distant and desultory, though long, cannonade, night separated the combatants. Much damage was sustained by both parties ; the

\* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 50.—History of Europe, 1704, p. 364.—St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 271.

french lost 1,500 men, yet not a single ship was taken or destroyed.

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On the ensuing morning both fleets were still in sight of each other ; but neither shewed any resolution to renew the conflict. The french, however, first retired, and left the sea to the english. Both parties published pompous accounts of the engagement, and both claimed the victory ; yet, though it was not immediately decisive, the french experienced the consequences of a defeat. Their ships were obliged to return to port, and their resources being drained to maintain the contest by land, they were unable to send out a squadron sufficiently powerful to dispute the mastery of the sea, during the rest of the war.\*

On both sides the most erroneous and contradictory accounts were given of an engagement, which does not reflect great honour on either. On the part of the english, sir Cloutesley Shovel distinguished himself ; on that of the french, the count of Toulouse displayed great bravery ; he was slightly wounded in the head, and five of his pages were killed by his side.

The internal distress of Spain was rendered still more alarming by the misfortunes which fell with accumulated force on the House of Bourbon.

\* See the different accounts of this engagement in the History of Europe, 1704, p. 456—478—480.

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In the Netherlands, the military operations were merely defensive; in Italy the french consumed the whole campaign in the capture of the three fortresses of Vercelli, Ivrea, and Susa, which may be considered as the out-works of Turin.

But it was in Germany that a fatal blow was struck to that edifice of power, the superstructure of which had employed so long a period, and called forth such ardent exertions. Louis, indeed, made strenuous preparations to fulfil the plan so unexpectedly baffled in the preceding campaign. While, on one side, the hungarian insurgents over-ran the greater part of Hungary, penetrated into Austria, and insulted even the capital, he strengthened the force already established in the heart of Bavaria, and collected vast levies to pour new armies into Germany, in order to carry the war at once into the austrian dominions, and dictate peace under the walls of Vienna.

Early in the spring 15,000 men traversed the black forest, and united with the gallo-bavarian army, which was already superior to the imperialists. Another body of 45,000 men was assembled on the Rhine, under Tallard, to watch the allies, who had threatened an invasion by the Moselle, and to assist the attack on the side of Bavaria, by continual reinforcements, and by protecting the communications with the french frontier.

But the allies, under the direction of Eugene and Marlborough, had now assumed that regularity of design and vigour of execution, which seemed hitherto the portion of the French alone. Leopold suspended the progress of the rebels in Hungary, by alternately employing negotiation and force; and succeeded in checking their incursions, though he was too weak to crush the rebellion. The treasure and power of England were exerted to rescue the House of Austria from impending ruin; and by British influence, the Dutch and the German states were united against the common enemy.

Nearly at the same time, 22,000 men from the Netherlands, under Marlborough, and 14,000 from the Rhine, directed their march towards the Bavarian frontier, to unite with the Germans, under the Margrave of Baden, while Eugene, with 15,000 Germans, remained on the Rhine, to watch the movements of Tallard. Deceiving the enemy by menacing the frontier of Lorraine, Marlborough pursued his march unmolested, and joined the Margrave in the vicinity of Ulm. With a force, which amounted to above 45,000 men, they baffled the designs of the Gallo-Bavarians, broke through their system of defence by defeating 15,000 men at Schellenberg, on the bank of the Danube, and after a fruitless attempt

CHAP. 9. to detach the elector, carried the war to the very  
1704. walls of his capital.

The rapid advance of Tallard, with 30,000 men, seemed again likely to change the fortune of the campaign ; but the same skill and good fortune on the side of the allies, maintained the superiority. Eugene, with 15,000 men, followed the french from the Rhine, and notwithstanding his inferior numbers, and the central position of the enemy, succeeded in uniting with Marlborough near Hochstedt, at the very moment when the force of the gallo-bavarians was augmented by the army of Tallard. Conscious that every hour of delay would augment the advantages of the enemy, the allied generals advanced against their army, which they found strongly posted near Blenheim, on the bank of the Danube. They overcame all the obstacles of a difficult and morassy ground, attacked the enemy, and after a most desperate resistance, gained a decisive victory. The french were totally broken and defeated, and lost 40,000 men, including 13,000 prisoners, with Tallard himself, who was captured as he was attempting to rally the fugitives. Marsin and the elector with difficulty collected their scattered forces, and fled towards the Rhine, with the diminished remnant of that army which had threatened Germany with

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bondage, and the House of Austria with destruction.\*

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The effect of this defeat was felt in every quarter of Europe; but in Spain it produced a greater revulsion of sentiment than almost any other event of the war. It was hailed by the disaffected, as the downfall of French power; and even the loyal, hopeless of protection from France, became lukewarm towards the prince of their choice.

\* State of Europe for 1704, p. 314—407.—Tindal, v. 16, p. 27.—House of Austria, vol. 1, ch. 70.

## CHAPTER THE TENTH.

1704—1705.

*Arrangements for the recal of the princess Orsini—Correspondence on this subject, between Louis, his ambassador, and Philip—Departure of the princess from Madrid—Indignation of the queen—Arrival of the duke of Grammont, the new ambassador—Successful cabals to procure the return of the princess—Her reconciliation with the court of France—Recal of Grammont—Disgrace of Daubenton—Amelot appointed as the new ambassador, and preparations for the restoration of the princess to power.*

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THE tumult of military operations did not allay the internal feuds of the cabinet.

Louis had no sooner formed the resolution to recal the princess, than he prepared the means of execution with the same precaution and secrecy, as if the fate of his empire depended on success. He endeavoured to lull her into security by the most extravagant flattery, and to an appeal which she made to his judgment, replied by his minister, among other expressions of confidence and esteem, “Enlightened and well-intentioned as you are, whatever you do will always be for the best.”

From the affectionate attachment of the queen to her favourite, it was deemed necessary to remove Philip beyond the sphere of her influence.

He was therefore ordered to join the army collected for the invasion of Portugal, and all the solicitations of the queen to accompany him were rejected.

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Philip being arrived at Placentia, the plan of operations, as it was not unaptly called, was communicated to the abbot d'Estrées by Louis himself. "The complaints," he wrote, "against the princess having so much increased, it is necessary to come to a final determination; and the evils derived from her continuance at Madrid are so evident that it is now time to remove her. I should not have so long delayed taking this resolution, had I consulted the good of my service; but it was necessary to wait till the king had retired from Madrid, that his sensibility to the tears of the queen might not raise obstacles to the design, and that his cooler reason might have time to operate."

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He then commanded d'Estrées to concert with Berwick and the marquis of Rivas the most proper means to persuade Philip, and to ensure the prompt execution of the design. "If," he continued, "the king consents, of which a doubt can scarcely be admitted, the cardinal Portocarrero, and the marquis of Mancera, or some other minister at Madrid, must adopt the necessary measures secretly, and before the queen can be apprised, by presenting to her a letter from

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Philip himself, enjoining her to obey my orders without hesitation. Endeavour also to prevent the princess from seeing the queen, and if that cannot be done, at least render their interview as short as possible, and enforce her departure on the following morning. She may remain eight days at Alcala to prepare for her journey.

“ Should the king resist, represent to him the burthens of the war, which I am waging for his interest. Do not say I will abandon him, for that he will not believe ; but make him sensible that notwithstanding my affection, I may be induced, if he does not comply, to make peace at the expence of Spain ; that I may at length become weary of supporting a kingdom, in which I find nothing but disorders and contradiction. Let Berwick make the same representations, in a private audience. In a word, I must and will be obeyed ; my own honour and the interest of my grandson, as well as that of his throne, are pledged for the success.”

The abbot, however, had no cause to triumph ; for in the same letter, the king informed him of his intended recal, as necessary to appease the king and queen, though he softened the unwelcome declaration with expressions of satisfaction, and promises of future reward.

March 19.

“ I have given you,” he said, in his mandate to Philip, “ many proofs of my friendship ; but

I never gave you a stronger than the disagreeable task which I now fulfil, in requesting you to dismiss the princess Orsini without a moment's delay. Do not hesitate to take this resolution ; your safety depends upon it. Contribute at least to quiet the interior of Spain, while I employ all my strength in carrying on a war to maintain your interests without. The abbot d'Estrées has my instructions. I refer you to him ; and I am persuaded that you will believe what I say, when ruin will be the consequence of opposition to my advice. Communicate this letter to the queen. I likewise inclose one for her.

" Your majesty must immediately appoint a new camerara-mayor, from four persons whom the abbot d'Estrées will name. I purpose to send you another embassador, and I hope he will please you. I can sincerely assure you that I omit nothing which may contribute to your interest and satisfaction."\*

Philip, however afflicted, made no resistance to this mandate ; he only regretted and lamented the effect it might produce on the queen ; and the marquis of Chateauneuf, who was returning from his embassy at Lisbon, was charged to deliver to her the order of Louis, which was expressed in cold and decisive terms. The princess was directed to take the route through

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 191.

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CHAP. 10. the south of France, and from thence to repair  
1704—1705. to Rome.

On this trying occasion the queen displayed a degree of coolness and discretion which seemed incompatible with the natural vivacity of her temper. She bowed in submissive though sullen acquiescence, to the decree which separated her from her friend and confidant, who had assisted in sharing the burthens of a laborious government, whose spirit and talents had enlivened the tedium of her monotonous life.

The princess also received the unexpected mandate for her dismission and banishment into Italy, with dignity and fortitude. She made no petulant complaint nor shewed the least hesitation. On the ensuing morning she departed from Madrid without seeing the queen, after exhorting her in a letter to submit with resignation to the will of Louis; and to prove her submission by instantly chusing a new cameraramayor, from the persons named by the abbot. But while she made no shew of resistance in leaving the capital, she displayed no inclination to quit the kingdom within the eight days prescribed. She took up her abode at Alcala for a considerable time, in spite of repeated commands from Versailles to hasten her departure, and seized every pretext to linger in the different towns in her passage towards Bayonne. At

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Vittoria she met the new ambassador, the duke de Grammont, and rallied him on his affected secrecy in regard to her future destination.

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But in the midst of this apparent calmness and submission, she was buoyed up by the hope, that the unfavourable opinion which Louis entertained of her conduct, would gradually wear away; that her numerous friends at Versailles would interest themselves in her behalf. She did not however conceal her indignation at the malicious representations of the cardinal and abbot, to whom she wholly attributed her disgrace. She called upon the king of France to respect her injured innocence; she deprecated the injustice of listening only to the accusations of her enemies, and with the firmness of a person aggrieved rather than humbled, she demanded permission to repair to Versailles and vindicate her conduct.

It is a matter of great astonishment, that Louis, so profoundly versed in the wiles and machinations of those who surround a throne, should have been so little acquainted with human nature, as to imagine that the princess Orsini was the sole cause of the discontents which reigned in Spain; or to flatter himself that her removal would operate like a charm in restoring order and tranquillity to a divided court, and distracted country. Yet this, however absurd,

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appears to have been the opinion which he entertained of the state of Spain and the disposition of the nobles ; for, in delivering his instructions to the duke of Grammont, he told him, that he would *find a court without factions, and a country without disaffection.* The rule given to the new minister for his conduct, was to pay all outward regard to the nobles without allowing them real power ; and in preserving the established formalities, to consult as little as possible the councils and other branches of the national administration.

A striking proof of the trite adage, "that circumstances make men," is displayed in the conduct of those who successively filled the embassy at Madrid. No sooner had they passed the Pyrenees, than they seemed to have changed their very nature. Though before remarkable for discretion and address, they scarcely appeared in a court where they deemed themselves authorised to rule a weak monarch, and where instead of respect and submission they experienced nothing but difficulties and opposition, than they became equally remarkable for presumption and instability. Grammont, like his predecessors, entered Spain with the hope of exercising the power of a monarch under the exterior of an ambassador. On passing the frontier he wrote, "I am clearly convinced, that for the sake of

May 25.

the king of Spain, it is necessary our sovereign should govern despotically. But the spaniards must not perceive it ; nor indeed will this be a difficult task.”\*

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The very commencement of his office proved the fallacy of his expectations. He had persuaded himself, that the young queen would speedily lose her chagrin, and forget her favourite ; that he should encounter little difficulty in employing her agency to govern the king. But he, as well as his employer, had too lightly calculated on the strength of a mind of deep sensibility ; on the spirit of a woman, who, though young, knew her own power, and who resented the indignity she had suffered in the loss of her guide and friend. Instead of a tame and ready submission, she threw off her dejection, and expressed her indignation with a spirit far above her years.

In the private audience after the ceremonial of a public reception, “ Tell me,” she said to Grammont, “ what are the complaints of the king of France against the princess Orsini ? what has that injured woman done to justify such cruel indignity ? Is there a single example that a person of her quality, whom the king and myself have honoured with our friendship, has ever been so unworthily treated without a

\* Mémoires de Noailles, t. 3, p. 207.

**CHAP. 10.** cause?" In reply to the ambassador, who attempted to expatiate on the general discontent of the spaniards, and her misintelligence with the french ambassador, she continued, " All the accusations transmitted to the king our grandfather are false. It is to be lamented, that he, the wisest and most prudent of men, should have given more credit to the reports of her enemies, than to the declarations of his grandson, who, he well knows, resembles him in probity, and who was fully convinced of the rectitude of her conduct. No, duke of Grammont, no, I do not deceive you, when I add, I never shall be appeased!" At the conclusion of this apostrophe, she attempted to express her gratitude to the king of France, but was interrupted by sobs and tears.\*

Soon after this affecting scene, the ambassador repaired to Philip on the frontier of Portugal, and the queen, conscious of her power over the mind of her husband, submitted in sullen silence till his return to Madrid; when the heats of the season suspended the military operations. She then, with redoubled energy, resumed her efforts to procure the return of her favourite.

Her solicitations, however, produced no effect; for Louis, inflexible in his resolution, ordered Chateauneuf to announce his positive refusal:

\* Neailles, t. 3, p. 209.

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"Let the queen know," he wrote, "that when I resolved to remove the princess Orsini from Spain, and ordered her to return to her former residence at Rome, I did not act without mature deliberation, nor without such powerful reasons as render all change impossible. Let her know that I was not influenced by the intrigues and cabals of her enemies, or by false representations. In a word, explain to her that I decide all things myself; that no one can presume to suppose I judge from facts contrary to truth; for I always learn the truth from different quarters before I adopt a final determination." At the same time he spurned all the solicitations made by the friends of the princess, and gave a public proof of his approbation and favour to her most inveterate enemies, by nominating the cardinal d'Estrées to the rich abbey of St. Germain, and conferring on the abbot the order of the Holy Ghost.

The determination of Louis, instead of discouraging the queen, served only to rouse an equal determination on her part; and while she laboured to infuse her own spirit into the king, the successive measures of the court of Versailles favoured her efforts. Not satisfied with the dismissal of the princess, Louis next endeavoured to complete the overthrow of the administration formed under her auspices, by exacting the

CHAP. 10. disgrace of all who were either connected with  
1704—1705. or supported by her ; not excepting even Orri,  
before so much eulogised by the french cabinet,  
and so justly approved by Philip.

He had been already marked as a victim in the instructions to Grammont. He is described in terms evidently borrowed from the representations of the two late ambassadors, as one who had obtained the removal of Rivas and the substitution of Canales his own creature, that he might exercise his authority under the name of a native. He is depicted as one who affects the airs of a prime minister, despising *the usual forms of the government, and the antient custom of consulting* the tribunals ; as one who would divert the funds destined for the pay of the troops to other purposes, should he continue in the administration. The representations of the king and the urgent remonstrances of the queen were in vain employed in his favour ; he received his dismission in form, and was summoned to Paris to explain and justify his conduct.

This arbitrary proceeding was followed by a mandate to dismiss Canales, who was the creature of Orri, and to re-establish Rivas in the full exercise of his functions as sole secretary. Although the docile temper of Philip was inclined to obey, the queen exerted her influence, and not only prevailed on him to resist the execution

of this mandate, but to make the most strenuous opposition to the various changes which were to be introduced in the general administration.

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Grammont, unable to vanquish the reluctance of Philip, found it necessary to recur to the queen, and endeavoured to employ her agency in the fulfilment of his instructions. She at first affected great repugnance, and even retorted the arguments which had been formerly employed against her interference : “ *How can a girl of fifteen,*” she ironically asked, “ without experience and without talents, presume to direct affairs of state ? ”

Meanwhile she caballed with the ministers of the cabinet who were never disinclined to oppose the exercise of foreign influence, and with those nobles who were dissatisfied with their exclusion from power. At her secret instigation, Montellano gave private orders in his extensive department, contrary to the decisions of the cabinet ; and with her connivance if not suggestion, all the members of administration united in demanding the re-establishment of the ancient forms, and remonstrating against the increase of the military force.

In consequence of this violent struggle a total suspension of business prevailed, at the moment when prompt and vigorous exertions were necessary to resist the increasing force of the allies,

CHAP. 10. and crush the cabals of the austrian partisans.  
 1704—1705. The most trifling, as well as the most important measures, were equally thwarted ; and a scene of discontent and confusion ensued, which scarcely finds its parallel in the history of Spain.

July 25.

In this dilemma, Grammont made a final appeal to Louis, and requested his powerful intervention; as necessary to soften the opposition of the queen, and induce her to employ her agency in restoring motion to the sluggish machine of government. Too adroit to avow her opposition, she affected compliance, but exacted conditions, which under the semblance of humility, were calculated to strengthen her influence. "What I ask," she wrote to Louis, "is that I may interfere in business with the king alone, and avoid public appearances, that his reputation may not suffer. I much fear that you will repent of this ; for, though, assuredly, I wish to do my best, in promoting the service of the king ; yet, at my age and with my little experience, many errors are to be apprehended."

Aug. 6.

Louis found it necessary to affect satisfaction ; and, after lauding her discretion and delicacy, condescended to solicit her assistance in promoting the re-appointment of Rivas, and the establishment of a new administration. Yet, notwithstanding her professions and airs of

humility ; notwithstanding she affected to concur in the dismission of Canales, she persisted in opposing the re-appointment of Rivas, and by her cabals with the disaffected nobles, and her influence with the king, obstructed every measure of the ambassador.

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Had the spanish arms proved successful, this singular struggle might perhaps have terminated in the emancipation of the court from the trammels of France ; but the unexpected surprise of Gibraltar, which had been totally neglected, in spite of repeated remonstrances from Grammont, created an alarm highly favourable to the views of Louis. Grammont seized the opportunity to decry the existing administration. "Behold," he observed, "the good effects of the admirable management of Orri and Canales. Both deserve to lose their heads. God grant that the people may not rise against the queen and her wretched government!" The queen could no longer venture to resist ; Canales was dismissed, Rivas restored, and a junta of government established by the recommendation, and under the auspices, of the french ambassador.

But, although the consent of the queen was extorted, she did not disguise her repugnance. She reminded Rivas of his former misconduct ; she declared that the wishes of the french monarch had alone induced her to forget the past, to

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restore him to favour, and to become a surety for his future behaviour. She wrote, and dictated to Philip letters demanding the return of Orri, whose presence was necessary for the re-establishment of the finances; and she made the strongest protest against the nomination of Portocarrero, and del Fresno, as members of the new administration.\*

Louis, irritated by these endless remonstrances, and the contumacy of Philip, expressed his resentment in terms of reproach and bitterness, which a pedagogue would scarcely employ with his scholars.

Aug. 20.

" You desire my advice," he wrote to Philip, " and I write my sentiments ; but the best advice is useless when it is not called for till the evil is at hand. It is often more easy to prevent than to remedy ; so I foresee, with sorrow, numerous embarrassments, if you do not establish order in the administration of your affairs. I require the dismissal of Canales, and Orri : I find on your part resistance and opposition. You see the effects of their counsels, from the fate of your arms and the loss of your fortresses. It seems, however, that the interest of those individuals engrosses your whole attention ; and at the very moment when you ought to form great designs, you condescend to enter into the

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 227.

cabals of the princess, with which I am incessantly perplexed. I am persuaded of your sincerity, and believe you when you promise to follow my advice. Profit then by that which I now give you with my usual friendship and affection.

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“ You will never succeed while the present disorder reigns in your affairs. Establish a wise and enlightened council ; the duke of Grammont will name those whom I wish to recommend. Assemble them without delay ; consult them particularly on the subjects of war, finance, and policy, and issue no order without their approbation. When I see such a council established, I will cheerfully supply you with the succours which you need ; before that is done, I have too much reason to consider the troops as lost which I may send into Spain. Shew that there are a king and council in Spain ; that you command ; that those individuals who abuse your confidence are not masters of the monarchy. I have never recommended to your majesty any thing but the true glory and interests of your kingdom. Labour for both : it is the only return which I require for all I do, and for the affection I entertain for you.”\*

These bitter reproaches awed the timid and docile Philip, and extorted his acquiescence. By the direction of Grammont, a new council was

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 229.

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formed. To soothe the queen, Portocarrero and del Fresno were excluded. Arias was recalled from his diocese to take a share in affairs, and the only additional members were Monterey and Montalto.

In the midst of reluctant compliance, the real sentiments of the sovereigns, or rather of the queen, were displayed by the favours heaped on the friends of the princess. As if in contrast to the honours bestowed on the cardinal and abbot d'Estrées, Canales was raised to the rank of counsellor of state, and the post of gentleman of the bed-chamber, and rewarded with a pension of 12,000 ducats; a pension of 2,000 was also granted to d'Aubigni, the secretary and confidant of the exiled favourite. The new cabinet was also reduced to a mere cypher, by the arts of the queen, and by secret orders issued through the agency of Montellano.

Such unabated perseverance convinced Louis that the queen was secretly tutored by the princess, to obstruct the measures of the government. This suspicion, or rather conviction, formed the subject of a letter to the queen, in terms no less reproachful than that to Philip, though blended with expressions of friendship and complacency.

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"The consequences which I foresaw are become so serious as to oblige me to express my sentiments to your majesty with my natural sin-

cerity, and the liberty with which a grand-father addresses his grand-daughter. I gave you the princess Orsini, from my esteem for her; from the hope that she would form your youthful mind, and inspire you with sentiments worthy of your exalted station. I selected an ambassador who had been always considered as one of her friends, that they might more readily concert together the means of serving us. You well know also the pains I took to induce you to give your confidence to the princess. Nevertheless, forgetting our mutual interests, she has indulged an enmity of which I was ignorant, and incessantly contradicted those who were charged with my affairs. Had she felt a sincere attachment to you, she would have sacrificed her own resentment, whether well or ill-founded, against the ambassador, instead of implicating your majesty.

" Persons of your high station ought to raise themselves above private quarrels, and act with a proper regard to their own interests, and those of their subjects, which are always identified. It, therefore, became necessary either to recal my ambassador, abandon you to the princess, and suffer her to govern your kingdoms alone, or to recal her also. This I did with the hope that you would conform to my wishes; and that, by the absence of the princess, those impressions

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“ But it is not true that we ever suspected her of holding intelligence with our enemies ; a supposition which she has herself suggested to acquire merit with you. We only accused her of desiring to govern Spain ; of not inspiring you with all the sentiments which you ought to have felt for me ; of forming friendships and enmities in a situation where she should have been actuated by no passion but for your interest.

“ I judge of the counsels she gives you by their consequences. You have often thwarted what I proposed ; you have placed no confidence in my ambassadors ; you hate or love at the impulse of the princess ; *at the age of fifteen*, you are ambitious to govern a vast but unsettled monarchy, without advice. Can you follow better or more disinterested than mine ? If the princess had acted with integrity, would she have given you any other ? Had she indeed acted thus, you would have seen in me no resentment, no prejudice against her, nor any other views than for our respective interests, which cannot be different.

“ Your understanding, I admit, is far above your years. I am delighted that you enter into business ; I approve the full confidence which the king your husband reposes in you ; but both of you will for a long time need advice, because

you are deficient in experience. I cannot serve you as I wish, if we do not act in concert, and if you do not place confidence in my embassadors, who have no personal interest in Spain.

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" Whenever you have any particular motive or wish, communicate it to me ; I will cheerfully accede to it if not dangerous ; for I desire nothing so much as to give you pleasure, and to testify my affection for you in the most trifling, as I trust I do in the most important concerns."\*

These reproaches only provoked a more decided opposition on the part of the queen ; and as Tessé justly observed, she seemed resolved to overthrow the kingdom and risk the crown rather than not satisfy her ruling passion, and attain the object of her ardent wishes.† In fact, Grammont himself, however unwilling to acknowledge his defeat, was convinced by bitter experience of the vast ascendancy of the princess, and that no other resource was left but her intervention.

By his representations, Louis was induced to change his plan of attack, and to effect by mildness what he could not obtain by threats and violence. He complacently listened to the representations of her numerous friends at Versailles ; he affected a change of sentiment, and promised to employ his interest in raising her

\* Oeuvres de Louis 14, t. 6, p. 167.

† Mémoires de Tessé, t. 2, p. 157.

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brother the abbot de la Tremouille to the purple, and to confer on him the embassy of Rome, promises which were both fulfilled. He permitted her also to take up her residence at Toulouse, instead of proceeding as he had originally ordered to Rome.

This indulgence was attended with the desired effect. A secret suggestion from Toulouse softened the queen. She appeared to listen to the counsels of Grammont; she even promised her support, and changed her conduct from coldness and reserve to affability and confidence. At her instigation, Montellano expressed his anxiety to act in confidence with the ambassador, and promote the views of the court of Versailles. Grammont was caught in the snare; he boasted that he had cut off the heads of the hydra; he announced the return of confidence and tranquillity. His dispatches were consequently filled with praises of the queen, and expressions of gratitude for the services of the exiled favourite.

The queen profited by this change of sentiment to obtain the recal of Berwick.\* who was too independent to take a share in these petty cabals, and the nomination of a general, calculated to further her design. She wrought on the

\* "C'est un grand diable d'Anglois sec qui va toujours droit devant lui," was the reply of the queen, when asked by Tessé, why she procured his recal. Mem: de Berwick, t. 1, p. 274.

jealousy which Grammont entertained of Berwick, and lured him with the hope of obtaining the nomination of one of his own friends ; but at the same time she employed the agency of her sister the duchess of Burgundy, and madame de Maintenon, to direct the choice of the court on Tessé, whom she knew to be favourably inclined to the princess.

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At length measures were prepared for unraveling the plot of this political comedy. She boldly requested, not that her favourite might be restored, but as an act of justice, heard in her own defence. This artful application was successful, and drew from the king a gracious permission for the princess to repair to Versailles, which was the signal of her triumph. The arrival of Tessé at Madrid hastened the development of the intrigue ; while his representations of the conduct of the princess and of the state of Spain, assumed a colouring far different from that which had appeared in the correspondence of the late ambassadors.

The joy and triumph of the queen were complete. The services of Montellano were rewarded with the rank of a duke and grandee of the second class, accompanied with increased favour and confidence. Rivas was again removed, and his office divided between Don Pedro del Campo, marquis of Mejorada, secretary for state affairs,

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and Don Joseph, marquis of Grimaldo, secretary of the finances and war, a personal favourite of the king and queen, who now commenced his long political career.

Grammont had the mortification to discover that he had been made the instrument of his own degradation. Irritated by the appointment of Tessé instead of one of his own creatures, and perceiving that he should be reduced to a mere cypher by the superior influence of the princess, he gave way to his disappointment and indignation, and filled his dispatches with invectives against her, as well as against the odious government of the queen, and the despotism which she exercised over her doting husband. He even attempted to brave her influence, and after the example of the cardinal d'Estrées employed the intervention of the confessor to sway the mind of Philip. If he did not succeed in his design, he at least persuaded a prince, who had no will of his own, to express to the king of France his disapprobation of the queen's conduct, his shame at being governed by a *girl of fifteen*, and to add that he desired the recal of the princess Orsini merely in compliance with her importunities. Proud of an apparent advantage gained at so critical a time, Grammont, in the exultation of success, described Philip as a new man, perfectly disposed to obey the impulse given by the

court of Versailles. The confessor, in the cant of his order, considered the change as the work of God alone, whose will it was to draw the king from the abyss into which his blindness had plunged him.

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But this act of imprudence accelerated the change which Grammont fondly hoped to avert. Louis, however deceived in the preceding instances, had now better learnt to appreciate the character of Philip, and the unbounded power of his consort. In his reply to the ambassador, he therefore dwelt on the danger and impracticability of an attempt to estrange the king from the queen. " You know his weakness. Should he change his opinion, he will probably inform the queen that you endeavoured to govern without her ; that you acted by my orders, and that I consider her interference as disgraceful to his character and opprobrious to his government. She will regard as a flagrant insult this attempt to lessen her power, to which perhaps she feels scarcely less attachment than to her husband. You are doubtless ignorant, that at the very time when he appeared to you as if he disapproved her conduct, he gave a new proof of his deference, by requesting his father to solicit the return of the princess Orsini, as necessary for his interest and welfare. Such contradictions plainly shew the little reliance to be placed on his firm-

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ness and secrecy. The queen will be always mistress, and it is more prudent to avail ourselves of her ascendancy, than to make a fruitless attempt to subvert it.

“ The king of Spain must not be informed of my sentiments on this subject, for it would only discourage him; and the frequent reproaches I should be obliged to make on his incurable timidity, would likewise serve to render him still more timid. Tell him that I learn, with pleasure, his resolution to follow my advice; assure him that I will give none which is not consonant to his glory and welfare; that I am convinced he will receive and follow it, as coming from a father who tenderly loves him, and who is more attached to his interests than to my own. You may express my satisfaction at his firm attachment to the queen, and my persuasion that if she did not entertain the same sentiments as himself, or was capable of estranging him from me, he would not hesitate to sacrifice his affection to the solid interests of his crown. Lastly, strive as you have begun, to gain the confidence of the queen, and not excite any suspicion that you are desirous to counteract her influence. We can rely too little on the firmness of the king, to think of reposing implicit confidence in him.”\*

The queen, who, during the whole intrigue,

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 256.

penetrated the designs of the ambassador, had no sooner drawn the advantages she expected from his co-operation, than she gave way to her indignation, and solicited his recal with no less eagerness than she had shewn in procuring the dismission of his predecessors, the cardinal and the abbot. She even prevailed on Philip to disavow the double part he had acted, and to join in her solicitations. While he confessed his full and unabated attachment to the princess Orsini, he acknowledged that his great affection for the queen had led him to regret that her time and regard should be shared with the princess ; and that Grammont, profiting by this momentary displeasure, had drawn from him declarations contrary to his real sentiments. “ I now reproach myself,” he added, “ for my blindness in writing against the princess and Orri, and intreat you to excuse my weakness.” He bitterly complained of the attempts of d’Aubenton to estrange him from the queen, and demanded another confessor, who would confine himself to the duties of his priestly office.

Such an humiliating avowal of mental weakness, must have removed all the doubts of Louis, had he still doubted, whether his grandson was capable of governing alone, and proved that every attempt to oppose the queen could only tend to disconcert his own designs. He relin-

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quished therefore, his sanguine expectation of governing Spain, without intermediate agency ; and recurred to his original plan of swaying the queen by means of the princess Orsini, whose utility he had now learned to appreciate. He likewise acknowledged the meritorious services of Orri, since whose removal the finances of Spain had relapsed into their original chaos, and he announced to Philip his resolution to gratify his wishes by restoring the princess and Orri, and recalling the duke of Grammont and the confessor.

The reception of the princess at the court of Versailles far surpassed her most sanguine expectations. Persons of the highest distinction, as well as the duke of Alva, embassador of Spain, went out to meet and escort her to Paris ; the members of the royal family honoured her with their visits ; her residence was crowded like the royal levees, and by the express command of Louis, Torci, the most vehement opponent of her return, was constrained to testify his respects. Her appearance at Versailles was no less marked with honours and distinctions. She was received not as a suppliant, but as an injured person, called into notice to render the disgrace and disappointment of her calumniators more public. She was admitted to frequent and confidential interviews with the king and madame de Main-

June 4.

tenon, and experienced from Louis such unusual marks of favour and condescension, as shewed his anxiety to efface the recollection of his past resentment.

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To the honour of this extraordinary woman, she bore this tide of returning favour with the same outward marks of serenity and firmness, as she had shewn in her disgrace. She was, however, too much gratified with such flattering and lavish distinctions, to hasten from the scene of her triumph. Whether she hoped to exercise the same rule at Versailles as at Madrid, or whether she felt a real reluctance to encounter the difficulties of her former situation, is doubtful; but she suffered many months to elapse, equally disregarding the solicitations of her royal mistress, and the hints of the french cabinet, that her presence was necessary in Spain.

The visible ascendancy which her captivating manners gained over the mind of Louis himself, at length awakened the jealousy of madame de Maintenon, who omitted no effort to remove so dangerous a rival. In such circumstances no difficulties were permitted to prolong her stay; and she was allowed to new model at pleasure the government and administration of Spain. Orri was restored to his former post. At her recommendation a new embassador was appointed to fill the place of Grammont; and her choice

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was better adapted to the situation of Spain, than any which had been made since the ministry of Harcourt; for Amelot, whom she selected, was not likely to embroil the court of Madrid with pretensions derived from high birth or station. He was president of the parliament of Paris, a man of great capacity and information, and had already distinguished his abilities and address, in embassies to Venice, Switzerland, and Portugal. But the qualities which had recommended him for his office, were tried prudence, circumspection, insinuating suppleness of character, and above all an unbounded devotion to his patroness.\*

\* For the contents of this chapter, see *Memoires de St. Philippe*, t. 1, *passim*.—*Noailles*, t. 3.—*Berwick*, t. 1.—*Tessé*, t. 2, c. 9.—*Ortiz, Desormeaux, and Targe*.

## CHAPTER THE ELEVENTH.

1705.

*Memoir of Tessé to the french cabinet, on the state of the court, cabinet, and nation—Arrival of Amelot and Orri—Difficulties of the new ambassador—Opposition to the proposal for the admission of french garrisons into the frontier places—Vehemence of Montellano—Supposed conspiracies against the king and queen—Arrest and banishment of Leganes—Dissatisfaction of the grandees.*

A MEMOIR transmitted by Tessé to Chamillart, minister of war, for the information of Louis, presents a curious and interesting, though overcharged, picture of the cabinet and kingdom, at the close of the political struggle, which terminated in the restoration of the princess Orsinji.

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*“Camp before Gibraltar, April 11, 1705.*

“The marquis de Maulevrier will converse with M. Chamillart on the total indifference, indecision, and uncertainty of the king, entirely governed by the queen, who, with youth and sense, has not the slightest tincture of business, nor will have any, except by the allurement of the person placed about her, and in whom, whether man or woman, she may place her confidence. The mind of the queen, and perhaps her heart, would be naturally inclined to pleasure,

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and to keep a court with that state of freedom which women enjoy in France, and to which she was accustomed in Piedmont. The spaniards are averse to this custom ; but she would establish it in spite of them, if the king himself, on his part, was not more solitary and less social, even than the spaniards ; for except his favourite diversion of the chace, in which, indeed, he is almost alone, his temper inclines him to shut himself up. If etiquette was not established in Spain, he would establish it.

" The infatuation of the king for the queen is so great, that she entirely governs him. This princess, who has been brought up by a father animated with unspeakable hatred against the french, would be glad, were it possible, to have no need of the french. She receives them only from necessity, and pays them with fine words and a flattering address ; she fears and greatly respects our king, and is anxious to acquire his esteem ; she naturally hates continued application ; but she is desirous of information, and would be offended were any thing transacted without her knowledge.

" The spaniards would rather be exposed to a general revolution than be governed by France ; they might have submitted at first, but it is now too late. The queen is implacably averse to the duke of Grammont, because she

has been informed by the king, that he attempted to exclude her from business. He at first spoke to her of the princess Orsini, as of a person, who neither for her interest nor that of France, ought to return into Spain. The queen knows from the king himself, that the ambassador and confessor united to prevent the return of her favourite. A residence in the interior of the palace would be necessary, to ascertain whether it be from motives of pleasure, amusement, or business, that the queen so passionately desired her restoration, as to be capable of overturning the kingdom, and proceeding to extremities, if the king had not consented to it.

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"The president of Castile,\* who has a principal share in affairs, manifests good intentions, provided every thing passes through the council, which considers itself as the guardian not only of the kingdom but of the king. I have seen private letters and orders from him to corregidores and judges, totally contrary to the decisions of the despacho, so that he thus almost always combats what the despacho (of which he is a member) has decided. The consequence is, that whatever is granted is obstructed in the execution.

"The king of Spain will never be really king till the authority of this council is diminished:

\* Montellano.

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nothing would be more easy if he chose to speak, because the members may be removed at a moment's notice, without a murmur from any, even from him who is dismissed. But the king, naturally timid and indolent, says nothing; nor will he say any thing. He thinks justly, but he had better think less and speak more.

" The marquis of Mancera, who belongs to the cabinet, and knows only the antient routine, is a mere cypher. The duke of Montalto may have good intentions, but I would not answer for them. He has never been in the field, he hates war, is ignorant of it, and incapable of application. The count of Monterey has served in Flanders, and was successful; he is of a more intriguing character than the others; but as for war, he knows no more of the detail, than if he had never been governor of Flanders. The marquis of Mejorada is a man of probity, rich, well inclined; he has never served in the army, will answer for nothing, nor take any thing on himself; he would be a good and faithful clerk under any one who would plan and decide on his business; but of his own accord he will never carry his views farther than to please his superiors. These, with the french embassador, compose that cabinet so much envied by others; of a young king who thinks only of his wife, and is fascinated by her charms; of four ministers

who, though divided among themselves, agree in opposing every thing which tends to establish the royal authority ; of the secretary of state who merely obeys, has no deliberative voice, and would be sorry to have one, because it would draw on him a responsibility which he will not incur. Rivas is more intelligent and capable than all of them ; but he has unfortunately quarrelled with the princess Orsini, and has therefore incurred the aversion of the queen. Lastly, this council, I repeat, of the despacho, is composed of the persons aforesaid, and the french ambassador, who makes the principal figure, but whose opinion is always thwarted by the four others. He goes directly to the fact and the good of the service, and acquaints the king with what is proper to be done. The king has not the necessary firmness ; the despacho is passed in contradictions ; the clock strikes ; the king, who never puts it forward to hasten the opening of the assembly, is charmed when the time arrives for the close, and nothing is concluded.

“ With regard to the council of war, it is composed of people who have never been engaged, who have read some old books on the subject, who have an inexpressible aversion and contempt for what is called war ; who wish for success, yet would do nothing to promote it.

CHAP. 11. The king will never have troops, armies, stores, places, fleets, arms, magazines, finally, any thing which constitutes the stability and greatness of a monarchy, while he never labours for those objects which maintain it; or if he does not chuse to do business, while he has no prime minister who crushes the rest, and plays the same part in Spain, that cardinal Richelieu did under the late king, or Mazarin during the minority of the present.

" The general of a spanish army is, in Spain, the same as the doge at Venice ; he has only the outward appearance, and except the day of action, he passes the rest of the year thwarted by a council which is never wrong. This council has not forgotten that the duke of Alva, after having conquered Portugal, was not allowed to kiss the hand of his sovereign, and, indeed, was fortunate in being permitted to retire to his home.

" The duke of Medina Celi, who has no share in business, is proud and vain of his birth ; he might, perhaps, be capable of being prime minister, and flattered with holding a place sufficiently high to give a new form to the government. But at the same time, after having employed him, one ought to be certain, at the end of two years, of hanging him.

" In the total ruin of the infantry, the council

has taken the resolution of raising recruits ; but to judge from those who are chosen, it is only a waste of time and money. The priests and officers of justice are charged with this levy, of which the men will carry away the clothes and arms. Till the officer is made responsible for his company, there will never be troops.

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" The president of Castile names almost all the corregidores, who render him an account of every thing ; and nothing is done in the towns but by them. It is consequently the spirit of the council of Castile which rules in Spain, and this council, guardian of the king and kingdom, holds both in tutelage.

" Philip the second began to place the profession of arms below that of the robe. This is carried to such a degree, that those who have longest served in the military profession, or the viceroyalties, for their recompence and establishment, look forward to a return into the council, where they no longer wage war, but pass their time in thwarting those who do. If affairs do not mend, the support of Spain will be the ruin of France. It signifies not at Madrid, whether Philip or Charles be king, provided they have one who acts only as they wish. Except half a dozen persons at most, who would follow the king, from a point of honour, should a general revolution happen, I do not know any one at

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Madrid, who would not kiss the hand of the archduke.

" Notwithstanding the attachment of Philip to his grandfather, he is at times extremely obstinate. Oppose his wishes, he does not answer; but he orders the contrary to what has been advised. The queen alone can make him change from black to white.

" The only thing which rendered the duke of Berwick insufferable to the king, was because his majesty wished to return to the queen, and the duke firmly opposed it. To reconcile the service with the impatience of the king, the princess Orsini had resolved to repair with the queen to Badajoz, when she received the order to quit Spain.

" With regard to the following campaign, the best that can happen, will be not to make it. The force of the enemy will decide it; their position, where it is to be made, and how conducted; for not being superior to give the law, we must receive it. The general imagines that he has arranged his measures, and has an object in view; but, a whim at Madrid occasions positive orders, and every thing is overturned.

" I have promised the king to make this campaign. I will make it with all its inconveniences, faults, and variations; after which, I request him to order the king, his grandson, to direct

his attention to some spanish general. In my situation, the king, my master, may send me to the gallies, and I will row like a slave for his service; but no upright and honest man can serve in this country, in the present general disorder, which those at Madrid wish to maintain.

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“ The king cares about a household, about horse and foot guards, whether his attendants be clothed, whether he has a carriage of oiled cloth or velvet, whether he has a court or not, exactly as I care whether I have a footman more or less.

“ From the services of cardinal Portocarrero, in obtaining the testament of the late king, he ought to be employed and consulted, but he is out of the question. He is full of good intentions; yet cannot be in the ministry because he must be at the head. He cannot suffer a colleague, and is incapable of being the chief.

“ The archbishop of Seville would be capable of taking the lead; and if ever the king had a first minister, would be a fitter person than any other; with the exception, however, that a cardinal priest in Spain will always be dependent on Rome, and the clergy, which is contrary to the good of the state.

“ The count of Aguilar\* is one of those who who has most sense. He is closely united with Medina Celi. All these gentry have only

\* Frigiliana.

CHAP. 11. one principal object, to lower the king's authority ; to prevent him from forming an army, that he may never be master. The other grantees have no share in state affairs. They have their private cabals and their intrigues; but the general principle is rather to suffer a revolution than change their customs.

1705.

" Place in Spain a king who chuses to be master, who speaks, labours, and decides ; or even one who selects a prime minister, gives him his whole authority, and only signs what he has settled ; in a single year the king will be master, or his first minister stoned or poisoned.\* It is better to risk this alternative than to drag after us, as at present, a cord which will strangle us, if peace be not made. For, it is the reigning principle in Spain, to keep every thing in suspense, to do and undo, to change the ministry every six months, to have no established fund for war, to leave all military details to the council of war, of which no member is acquainted with any thing, except scrawling on paper. It is fighting one's shadow, to think that war can be maintained on such conditions.

" The people are faithful and love the king ; the army, if paid, would be faithful also ; but the council does not chuse that it should.

\* This remark is plainly justified by the administration of Alberoni.

" If any one appears truly attached to the king and to the support of his crown, all unite in a moment to overwhelm him.

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" Orri had begun to sap the foundation of the authority of the councils, and was able to do it, because he made the king sign what he pleased. I know not whether all he proposed was feasible; and it is necessary to be on one's guard against the fascination of his projects, which he almost always grounds on impracticable principles. But if he had succeeded, the king of Spain might have been a powerful monarch, and facilitated every thing to our sovereign. He was supported by the queen, to whom he was agreeable; this fellow would have been hung, or become a great man."

" The foregoing is a vague piece of reasoning, which only tends to prove that the affairs of no kingdom were ever in the same degree of confusion as those of Spain; and that it is necessary, perhaps, to imitate those gamesters who throw every thing on a last stake, which ruins or enriches them."\*

Such was the state of the cabinet and court, at the period when the princess was restored to authority. Amelot and Orri were dispatched to resume their respective offices, and to prepare the way for her reception.

\* *Mémoires de Tessé*, t. 2, p. 154.

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Feb. 15,  
1705.

Louis himself now condescended to own that he had injured his own interests as well as those of his grandson, by interfering too much in the internal affairs of the Spanish court. "Were I," he observed to Grammont, "as intimately acquainted with Spain; were I as well instructed in the details of her government as my own; were the Spaniards as well known to me, as my own subjects, I could not be assured that I should give just advice in all particulars. Things will change their nature, before my letters can arrive; and the very resolution, which would be proper some days before, will perhaps be injurious at the time when it reaches Madrid. I shall therefore restrict myself to advise my grandson in general affairs, whenever there shall be time for deliberation; leaving him to draw proper lights from past experience for the regulation of his personal conduct."\*

Amelot also was strongly imbued with principles contrary to preceding ambassadors. He left Paris with a conviction, that the success of his mission would depend on imitating Harcourt, in bowing to the genius of the Spanish nation; in obtaining the co-operation of the ministers, not by affecting to rule, but by employing mildness and argument to convince them, that the measures he was charged to propose, were cal-

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 271.

culated to promote the glory of the sovereign and the welfare of the monarchy.

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But a short stay at Madrid was sufficient to convince him, that the state of Spain and the characters of the persons with whom he was to treat, were far different from the notions which he had conceived at Versailles. For though the disposition of the queen was changed, and she now employed her power to promote the views of Louis; yet the court itself began to experience the mischievous effects of that opposition which she had recently encouraged. Not merely the discontented party, but even the ministers themselves privately obstructed or publicly thwarted the measures of the government; and the consequences of their open opposition or petty cabals were felt in every department of the state.

Even Montellano, whose assistance the queen had so successfully employed and liberally rewarded, had now tasted the sweets of power, and was unwilling to give place to the agents of France. He threw off the suppleness which had proved the instrument of his rise, and, without openly opposing the return of the princess, joined with the french ambassador in persuading the king to appoint the duchess of Bejar, the new camerara-mayor. By an air of frankness and independence, he had gained the

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respect of the king and queen, and he was venerated by that party of the spaniards who were decidedly adverse to foreign controul.

Indignant at the spirit of opposition, which he encountered in every rank and party, the french minister observed, “ It is the invariable object of the nobles to keep the king in tutelage, and the crown in a state of weakness ; and without firmness and decision, the king of France must be exposed to endless contradictions. Nothing beneficial can be carried into execution, and all attempts to re-establish the affairs of the state will be desperate.” He laid down the maxim to shew outward respect to the dignity and privileges of the grandees ; but to govern as much as possible without their concurrence, and pay little attention to their sentiments or complaints.

May 27.

In detailing to Louis the fall of Albuquerque, and the rising symptoms of rebellion in Catalonia, he continued, “ Every day augments the evil. The few troops, who still remain under their standards, daily desert for want of bread. The officers in command, destitute of every requisite, tender their resignation. The ministers of the cabinet are tranquil, seeing and hearing reiterated proofs of these miseries with perfect apathy ; as if it concerned only their neighbours. These misfortunes are continually

attributed to the want of money ; yet no one gives himself the slightest trouble to raise it, nor ever dreams that it is possible." Orri proposed as an immediate remedy to resume his former plans ; but for fear of giving an unfavourable impression at the very commencement of his embassy, Amelot suspended the design.

Amelot had soon reason to adduce a new proof of the truth of his observations. The irruption of the portuguese army into Andalusia, and the dread of a rising in Catalonia and Aragon, induced Louis to provide against a reverse of circumstances by securing a stable footing in Spain. He therefore proposed the admission of french garrisons into St. Andero, St. Sebastian and St. Lucar, and the forts on the coasts of Guipuscoa and Alava. By the interposition of the queen, he obtained the acquiescence of his grandson, and his minister was charged to lay the proposal before the cabinet council.

The demand was accordingly made in the presence of the king. The members were at first startled, and preserved silence, till Montel-lano had the boldness to combat the proposition, and to expatiate on the disgrace which would fall on the spanish nation, should the king adopt a measure so derogatory to his own dignity, and so injurious to his subjects. He even vehemently

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CHAP. 11. arraigned it as calculated to increase the animosity between the two nations ; and pointedly adverted to the jealousy entertained of the french army which was defending the frontier on the side of Portugal. The other members were not bold enough to follow his example ; but they did not conceal their reluctance. Amelot himself lost his usual discretion ; he inveighed against the apathy and prejudices of the natives, and vehemently represented the necessity of depending on France for the preservation of the monarchy.

Philip was roused by these altercations, and expressed his indignation with unusual warmth, declaring, that no distinction ought to be made between the french and spanish troops, while their two sovereigns were closely united. He sanctioned the proposal of Amelot, and insisted that orders should be given for its execution without delay and without reply.\*

But notwithstanding the decision of Philip, similar difficulties were raised against the financial plans of Orri, to collect funds for the prosecution of the war ; and similar altercations took place on the means for increasing the army, and improving military discipline.

A new cause of obloquy was derived from the detection of a plot, real or supposed, to seize

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 362.—Noailles, t. 3, p. 287.

the king and queen at the festival of the Holy Sacrament, when the court repaired with great ceremony to the palace of Buen Retiro. The chief of this conspiracy was the count of Leganez, a grandee of high rank, abilities, and influence; captain general of the artillery, and governor of the royal palace, who had been long suspected of an attachment to the House of Austria. It was to have been carried into execution by means of the english, german, and dutch deserters or prisoners of war, who had been collected in the capital, and in their extreme distress, were visited and relieved by Leganez. The plot was, as is usual, highly exaggerated by popular rumours. Insurrections were expected to take place in Madrid, Grenada, and Cadiz, where secret intelligence was maintained with the enemy; on the same day, the french and their partisans were to be massacred; the king and queen to be conveyed to Lisbon, or, if likely to be rescued, to be put to death. The explosion of the plot was to be the signal for proclaiming the archduke; while the movements of the portuguese army, joined with the appearance of hostile squadrons on the coast, were considered as intended to facilitate its execution.

Amelot discovered the design, and caused Leganez to be arrested, without waiting for the approbation of the french cabinet. No public

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proof was ever produced either of his guilt, or of the conspiracy itself; but he was sent prisoner first to Pampeluna, and afterwards conveyed to France, where he died in 1711.

The grandes were highly offended by the arrest and imprisonment of a grande, contrary to the privileges of their order, and the forms of justice, on the foundation of vague suspicions, without sufficient proofs or a regular process. The informality of his arrest created an additional interest in his fate. His innocence was loudly proclaimed ; and this obnoxious measure threw an odium on the first proceedings of the new ambassador, which neither his own discretion, nor the united approbation of both courts, were sufficient to remove.\*

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 291—300.—St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 361.—Tessé, t. 2, p. 196.

## CHAPTER THE TWELFTH.

1705.

*Failure of the siege of Gibraltar—Letters from marshal Tessé—Events of the campaign in Portugal—The allies land in Catalonia—Capture of Barcelona—The eastern parts of Spain declare in favour of Charles.*

UNDER the administration of Amelot, the most afflicting events threatened the throne of Philip and the downfal of the french power in Spain.

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The capture of Gibraltar made a deep impression on the mind of Philip, and he sacrificed every other military object, for the recovery of this important fortress, the loss of which at once wounded his pride and endangered his safety. As early as October, he dispatched the marquis of Villadarias with a body of troops from the army in Estremadura to lay siege to Gibraltar by land; while a french squadron from Cadiz, under the command of the baron de Pontis, blockaded it by sea. But from the inexperience of the general, and still more from the want of every requisite for so arduous an undertaking, the besiegers made little progress.

1704.

At length the operations on the western

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frontier were suspended for the pursuit of this darling object. Tessé, who had recently succeeded Berwick in the command, was dispatched to press the siege, and encouraged with the promise of immediate succours and supplies. But the intrepid governor and brave garrison held out against all attacks by land; while the British squadrons threw in continual reinforcements of troops, as well as supplies of provisions and stores. On the other hand, the operations of the Spanish army were frustrated or delayed by a degree of improvidence scarcely conceivable, no less than by the obstacles derived from the peculiar nature of the country.

Jan. 2,  
1705.

"Here I am," wrote Tessé, to the Prince of Condé, "before the pillars of Hercules; and this siege, which has been undertaken with more perseverance and spirit, than means of ensuring success, would have been happily terminated, if those means had been provided.

"But in Spain, to use the old proverb, we live only from day to day; and think not of remedies, till evils appear. I found the siege indeed farther advanced than I had reason to expect, notwithstanding the supplies of succours to the besieged, one instance of which I had the misfortune to witness. The English set us an example in keeping the sea in all seasons with as much tranquillity, as your swans at Chantilly.

But when the breaches had been rendered practicable; and only a few days were required to batter down what remained, our ammunition failed, and our useless artillery could not be changed. The squadron of baron Pontis, without which the reduction cannot be completed, was detained by contrary winds. No convoys made their appearance, no cannon arrived, and on a mere point of honour a few shots only were fired every hour. Thus the enemy had time to repair their damages, while our army is almost annihilated.

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" I was told on my arrival here, that I should find 20 pieces of artillery and 300,000 pounds of powder; but the cannon are still at Cadiz, and I have no intelligence of the powder, which was to be forwarded from Toulon. If you ask why we do not raise the siege? I reply, the cannon and stores cannot be carried away by land, and we have no means to convey them by sea. In a word, notwithstanding all the measures said to be adopted for obtaining money and other requisites, they are still in the same wretched condition at Madrid as we are here."\*

In this situation of affairs the squadron of Pontis arrived, and sanguine expectations were formed of immediate success. But in the midst of these hopes it was defeated by an english fleet;

April  
1705.

\* Memoires de Tessé, t. 2, p. 147.

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three men of war were taken, and the remainder with difficulty escaped. This disaster rendered the farther prosecution of the siege impracticable; and the reluctant consent of Philip was extorted to leave Gibraltar to its fate.\*

April 24. On the day the siege was raised, Tessé wrote to Louis in the same querulous style which we find in all his letters from Spain.

“ I received, between Xeres and Seville, the honour of your majesty’s letter. I admire your majesty’s firmness and goodness; for if you had scolded us all, beginning with the king your grandson, you would not have treated us according to our deserts. Never, to use the old proverb, was a plough so ill harnessed as this country; where every thing passes without order, without precaution, without decision, without money, without objects; in a word, without every thing which is the support of states. If it was intended to ruin the monarchy, nothing could have been done more to the purpose.

“ Your majesty will have seen by my letters to Chamillard, the strange situation of what is here called war, troops, money, magazines, and preparations. God grant that the arrival of Orri may be a remedy for so many disorders; at

\* Targe, t. 2, & 3, *passim*.—St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 284—305.—Tindal, vol. 16, p. 55.—Cunningham, c. 7.—History of Europe, 1704—1705, *passim*.

least, that one person may be found near the king of Spain, who can give orders. Three months have passed, and nothing whatever has been forwarded in the department of war. The duke of Grammont has worn out his lungs, and I my patience.

" We have failed before Gibraltar for want of method and precaution ; and of those arrangements with which no one is better acquainted than your majesty. The unfortunate loss of your ships only happened because they do not comprehend at Madrid either the effect or practicability of what they order ; they one day destroy what they do another.

" The general spirit of the spaniards, even of the most zealous, is to foresee nothing ; to think that they are exculpated for the misfortunes they bring on themselves, by yielding to superior power. The king himself seems occasionally to desire that chance should furnish what can only be hoped for from the best combined precautions, and his specific orders have an air of obstinacy which must injure his service.

" I will not answer for being able to settle at Madrid the levy of militia, or of many other things which I feel to be necessary. I thought the queen would enter into business. She promised me, and she is capable ; but your majesty knows what a young person is, however perfect.

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"As to the funds which your majesty commands me to establish for the subsistence of the troops, they have never laid before me any thing but impossibilities; the troops are neither paid nor recruited. In a word, Sire, all things are in a miserable state.

"I will inform your majesty of what passes at Madrid; and, I will, as I am commanded, speak freely to the catholic king; for I cannot spend my life in saying agreeable things when I do not feel them."\*

On resuming his command on the portuguese frontier, Tessé was scarcely less embarrassed. The army being inefficient and ill provided with stores, he was forced to separate his troops and remain on the defensive. He had the mortification to witness the capture of Salvatierra, Albuquerque, and Valencia de Alcantara, and deemed himself fortunate in preserving even Alcantara and Badajos, and covering the spanish territory from the incursions of the enemy.

June 17.

In one of his letters to the prince of Condé, he depicted his situation in strong colours. After tracing the unfortunate circumstances of the campaign, he added, "Such is the short detail of the past; but if I wrote as diffusely as St. Austin, I should never sufficiently describe by what premeditated contradictions the most faithful

\* Memoires de Tessé, t. 2, p. 187.

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have been disgusted, and the most zealous dis-  
couraged. I have been compelled to leave at  
Cadiz, more than a hundred leagues from hence,  
two french battalions and a regiment of dragoons;  
because I was obliged to hurry away, and be-  
cause spanish lethargy had provided nothing.  
We shall see what the new reign or government  
will produce: it cannot be worse than the past.  
The illness and delay of the princess Orsini,  
throw me into despair. There are many things  
of importance which cannot proceed till she is at  
Madrid.”\*

“ A few hours later,” he wrote to Amelot,  
“ and Badajos would have been taken, to the joy  
of the garrison, because the spanish troops were  
unpaid, and the officers highly discontented; be-  
cause the necessary orders were badly given, and  
worse executed; and the spirit of insubordina-  
tion universal.” He pressed for french officers  
in the garrisons, adding, “ I would not trust a  
spaniard, however brave, with the defence of a  
steeple. They fight duels; but as a body, and  
for their country, is an idea which never enters  
their heads.”†

In proportion to the misfortunes of the army,  
and the embarrassments of the court, internal

\* Memoires de Tessé, t. 2, p. 195.

† This petulant remark savours more of ill humour than justice,  
as the whole history of the war will prove.

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discontents increased; the disaffected became bolder and more active, and the public mind was agitated with rumours of real or pretended plots against the government. The count of Cifuentes, a nobleman of high rank, and turbulent spirit, fitted by his skill in intrigue and popularity to become the head of a faction, had in the preceding year formed an austrian party in Andalusia, where his connections were extensive. His machinations being discovered, he was arrested on his return from Madrid; but he found means to escape, and secretly traversed Aragon, Valencia, and Andalusia, increasing the number of his partisans, and preparing the way for a general revolt.\*

The designs of Cifuentes, were scarcely discovered before the conspiracy attributed to Leganez, created additional alarm, and diffused a sentiment of discontent and suspicion throughout the court and capital.†

In the midst of the disquietudes which agitated Spain, the defection of the duke of Savoy was an irreparable misfortune to the bourbon arms in Italy. This prince, whose necessary and fundamental principle of policy was to maintain the balance between the two great rival powers, had no sooner secured his own personal interest, and the establishment of his daughters by the bourbon

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 250. † See page 335,

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alliance, than he endeavoured to reduce the preponderance of the House of Bourbon in Italy, which threatened his own independence. He, therefore, tampered with the allies ; and at the very moment when Vendome had led a considerable force into the Trentin, to favour the operations of the army in Bavaria, he suddenly declared in favour of Austria, and announced his accession to the grand alliance. His machinations, however artfully conducted, could not be entirely concealed from the vigilance of the french monarch. Vendome hastened back from the Trentin, arrested his officers, and incorporated many of his troops in the french ranks ; while an army, under the command of Tessé, advanced through Savoy, and a laconic epistle from Louis denounced the vengeance of an injured sovereign. The principal places of Piedmont were rapidly reduced. The duke himself would have fallen the sacrifice of his varying policy, had not the imperial general Staremburg suddenly broken up his quarters in the midst of winter, joined him by a rapid and masterly march, and enabled him to maintain the struggle against a vast superiority of force, till succours could arrive from the allied powers.\*

These events, while they distressed the court of Madrid, gave new encouragement to the

\* House of Austria, v. 1, ch. 69.

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partisans of Austria, and contributed to hasten the measures taken in Portugal for the intended invasion. Other incidents gave additional union and strength to the cause. The duke of Cadaval, principal minister of Portugal, was disgraced in consequence of his secret connections with France. A new attack of the apoplexy having reduced the king to a state of imbecility, the queen dowager was called to the regency, and the administration intrusted to those who were well inclined to England and Austria. The bickerings and rivalry between the prince of Darmstadt and the admiral of Castile, which had greatly tended to mar the designs of the allies, were also terminated by the decline of the admiral's influence, and his subsequent death, the effect of chagrin and disappointed ambition.\*

With this auspicious change in their prospects, the allies sent a reinforcement of 15,000 men to Portugal, under the command of the gallant Peterborough, and made active preparations for a vigorous campaign. It was intended, that while the combined forces invaded Spain on the side of Beira and Alemtejo, an english squadron should convey the archduke himself with 6,000 men to effect a descent on the coast of Italy, and assist in the unequal struggle which the duke of Savoy was maintaining against the bourbon arms.

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 323.

This detachment departed under the command of Peterborough, and on reaching Gibraltar the prince of Darmstadt joined the expedition as a volunteer. From his extensive influence in Catalonia, he urged the advantage of landing in Spain instead of Italy, and profiting by the general discontent; but Peterborough, who better appreciated the weakness of his force, persisted in the original design. Charles himself, however, naturally espoused the proposal of the prince; and Catalonia was destined to become the scene of action and the source of a civil war, which shook the throne of Philip, and was not extinguished till after peace was restored between the contending powers.

While the squadron lay at anchor in the bay of Altea near Valencia, Peterborough published a manifesto declaring that he was come to assert the just rights of the House of Austria to the Spanish throne, and deliver the country from the irksome yoke of a foreign domination. This address was actively dispersed by means of the Austrian partisans, particularly of Basset, an enterprising officer who had accompanied the expedition. The inhabitants of Altea and the neighbouring districts rose with one accord, and flocked in crowds to hail the archduke as their deliverer. At the same time a commotion arose in Denia, and the garrison surrendering without

CHAP. 12. opposition, were replaced by a body of 400 men  
1705. from the fleet, under the command of general Ramero, one of the spanish adherents of the archduke. In this petty town, Charles was first proclaimed king of Spain with the usual solemnities.

Aug. 25. Elate with this success, the new sovereign over-ruled the opposition of Peterborough ; and after a short delay the squadron proceeded directly to the road of Barcelona, and landed a body of troops to the east of the city. The difficulties attending their situation were however so great, that during three weeks no progress was made in its reduction. The garrison was not inferior in force to the besiegers ; and the fortifications were commanded by the strong citadel of Montjuich, which, from its lofty situation, might be deemed almost impregnable. Velasco, the gallant viceroy, who had before saved the city, still held the government, and was assisted by the duke of Popoli, who had equally distinguished himself in the preservation of Naples. By the firmness of these nobles, and the zeal with which they inspired the garrison, the inhabitants were retained in their duty to Philip, the disaffected in the vicinity intimidated, and the magnificent representations of the prince of Darmstadt, that the whole country waited only the signal to rise, were proved to be as fallacious

as on the former occasion. The austrian standard was joined only by about 1,500 miquelets or mountaineers, men who gained a precarious subsistence by smuggling and plunder, and were averse to the slightest restraint of discipline.

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In consequence of this disappointment the allied camp became a scene of disunion, tumult, and despondency ; the generals, far from devising plans for the annoyance of the enemy, seemed wholly occupied in accusing and recriminating each other. Repeated councils of war only tended to aggravate and prolong their disputes ; the prosecution of the siege was publicly declared an act of madness ; and the dutch general even announced his resolution to disobey the orders of the commander in chief, rather than sacrifice his soldiers in so wild an enterprise.

In the midst of these feuds, the unceasing representations of the prince encouraged Charles not to re-embark the troops. The garrison imprudently suffering themselves to be shut up within the walls, the desultory parties which had joined the austrian standard, aggravated the internal discontents by intercepting the supply of provisions ; while the austrian emissaries, roaming over the inland country, made continual though silent accessions to their cause.

At length Peterborough himself, stung with

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the reproaches of Charles and the prince, called forth his resources to complete an enterprise, which he had represented as impracticable. As the fort of Montjuich commanded the fortifications on the weakest side of the town ; and as the garrison, from confidence in the strength of its works and towering situation, were likely to be unprepared for a sudden attack, he formed the daring design of surprising this important post. To conceal his purpose, he called a council of war both of the land and sea officers, and acquiesced in their decision, that if the siege should be deemed impracticable on a certain day, the troops were to be re-embarked, and an attempt made on the coast of Naples. No circumstance was suffered to occur which might encourage the prosecution of the siege. On the appointed day, he ordered the battering artillery to be sent on board, and coolly made the requisite preparations for re-embarking the troops, disregarding alike the bitter remonstrances of Charles, and the murmurs of those whose hopes were disappointed. Sensible that secrecy was the soul of such an enterprise, he suffered not the slightest hint to escape, even to his confidential friends Stanhope and Methuen. He silently matured the arrangements for his design, prepared the necessary artillery, and posted 1,000 men in a convent midway between the citadel and the town.

In the evening, and at the very moment when the inhabitants of Barcelona were rejoicing for their apparent deliverance, he headed a detachment of 1,200 foot and 200 horse ; and stopping in his march at the quarters of the prince of Darmstadt, disclosed the design, and claimed his assistance. Although all intercourse had been suspended between the two rivals for several weeks, the challenge was as readily accepted as it was gallantly given, and these two great but eccentric men, in a moment, buried all memory of their former animosity to unite their skill and bravery against the common enemy.

Taking a circuitous route at the foot of the heights, they arrived early in the morning under the hill on which the fortress is situated, about a quarter of a mile from the outer works. The earl waiting till the break of day, formed a part of his detachment into two bodies, each consisting of a forlorn hope of 30 men, and an additional party of 60 supported by 200 ; while 500 were drawn up in the rear, as a corps of reserve.

The rival heroes headed the party which was destined for the most dangerous part of the enterprise, the assault of a bastion on the side of the town. At the appointed signal, the troops advanced over the glacis, coolly received the fire of the enemy, leaped into the covert way, dispersed its defenders, and, gaining the bastion,

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fortified its gorge with a heap of stones, left there by accident. This attack engrossing the principal attention of the garrison, the other body advanced with far less danger, gained a demi-bastion on the western side of the fortifications, cast up a slight entrenchment, and turned the artillery against the inner works. The garrison being driven from the exterior works, orders were given to bring up the artillery, previously prepared, and to advance the 1,000 men posted in the convent.

But the alarm had spread into Barcelona, and a party of dragoons was detached by the governor, 200 of whom dismounting, reached the citadel. On the arrival of this succour, the garrison gave a shout of exultation; and the prince of Darmstadt mistaking it for an offer to surrender, incautiously advanced towards the inner works with a party of 300 men. The garrison suffered them to enter the ditch, and then suddenly sallying forth, took 200 prisoners, and poured a heavy fire on the rest who were making their escape. The prince fell by an accidental shot in the conflict.

At this moment, a new alarm was given to the assailants by the approach of a strong corps from the town. Peterborough riding forward to observe them, his officers and soldiers were seized with a sudden panic, abandoned their

posts, and began their retreat. Fortunately apprised of this movement before it was discovered by the garrison, he returned, rallied the troops, and led them back to their posts. At the same time the 200 men just captured by the Spaniards, and sent down to the town, met the hostile party advancing, and gave the intelligence that Peterborough and the prince of Darmstadt were themselves present in the assault. The commander of the reinforcement naturally supposing that the general in chief would not engage in so desperate an enterprise, without the support of the whole army, was alarmed for his own safety, and hastened back to the town lest he should be intercepted.

The body of 1,000 men now arriving from the convent, the posts which had been taken were properly secured; a communication was opened with the camp to the east of the town, and the battering artillery re-landed. Two mortars were brought to bear on the inner fortifications, and by a continuance of the almost miraculous good fortune attending this singular enterprise, the shells set fire to a magazine, which blew up the face of one of the bastions, and killed the governor, with some of his principal officers. The alert and active miquelets seized the advantage derived from this moment of confusion and terror, rushed into the works,

CHAP. 12. and being supported by the regulars, the remnant of the garrison could only escape an instant massacre, by surrendering themselves prisoners of war.

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On the capture of Montjuich, 14,000 catalans at once joined the austrian standard. But notwithstanding this accession of force, the loss of the citadel, and the effect which the besieging batteries produced on the works, Velasco still held out, and declared his resolution to bury himself under the ruins of the town. Had the inhabitants been animated by similar ardour, they might have defended themselves till the arrival of succours. But the austrian party was rapidly increasing, and the garrison discouraged: the people clamoured for a capitulation, and many of the troops either deserted to the enemy or joined the disaffected. The intrepid governor was at length reduced to capitulate. He obtained the condition that the garrison should march out with the honours of war, and be escorted to the neighbouring fortress of Roses; but, in quitting the place, was exposed to the fury of the people, and he, as well as the loyal adherents of Philip, owed their safety to the personal exertions of their gallant conqueror.\*

\* The best and most accurate account of the siege of Barcelona, and of the motives which actuated the earl of Peterborough, is to be found in the Memoirs of captain Carleton, who accom-

On the 23d of October, Charles was received in the capital of Catalonia with extraordinary transports of joy, and solemnly proclaimed sovereign of the Spanish monarchy ; and, at the same time, the inhabitants exultingly burnt the charter of privileges given by Philip, to receive a new grant from the hand of their chosen sovereign.

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Of the garrison which took the road to Roses, all, except 1,000 men, joined the Austrian standard. Desertion and disaffection appeared in every quarter, and rapidly extended over the eastern part of Spain. In Catalonia, the insurgents under the direction of Cifuentes, and supported by the allies, secured, almost without a struggle, the important posts of Tarragona, Tortosa, Lerida, and Girona, with the principal places of the province, except Roses, and even spread themselves into the neighbouring districts of Aragon. A regiment of 750 horse, which had been employed to blockade Denia, went over to the archduke, and, under the command of Romero, favoured a general rising of the people of Valencia. Basset, with a party of

panied his lordship, and took an important part in the expedition. He proves, beyond a doubt, that the enterprise was solely planned by Peterborough, and that the prince of Darmstadt only joined him when marching to the attack. Such undoubted authority relieves us from the trouble of examining the controversy respecting the conduct of lord Peterborough, which was agitated with such acrimony at home, and of which an analysis may be found in the pages of Rapin.

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catalans and valencian insurgents, advanced against the capital, where a strong party was formed for the archduke. Confiding in their support, one of the chiefs advanced to the very gates, holding in one hand his drawn sword, and in the other a portrait of the austrian prince. The people burst into a transport of enthusiasm, even the soldiery joined in the revolt, and the city received the austrian partisans without a moment's opposition. The viceroy, the marquis of Villagarcia, was permitted to retire; but the archbishop, affecting to yield to force and surrender himself prisoner, embraced the cause of Charles, and afterwards became one of his favourite and confidential ministers. Finally, the principal places were rapidly reduced, and nothing remained to Philip in Valencia and Murcia, except the fortress of Alicante and Peñiscola.

As the season was too far advanced for farther operations, the fleet took its departure. One division under sir Cloudesly Shovel returned to England, twenty-five sail under sir John Lake wintered at Lisbon, and a light squadron of six frigates remained for the protection of Barcelona. The city was placed in a state of defence, and the inhabitants enrolled and disciplined. Six native regiments were raised to reinforce the small army of Charles; while Peterborough and

Cifuentes, at the head of a flying corps, established garrisons in the frontier towns, and cut off all communication with the interior. The ferment extended so rapidly, even into Aragon, that the archbishop of Saragossa could scarcely maintain the peace of that capital, where the inhabitants rose against the french troops sent for their protection. Disaffection, however, continued to spread ; it was deemed imprudent to call the troops into action ; and no operations could be undertaken to check the progress of revolt, till a french force arrived.\*

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 267—342.—Ortiz, lib. 22, c. 4, 5.—Targe, t. 4, p. 109, and seq.—Desormeaux.—Defence of the earl of Peterborough—Carleton's Memoirs.—History of Europe for 1705—Tindal, Cunningham.

## CHAPTER THE THIRTEENTH.

1705.

*Arrival and honourable reception of the princess Orsini—Increasing feuds in the cabinet—Dissatisfaction of the grandes, and dispute on a point of etiquette—Correspondence of the princess with Torci—Farther changes in the cabinet—Montellano removed from the presidency of Castile—Increasing discontents of the nobles—Spirited resolution of Philip to head the army in Catalonia—Establishment of the regency on his departure—Interesting letter from the queen to Louis the fourteenth.*

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Aug. 5.

AFTER long delays the princess Orsini departed from a court of which she appeared as the reigning divinity; and her entrance into the capital of Spain resembled the triumphal entry of a sovereign into his own dominions. At the distance of two leagues, she was met by the king and queen, and, after an affectionate embrace, was invited to take a place in the royal carriage.\* But she was now become too discreet to violate the rigid rules of Spanish etiquette, by accepting an honour to which a subject was not entitled. She resumed her office of camerara-mayor, by the resignation of the

\* “Le roi et la reine la reçurent avec des démonstrations de joie, dont on n'a point d'exemple de souverain à sujet, &c.” St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 301.

duchess of Bejar, and the queen seemed as if unable to testify the warmth of her affection to the princess, or the extent of her gratitude to the king of France. Her return was hailed by both courts, as the panacea to close the wounds which her recal had inflicted. Louis himself, with a degree of humility to which he had long been a stranger, acknowledged his own error in recalling her from Madrid; and in his letters to the queen, he observed, "The confidence you will please to place in her, together with her understanding and zeal, will restore the affairs of the monarchy, and effectually promote the interests of the two crowns."

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The presence of the princess did not, however, allay the feuds which had been called into action during the recent struggles. The nobles, proud of the part they had acted, and presuming on the attentions of the court, endeavoured to maintain their temporary influence, and profited by the public distress to resume their ascendancy over the crown. Even those who had been chosen for ministers, with the hope that they would obey the hand which had raised them, had disappointed the expectation of their employers; they had either been dismissed in disgrace or voluntarily withdrawn from responsibility, and by their example and complaints contributed to increase the public odium. Of

CHAP. 13. <sup>1705.</sup> all who had originally promoted the accession of a bourbon prince, scarcely a single person now remained in power.

In such a disposition of the public mind, every proposal to draw forth resources adequate to the exigency of the moment, was either evaded or opposed. An attempt to introduce a new species of poll tax, after the example of France, almost excited a rebellion, and was never carried into effect ; and to meet even the ordinary necessities of the government, the king was reduced to accept a donation of two millions of livres from France. The troops, left without pay or appointments, deserted in whole companies ; discontent spread through every rank, and the officers themselves, who were intrusted with the defence of places, were merely anxious to obtain an honourable pretext for capitulation.

The first subject of opposition encountered by the princess arose from that invariable object of jealousy, the royal guards.

Considering the doubtful tenure of the spanish crown, the degraded state of the royal authority, and the prevailing discontents, it had been long the object of the french cabinet to abolish the antient guards, and replace them by a more numerous as well as more loyal body of troops, both to give dignity to the crown and security to the person of the king.

Such an innovation among a people accustomed to see their sovereigns almost unattended, like a father in the midst of his family, excited the greatest apprehension and jealousy : it was opposed by all ranks and parties, who considered it as a measure calculated to extinguish the remains of their liberty and independence. No persuasion or lure could subdue this opposition, till the new government was perfectly established, and the increasing dangers from without, as well as rumours of plots within, silenced, though without suppressing, the national sentiment. The fertile genius of Orri had discovered funds to provide for the expence ; and the address of the princess was employed to obviate the objections of the most strenuous remonstrants. To reconcile the higher ranks, four companies of cavalry were formed, two of spaniards, one of italians, and one of walloons, consisting of 200 gentlemen each. The captains, who bore the rank of colonel, were the count of Lemos, the dukes of Sessa and Popoli, and the prince of Tzerclaes Tilli. To these companies of parade were added an efficient force of foot guards, consisting of two regiments of 3,000 men each, one walloons and one spaniards.

But neither custom nor interest could reconcile the spaniards to the innovation ; and it was

CHAP. 15. incessantly opposed, not only by remonstrances  
1705. from the grandees in avowed opposition, but even by the nobles attached to the court, and not unfrequently by the cabinet.

A petty incident which happened immediately after the arrival of the princess, shewed the jealousy with which the nobles regarded this obnoxious body. The prince of Tzerclaes, whose military talents and services had procured him the command of the walloon company, was created a grandee, and honoured with the privilege of seating himself, instead of standing, between the king and the body of grandees at the public celebration of mass. This privilege, though shared with the other captains, was made a pretext for complaint. The grandees joined in a representation to the princess against this breach of etiquette, and the privileges of their order, which was entitled to precedence next to the royal family, and refused to attend the mass unless it was revoked. A consultation was held in conjunction with Amelot, and the princess was deputed to reply, that the king would listen to their representations, but persisted in his resolution. They departed in high disgust, and only three appeared at the next celebration of the mass. To pacify them, the king declared that there was no intention to infringe their privileges; but the greater number still con-

tinued refractory, and at the Te Deum for the victory of Cassano, the king assisted without parade, to avoid a public appearance of disrespect to his person. Still only eight were gained over, and it was found necessary to remove the two spanish captains, the count of Lemos and the duke of Sessa, and to transfer their offices to the duke of Ossuna and the count of Aguilar, who had shewn more flexibility and attachment to their sovereign.

At length this contumacious and captious spirit seems to have exhausted the patience of the princess herself, though she had been hitherto the principal advocate for conciliating the nobles. We find her observing in a letter to Torci, “ the essential requisite is not to gratify the grandees ; for that cannot be done without confirming the power they have usurped, which would occasion the loss of the throne, and risk the life of the king. We must pursue our plans for raising troops and finding the means of paying them, and despise the rest.”\*

About the same time she ventured to dissipate the illusion which still prevailed in the french cabinet, by a true though unvarnished picture of the real state of the spanish nation, and the views of the different parties.

\* St. Simon, t. 3, p. 228.

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Nov. 6.

"It is, Sir," she said in a letter to Torci, "an incontestible truth, that the spaniards delivered themselves over to a french prince, merely from the apprehension of not being succoured by the emperor. The grand alliance was disunited ; France had stationed powerful armies on the frontiers ; and the House of Austria appeared to be abandoned by the allies, who demanded the dismemberment of the monarchy. Doubtless these reasons operated on those who advised Charles the second to make the will in favour of the duke of Anjou. Philip was accordingly received with acclamations, and no disaffection appeared as long as these sentiments prevailed.

"But scarcely had the principal powers of Europe declared for the archduke, before the french were no longer safe at Madrid. Blecourt, who was there at the time, will acknowledge this ; and I have several letters from cardinal Portocarrero, during my residence at Barcelona, which prove my assertion. The defection of the duke of Savoy, and the war with Portugal, shook the public mind ; but it was the fatal day of Hochstedt which produced an almost total alienation, and was considered by this country as the ruin of France. From that moment, the nobles, forgetting the favours and liberality of their king our master, con-

ceived that they could not otherwise prevent the division of their monarchy, than by ranging themselves with the allies, who appeared the strongest side. The people also, disgusted by the extinction of commerce, habitually detesting the french, and seduced by numerous agents, who were scattered over the provinces without the fear of punishment, began to consider the acknowledgment of the archduke as the means of disposing of their wool, the riches of Spain, to the english and dutch, and of securing the safety of their galleons, the whole profits of which, as they complain, are monopolised by the french.

" These considerations, and the opinion that France is reduced to the last extremity, have thrown the most loyal into their present state of apathy. All other pretexts are mere inventions to cover the real motive. Hence, to have an excuse for changing their king, without incurring the charge of disloyalty, the spanish government, last year, ruined the troops by barbarous usage ; and none can be induced to serve in the infantry. If Grammont deserves reproach, it is for not having discovered this iniquitous mystery, and for having laboured, like others, in reducing the affairs of Spain to the deplorable state in which Amelot found them.

" I pass, Sir, to the changes which have taken

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place since the arrival of the new ambassador. As these changes were mostly made in my absence, you will easily believe that I am not interested in approving them. Nevertheless, without entering into details, I do not hesitate in declaring that there is not one which does not contribute to avert the ruin of the monarchy. Some have re-established, in a certain degree, the royal authority ; others have given occasion to assemble troops ; and none have been in the least connected with the revolt of the catalans, or the disaffection of the natives of Valencia and Aragon. Those provinces are the best used ; they pay little to the king, and, as far as I know, not the smallest of their privileges has been violated.”\*

Without the complete direction of the cabinet, it was in vain to propose beneficial or consistent plans. Accordingly Montellano, who had acquired great popularity by his strenuous opposition to the recent innovations, was removed from his office of governor of the council of Castile, which was transferred to Ronquillo, formerly corregidor of Madrid, who, with the duke of Veraguas, obtained a seat in the cabinet. These two ministers were selected in consequence of their professed attachment to France ; and as the princess could not be admitted on account of her sex, the

\* St. Simon, t. 3, p. 233,

french embassador, who was the ostensible organ of the two courts, became the invariable object of spanish odium.

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The grandees on their part were not baffled or discouraged, but united their whole strength to obtain the establishment of a spanish administration. Their proposal was at first eluded ; but the loss of Barcelona, the defection of all Catalonia except Roses, and the rising insurrections in Valencia and Aragon, compelled the princess and Amelot to overlook the mischiefs already derived from the tardiness and contradictions of the spanish councils. They accordingly held a new conference with the duke of Medina Celi and the count of Frigiliana, the chiefs of the opposition, listened to their representations of the national grievances, and offered to form a new cabinet, and revive the antient mode of transacting business with the spanish secretary of state. But the concession being deemed a proof of weakness, new demands were brought forward, and it was insisted that the french embassador should not assist in the cabinet, unless the spanish embassador was admitted into that of Versailles. The two chiefs recommended themselves and the duke of Veraguas as alone capable of directing the helm of state ; but Medina Celi declined the offer of a seat in the cabinet, under the pretext of his infirmities. The other nobles either re-

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CHAP. 13. jected all offers, or were unable to afford efficient support, from want of abilities and want of influence.

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The negotiation was accordingly again broken off, and the french agents persuaded Philip to adopt the only alternative which his situation permitted, and throw himself intirely on the support of Louis. He made therefore an earnest and pathetic appeal to his grandfather. After representing the deplorable state of his kingdom, the disaffection of his subjects, the dilatory spirit of those who were most faithful to his cause, and the alarming deficiency of money and troops, he urgently solicited assistance. "To you," he said, "under Providence, I am chiefly indebted for my crown. You will not, I am convinced, permit the sceptre to be wrested from the hands in which you placed it, nor leave me to return to France a deposed sovereign, a disgrace to my family, and a burthen to my country." He concluded with declaring his resolution to lead his army into Catalonia, and crush the party of his rival before he could receive reinforcements. With this representation, the count of Aguilar was dispatched to Paris.

Louis, though not deficient in natural affection, was too sensible of his own interest to need this pathetic appeal to his feelings. Although he was pressed on all sides by numerous enemies;

although his own frontier was exposed to invasion, he made the most strenuous efforts to sustain the throne of his grandson, and promised to detach a considerable reinforcement to join him under the walls of Barcelona.

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The departure of Philip to the army being decided, the next object was to settle the government during his absence. According to former precedents, the king would have been accompanied by a part of the cabinet and the french ambassador, while the administration was vested in the queen with the title of regent. But past experience had taught both the queen and princess to regard this arrangement with real or feigned reluctance. The princess therefore proposed, that Philip should be accompanied by the count of Frigiliana in the capacity of grand master of the household, to gratify the spaniards, and regulate himself by the advice of Tessé; while Amelot was to remain at Madrid and assist her in directing the operations of the regency. The queen testified her embarrassment in a letter to Louis.

"I never," she said, "loved to rule; I am already too well acquainted with the difficulties of government, and find in it nothing agreeable. The unfortunate situation of our present affairs will render my office still more troublesome; and I own that I should have found it unsupportable,

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did not your minister, in whom I place implicit confidence, assist me, and witness my conduct. He will doubtless inform you that my character was greatly mistaken, when I was represented as a princess who loved to interfere in business. Would to God that I had no other business than that which occupies most women, namely, to amuse myself with such trifles as would enable me to pass a life less agitated than at present."\*

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 326.

## CHAPTER THE FOURTEENTH.

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*Expedition against Barcelona—Philip joins the army under the direction of Tessé—Siege of Barcelona—Arrival of succours; and precipitate retreat of the french and spanish army beyond the Pyrenees—Insurrection of Aragon and Valencia—Charles proclaimed at Saragossa—Philip returns to Madrid—Removes the royal residence to Burgos—Spirited conduct of Philip and the queen; and zeal and loyalty of the castilians—The allies occupy Madrid—Toledo declares for the archduke in consequence of the intrigues of Portocarrero and the queen dowager—Able campaign of marshal Berwick—Forces the allies to retreat into Valencia—Philip returns to Madrid and resumes the government—Military operations in the Netherlands and Italy—Siege and battle of Turin—Loss of the spanish dominions in Lombardy.*

EVERY exertion was made and every consideration sacrificed for the expedition against Catalonia, on which the fate of Spain seemed to depend. All the french troops except four squadrons were drawn from the western army; the frontier was left to the defence of the native militia, and the new levies. But to supply, as far as possible, the deficiency of force by the abilities of the general, the duke of Berwick, who was deservedly beloved in Spain, and distinguished for his skill in defensive warfare, was appointed to this arduous command.

The meditated invasion of Catalonia was not

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however carried into execution without a recurrence of the same difficulties as had already marred so many of Philip's designs.

Tessé was ill calculated for the arduous and delicate enterprise. Though personally brave and skilful, he was cautious and indecisive, and in all his designs looked rather to safety than success. Accustomed to the mechanical regularity of a despotic government, and the prompt obedience of a well disciplined army, he was confounded and perplexed by the cabals of the court and nobles, the disaffection of the people, the insubordination of the troops ; and his letters to Versailles were filled with alarms and forebodings, complaints and despondency. He represented the plans formed at Madrid, as the fantasies of drowning persons who eagerly catch at shadows ; he described the Spaniards as anxious for a change of sovereigns, and declared that an army in every province would scarcely suffice to maintain the royal authority. He dwelt on the difficulty of traversing sixty leagues of country embarrassed with defiles, intersected by mountains and rivers, and unable to furnish the most indispensable supplies. He shewed the uncertainty of the communication by sea, in the presence of a powerful fleet ; and expatiated on the consequences of a failure with an army unequal to the enterprize, and with the hostile

places of Lerida and Tortosa in the rear. He did not hesitate also to predict, that the diminution of the army on the western frontier would invite a new invasion from Portugal, and enable the confederates to penetrate to Madrid.

These representations being over-ruled, he proposed to prepare the way for the reduction of Barcelona, by the capture of Lerida, Tortosa, Valencia, and Girona, the possession of which would at least secure a safe retreat.\* But Philip, eager to crush the insurrection in its focus, and expel his competitor from Spain, overlooked all the difficulties and obstacles which alarmed his cautious general, and being supported by the opinion of his Spanish officers, the army was ordered to proceed directly against Barcelona.

During the march, an unfortunate accident occurred, which, though not uncommon in similar circumstances, increased the perplexity and difficulties of Tessé. A lieutenant was massacred in his bed in the town of Guerra, nine leagues from Saragossa. When the circumstance was discovered, the troops of the division to which he belonged, returned into the town, razed the house where the murder was committed, and plundered the inhabitants. The tumult became a signal for the neighbouring peasantry, who flocked into the town to assist their country-

\* *Memoires de Tessé*, t. 2, p. 211.

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men ; and it was not quelled till many lives had been sacrificed. The incident sufficiently proved the hostile disposition of the country, and the general aversion to the bourbon government.

At length the army was put in motion. Tessé, at the head of 20,000 men, descended along the course of the Ebro from Saragossa, and was joined by Philip at Alcaniz. From hence he directed his

March 23.

march towards Lerida, which it appears to have been still his intention to reduce ; but an order from Versailles induced him to continue his progress to Barcelona. Meanwhile, Noailles, with the promised reinforcements, had penetrated through the eastern Pyrenees, left a detachment to blockade Girona, and advancing along the coast joined the main body under the walls of the capital.

April 6.

At the same time a squadron of twenty ships, under the count of Thoulouse, cast anchor in the road to cut off the supplies of the besieged by sea. The greater part of the catalans retired on every side before the royal forces, wasting the country, poisoning the wells, and opposing every obstacle to their march.

The state of Barcelona might have justified the most sanguine hopes of success. The force which had given the first impulse to the insurrection being dispersed to occupy the places which had declared for an austrian prince, scarcely 3,000 regulars were left to defend a

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town which required a garrison of at least 15,000 men. Dazzled with the success of the allied arms, and deeming themselves secure from an immediate attack, the inhabitants had given way to overweening confidence, and neglected the requisite preparations for defence. At the same time the petty court of Charles was distracted by the squabbles between the native Spaniards and his German adherents. Peterborough, who with the flying camp watched the passes of the country, repeatedly warned him of the impending danger, and urged him to retire; and these intimations were seconded by many of those about his person.

But either from a natural firmness of mind, or from a just apprehension of ruining his cause in Spain, by deserting his adherents at such a crisis, Charles determined to abide the issue of the contest. He had likewise the address to influence in his favour that religious enthusiasm which is inherent in the Spanish character. He repaired to one of the churches, prostrated himself before an image of the blessed Virgin, and having performed his devotions, appeared in public with an air of joy. He declared that the Virgin, attended by two angels, had manifested herself to him; adding, "with the assurance of her divine protection, I will never quit Barcelona, but remain and share the fate of

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my brave catalans.”\* Such a revelation was hailed as a miracle, and its effect was heightened by the exhortations of the priests and the enthusiasm of the women.

As if to make amends for their former apathy, all ranks vied in the most strenuous exertions. All who were capable of bearing arms were enrolled and disciplined, and the whole city was encouraged by the example of Charles and his attendants, who assisted in repairing the breaches, and strengthening the works. The priests and monks flew to arms; the capuchins appeared on the parade, their beards ornamented with party coloured ribbands; the women and girls, formed into companies, guarded the posts less exposed, or worked on the ramparts like the common pioneers.

To favour the efforts of the besieged, Peterborough, with a flying corps of 3,000 men, seconded by Cifuentes, drew towards the neighbourhood of the town, and by incessant attacks kept the besieging army in constant alarm. The garrison also was continually reinforced by convoys of light vessels from the neighbouring coast, which profited by the shallows, or found means to elude the vigilance of the blockading squadron.

Notwithstanding all these exertions, a town

\* Tessé, t. 2, p. 219.—Noailles, t. 2, p. 348.

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so extensive and weakly garrisoned could not long have resisted the well directed efforts of a powerful army. But its fall was retarded by the desperate resistance of the citadel of Montjuich against an attack of twenty-three days, during which Philip animated the assailants by his presence. General Donegal the commandant being killed, the garrison retired into the town ; and the besiegers, masters of the works which crown this commanding height, turned their whole force against the body of the place. The approaches were rapidly made, and practicable breaches formed in the rampart. Notwithstanding the unaccountable delay derived either from the circumspection of Tessé, or from some cause, which cannot now be developed, arrangements were made for the decisive assault ; and Philip within a few hours hoped to see his rival at his feet, and to extinguish the last embers of a revolt which had endangered his throne.\*

At this moment of awful suspense, a british and dutch squadron, charged with reinforcements and supplies, appeared in sight. In an instant the state of the contending parties was totally changed. The french squadron quitted

\* History of Europe, 1706, p. 64.—Memoires de Tessé, t. 2, ch. 10.—Noailles, t. 3, liv. 7.—St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 1.—Targe.

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the road and retired towards Toulon ; the combined fleets approached the shore ; the troops were landed and continued under arms the whole night, to repel an assault which was hourly apprehended from an impulse of desperation.

The arrival of such a reinforcement, and the suspension of all communication by sea, discouraged the cautious and deliberative Tessé. He over-ruled the spirited resolution of Philip to prosecute the siege, and in the middle of the night made a precipitate retreat, abandoning his heavy artillery and stores, and consigning the sick and wounded to the humanity of the enemy. In the morning the sky was overcast with a total eclipse, from which the superstitious augured the eternal setting of the bourbon sun.\*

The retreating army had however to encounter more formidable mischiefs than the sinister aspects of the heavens. They were severely harassed in their march through a broken and impoverished country, by the daring attacks of Peterborough and Cifuentes ; and being precluded from all communication with the central provinces, were reduced to force a tedious and dangerous way through the eastern Pyrenees into Roussillon. Philip himself arrived at Perpignan on the 19th of May.

\* The sun is the device of the House of Bourbon. Memoirs of lord Walpole, v. 1, p. 9, 8vo.

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A retreat effected under such adverse circumstances, the danger which impended over the western frontier, and the effects which were apprehended from the return of Philip to Madrid, defeated, disgraced, and without an army, joined to the disasters which had already marked the campaign in Flanders, induced Tessé to recommend Philip to retire to Paris. Even Louis opposed his immediate return to Madrid, and ordered him to repair with a few regiments to Pampeluna, and there remain till sufficient reinforcements could be sent to escort him with honour to his capital.

But Philip, the vigour of whose mind was never called into action except by adversity, despised the advice of his more timid counsellors. He declared that he had taken his resolution to assert his rights to Spain on Spanish ground. Without waiting for the opinion of his grandfather, he hastened by the common road to Pampeluna without an escort, and at once astonished and gratified his subjects by appearing in his capital within a month after his unfortunate retreat.

He arrived only to witness new mortifications. Notwithstanding the dignified conduct of the queen, and her earnest appeals to the nobles, she could only procure a contribution, which was rather a mockery than a relief. The nobles

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stood aloof, lukewarm in his cause, or preparing to hail the victorious arms of his competitor. In an assembly summoned by the orders of Louis, in which to ascertain their disposition the french minister declared that his master could not maintain Philip on the throne, contrary to the wishes of the nation, the duke of Medina Celi spoke the common sentiment, in a bitter invective against the controul of France, and against the malversations of the princess Orsini, whom he accused of a shameful traffic of governments and offices.\* This appeal therefore produced little effect except cold professions of attachment, and acclamations of “ Long live Philip the fifth.”

On the western frontier, the duke of Berwick, with an army, too weak even for defensive warfare, had retreated before the invading force of 40,000 men from Portugal. The capture of Alcantara, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca, opened to the enemy a way to the very capital, and they only waited the intelligence of the advance of Charles from Catalonia to prosecute their success. On the eastern side of the peninsula, where the fatal blow had been first struck, the danger continued to spread. Don Luis de Cordova, count of Santa Cruz, went over to the

May 12.  
June 7.

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 359.—Larrey Histoire de Louis 14, t. 9, p. 25.

austrian party with a treasure of 60,000 crowns, which he was commissioned to convey to Oran, and by his intelligence and influence promoted the capture of Carthagena, which contained the remnant of the spanish fleet. The insurrection extended into Aragon ; while the army which had saved Barcelona, swelled by numerous partisans from the neighbouring provinces, was preparing to advance into the heart of the peninsula, and join the forces from Portugal at Madrid.

In such disastrous circumstances the court was reduced to abandon the capital. Philip took the road of Guadalaxara to join the army of Berwick, which though amounting to no more than 8,000 men, principally cavalry, was the only force left to protect his person and his crown. The whole court was panic-struck. Some of the nobles pressed the king to strengthen the army by withdrawing the french garrisons of Fuentarabia, St. Sebastian and Pampeluna ; and others to remove the court to Pampeluna, as the only expedient to secure a retreat into France. But this timid and imprudent proposal was over-ruled by Berwick and Amelot, who represented that a retreat into Navarre, would confirm the general suspicion of a design to abandon the country. They therefore persuaded Philip to remove the royal residence and tribunals to Burgos, the

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1706. accordingly published, announcing this removal,  
and permitting all who were not attached to the  
court by their offices, to remain.

After publishing this decree, the king departed, and was followed by a great body of the nobles. The duke of Medina Sidonia, Montellano, the count of Frigiliana, and Ronquillo, governor of the council of Castile, accompanied him as members of the cabinet. The dukes of Popoli and Ossuna, the count of Aguilar, with the prince of Tzerclaes, captains of the horse guards; and the marquis of Aytona, who commanded the foot guards, did not abandon their sovereign. The gentlemen of the bed chamber, the count of Benevente, high steward, the marquises of Quintana and Jamaica, the counts of San Estevan de Gormaz and Baños, don Alonso Manrica, constable of Castile, and grand master of the houshold, and the chamberlains of the week, repaired also to the army.

The queen likewise was not deserted by a single person of her housshould. She was accompanied by her grand-master the count of San Estevan del Puerto, and the marquis of Almonacid, her master of the horse. The presidents of the councils, and those grandees,

\* Memoires de Berwick, t. 1, p. 851.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 89.

whose age or infirmities did not permit them to follow the army, repaired to Burgos, particularly the marquises del Fresno and Mancera, the dukes of Montalto, Jovenazzo, and Veraguas, as well as the greater part of the members belonging to the councils of Castile, Aragon, the Indies and Italy, the list of whose names would be too long to enumerate.

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In this trying situation, and amidst all its attendant embarrassments, the young queen did not belie the spirit which she had hitherto displayed. "After a journey of eight days," she wrote to madame de Maintenon, "I arrived at Burgos yesterday in the evening, extremely fatigued with rising early, overpowered with the heat and dust, finding no repose but in the most wretched hovels, so dilapidated, that in one instance the wall fell down to the peril of all within. From this you may judge of the rest. We hoped, on our arrival here, to be lodged with more comfort and convenience; but we have been much disappointed. Notwithstanding these distresses we shall be happy if the king overcomes his enemies. The worst is, scarcely a day passes without bad news. Saragossa revolted without even seeing the enemy; Cartagena is lost, and the portuguese are established at Madrid."\*

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\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 361.

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Before the departure of Philip from the capital, the light troops of the enemy already hovered on the neighbouring heights ; and in a few days, a column of cavalry, the vanguard of the portuguese army, under the marquis of Villaverde, took possession of the capital, and proclaimed Charles the third. Two days afterwards the earl of Galway and the marquis de las Minas made their triumphal entry at the head of the main body, which consisted of 30,000 portuguese, english, and dutch.

But to their extreme disappointment, no crowds nor acclamations welcomed their arrival. The nobles who had written to invite their approach, instead of joining them, did not make their appearance, and were principally those fluctuating characters, who, in every political storm, are anxious only to secure their own safety, or persons who had experienced the displeasure of the court. Among these last, we distinguish the count of Lemos, the patriarch of the Indies, and Don Balthazar Mendoza, bishop of Segovia. Oropesa, without openly espousing the cause of the archduke, suffered himself to be captured by the allied troops, at Guadalaxara, with the count de Haro his son-in-law. Scarcely, therefore, could the allies obtain respectable members to fill the different departments of their ephemeral government. At Madrid, their orders

were obeyed only from apprehension, and beyond the reach of their military force, were set at defiance. It is remarkable that the marquis of Rivas was among those who remained and took the oath of allegiance to Charles ; yet no inducement or importunity could prevail on him to acknowledge that the testament of Charles the second was surreptitious.

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Toledo was the only city of consequence which evinced a decided attachment to the austrian prince ; but this was a mere temporary effervescence excited by the cabals and example of the queen dowager and Portocarrero. The queen testified the most extravagant joy at the success of her nephew ; she relinquished the mournful sables which are constantly worn by the widowed queens of Spain, assumed a gala dress, as well as her whole household, and wrote a congratulatory letter to Charles, accompanied with a present of jewels. Portocarrero had long manifested an aversion to the sovereign whom he had assisted to place on the throne. He stigmatised the french as tyrants ; he charged Philip himself with the basest ingratitude ; and made a public display of his sentiments when the austrian troops entered Toledo, by blessing their standards, performing a solemn Te Deum in the cathedral, and concluding the day with a sumptuous

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Meanwhile every effort had been made by the court to profit by the dilatory proceedings of the enemy, and the rising spirit of the people. Philip himself shook off his natural reserve and indolence, and displayed such activity and address, that we scarcely recognise him as the prince described by Tessé. "His cold and silent deportment is ill calculated to gain the affections or excite the enthusiasm of those about him. He seldom speaks; do well or ill, it is the same; he thinks still as though he never thought, and after this campaign his presence at the head of his armies will only be prejudicial to his service."†

But accumulated difficulties kindled the spark of animation that lay smothered in his breast. To counteract the effect of the rumours that he intended to abandon Spain, and to check the desertion from the army which formed his only resource, he rode through the ranks, addressing the soldiers with the most tender and gracious expressions. He called on them to perform their duty towards a sovereign, who, rather than abandon Castile, was determined to tinge its beloved soil with his blood, and declared, that he waited only for the reinforcements, which were

\* St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 66.      † Tessé, t. 2, p. 220.

hourly expected from France, to lead them to a glorious death or victory. So spirited and affectionate an address produced its due effect on a romantic nation; the troops displayed all the ardour of Spaniards in the cause of a prince, who had placed his life and crown, his hopes and safety, in their hands. To gratify the people, Orri, who as the minister of finance was most exposed to the national hatred, was detained in France, whither he had been sent to obtain supplies.

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The enthusiasm inspired by the address and spirit of Philip, spread into the provinces. Delighted with the assurance that they should preserve a sovereign whom they had voluntarily acknowledged, and who was pledged to maintain the integrity of their monarchy, and disdaining to receive a prince whom they considered as forced on them by rebels, enemies, and heretics, a new sentiment animated every heart. They lavished their property in his service, supplied his army with provisions, and flocked to combat under his standard. In Castile, almost every individual became a soldier; even the distant province of Estremadura maintained an army of 12,000 men; in Salamanca the allies had scarcely quitted the town before the inhabitants rose, again proclaimed Philip, and levied a corps of troops, which cut off all their communication with Portugal.

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Two letters written by the princess, during this trying crisis, highly illustrate the Spanish character, and shew the returning tide in favour of the Bourbon cause.

"The Spanish troops display so much eagerness and zeal, that we begin to be apprehensive, lest the enemy should abandon Madrid before we are prepared to attack them. Should they be rash enough to risk a battle, the reign of the archduke will terminate in Castile; few of the Portuguese will return home, and Saragossa will not long remain in revolt. Andalusia, and the neighbouring provinces, are making such considerable exertions, that we have no cause of apprehension in that quarter, or for Cadiz. Valladolid, which appeared to waver, gave, on the 7th instant, a convincing proof of fidelity. Men, women, and children issued from their houses with arms in their hands, exclaiming, in a transport of enthusiasm, "long live Philip, and perish traitors;" yet, to the credit of their forbearance, this burst of loyalty was not followed by the massacre of those who were suspected of partiality to Austria.

"These provinces, poor as they are, vie in raising subsidies to the king. We are already sure of 8,000 pistoles, and though we have not yet received them, I obtained a considerable part of that sum on my own credit, and sent it to the

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embassador. We are now negotiating for 15,000 more. These sums will prove considerable resources in the present time of disorder and interruption of commerce. We learn from Aragon that several large towns have formed associations to defend themselves, and attack Saragossa ; but, unfortunately, we have no advance to supply the money which is required."

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The second letter was written after the retreat of the enemy, and the example of the capital, had given a new impulse to the national enthusiasm.

" Since the people of Madrid have been able to give proofs of fidelity to their king, the joy has been general and unmixed ; and never was there an example of greater affection and zeal for his royal person.

Sept. 9.

" The provinces continue to raise troops for their defence. The poorest villages contribute what they can, nay, even beyond their means. The day before yesterday, a priest brought an hundred and twenty pistoles to the queen, from a village which only contained an hundred and twenty houses. He said, ' my flock are ashamed of sending so small a sum ; but they desire you to consider, that in the same purse are not less than an hundred and twenty hearts, faithful even to death.' The good man wept as he spoke, and we wept also. Another small village of

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twenty cottages, sent yesterday fifty pistoles, with similar protestations."\*

May 4.

During this arduous struggle, Berwick had conducted the army, which formed the final hope and resource of the monarchy, with a degree of skill and judgment proportionate to the magnitude of the cause at issue. Arriving at Badajos in the latter end of March, he assumed the command; but so ill had the preliminary arrangements been executed by the agents of the court, that he found himself anticipated by the enemy, who had taken the field; and was reduced to witness the reduction of the frontier fortress Alcantara, into which he had thrown the best part of his infantry. With an army which now consisted principally of cavalry, he was only able to watch the movements of the enemy, and gradually retired before them in the direction of Palencia, to Peralda, as they advanced to Madrid.

Fortunately for his little corps, and for the cause which it defended, the allies were totally ignorant of the transactions on the western side of Spain, and were afraid to push forward to the capital, lest the reduction of Barcelona should enable Philip to return, and overwhelm them with his whole force. After considerable delay and hesitation, they quitted the direct road to Madrid, reduced Ciudad Rodrigo, and turned

\* St. Simon, t. 3, p. 237—239.

their march towards Salamanca, where they proposed to wait the result of the attack on Barcelona. CHAP. 14.  
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At length, apprised of the relief of Barcelona, and the retreat of the french army across the Pyrenees, they moved towards the capital. But Berwick, still avoiding a contest, left some detachments under the marquis of Bay, to maintain the country south of the Tagus ; he hung on the march of the allies, skirted the borders of Castile, and at the time when they reached Madrid, occupied the position between Sopetran and Xadraca near the Henares. He thus secured the passes of the neighbouring mountains, covered Old Castile, kept open the communication with France, and was enabled to retard the junction of the force advancing with the archduke, from Barcelona.

His little army consisted of not more than 9,000 men, and had the allies vigorously pushed their successful career, he must have abandoned Castile, and perhaps Spain itself, before reinforcements could have arrived.

Fortunately, new errors of the allies favoured his plan of defence. The generals who occupied the capital, contented themselves with pushing a corps to Toledo, and suffered their troops to waste the important moments in such excesses, that the hospitals were crowded with above 6,000 sick. A part of the force under Peterborough was sent

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by sea to Valencia, in order to penetrate through that fertile country into the interior ; and in consequence of the insurrection in Aragon, Charles himself, after loitering several weeks in Catalonia, was persuaded to repair to Saragossa, and take possession of that kingdom.

Of these delays, the french commander skilfully availed himself. Behind the Henares, he was joined by the troops who had retreated from Barcelona, and after a rapid march through the southern districts of France, had re-entered Spain by the way of Pampeluna. In this position, and with this increase of force, he prevented the allies from making any movement to re-establish their communication with Portugal, which was cut off by the detachments left in the south as well as by the parties in the north, and he kept their whole attention fixed on Saragossa, by threatening to interrupt the march of Charles.

Aug. 5.

Meanwhile new levies crowded to his standard ; and at length, when the archduke effected his junction with the allies at Guadalaxara, they were astonished and embarrassed to find themselves in the presence of an army, equal, if not superior, to their own. They were now reduced to an alarming situation. Their communications, both towards the east and west, were interrupted by the people, who unanimously flew to arms ; their troops were rapidly wasting away from the

effects of the climate ; and the consequences of licentiousness, with the active warfare waged by the peasantry, completed the ravages of disease, hardship, and fatigue. At this moment, Berwick began to act offensively. He pushed a detachment to recover Madrid ; and the posts occupied by the allies in Estremadura were rapidly reduced.

Having thus closed the way to Portugal, he pressed on the allies in their retreat towards Valencia, now their only resource, and by a vigorous and active pursuit, rendered their loss scarcely less decisive than an absolute defeat. He succeeded in driving them beyond the mountains which border Aragon and Valencia, and closed the campaign with the recovery of Orihuela, Cuenca, and Carthagena.

" Thus," he observes, " finished this campaign, one of the most singular, from the variety of its events. The beginning threatened us with total ruin ; but the progress and close were equally advantageous and glorious to the arms of the two crowns. The enemy masters of Madrid ; no army to check them ; the king obliged to raise the siege of Barcelona, and retire into France : all seemed to decide the fate of Spain. And, doubtless, had the enemy profited by their previous success, and pushed their point, the archduke must have been king, without a hope

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of return for his catholic majesty. But the glaring faults of their generals, joined to the unparalleled fidelity of the castilians, gave us the time and means to regain the upper hand, and drive them again out of Castile."

"The two armies made," if we may use the expression, "a *tour* round Spain. They began the campaign near Badajos, and, after traversing the two Castiles, finished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia, at the distance of an hundred and fifty leagues. They occupied eighty-five camps, and, although no general engagement took place, we obtained the same advantages as from a victory; for, according to calculation, we made ten thousand prisoners."\*

Oct. 4.

Philip quitted his army on the borders of Murcia, and returned to his capital. His distresses and fortitude having endeared him to his subjects, he was received with an universal burst of joy, far more impressive than the acclamations which had hailed his first accession. Meanwhile the council of Castile proceeded to chastise those who had espoused or favoured the party of the archduke. Those in office, who had refused to accompany the court, were dismissed; some of the more distinguished suffered imprisonment, exile, or confiscation of property; and numbers of inferior consequence were compelled to take

\* Memoires de Berwick, t. 1, p. 372.

refuge in Catalonia. The temperate conduct of Philip on this occasion has been too much lauded; for his lenity was confined to particular objects. The queen dowager was respectfully requested to withdraw from a country which was the scene of trouble and danger, and conveyed to Bayonne. The defection of Portocarrero was overlooked, in consideration of his age and services; and Rivas, after a temporary exile to his estate, was permitted to return on the birth of the prince of Asturias. The count of Lemos, the patriarch of the Indies, Mendoza, and some others taken on different occasions by the Spanish parties, were liberated after a short confinement.\*

Louis now did ample justice to the fidelity and spirit of the Castilians.

"Your enemies," he exultingly wrote to Philip, "can no longer hope to succeed, since their progress has only served to display the courage and fidelity of a nation equally brave and loyal. Your people cannot be distinguished from regular troops, and, doubtless, such convincing proofs of their attachment to you, must augment your affection for them. This is due to them, and I should exhort you to give frequent proofs of it, did I not know that your sentiments on this subject are conformable to my own."†

\* St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 62—66.—Ortiz, 7, p. 108.

† Noailles, t. 3, p. 366.

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This zealous loyalty was equally admired by their enemies. Peterborough, whose gallant spirit was captivated by congenial ardour, declared that all the force of Europe was not sufficient to conquer Castile.

While Philip was maintaining the struggle in the peninsula, the distant dominions were severed from his empire.

In the Netherlands the french under Villeroy\* were totally defeated by Marlborough at Ramillies, with the loss of 13,000 killed and prisoners, 50 pieces of artillery, and 120 standards. The broken army found a shelter behind the fortresses which covered the frontier ; but the immediate consequence of the defeat was the total loss of almost the whole spanish Netherlands. On the very day after the engagement, the victorious army entered Louvain ; Brussels opened its gates, Mechlin, Antwerp, Bruges, Ghent, and Oudenard, surrendered at discretion ; Ostend capitulated after a siege of ten days ; even Menin, the key of Flanders, and the masterpiece of Vauban, though defended by a garrison of 6,000 men, did not check the conquerors more than twenty days ; and the campaign was closed by the reduction of Dendermond and Aeth.

\* This presumptuous and unfortunate general had been recently released from captivity, and, by the ill judged partiality of Louis, appointed to the command in the Netherlands.

Thus not only were the richest and most populous provinces of Europe wrested from Spain ; but the french were expelled from those outworks which their profound and active policy had erected on the boundaries of their vast monarchy ; and the allies obtained possession of a country, which had hitherto involved the safety of Holland, and given to France a decisive advantage in all the military contests of Germany.

To compensate for these misfortunes in Flanders, Louis redoubled his efforts to re-establish his superiority in Italy. As the possessions of the duke of Savoy were circumscribed to Turin, the french were anxious to reduce a fortress which was the only obstacle to the consolidation of their power beyond the Alps. Every exertion was therefore made to secure the places commanding the principal avenues into Lombardy. Nice and Villafranca were reduced ; and the capture of Montmelian after a blockade of eighteen months, opened a way through Savoy, into the centre of Piedmont. On the side of the Mantuan, Vendome suddenly collected his forces, surprised the imperialists in their quarters, routed them with considerable slaughter, drove them beyond the Adige, and took measures for closing the passages from Germany. The enemy being thus expelled, and the requisite

CHAP. 14. COMMUNICATIONS opened, reinforcements were  
1706. dispatched across the Alps, preparations were made equal to the importance of the intended siege, and the investment was formed by an army of 50,000 men, under La Feuillade.

Before the circumvallation was completed, the duke of Savoy left Count Daun with a garrison of 10,000 regulars and a body of militia, to defend the city; and at the head of his cavalry took refuge in the valley of Lucerna and the recesses of the Alps. Mendovi and Ceva were surprised by the French; Asti was besieged by the militia of the Milanese; and the duchess of Savoy, with her infant family, was compelled to take refuge in the territories of Genoa.

In the commencement of June, began the memorable siege of Turin. The trenches were opened against the citadel and some outworks which stretched towards the Doria. The approaches were pushed in the regular form; the outworks successively carried; the body of the place itself attacked; and the brave garrison, after exhausting all the resources of defence, was on the point of yielding to superior numbers and skill.

But at the moment when success seemed likely to crown the efforts of the French, the prize was wrested from their grasp; and they experienced a new reverse, scarcely less decisive than that

which had already shaken their power in the Netherlands and Germany.

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Eugene reached the frontier of Italy, at the moment when the imperialists were broken and dispersed by Vendome, and secured the retreat of 10,000 men, the remnant of the army. On the arrival of succours from Germany, he again descended by the sources of the Brenta into the Veronese ; left a corps at St. Martino, to keep up his communications, and crossed to the south of the Po. By the junction of successive reinforcements, he was enabled to baffle all the defensive measures of the french, who endeavoured to check him on the Adige, and the Parmegiana ; and after a march scarcely paralleled for length, rapidity, and difficulty, he reached the piedmontese territories, and united with the duke of Savoy at Villastellone.

In the interval, Vendome being recalled to remedy the effects of the defeat in the Netherlands, his successor Marsin, leaving a corps in the Milanese, hastened to join the besieging army, and press the reduction of Turin, which was now at the last extremity. From an eagerness to attain this object, they permitted the allied forces to attack them in their entrenchments, and suffered a complete defeat : 6,000 men were killed, 2,000 made prisoners, and the artillery and stores fell into the hands of the

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conquerors. The place was not only relieved, but the french were driven in disorder beyond the Alps ; the passes were closed against their return, and the corps left in the Milanese defeated and forced to take refuge in the fortresses. Charles was proclaimed sovereign of the Milanese as a dependence of the spanish crown ; and Eugene installed as governor in his name. The attachment of the duke of Savoy was rewarded with the cession of Valenza, Alessandria, the Lumellina, and the Val di Sesia.\*

\* Muratori Annali d' Italia, 1706—p. 47—53. House of Austria, v. 1, ch. 73.

## CHAPTER THE FIFTEENTH.

1707—1708.

*Overtures of peace made by France—Disunion among the allies—Neutrality concluded for Italy, and conquest of Naples by the emperor—Fruitless expedition against Toulon—Battle of Almanza, and successful operations in Spain—Reduction of Valencia and Aragon, and abolition of their constitution—Capture of Lerida, by the duke of Orleans—Birth of the infant Don Louis—Campaign of 1708—Reduction of Tortosa, by the duke of Orleans—His contentions with the princess Orsini and Amelot, and his views on the throne of Spain.*

IN the course of this year, the war may be said to have languished in the Netherlands and in Germany, while the south of France, Italy, and Spain, became the theatre of active operations.

The success of the last campaign produced its usual effect, division and jealousy among the allies. A powerful party in England clamoured for peace, or for some decisive operations to crush the marine of France; the merchants of Holland began to regret the loss of their commercial advantages; the emperor, apprehensive of being deserted by the maritime powers, was eager to appropriate the distant provinces of the Spanish monarchy, and the duke of Savoy was

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CHAP. 15. only anxious to augment the portion which he  
1707—1708. had already dismembered from the Milanese.

Louis was well acquainted with this change of sentiment, and endeavoured to divide those whom he could not conquer or deceive, united. Soon after the battle of Ramillies, he made secret overtures to the maritime powers, offering the alternative of Spain and the Indies, or the Italian provinces, to Charles ; the guaranty of the protestant succession to England ; a barrier in the Netherlands to the Dutch ; and great commercial advantages to both powers. Failing in this quarter, he next employed the agency of the pope to open a similar negotiation with the emperor, and lured him with the cession of the Italian provinces, on the condition that Philip should retain Spain and the Indies.\*

These negotiations were, indeed, fruitless, if the object was really peace ; but the views of the proposer were not totally disappointed ; jealousies increased among the allied powers, and the consequent discord greatly contributed to thwart the operations of the ensuing campaign. The emperor, with the connivance of the duke of Savoy, hastily concluded a treaty for the neutrality of Italy, suffered 20,000 French troops, who were shut up in the different for-

\* Hare's Letters to a Tory Member.—Lamberti, t. 5, p. 266  
—Walpole's Answer to Bolingbroke, p. 173.

tresses of the Milanese, to return to France, and detached a considerable part of his force for the conquest of Naples.

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This enterprise was executed without the slightest difficulty. The flower of the soldiery having been already withdrawn to strengthen the army in Spain, and the french troops recalled to gratify the prejudices of the people, the country was left almost defenceless. Accordingly, general Daun, the brave defender of Turin, marched from Lombardy with 9,000 men, traversed the papal dominions, advanced without hesitation into the interior of the kingdom, and was every where welcomed by the acclamations of the people. The duke of Escalona, the spanish viceroy, with difficulty escaped the popular fury, and, with a few faithful nobles, threw himself into Gaeta. The magistrates of the capital advanced to Aversa, and delivering the keys to the austrian commander, pledged their allegiance to Charles. Within a short period, the austrian government was universally acknowledged. Gaeta was taken by storm, after a long blockade, and the conquest completed by the reduction of the petty forts in Calabria.\*

The activity and prudence of the viceroy, the marquis de los Balbases, alone prevented Sicily

\* Muratori Annali, 1707.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 123.—St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 130.—House of Austria, v. 1, ch. 74.

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from following the example of Naples ; for the natives were no less averse to the bourbon government than the neapolitans. By a proper mixture of severity and conciliation, he suppressed the rising commotions ; while, on the other hand, the want of force and of the means of transport, prevented the austrian commander from attempting so easy a conquest. Hence Sicily remained under the dominion of Philip, till the close of the war.\*

October.

Meanwhile the importunities of the english cabinet prevailed on the emperor and the duke of Savoy to join in an expedition against Toulon. Great efforts were made for this important operation ; but the clashing interests of the different parties, the jealousies of the commanders, and the reduction of the allied force by the expedition to Naples, joined to the prompt and strenuous exertions of France, frustrated the design. The allies, indeed, penetrated through Provence, and attacked Toulon ; but the reduction of a few outworks was the sole fruit of their ill-fated enterprise ; and at the end of the campaign, they, with difficulty, effected their retreat into Italy, after 14,000 men had fallen a sacrifice to sickness and fatigue. The capture of Susa and Orbitello, two fortresses which closed the passages of the Alps, was an advantage of too

\* Muratori—St. Philippe.



inferior importance to counterbalance the effects  
of this failure.\*

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By the neutrality of Italy, Louis was enabled to detach a considerable force into Spain, and the duke of Orleans was nominated to the command of the principal army. On the side of the allies, likewise, an expedition of 12,000 men, originally formed to effect a landing near the mouth of the Garonne, but frustrated by contrary winds, was sent, partly to reinforce the army in Portugal, and partly to that which had wintered on the borders of Murcia and Valencia. Both sides were, therefore, disposed for an arduous struggle ; and the fortunate result of a single battle not only decided the fate of the campaign, but restored the tottering authority of Philip.

Various plans of operation were agitated at the courts of Versailles and Madrid ; till, at length, the advice of Berwick prevailed. The duke of Noailles, with a small force, was to effect a diversion, as before, on the side of the eastern Pyrenees ; but the expected succours from France were to be concentrated in Navarre. From hence a part was to be detached to recover Aragon, while the remainder might join the army of Berwick, which was to follow the allies, whether they again attempted to penetrate into

\* History of Europe for 1707.—House of Austria.—Memoirs of lord Walpole.

CHAP. 15. *Castile, or made an effort to spread themselves through Murcia, and recover their superiority in the south. To check any invasion from Portugal, a force, sufficient for defence, was detached under the marquis of Bay to the western frontier.*

*1707.  
April 6.*

The campaign, however, commenced before these arrangements were matured. The confederate generals, Galway and Las Minas, were anxious to anticipate the arrival of the succours from France. Hoping to crush in detail the forces of Berwick, they suddenly collected their troops to the amount of 30,000 men, and endeavoured to break into his quarters. But the french commander detained them by throwing garrisons into Villena and Chinchilla, till he had re-united his army, and took post in the Vega, or plain of Almanza, where he was opportunely joined by a part of the expected reinforcements. The allies, ignorant of this circumstance, hurried on to an engagement, though inferior in cavalry, and on ground highly favourable to that of the enemy.

*April 25.*

Berwick ranged his army in the usual order; while in that of the allies, the cavalry and infantry were intermixed, to balance the superiority of the bourbon horse. The engagement commenced with a bold effort of the allied forces on the left, who passing a ravine before their front,

gained a height, which the french commander had strengthened with a formidable battery, and prepared to turn his right. The spanish cavalry made a desperate charge to regain the height, and drove back the allies; but were checked in their turn by the fire of the infantry, and a second charge ended in a similar failure. Meanwhile, the battle had extended along the centre and left; the first line of the spaniards was broken; and two english battalions penetrated through the second, to the very walls of Almanza.

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However, the skill and firmness of Berwick remedied the confusion, and restored the fortune of the day. The routed infantry were rallied, and again brought forward, and a brigade detached under the enterprising Asfeld, to support a new charge on the right. This movement was successful. The united cavalry and infantry broke the allies, and turned on their flank; while the centre and left made a vigorous effort along their front. At this crisis, Galway and Las Minas were both dangerously wounded and forced to quit the field; and the confusion became irreparable. Deprived of their chiefs, the allies fought without order or effect; they were attacked and broken on all sides; the carnage was dreadful, and the route complete. Count Dohna, with thirteen dutch, english, and portuguese battalions, cut his way through the

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hostile ranks, and took post in the neighbouring wood of Caudete; but was reduced by famine to surrender on the following day.

The baggage and artillery were taken. Among the trophies of the victory, no less than an hundred and twenty standards were sent to Madrid, bearing the arms of almost every power leagued against Philip, besides those of the revolted kingdoms of Catalonia, Aragon, and Valencia. The victory was decisive: the Spaniards lost scarcely 2,000 men, while of the allies 5,000 were left on the field, and 12,000 made prisoners.\*

The anguish of a severe wound did not damp the ardour of Galway, who had already lost an arm in the preceding campaign. He collected the scattered remnants of the army, threw garrisons into Xativa, Alcira, Denia, and Alicante, and, with his colleague Las Minas, evaded pursuit, by a rapid retreat towards the Ebro, behind which they hoped to maintain themselves till joined by reinforcements. On their arrival at Tortosa, they could muster no more than 5,000 men, of whom only 800 were infantry.

In gratitude for a victory which may be justly said to have saved Spain, Philip conferred on Berwick the rank of grandee, with the title of

\* Berwick, t. 1, p. 388.—St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 110.—History of Europe for 1707, p. 175, 184.—House of Austria, ch. 74.—Ortiz, lib. 22, c. 7.

duke of Liria and Xerica, and distinguished the town of Almanza with peculiar privileges. The spot was afterwards marked by the erection of a column bearing an inscription commemorative of the event.\*

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Few victories were ever followed by more rapid successes. On the ensuing day the duke of Orleans joined the army in the moment of triumph, deeply regretting that he had arrived too late to share the honours of the field. He paid due praise to the valour of the troops and the abilities of the general; and, assuming the command, hastened to profit by the victory. He detached Asfeld with 8,000 men to reduce the country beyond the Xucar, and with the main army advanced towards Valencia. The city being unprovided for defence, the count of Corzana, governor for Charles, withdrew by the route of Murviedro, and deputies were dispatched to meet the royal army in its route, bearing the keys, and imploring mercy for the repentant inhabitants.

April 26.

Without a moment's delay, the duke left Berwick to complete the reduction of the province; and with a strong escort, took the route to the capital. Instead of waiting to share the joy and receive the congratulations of the court, he proceeded towards Navarre. At Tudela, he met

May 8.

May 9.

\* Berwick, t. 1, p. 417.—St. Philippe, t. 11, p. 117.—Ortiz.

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the troops which had arrived from France; and with the speed of a traveller directed his march towards Saragossa, which was no less unprovided for resistance than the capital of Valencia. On his approach, the austrian garrison retired to Lerida, and left the city to its fate.

May 25. “On coming in sight of Saragossa,” he wrote to the king of France, “I galloped forward at the head of the cavalry, merely to reconnoitre the place, and alarm the inhabitants. The garrison instantly retired, and deputies were seen coming out to propose a capitulation. I did not, however, wait their arrival, but pushed forward some infantry, who, with unloaded arms, entered the town, and the magistrates surrendering, answered for the submission of the kingdom.”\*

Berwick relates an anecdote relative to this incident, which, from its singularity, requires no less than his respectable testimony to render it credible. On the sudden appearance of the royal army, the count of Puebla, chief of the austrian party, persuaded the people that it was an apparition raised by magic. The priests even repaired to the ramparts, from whence the troops were descried, and performed the accustomed office of exorcism. But the following morning proved to the deluded multitude, that such spectres were not under the empire of the

\* Noailles, t. 2, p. 387.

church ; for the hussars pushing into the suburbs, charged the crowd, put some to death, and spread such a general panic, that the magistrates hurried out to surrender their keys and supplicate for pardon.\*

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As the conquest of Aragon had already been anticipated, a resolution was taken to change its constitution, which was naturally an object of jealousy to the crown. After long debates in the cabinet, in which the Spanish ministers zealously pleaded the cause of their misguided countrymen, a royal decree was issued, abolishing the *Fueros*, or rights and privileges of Aragon and Valencia ; first, in virtue of the supreme authority residing in the sovereign, and secondly, by the right of conquest derived from the recent rebellion. For these reasons, as well as from the necessity of introducing changes adapted to times and circumstances, and establishing an uniform system of government under the same head, Aragon and Valencia were in future to be ruled by the same laws and customs as Castile ; and the natives of the three kingdoms were rendered equally eligible to all offices and employments. The *audiencias* or tribunals were also to be governed by the same forms and principles as the chanceries of Valladolid and

June 29.

\* Memoires de Berwick, who says he received the account from some of the principal magistrates, t. 1, p. 198.

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Granada, except in ecclesiastical matters, which were still to be regulated according to the concordates with the holy see.

A second decree was afterwards promulgated, confirming the peculiar privileges and franchises of those persons and communities, who in the recent troubles had remained faithful to the crown.\*

While these events were passing in Aragon, Valencia was reduced to obedience by the joint efforts of Berwick and Asfeld.

On separating from the main army, Asfeld received the submission of Alcira, threw a bridge over the Xucar, and commenced his operations with the siege of Xativa, which was garrisoned by 600 english, the inhabitants, and some of the peasantry, who had embraced the cause of Charles. The fate of this petty town, furnishes a memorable instance of that desperate heroism of which the spanish people have given numerous examples.

"The inhabitants," observes Berwick, "supported by 600 english, defended themselves with incredible obstinacy. They could not be induced to surrender, and the breach being effected, and our lodgment established, it was necessary to bring cannon in order to demolish their intrenchments behind. It was even neces-

\* Ortiz, t. 7, p. 129.—St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 171.

sary to attack street by street, and house by house ; for these madmen defended themselves with unexampled firmness and bravery. Finally, after a siege of fifteen days, and eight days possession of the town, it was carried sword in hand. Numbers of the inhabitants were slain, particularly the monks, and those who could escape retired behind an outwork of the castle. Asfeld brought up cannon to batter it down, on which the english commander demanded a capitulation for the inhabitants ; but as no other condition was offered, except to submit themselves to the mercy of his catholic majesty, the english retired into the inner works of the castle, and the inhabitants laid down their arms.

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“ To impress terror, and by a severe example, to prevent similar obstinacy, I caused the town to be razed, leaving only the principal church, and sent all the inhabitants into Castile, under a prohibition never to return into their native country.”\*

The castle, which in the middle ages had been remarkable for its strength, did not surrender till after it had withstood a blockade of considerable length.

While Asfeld was occupied in the south of Valencia and Murcia, Berwick collected supplies

\* Berwick, t. 1, p. 401.—St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 124. The place has been since rebuilt under the name of San Felipe.

CHAP. 15. for prosecuting his success. Having placed a  
1707—1708. garrison in the capital, he proceeded towards the north, reducing the remainder of the kingdom, drove the allies beyond the Ebro, and penetrating into the suburbs of Tortosa, forced them to destroy their bridge of communication.

May 23. May 26. After clearing the northern district of Valencia, Berwick left Asfeld with 12,000 men to maintain his conquests, directed his march up the course of the Ebro, forced the pass of Cherta, reduced the bordering places of Aragon, and crossing the Ebro at Caspe, united his troops with those of the duke of Orleans at Candasnos.

June 11. June 14. Thus, in less than a month after the victory of Almanza, the bourbon troops had recovered all Aragon, with Valencia and Murcia, except the two maritime places, Denia and Alicante. Emboldened by these rapid successes, and by the weakness of the allies, the duke of Orleans was anxious to proceed in the subjugation of Catalonia, before reinforcements could arrive to support the declining cause of Austria. With this view, he meditated the sieges of Lerida and Tortosa, which covered the province from invasion on the sides of Aragon and Valencia. The projected attack against Lerida, was, however, retarded by the numerous obstacles which, in a mountainous and sterile country, frequently baffle the ablest plans and best combined opera-

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Aug.

Sept.

Oct. 3.

tions. The Cinca and the Segra were swelled by frequent inundations, the army experienced a want of provisions, and the battering artillery, which had been promised by both courts, was not yet arrived. While the duke was struggling with difficulties which would have overwhelmed a less resolute spirit, Berwick was summoned into Provence with 12,000 men, to contribute to the relief of Toulon, and did not return till the advanced season, and increasing distresses of the army, seemed to preclude all further operations. Indeed, the court of Madrid, to prevent the ruin of the army by an autumnal, or rather winter siege, issued reiterated orders to desist from the enterprise, and made the warmest remonstrances at the court of Versailles. The circumspection of Berwick was averse to an undertaking which, however successful, would not fail of proving highly destructive at the close of a laborious campaign. But no remonstrances or obstacles could vanquish the resolution of the duke of Orleans. The requisites for the siege being at length provided, he traversed the Cinca and Segra, above and below Lerida and Balaguer, and established himself in the fertile plain of Urgel, in spite of the efforts of the enemy. It was now no season for hesitation. The trenches were immediately opened, and the attacks pushed with unexampled vigour; the allies attempted in

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vain to interrupt the siege, and this fortress, which had heretofore baffled the arms of France, surrendered on the very day that orders arrived from Versailles to desist from the enterprise.

The duke of Orleans was still anxious to prosecute the siege of Tortosa, that he might open the ensuing campaign with an invasion of Catalonia both on the south and west. But from the severe losses of the army in the preceding campaign and the recent siege, with the prospect of still greater difficulties from the advance of the season, the court adopted the prudent advice of Berwick; and the duke was obliged to suspend his operations, and distribute his troops in quarters calculated to cover his recent conquests in Aragon and Valencia.

Oct. 4. On the side of Portugal, the efforts of the Spaniards were crowned by the recapture of Ciudad Rodrigo. The expedition from Roussillon, under Noailles, produced no other effect than the occupation of 4,000 of the allies in the north of Catalonia, and the reduction of some trifling forts.

Aug. 25. The successes of the year were heightened by the birth of an infant, who received the name of Louis Ferdinand, because he was born on the festival of St. Louis, king of France. As the allies and their partisans had industriously spread reports that the pregnancy of the queen was

supposititious, the principal officers of church and state, as well as the foreign ministers, were present at the delivery in the customary manner. This prince, born in the bosom of the monarchy, gave new zeal to the loyal, and removed the dissatisfaction of many who were only anxious for the independence and integrity of their monarchy. The event was celebrated by the most heartfelt rejoicings, as well as by the distribution of graces and favours. State prisoners were set at liberty, and exiles recalled, among whom were the duke of Infantado, the count of Lemos, and the count of Monterey.\*

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After contributing so essentially to the salvation of Spain, Berwick experienced the usual uncertainty of court favour, and, either to gratify the princess, or the duke of Orleans, was recalled to display his talents in another quarter. His place was supplied by marshal Bezons.

The fatal defeat of Almanza, and the series of subsequent disasters, made a deep impression on the allies; but instead of discouraging, stimulated them to prosecute the contest with renewed energy.

1708.

Hitherto the cause of Charles had been principally supported by the maritime powers, and the portuguese, assisted by the catalans; but the earnest instances of the english and dutch go-

\* St. Philippe, t. 11, p. 165.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 127.

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vernments, induced Joseph to send into Spain a body of imperial troops, under the command of count Staremberg, the ablest of his generals, next to Eugene. Additional reinforcements were also detached from England, and a corps of hessians in british pay, ordered from Italy to join the army in Catalonia. It was hoped also that the court of Portugal would be induced to act with greater energy, in consequence of the death of Peter, and the accession of a young sovereign, John, who had recently cemented his alliance with the House of Austria, by a marriage with the sister of Charles.

The two unfortunate generals, to whose want of skill, or rashness, the recent ill success shad been perhaps erroneously attributed, were ordered to return to Lisbon with the portuguese troops, who were recalled from Catalonia, to prevent an invasion of Portugal. Las Minas, at the age of seventy-seven, was removed, and Galway was sent to head the english forces in Estremadura, where he displayed the same intrepidity, and experienced the same reverses. The command of the english forces in Catalonia was transferred to general Stanhope, who was also charged with the title and powers of envoy to Charles as king of Spain.

Hopes were entertained that these changes, and this accession of strength, would enable Charles to repair his recent disasters. But from

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the inevitable inconveniences of naval operations, and the reduced resources of the powers involved in the contest, the union of these forces, from such distant points, was slowly accomplished ; and many of the troops, when arrived on the scene of action, were ill adapted to take the field. Hence, at the opening of the campaign, the reinforcements were barely sufficient to fill the vacancy occasioned by drafts and losses. After the garrisons of Tortosa, Denia, and Alicante, had been strengthened, and a corps detached to the northern frontier, the allied commanders were unable to collect more than 10,600 men, besides the catalans, and desultory hordes of miquelets, to cope with the victorious army of Philip, whose strength was increased by his success.

The bourbon courts were not negligent in improving their superiority, and the lively genius of the duke of Orleans formed the most splendid plans for the total expulsion of the austrians from Spain. The principal army of 25,000 men, was to be assembled on the Ebro, to reduce Tortosa, the key of Catalonia on the south ; the troops under Asfeld, in Valencia, were to concur in the enterprise ; and 7,000 in Roussillon, under Noailles, having drawn a part of the allied force to the north, were to penetrate, by a rapid march, through the Cerdagne, and join the main

CHAP. 15.  
1707—1708. army in the valley of Urgel, after the capture of Tortosa. This united force was finally to be directed against Barcelona.

The execution of these splendid designs was, however, thwarted by the distresses of the state. Notwithstanding the boasted improvements of Orri, it was in vain to hope for regular contributions from a country which was the scene of war and devastation. The permanent revenue scarcely exceeded 500,000*l.* sterling, while the expences of the preceding campaign had absorbed 1,500,000*l.*; and to supply a part of this deficiency, a loan had been raised on the church to the amount of 200,000*l.* But as this expedient had excited considerable opposition on the part of the clergy, and particularly on that of the pope, it was proposed to meet the wants of the present year by a new supply under the name of a donative; the share of the clergy to be voluntary, while the laity were obliged to contribute, though the portion was left to their inclination or means.\*

This plan, however modified, was considered as an infringement of the ecclesiastical privileges, and the pope, by his nuncio, prohibited the clergy from contributing without an express permission from Rome, though, at the same time, he offered to grant a tax on the church property

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 400.

to any amount. Philip considered this as an incroachment of the holy see, and after a warm dispute, he relinquished this resource, rather than accept the offer.

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The treasury of France was equally drained by the enormous expenditure of this long protracted contest, and could but scantily supply the wants of the Spanish government. In such an exigency, the only remaining hope was placed in the treasures of America, which were daily expected. But at the moment when this resource was most needed, intelligence arrived that the flota, amounting to 17 galleons, unusually rich, had been intercepted by the British squadron under Sir Charles Wager, off Cartagena, three of the largest ships, laden with the precious metals, taken or destroyed, and the rest dispersed.\*

July.

In spite of disappointments, the Duke of Orleans was not discouraged. He endeavoured to remedy all deficiencies by his own activity, and made the utmost exertions to collect the requisites for a siege, and enable the army to take the field. "Our greatest enemies," he wrote to Chamillart, "are famine and wretchedness. You say that I perform the office of intendant to the army; but in this country, the general must do every thing. He must be superintendent of

\* Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, v. 3, p. 206. Tindal.

CHAP. 15. stores and artillery, and often paymaster and  
 1707—1708. treasurer, none of which I understand. Nevertheless, I hope to profit by the present circumstances, which must maintain the crown on the head of the king of Spain.”\*

Indeed, never was a general better calculated to fill this irksome situation than the duke of Orleans, by his uncommon activity, his valour and generosity, his captivating frankness of manners, and singular perseverance in the pursuit of his designs. Having hurried from Paris to Madrid, and visited the garrisons and quarters of Aragon and Valencia, he returned to Saragossa, where the troops were assembling, and published a general amnesty for all the miquelets in Aragon, who would lay down their arms. On the 13th of April, he put his army in motion, left 3,000 men at Balaguer to maintain his communications, and traversed the Segra and the Noguera at Fraga and Lerida. After a tedious and difficult march, he descended along the course of the Ebro, and, occupying the heights of Miraval, invested Tortosa on the north. At the same time, Asfeld surprised the passes between Valencia and Catalonia, and advancing to the right bank, by his well combined march, completed the investment on the south.

Notwithstanding the delays derived from the

\* Noailles, t. 3, p. 385.

earliness of the season, and the loss of a convoy, which was interrupted by the English squadron, joined to the slowness and difficulty of the communication with the magazines, the trenches were opened on the 22nd of June. A vigorous sally of the garrison on the 27th was repulsed, and the covert way carried on the night of the 10th of July by don Antonio de Villaruel, with a detachment of Spaniards. Staremburg had approached with all the force he could collect; but was too weak to afford relief; and the garrison on the ensuing morning capitulated with the honours of war, at the very time when the assailants were reduced to two days allowance of provisions. Of 3,000 men who evacuated Tortosa, above 1,800 entered the ranks of the besieging army.

The capture of Tortosa, was, however, the principal fruit of the campaign. The duke of Orleans, after leaving a garrison in the town, fell back towards Lerida, to effect the intended junction with Noailles. But the plan was baffled; for an invasion of Dauphiné by the duke of Savoy, diverted the force of Noailles; while Staremburg, strengthened by farther reinforcements, occupied the strong post of Cervera, and reduced the Bourbon army to inaction. Having kept the field as long as the season would permit,

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July 11.

CHAP. 15. the duke of Orleans distributed his troops into  
1707—1708. quarters, and departed for France.

After the reduction of Tortosa, Asfeld returned into Valencia to recover Denia and Alicante, which were still held by the allies. On the 17th of November, he invested Denia, effected a breach in five days, carried the town by assault, and drove the garrison of 900 men into the castle. An attempt to throw in succours by sea was repulsed, and the besieged were finally compelled to surrender prisoners of war.

The attacks of the french commander were next directed against Alicante. He carried the exterior works with the same success as at Denia, and confined the garrison in the citadel, which was constructed on a rock, and deemed impregnable. The ordinary methods of attack proving fruitless, a mine of unusual magnitude was formed under the rock. When it was ready for explosion, Asfeld invited the governor, general Richards, to send two engineers, in order to inspect the work. Accompanying them to the spot, he offered the garrison an honourable passage to Barcelona, deprecated the sacrifice of blood which must be the consequence of a longer defence, and allowed twenty-four hours for deliberation. But the intrepid governor, relying on the strength of the rock, persisted in his defence;

and as a bravado, sat down to table with many of his officers over the very chamber of the mine. At the signal given, he repaired to the spot considered as most exposed ; the mine was sprung ; the rock was convulsed as if by an earthquake ; the governor, the lieutenant-governor, colonel Syburg, with their company, and several soldiers, were either buried in the cavity, or blown to atoms in the air.

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This dreadful catastrophe did not, however, daunt colonel d'Albon, who succeeded to the command. An attempt was made by sea to save the remnant of this intrepid garrison, but frustrated by the measures of the besiegers. The troops were accordingly admitted to a capitulation, quitted the works with the honours of war, after a gallant defence of fifty-seven days, and were conveyed in triumph to Barcelona.\* This capture completed the reduction of Valencia.

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On the side of Portugal, the campaign was marked only by mutual cruelties and pillage.

The successes in the peninsula were counterbalanced by losses in other quarters. By the influence of the catalan nobles, an austrian party was formed in the Balearic Isles, which both by customs and inclination are connected with Catalonia. Minorca was reduced by general

\* St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 248—251.—History of Europe, for 1708.—Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, v. 3, p. 222.

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August,  
1708.

July.

Stanhope, after a short siege of the citadel, Port Mahon; and Majorca followed the example in submitting to the allied arms.\* About the same time, Sardinia surrendered to a small body of forces under the marquis of Alconzel, better known by the title of the count of Cifuentes.

During the whole of this campaign, and particularly towards its close, the army, the court, and capital, were equally agitated by contentions between the duke of Orleans and the princess Orsini.

The duke was a prince in whom unbounded libertinism did not extinguish the ardour of a great and ambitious mind. Too lively and independent to fashion himself according to the monotonous despotism of Versailles; too high-spirited to crouch before madame de Maintenon, he had estranged himself from the court, and divided his life between the indulgence of licentious pleasure, and the study of the arts and sciences. He felt, however, these pursuits insufficient to satisfy his active mind; and at length his importunities, joined to a wish to remove a prince of so unaccommodating a character from the vicinity of the court, induced Louis to send him to the nominal command of

\* A medal was struck on this occasion with the inscription SARDINIA ET BALEARIS MINOR CAPTE MDCCVIII.—Cunningham, v. 2, p. 205.—Rapin, v. 17.—Ortiz, lib. 22, c. 10.

the Italian army, under the direction of Marsin. In this campaign he distinguished his personal courage, and would doubtless have shewn no less military talents, had he not been shackled by the generals with whom he was associated. After his return from the unfortunate campaign in Italy, the abilities which he had displayed, and the same wish to remove him to a distance, occasioned his appointment to the command in Spain. It was hoped, that his affable manners and frankness of character would conciliate the princess Orsini; while his high birth and great talents would command the respect and affection of the Spaniards.

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In this expedition he was scarcely less shackled than in Italy. He was charged to live in confidence with the princess, and particularly forbidden to interfere in those affairs of state which did not regard his military command. His first address and graceful manners, indeed, won the favour of the court, and captivated the princess; but a lively and high-spirited prince was not likely to become more supple than a cardinal and an abbot, and he had scarcely assumed his office, before a new struggle for power ensued. The princess required a regular communication of his plans and operations; and he disdained to submit to the control of a woman. He peevishly attributed the distresses and deficiencies

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of the army, and even those delays in forwarding supplies, which were perhaps the mere effect of accident or necessity, to the machinations of the princess and Amelot; while she, as well as Philip, became jealous of his increasing influence among the soldiery, and his success in gaining over many of the disaffected. Their mutual opposition rose at last into personal animosity, and the breach was rendered irreconcilable by his public, gross, and contemptuous raillery.\* She, in consequence, employed her influence with madame de Maintenon, whom he had equally outraged, and the duke was ordered to return to France.

At the close of the campaign, he hastened to Madrid, where he continued two months in forwarding the preparations for the ensuing season. On this occasion, he did not spare his invectives against the tardiness of the government in the recent campaign; and in his correspondence with Versailles, he charged both the princess and Amelot with designedly thwarting his operations, and pressed for their removal.

The disasters of the french arms in the low countries, and the representations of those among the spaniards, who wished for a change of government, encouraged him to turn his views to the crown of Spain, should Philip, as was expected,

\* See St. Simon, t. 4, p. 6.

be compelled to withdraw. On his departure for Paris, he therefore left his confidential secretary, Regnault, to watch the progress of events, and maintain a correspondence with his partisans, among whom we find the respectable names of Montalto, Montellano, Mancera, Monterey, and Villaroel.\*

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\* St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 208.—St. Simon, t. 4, p. 37.—Ortiz.

## CHAPTER THE SIXTEENTH.

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*Losses of Spain—Distressed state of France—Memorial of Amelot on the court and kingdom of Spain—Motives of Louis for renewing the negotiation with the allies—Conferences at the Hague—Mutual offers and demands—Effects of this negotiation in Spain—State of the court and country—Pretended separation of the courts of Versailles and Madrid—Philip appeals to the loyalty of his subjects—Recal of Amelot, and appointment of a spanish administration, at the instigation of the princess Orsini—Zeal of the castilians—Louis rejects the preliminaries, and appeals to his subjects—His example followed by Philip—Feuds in the cabinet, and inactivity of the army—Fruitless journey of Philip to the camp—Neglect and improvidence of the spanish administration.*

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NOTWITHSTANDING the success of Philip's arms in the preceding campaign, the misfortunes of the House of Bourbon fell with undiminished force on Spain, and were accompanied with every sinister omen of new revolutions. Oran, the pride of the nation, and the conquest of Charles the fifth, had been recaptured by the moors; Sardinia and the Balearic Isles had been reduced; all the italian dominions, except Sicily, were in the possession of the allies; only four fortresses remained in the Netherlands, and the whole body of this splendid monarchy appeared crumbling into fragments. Aragon, Valencia, and Murcia, though conquered, secretly

favoured the austrian prince ; the whole force of Spain had been in vain employed to expel him from Catalonia ; nor would the heroic fidelity of the castilians have sufficed to preserve Philip on the throne, without the assistance of France.

But the strength of that mighty monarchy, which had threatened the independence of the civilized world, was almost exhausted by the length and violence of this protracted struggle. Since the disastrous campaign of 1706 had overthrown the french power in the Netherlands, Louis had maintained the contest with increasing disadvantages. In 1707, all his efforts had been merely defensive ; but in the ensuing year, he had relaxed his exertions in distant quarters, to accumulate in this important theatre of action, a force of 100,000 men, which was intrusted to the duke of Burgundy, presumptive heir to the crown, and directed by the matured skill and enterprising spirit of Vendome. Misfortune, however, still hung over his faded glories : this mighty force experienced a fatal defeat at Oudenard, and was only saved from total destruction by the prompt arrival of Berwick, with a new army from the Rhine.

This alarming catastrophe was followed by the reduction of Lisle, the first and fairest of his conquests in Flanders, and the key of the countries watered by the Lys and the Scheldt, which

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opened an irreparable breach in his frontier. He had now the regret to perceive that his future exertions in a quarter, hitherto the scene of his triumphs, must be employed to protect his own provinces from the scourge of war. For, while his veteran troops had been swept away by repeated defeats, while his fortresses had not sufficed to arrest the tide of victory, his finances were dilapidated, and his whole kingdom, under the pressure of an unfortunate conflict, was visited by pestilence and famine.

Internal distress and external misfortune would perhaps have produced little effect on the heart of a monarch, whose firmness in calamity extorts our admiration, without the impulse of a powerful cabal in the very bosom of his court and family. The dauphin, as the father of Philip, overlooked the interests of the crown, to which he was heir, and strengthened Louis in his determination to maintain him in Spain : the opinion of the monarch and the heir apparent did not want partisans ; but the duke of Burgundy, who felt less personal interest for the aggrandisement of his brother, was more solicitous for the welfare of France, over which he was destined to reign. He found zealous supporters among the ministers and nobles most distinguished for integrity and moderation, particularly the duke of Beauvilliers, chief of the

council of finance, and the chancellor Pontchartrain. Their incessant importunities, seconded by the public voice, constrained Louis at least to make overtures for the restoration of peace, before the armies again took the field.

After some indirect attempts, he employed the agency of the count of Bergueik, minister plenipotentiary from Philip in the Netherlands, and Rouillé, president of the parliament of Paris, french envoy to the elector of Bavaria, to open a clandestine negotiation with some leading men in Holland. Hints were thrown out, that the defection of the republic would be rewarded with a monopoly of the spanish commerce, and a proper barrier against France ; and if Philip was permitted to retain possession of Spain and the Indies, some of the exterior provinces would be ceded to the archduke. Philip himself was admitted to a knowledge of this secret transaction, and with his own hand, signed full powers, authorising his plenipotentiary to give full satisfaction to the dutch. These lures did not, however, make the expected impression ; for though a strong party in the provinces were anxious for peace, the government replied that no overtures would be listened to, unless Bergueik was empowered to yield Spain and the Indies as the preliminary basis of a treaty.\*

\* Torci, t. 1, p. 186.

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This repulse did not discourage the french king from continuing a negotiation which at least might furnish a theme for the partisans of peace in England and Holland. He therefore consented to enter into a discussion on the basis of the proffered condition, and demanded passports for the french and spanish plenipotentiaries. Accordingly a passport was granted for Rouillé as french plenipotentiary, but refused for Bergueik ; because it would have implied an acknowledgment of the right of Philip to Spain, which was the important question at issue.

To form a decisive plan of conduct, Louis was anxious to ascertain the sentiments of Philip, and the real situation of Spain. He therefore commissioned Amelot to apprise Philip, that he feared his own embarrassed situation might compel him to accept the preliminaries offered by the allies. The bare insinuation roused the spirit of the young monarch above his natural temper ; and he declared his resolution rather to perish than abandon his throne.

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" I was deeply affected," he wrote to his grandfather, " with the contents of your letter to Amelot, stating the chimerical and insolent demands of the english and dutch, for the preliminaries of peace. Never were similar demands before made. I cannot suppose that you will listen to them ; you, who have proved your-

self the most glorious king on earth. But I am indignant at the supposition, that I shall be compelled to abandon Spain, as long as a drop of blood flows in my veins ; of that blood which cannot submit to dishonour. I will spare no efforts to maintain myself on the throne, on which God has placed me ; and on which you, under Providence, have supported me. You, I am sure, approve these sentiments, and for the sake of your own glory, as well as affection for me, will encourage them. Let me intreat you to consult your own heart, your love of glory, your affection for France ; all of which call loudly in my favour. Let me intreat you to recollect, that those who give you other advice, do not appreciate your true interests ; as no greater misfortune can happen to France, than to break its union with Spain."\*

Thus assured of the firmness of his grandson, the next object of the french monarch was to ascertain the truth of the reports industriously spread by the austrian partisans, that even the people of Castile and Andalusia, hitherto the principal support of Philip, were anxious for a change of government, and to discover the resources which Spain could furnish for maintaining the contest. The reply of Amelot is an

\* Noailles, t. 4, p. 13.

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interesting description of the state of Spain, and the disposition of the people:

" No apprehensions need be entertained for the provinces which are not in the possession of the enemy ; nor is there the slightest reason to suspect the loyalty of the people in general. War, contributions, and famine, occasion great sufferings in those districts which are poor, as well from their natural barrenness, as from the national indolence ; but no bitter complaints are heard ; no symptoms of disobedience perceived. And indeed what cause can there be for fear, while the king of Spain is supported by so large an army, both of his own and french troops ?

" These disloyal rumours spring from the discontent of those grandees, who, because they are not admitted to a share of power, murmur heavily, and complain that no regard is paid to the grandees, the nobles and people ; that their customs and laws are overturned ; that the authority of their councils is annihilated ; that all will be lost without a change of measures. The duke of Orleans was importuned with such discourses ; he repeated them to me, and seemed to disregard them.

" Although there are many faults in the government, the complaints of those who censure it are easily refuted. The king, equitable even

to scrupulousness, always decides against himself in doubtful cases. He relieves the people as much as circumstances will permit ; he frees from taxes those places which have suffered by the invasion of the enemy ; he assists and rewards the subjects of Aragon, Valencia, and Catalonia, who maintained their fidelity in the midst of revolt ; he scatters his benefits daily ; he has no favourites who enrich themselves at the expence of the state, or who usurp for themselves and their relatives the rewards earned by others.

" The queen, condescending and beneficent, has never accepted a present even from the king ; she has never purchased a single jewel ; and neither the king nor queen expend five hundred pistoles above what is merely necessary. The princess Orsini is so disinterested that she does not receive her appointments or pensions, because she does not demand them. She even does good to those whom she knows to be her enemies.

" If the grandes possess little authority ; if the king confides almost in no one ; if the councils no longer dispose of many favours of which they were formerly the dispensers ; it is because Philip cannot otherwise support his throne, and such has long been the persuasion of the french court. Four years ago, he had

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neither troops, nor arms, nor artillery. His domestics were unpaid, his body guards, attenuated with hunger, received the alms distributed at the gates of the convents. Then the ministers of the cabinet governed; the councils ordered every thing. Who can now recommend the re-establishment of the antient councils, or submit to the discretion of people, who in time of peace did not leave sufficient to Charles the second to pay his journeys to Aranjuez or the Escorial?

"Neither threats, attempts, or artifices, have been spared to intimidate your ambassador, and oblige him to change his measures. But those who have only pure intentions, who have no interest nor rule except their duty, who have acquired some knowledge by long practice, who follow with implicit devotion the orders of their master, do not suffer themselves to be moved by fear, nor lured by the false hope of pleasing all: they pursue their objects with courage in spite of all obstacles. Thus, Sir, I imagine, you would be served.

"The chiefs of the cabal against the government are Montalto and Montellano, the count of Frigiliana, and the count of Monterey. They principally inveigh against the abolition of the laws and privileges of Aragon, and complain of the oppression of the people. Having expressed

my surprise to Montellano, who affected to be my friend, that after being loaded with favours and honours, he could censure the government of a monarch whose minister he was, he replied, ‘I am actuated by an excess of zeal. I wish my discourses to reach the ears of the king, and induce him to follow other maxims. But in future I will be silent, since it is judged necessary for the good of the service.’

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“ As to myself, I support the weight of all business, I am always ready to listen to remonstrances and complaints, and have never suspended the execution of my plans except to adopt better. But, can the grandes suffer a frenchman to govern, and the spaniards not to be masters? They caballed with the duke of Orleans to obtain my recal and that of the princess Orsini, with whom I perfectly agree. Such cabals indeed will continue as long as jealousy and disaffection prevail.

“ I freely confess that injurious rumours have redoubled, since the unfortunate campaign in Flanders, and that melancholy prognostics have produced the most dangerous effects. But, the inferior nobles, I am persuaded, are favourably disposed, and there is no cause to dread an insurrection as long as the king of Spain maintains a powerful army. I am, however, of opinion, *that if your majesty should withdraw your*

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*troops, the most loyal will consider the king as abandoned, and may renounce their allegiance when they see that he is incapable of supporting himself on the throne.*

"The riches of Peru and Mexico, those inexhaustible sources of wealth, are almost lost to Spain. Not only are complaints made against the french merchants for ruining the trade of Cadiz and Seville, in spite of the regulations of the french court against those who infringe the established rules, but the enormous abuses of the administration of the viceroys continue in full force. Avarice and pillage are unpunished, fortresses and garrisons are neglected; *all things seem to portend a fatal revolution.*

"Resolutions have been taken to recal the two viceroys, and to fix some precise bounds to the profits of their successors; so as to give them the means of enriching themselves without departing from their duty. I acknowledge that the expedient will not suffice to restrain eu-pidity; yet I do not see a better, even if the choice is directed on persons most distinguished for firmness and probity. So difficult is it to find among the grandees, a mind of sufficient strength to resist the influence of example and interest."\*

These details, however cautiously written and

\* Noailles, t. 4, p. 28—30.

favourably coloured, sufficiently proved the precarious state of the bourbon power in Spain, the little reliance to be placed on the exertions of Philip, if left to himself, and the necessity either of winning over the nobles by conciliation, or subjugating them by force.

Louis therefore resolved to open the proposed negotiation with the allies, without definitively accepting or refusing their conditions, to profit by time and circumstances, to divide his enemies, to rouse the dormant loyalty of the spaniards, and the energies of his own people; or, as a last resource, to purchase peace by the sacrifice of Philip, and prolong the contest indirectly, by encouraging the views of the duke of Orleans on the spanish throne. The whole of his plan does not seem to have been confided to any of the persons interested; but such instructions were separately imparted to Philip, the queen, the princess, and Amelot, as were necessary, to guide them in the different parts which they were respectively intended to act.

After some fruitless attempts to entangle the dutch in a separate negotiation, Rouillé had no other alternative than to submit his proposals to the allies in general. Conferences were opened at the Hague, first through the medium of the dutch plenipotentiaries, Buys and Vanderdussen, two men of a character not to be

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deceived by diplomatic artifice, and well affected to the principles of the grand alliance, and afterwards continued jointly with the plenipotentiaries of all the allies.

The question of peace or war was reduced to one simple proposition. As Louis, in contravention of preceding treaties and renunciations, had placed his grandson on the Spanish throne, and thus given cause to the war, he was required either to persuade or compel Philip to abandon Spain within a limited period, and to give security for the faithful performance of this condition.

Louis employed many expedients to evade or qualify the demand. He offered, first, in the name of Philip, to cede the Milanese, Naples, and Sicily; next, to add the Netherlands, or, at least, a barrier in the Netherlands; afterwards, to abandon Spain, and the dependent provinces, reserving only Naples and Sicily. The allies insisting that the whole Spanish monarchy should be restored to the House of Austria, except the territories promised to the king of Portugal, and the duke of Savoy; Louis, in his own person, declared his acceptance of this condition. At the same time, he avowed his inability either to obtain or extort the acquiescence of Philip; though, as a proof of his sincerity, he offered to withdraw his troops from the peninsula, and leave him unprotected to their invasion.

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As Louis had repeatedly violated the most solemn engagements, as the war was still vigorously prosecuted in Spain, and as Philip procured the acknowledgment of the infant prince of Asturias by the cortes, at the very moment of this discussion, the allies considered the offer as a mere captious attempt to draw the war from the Netherlands, where they maintained a decisive advantage; and to engage them in a distant and expensive contest, till France had recovered from her depression. They, therefore, required that Louis should himself become responsible for the execution of his engagement, and, as a pledge, demanded the fortresses in Spain, occupied by his troops, and the temporary surrender of certain towns in the Netherlands, till Spain should be evacuated. For the purpose of fulfilling this condition, they offered a suspension of arms for two months.

"Philip," they justly observed, "will either, as we suppose, conform to the advice of his grandfather, or he will endeavour to maintain himself on the throne. In the first case, it will be no detriment to the king to yield the cautionary places, because they will be restored immediately on the fulfilment of the treaty. In the second, it ought to appear clearly to all, even to the Spaniards themselves, that the king acts with good faith, and that he will not in reality succour

CHAP. 16. his grandson, directly or indirectly ; since he gives those places as a security for the performance of his promise.”\*

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After some useless discussion, Louis rejected these conditions, with the reply, that his troops in Spain were in the field, not in garrisons ; that the demand of the cautionary towns was an insult to his honour, and implied an injurious suspicion of his good faith, at the moment when the allies required implicit confidence in their own fidelity.

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This negotiation naturally alarmed Philip and his adherents, and they importuned Louis to relieve them from their apprehensions of being abandoned by France. But the answers of Louis excited additional alarm. In the midst of expressions of tenderness and affection for his grandson, he hinted that France was no longer capable of sustaining the burthens of war, with the additional evils of internal distress. The french ambassador was even ordered to prepare him for the cession of Spain itself. “ Peace,” Louis observed, “ must be obtained at any price : the longer it is deferred, the more distressed will be the condition of the king of Spain, and the greater sacrifices will be exacted from him.”

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“ There are,” he added, “ situations in which courage must yield to prudence, and as the

\* Memoires de Torci, t. 2, p. 161.

subjects of Philip, notwithstanding their present zeal and exertions, may not always be willing to give the same proofs of their attachment, it will be better to secure a part than to sacrifice the whole by an obstinate resistance. He well knows that I am ready to give him proofs of my friendship in supporting his dignity, by making considerable sacrifices, if necessary.”\*

These hints made a deep impression on the Spaniards. They justly considered the offers of Louis, to the allies, as a proof that France was unable to continue the contest, and was preparing to sacrifice Spain for the sake of obtaining an advantageous peace. To prevent, therefore, the dismemberment of their monarchy, even the most loyal began to waver. Some turned their views to the House of Austria; others, with the connivance of the French monarch, formed a plan for raising the Duke of Orleans to the throne, should Philip, from want of talents and spirit, or from the misfortunes of France, be compelled to abdicate.

This scheme, however, could not fail to aggravate the difficulties under which the Spanish court laboured at this moment of alarm and uncertainty. The Princess Orsini, whose personal jealousies sharpened her political vigilance, beheld the intrigues of the Orleans party with

\* Mémoires de Noailles, t. 4, p. 115.

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peculiar apprehension. She persuaded Philip that Regnault was employed by the duke, not merely to maintain a correspondence with his partisans, but that his machinations tended to nothing less than an immediate revolution in the government. Her suggestions induced Philip to denounce the duke at Versailles, and to make the most earnest request that he might not again be exposed to the presence of so dangerous a rival.

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Louis replied, "I have spoken to my nephew. He protests that, during his residence in Spain, he never interfered in the affairs of government; and he has made an appeal to my testimony, which I can readily give, that he never expressed the slightest wish for the recall of the ambassador Amelot. With respect to his secretary Regnault, he says he is employed on account of his knowledge of the Spanish language; but, as his conduct has displeased you, he shall instantly be recalled. I think this is what you have a right to demand on his part: for mine, I have found pretexts to avoid sending him this year into Spain; and you may be assured that, on every occasion, you will always receive proofs of my attention to your pleasure."\*

This representation induced Louis to enter into farther explanations with the duke of Orleans, who avowed his design to make an

\* Neailles, t. 4, p. 72.

effort for the crown, should Philip be obliged to retire. Louis, knowing the weakness of his grandson, and justly dreading the result of another unfortunate campaign, was not only far from disapproving his conduct, but readily seized so favourable an opportunity of prolonging the contest indirectly, should the fate of war compel him to abandon his grandson. While therefore he persisted in refusing to permit his resumption of the command, he advised him to dispatch another agent, under the pretext of bringing back his camp equipage, to maintain and extend his connections in Spain. This agent was La Rotte, a man whose address, character and talents, were well fitted for the mission.

St. Simon, the friend and confidant of the duke of Orleans, has recorded from his own mouth the substance of these conversations with Louis, and has preserved some particulars which do not appear in the royal correspondence. In one the king inquired on what footing he stood with the princess. The duke replying that he believed himself well with her, because he had done nothing to incur her dislike; the king rejoined, "She, however, much fears your return into Spain, and desires that you may not be sent back. She complains, that after having done every thing to please you, you have joined with her enemies; that your secretary, Regnault, keeps

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up a secret correspondence with them, which has obliged her to demand his recal, to prevent him from injuring her in your name."

The duke afterwards adverted to her misconduct, and the discretion he had hitherto maintained on her behalf. Louis reflected a moment, and then said, "In the present state of things it is proper to avoid sending you back to Spain. In such a crisis of affairs it is doubtful to whom the crown will belong. Should my grandson be obliged to withdraw, it is not worth while to examine the conduct of madame Orsini; if he preserves his throne, we may speak fully of your charges, and I shall be happy to have your advice."

Meanwhile the princess had not ceased to watch the conduct of the duke of Orleans, and the movements of his agents. She caused Regnault to be arrested, in such profound secrecy, that no one could conjecture the cause or time of his disappearance. She discovered, that the second agent, La Rotte, who had proceeded to the army, held secret interviews at midnight with different persons, and even repaired from Lerida to the quarters of general Stanhope.\* From

\* General Stanhope having been a jovial companion of the abbot Dubois, and the duke of Orleans, an interchange of letters and civilities appears to have taken place between him and the duke. St. Simon, t. 7, p. 107. See also Tindal, v. 16, p. 412. There was also some truth in this accusation, at least as far as regards the

these suspicious circumstances, she obtained likewise an order for his arrest, as he was returning to France under the protection of a french escort. In his possession were found various papers and documents in an unknown cypher, and parts of a correspondence between the duke of Orleans and general Stanhope.

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In consequence of this discovery, she accused the duke of maintaining a secret and traitorous correspondence with the enemy, of offering to expose the army to defeat, and abandon Spain to the allies, on the condition of being permitted to retain the kingdoms of Murcia, Valencia, and Navarre, and renouncing his own pretensions in favour of the archduke. To give a stronger colour to this imputation, rumours were spread that he intended to repudiate his wife, and to espouse, with the dispensation of the pope, the queen dowager of Spain, with a view to maintain his usurped power by the influence of her german connections.

correspondence with general Stanhope, for a partition of the spanish monarchy. General Stanhope communicated to the british government some overtures on this subject, and we find among the Marlborough Papers, private instructions sent by lord Sunderland, secretary of state, in a letter dated December 10, 1708, authorising the general to proceed in the negotiation, and to yield to him Navarre and Languedoc if the consent of Charles could be obtained. Notwithstanding this mysterious correspondence, we are inclined to suspect the overtures of the duke of Orleans were with the connivance of Louis, and perhaps only as a deception.

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These accusations, however absurd, made a deep impression on the mind of Philip. He earnestly renewed his representations to Louis, and insisted that the duke should never be permitted to resume the command in Spain, which he was persuaded would be the moment for the explosion of the conspiracy, and perhaps of his own deposition.

Louis now felt the inconvenience derived from his duplicity in conniving at the projects of the duke, and dreaded a renewal of those embarrassments which had before been occasioned by the opposition of the princess. He therefore adopted the only expedient calculated to save his honour, by mediating a reconciliation between his grandson and the duke, and promising to comply with his wishes. He communicated to Philip such parts of his conversations as were likely to further his view, and concluded with recommending him to bury the whole affair in oblivion.\*

In this trying situation, Philip was buoyed up by the queen and princess, neither of whom was of a character to forego the pleasure of rule, and the splendour of a court; he was equally encou-

\* Noailles, t. 4, p. 76.—St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 219—303, *passim*.  
—St. Simon, t. 5, *passim*; and particularly *Histoire des Projets du Duc d'Orleans, sur l'Espagne, en cas d'abandon de cette Couronne de la part du Roi Philippe*, t. 5, p. 11.

raged by the secret assurances of his father the dauphin, that he would never be abandoned by France.

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"I have taken," he wrote to Louis, "my resolution, and nothing shall compel me to change it. The crown of Spain, which God has placed on my head, I will maintain as long as a drop of blood flows in my veins. I owe this resolution to my conscience, my honour, and the love of my subjects. They, I am convinced, will never abandon me in the most adverse circumstances ; and as I am determined to expose my life at their head, so they will cheerfully shed their blood to retain me on the throne. Were I capable of meanly relinquishing my dignity, you, I am convinced, would renounce me as your grandson, and I for my part burn to prove my title to that honour, no less by my actions than by my blood. I will therefore never sign a treaty unworthy of myself ; I will never quit Spain while I have a spark of life ; I will rather perish, disputing every inch of ground at the head of my troops, than tarnish the glory of my house, which I hope will never be dishonoured by me. I shall feel the consolation, that while I am contending for my own interests, I am likewise contending for those of France, to which the preservation of Spain is absolutely necessary."\*

\* Noailles, t. 4, p. 45.

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As a public pledge to his subjects of a resolution never to abandon his throne, Philip convened the cortes\* of Castile and Aragon, and obtained the acknowledgment of his infant son don Louis, as prince of Asturias and heir of the spanish monarchy. This act was performed on the 7th of April, in the church of St. Geronimo del Prado, in the presence of the king and queen, and a vast concourse of people.

A letter from the queen to her sister the duchess of Burgundy, contains a minute account of the ceremony, interspersed with many amiable touches of maternal tenderness.

April 8.

" My son was yesterday acknowledged presumptive heir of the spanish monarchy, by the states of the kingdom, and in this quality, the clergy, all the grandees, the officers of the crown, and deputies of the towns who have a right to assist at the meeting of the states, swore fidelity to him, did homage, and kissed his hand. The patriarch, as grand almoner, confirmed him, according to usual custom. Cardinal Portocarrero was his godfather, and the duke of Medina Celi received the homage. This ceremony lasted nearly three hours. The assembly was very numerous; but every thing passed in

\* We must distinguish this species of assembly from the real cortes, in which the whole body of Hidalgos assisted in person, and the convocation of which had been long disused. See the last chapter in the appendix, c. 3.

the greatest order and with profound respect. I was no less surprised than gratified with the warm and tender expressions with which, in kissing our hands, each person testified his joy, and that of the whole kingdom.

"About twelve o'clock the king, myself, and my son, alighted at the church of St. Geronimo, which we found magnificently ornamented, and filled with all who have a right to be present in virtue of their offices, or as members of the states. The king was attended by the great officers of the crown. I was followed by fourteen ladies, all grandes, or wives of grandes, whom I chose from the first families of Spain ; and my son was carried by the princess Orsini. It was her duty, as camerara-mayor, to hold my train ; but as she filled the office of governess to the prince, her place was supplied by the count of Aguilar, captain of the guards, because if I had nominated a lady, this preference would have thrown all the rest into despair.

"As soon as we arrived under our canopy, the ceremony commenced with the *Veni Creator*. During the whole mass, my son behaved with a tranquillity and cheerfulness which drew general attention. He kissed the gospel and the pix, like a reasonable person ; but after mass, when he was carried to the altar to be confirmed, he became fretful at quitting me ; and when his

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brow was bound with the diadem, he was terrified, and cried. This did not, however, last long; for as soon as he was brought back to me his tears ceased.

"Each person, according to his rank, then took the oath, and did homage. More than two hundred kissed his hand, which he presented very graciously and with more patience than could be expected from an infant of twenty months. At last, however, they were obliged to bring his nurse, but while she suckled him, he gave his hand to kiss as before, though in a manner that seemed as if to inquire whether it would not soon finish. After the Te Deum, we passed to our apartment, in the same order, and with the same attendants. The people could not give more proofs of their zeal and love for us, than on this occasion. The court was splendid, and I think no festival was ever better regulated, nor more generally satisfactory."\*

The conduct of the holy see furnished Philip with another occasion to testify his resolution of maintaining his crown.

Clement the eleventh, though devoted to the House of Bourbon, had avoided compromising his authority between the contending powers, till the occupation of Naples and the Milanese by the austrians forced him to relinquish his neu-

\* Lambert, t. 5, p. 320.

trality. He refused indeed to acknowledge the archduke as king of Spain ; but endeavoured at once to secure his own safety, and evade this concession, by addressing him with the equivocal title of *the catholic king*.

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Though the austrians were dissatisfied with this partial acknowledgment, and though it sufficiently shewed the reluctance of the pope to declare against the House of Bourbon, Philip thought proper to consider it as an insult to his person and dignity, and submitted to his ministers, and a junta of theologians headed by the confessor Robinet, the question, Whether he should dismiss the nuntio ? It was decided in the affirmative ; but he did not venture to carry it into execution till he had received the sanction of his grandfather ; the french monarch gave a tacit approval, though he refused to break off his own connection with the head of the church. This apparent indecision weighed with the more timid members of the administration, who proposed to suspend or modify the decree ; while Philip, more firm, or better assured of the real sentiments of the french monarch, persisted in his original resolution. The nuntio was dismissed, his tribunal closed ; the customary remittances to Rome forbidden, and the spanish ambassador, the duke of Uzeda, recalled. The nuntio having erected his tribunal at Avignon,

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Philip marked his displeasure by forbidding the reception of briefs from Rome. At the same time, to preserve the appearance of respect and consideration towards the holy see, and to allay the apprehensions of the devout sons of the church, the conduct of the pope was considered as the effect of force, and public prayers offered up for his deliverance from the oppression of his enemies.\*

But whatever expedients were adopted to win the confidence of the nation at large, the cabinet still continued the scene of contest and confusion. Nothing could reconcile the spaniards to the controul of a french minister; and on the other hand, Amelot himself, impatient of their constant and frequently unreasonable opposition, relinquished that cautious and conciliating deportment which had recommended him for his mission. He became peevish and hasty, censured the refractory nobles in harsh and contumelious language, and insisted on the necessity of subduing their untractable spirit, by rigorous measures. He accordingly made frequent changes in the cabinet and councils, excluded Montellano, the duke of St. Juan, and others, who had been the most strenuous in opposition,

\* Memoires de St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 282, 295.—Noailles, t. 4, p. 38.—Tessé, t. 2, p. 288.—History of Europe, for 1709, p. 73, 262, 312.—Ortiz, t. 7, p. 162.

and retained only such as were either devoted to France, or too deficient in character and weight to influence the conduct of the administration. These vigorous measures did not contribute to allay the feuds in the court; for the exclusion of Montellano in particular gave him new popularity, as a noble distinguished for his independent character, and as the only barrier to the overbearing influence of France.

Murmurs and indignation prevailed throughout the court and capital. The grandees most attached to the bourbon cause, unanimously inveighed against France and the french agents, and decried Amelot and the princess as the authors of national ruin. The house of Montellano, whose taste for literature had led him to imitate the literary assemblies of other countries, became the resort of all who were discontented with the government. Equally irritated by his recent disgrace, and emboldened by his popularity, he was still more vehement in his censures. He did not even respect the remonstrance of the king, and replied to Amelot, who was charged to express to him the royal displeasure: "It is a proof of zeal and affection to censure what is prejudicial to the welfare of the monarchy. We are surely intitled to speak freely; we who are embarked with the king in the same vessel, which is on the point of perish-

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ing, because those who direct the helm, labour only to sink her.”\* Nor was the example of Montellano lost on the other nobles. The duke of Medina Celi even proposed to join the allies against the french who had insulted their loyalty and honour, by attempting to deprive them of a king, the object of their love and veneration, and united with them by congenial sentiments. From the court and capital these political feuds spread into the army: the spanish troops appeared more eager to contend with the french than with the enemy; and apprehensions were entertained that the french, who were resident at Madrid, would be sacrificed to the public hatred.†

It is not difficult to judge to what extremities these discontents might have led; but in the course of the negotiation, the terms on which the archduke had purchased the support of the allies transpired, and the zealous spaniards discovered, that even by accepting an austrian king, they could not prevent the dreaded dismemberment of their monarchy. For, besides the probability that he might be induced to cede a portion of the italian territories to Philip, he had already promised part of Galicia and Estremadura to the king of Portugal, and a barrier in the Netherlands to the dutch. The publication of the

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 246.      † St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 245.

projects attributed to the duke of Orleans, produced a similar effect on those who regarded him as the champion of their independence. The hopes of the nation were, therefore, directed to Philip, as their last and only resource, and the tide of popularity again turned in his favour.

The princess Orsini now came forward to act her part in this political drama.\* Although she had hitherto supported all the measures of Ame- lot, and had recently assisted him in overcoming the reluctance of the king and queen to consent to the disgrace of Montellano, she now sacrificed him to the interests of both courts, and the wishes of the nation. She, therefore, threw on him the odium of the obnoxious measures, recommended his recall, affected indignation at the humiliating offers of Louis to the allies, and, with pretended disinterestedness, offered her own resignation. She also employed her influence over the queen to induce Philip to throw himself on the support of his subjects.

At her instigation, the king convened the chief ministers and grandes to demand their assist- ance and counsel. He dwelt on the state of alarm and inquietude into which he was thrown

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\* It is evident from the correspondence preserved in the Mémoirs of Noailles, that the princess was the chief agent in this political revolution, and gave the impulse to Philip through the means of her royal mistress.—Noailles, t. 4, p. 50, &c.



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by the public rumours that he was to be abandoned by France, and his own uncertainty respecting the real intentions of the french cabinet. He announced his resolution rather to die than to yield his crown ; appealed to the zeal and affection of his subjects, and concluded with expressing his determination to be guided by their advice.

The whole assembly were deeply moved ; but the national impulse was given by Portocarrero, who, at the advanced age of seventy-four, emerged from his retreat to attend this important deliberation, and by acting the part becoming his high station, compensated for his recent apostacy. His example and exhortations called forth an unanimous burst of enthusiasm.\* The assembly protested that duty and affection, no less than allegiance, bound them to maintain their sovereign on his throne. It was, they declared, a degradation of the national dignity, to suffer England and Holland to parcel out their monarchy ; and if the king of France was no longer able to furnish the requisite assistance, the whole people, without distinction of rank, profession, or age, should rise in a mass, and sacrifice themselves for their king, their country, and their honour. They recommended the im-

\* This act closed the political life of this remarkable man, who died Sept. 14, at Toledo.—St. Philippe, t. 2, p. 306.

mediate dismission of all the french, and the CHAP. 16.  
establishment of a spanish administration.

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Philip readily listened to a proposal which he was pre-disposed to accept, and the princess Orsini herself communicated to Amelot the unwelcome tidings of his dismission. She, however, shewed herself as the principal adviser of these popular measures, and through the interposition of the queen, obtained a special exception in her own favour from the general decree. The duke of Medina Celi was placed at the head of the administration, as minister for foreign affairs ; the marquis of Bedmar was appointed to the department of war ; the other members of the ministry, being spaniards, were permitted to retain their offices ; the two secretaries of the cabinet, Mejorada and Grimaldo, continued to exercise their important functions, and to possess the royal confidence. Amelot was also to be succeeded in his embassy by Blecourt, who had formerly filled the post of minister in Spain, and was to be expressly excluded from the privilege enjoyed by his predecessors, of assisting at the deliberations of the cabinet.

To give still farther proofs of a determination not to abandon his throne, Philip appointed the duke of Alva, and the count of Bergueik, two noblemen distinguished for their opposition to the dismemberment of Spain, as his plenipoten-

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tiaries to the conferences at the Hague, where he was well aware they would not be admitted. Their instructions were given to the public, and clearly shew the purpose for which they were calculated. “The temple of peace,” it was observed, “ought to be decorated with the furniture of both Spain and France; the robe of the goddess should not be cut from a single piece of brocade, because it is contrary to equity that Spain alone should be dismembered; and therefore whatever France may sacrifice, whatever it may cost her, Spain will never submit to be despoiled of her antient patrimony.”

After this allegorical exordium, it is added :

“The king is resolved never to cede any part of Spain or the Indies, or the duchy of Milan; and in conformity with this resolution, he protests against the actual dismemberment of the Milanese, by the emperor to the duke of Savoy, though he is willing to indemnify the duke with the island of Sardinia. In the last extremity, and to obtain peace, his majesty will cede to the archduke, Naples; and to the english, Jamaica, on the restoration of Majorca and Minorca. He revokes the offer of commercial advantages to the dutch, and will only open the trade of America to all nations by means of a board established at Cadiz. The plenipotentiaries are enjoined to communicate their orders to the king

of France, and to adhere scrupulously to these terms. But should these offers not be deemed sufficient to obtain peace, they must endeavour to prevail on the king of France to cede some of his own conquests, to procure the re-establishment of the electors of Bavaria and Cologne, and leave to the elector of Bavaria the administration of the Netherlands, till they can be transferred to a spanish prince.”\*

The grandees and nation did not belie the solemn pledge which they had given to their sovereign. Levies of men, and contributions of money and plate, were poured in ; the enthusiasm of the nobles was communicated to the clergy ; the hierarchy not only lavished their treasures, but employed their powerful influence against a prince who was supported by rebels and heretics ; while the people, animated by the exhortations of their chiefs and pastors, flocked to the royal standard. For the first time since the commencement of the contest, the supreme command was given to a spaniard, the count of Aguilar, who was distinguished among his countrymen for military talents, and devotedly attached to Philip.

The reviving loyalty of the spaniards, and the impossibility of persuading the allies to recede from terms which left no room for evasion or

\* Lamberti, t. 5, p. 322.—Noailles, t. 4, p. 55.

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delay, induced Louis to terminate a negotiation from which he could draw no farther advantage: To give greater effect to his proposals, and to preserve the appearance of an anxiety for peace, he employed on this important mission the marquis of Torci, his confidential minister, who repaired to the scene of the conferences. The new plenipotentiary had only the same conditions to propose as his predecessor, though under a different form. After a discussion in which he exerted all his diplomatic abilities to give to the proposals of his sovereign the colour of moderation and sincerity, he concluded with requiring from the allies a distinct and formal declaration of their demands.

Accordingly, preliminaries were drawn up as the basis of the intended peace, and sanctioned by the signature of all the plenipotentiaries, on the part of the allies. The fourth and thirty-seventh articles, which related to the spanish succession, comprised the acknowledgment of the archduke, as sovereign of the whole spanish monarchy. A suspension of arms for two months was to be granted for putting him in possession of the throne; to cease at that period, if this condition was not fulfilled, by means which were left to the option of the king of France. Should Philip refuse his consent, the king of France was not only to withdraw his troops and with-

hold his succours, *but was to join with the allies in concerting proper measures to obtain his compliance.* Finally, the monarchy was to continue in the House of Austria, and no prince of the House of Bourbon was ever to become sovereign of any part; nor was the crown of France to acquire any portion of the Spanish Indies, or its subjects to participate in the commerce of the new world.\* Other conditions were also stipulated for the emperor and empire, as well as for England and Holland; and a power was reserved to bring forward ulterior demands for the subordinate members of the grand alliance. Torci verbally expressed his own personal acceptance of these preliminaries, but with a reference to the pleasure of his sovereign; and on his departure to Paris, the strongest hopes were entertained that the contest was brought to a termination, and that the returning courier would bring the approbation of the king. Louis, however, was not yet sufficiently humbled to accept terms which would have rendered vain all the labours of fifty years. He not only refused his acquiescence, but considering the clause in the ob-

\* It would be foreign to the plan of this work to give more than an outline of such parts of the negotiation at the Hague, as related to Spain. As to those parts which regarded the emperor, empire, and the other powers, after the ample detail which we have given in the History of the House of Austria, we trust we may be permitted to refer to that work, vol. 1, ch. 76.

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noxious article, which bound him to join with the allies, as an obligation to make war against his grandson, declared, that if driven to the melancholy alternative, he would rather wage war against his enemies than against his own children. He availed himself also of the apparent cruelty of such a demand, to silence the importunities of the duke of Burguady, and rouse the spirit of his people. He published a solemn declaration of his pacific views, and, after expatiating on the barbarity and insolence of his enemies, appealed to the loyalty and honour of his subjects, to preserve him from degradation. "I pass by," he said, "the proposal they have made me to join my forces with those of the league, and expel the king, my grandson, from his throne, if he will not voluntarily consent to descend to a private station. It is contrary to humanity even to believe that they could entertain the hope of drawing me into such an alliance. But, although my tenderness for my people is as strong as my affection for my children; although I share with them the calamities which war draws upon faithful subjects, and have manifested to all Europe that I sincerely desire peace, I am persuaded they will themselves oppose the acceptance of it, upon conditions equally contrary to justice and to the honour of the french nation."

The effect of this appeal was general and

instantaneous. The duke of Burgundy, and his partisans, vied with their opponents in zeal for the prosecution of the war; while the nation, which had already begun to sink under the weight of calamity, was roused by the appeal of their aged monarch, and rallied round the throne to preserve it from humiliation and dishonour.

Philip imitated the example of Louis in appealing to the loyalty and honour of his people. After recapitulating the circumstances of the negotiation, he observed, “the allies, not content with their exorbitant pretensions, even proposed, as a fundamental article, that the king, my grandfather, should unite with them to expel me by force, if I did not voluntarily abandon Spain within two months. A rash and scandalous proposition! Yet, in this they shewed some knowledge and esteem of my constancy, as well as of the fidelity and valour of my courageous spaniards; for it is a confession, that so many powers united, are not assured of success.”

After expatiating on the danger which threatened the holy catholic church, from the combination of heretics, and the diffusion of heretical doctrines, he pathetically added, “If from the number and magnitude of my sins, the divine benediction be with-held from me, I will tinge the soil of my beloved Spain with my blood, in the sight of my subjects; content if the wrath of

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"For this purpose, my subjects must support me with their united and renowned fidelity, and generous efforts. They must join in sincere christian charity and natural affection ; we must address ourselves to God, and the holy Virgin Mary, the peculiar protectress of me and my kingdoms, by fervent and constant prayer ; we must root out from our minds those vices which would turn away the divine mercy. Thus united, we will fight for our honour and for our native land, under the eternal will of Providence, against the blasphemous pride of those who arrogate to themselves a power to divide and dispose of empires, and transfer them from nation to nation."\*

This spirited address made as deep an impression on the spaniards, as that of Louis on the french. But Spain was now too much exhausted to furnish resources for the impending struggle. When, therefore, Louis announced the sad necessity of withdrawing his troops for the defence of his own kingdom, Philip, both directly and by his agents, made the most earnest appli-

\* Lamberti, t. 5, p. 306.—History of Europe, 1709, p. 471.

cations for a continuance of that support, to which he had hitherto owed his crown. These proving fruitless, the queen pathetically appealed to his humanity and paternal feelings.

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"We have no infantry," she observed, "and unless you will spare us twenty battalions, the enemy will reach Madrid, and we are ruined. Have compassion, I intreat you, on my forlorn situation. In hourly expectation of my delivery, what will become of me and my children! The very dread of being thus abandoned will cause my death. Can you be so hard-hearted as to expose me to such imminent danger, when it is in your power to relieve me? I cannot, nor will I believe, that the kindness and affection you have shewn to me, will ever suffer you to desert me on this trying occasion."\*

June 17.

It seemed as if this pathetic appeal overbore the considerations of policy. Louis agreed to leave twenty-five battalions in Spain; but he restricted this concession to the period of a few weeks, till Philip should have time to collect and organise a native army, and provide for his own safety. Conscious also that the increasing exertions of the allies would occupy his whole force in the campaign which was now opened, he stimulated the resolution of Philip, and the zeal of his subjects, by renewing his hints, that unless

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\* Noailles, t. 4, p. 65.

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Spain could support herself, he must ultimately renounce all hopes of maintaining his family on the throne.

Fortunately indeed for Philip, the war in Spain was suffered to languish by the allies, who concentrated their principal strength in the Netherlands. The spanish forces under the marquis of Bay, had discomfited the british and portuguese on the Caya, in the vicinity of Campo Mayor, and thereby averted the danger from the western frontier. In Catalonia, the united armies were superior to that of the allies ; but this advantage was rendered unavailing by their mutual hatred, and particularly by the contentions between the two commanders, Bezons and Aguilar. As the french were enjoined to remain only on the defensive, the active Staremburg did not hesitate to cross the Segra in the presence of the bourbon army, and invest the fortress of Balaguer. The spaniards were eager to risk an engagement ; but Bezons, shackled by his orders, and dreading, lest in the confusion of a battle, they should turn their arms against his own troops instead of the enemy, retreated at the moment of action, and the army had the mortification to witness the reduction of the fortress, and the loss of three battalions who surrendered as prisoners of war.

Irritated with the intelligence, Philip quitted

Madrid, and hastened to the army with the hope of terminating the disputes of the generals, and checking the feuds of the soldiery. He announced his resolution in an indignant letter to Bezons from Guadalaxara. "I am surprised," he said, "at your conduct in sight of the enemy, on the 27th of last month, which I consider as disgraceful to the two nations. On receiving the intelligence, I departed this morning from Madrid to head my army, without a moment's delay. I order you to have in readiness for my arrival forty battalions and sixty squadrons, which I know you can collect. It becomes necessary to support the honour of France and Spain; and be assured that I do not repair to the army without a resolution of doing something worthy of my birth. You will not, I am satisfied, lose my esteem, but will on all occasions endeavour to deserve it."\*

Philip found his army not only divided by national feuds, but in the most deplorable condition for want of forage and subsistence; and the enemy in a position too strong to be forced. After waiting three weeks, only to witness the miseries of the soldiery, and the increasing divisions of the officers, he transferred the command of the Spaniards to the prince of Tzerclaes, and, accompanied by Aguilar, hurried away from a

\* Lamberti, t. 5, p. 393.

CHAP. 16. scene, where he had experienced nothing but  
1709. affliction.\*

In the midst of this mortifying inactivity, Noailles sustained the honour of the french arms by his operations on the side of the eastern Pyrenees. He reduced Figueras, and surprising an austrian camp under the walls of Girona, made the general prisoner, took the artillery and baggage, and killed, dispersed, or captured the troops; but his exploits, however brilliant, produced no permanent advantage; for he again returned to winter on the frontier of Rousillon.

The promised change of measures, and the formation of a spanish ministry, had not contributed to restore tranquillity in the palace and cabinet. The people, and those at a distance from the court, were perhaps deceived by outward appearances; but it required no deep sagacity to discover, that the separation from France was merely an affected and temporary expedient to stimulate the zeal of the nation; and give colour to the asseverations of Louis, that he was unable to wrest the crown from his grandson. These suspicions were justified by the increasing interference of the french cabinet, at the very moment, when it was said to cease, and by the obsequious obedience of Philip to the

\* St. Philippe, t. 1, p. 276.

secret mandates of Versailles. For although he had avowed the resolution of throwing himself into the arms of his subjects, he never gave his confidence to the duke of Medina Celi, and those who were nominally entrusted with the management of affairs, but to the secretary Grimaldo, who was of too supple and conciliating a character to oppose his own national prejudices to the royal pleasure. He also detained Amelot under various pretences, until the moment of his departure to the army; admitted him into the cabinet, and paid the same attention to his advice as during the preceding part of his mission.\*

In these circumstances the duke of Medina Celi considered himself as placed at the head of the government, only to facilitate his ruin. Even Ronquillo and Bedmar did not conceal their aversion to a system of administration, in which they were rendered responsible without the power of acting; they remonstrated against the breach of the solemn promise which the king had pledged to the nation, to intrust the government only to spaniards.

To allay these clamours, the princess thought proper to make a new tender of her resignation, and demanded her recal, under the pretext that her presence was injurious to the crown. Her

\* Noailles, t. 4, p. 82.



CHAP. 16. real or affected delicacy, was, however, overruled by the instances of the queen ; and the moderate opponents of french influence were satisfied with a solemn declaration, that she would not again interfere in the business of government. She also found it necessary to hasten the departure of Amelot, as well as the dismission of all her countrymen. The french minister at length quitting the capital, at the very moment when Philip repaired to the army, with difficulty escaped the effects of popular indignation.\*

Philip returned to Madrid, to meet still greater difficulties than he had encountered at the army. The system of administration which had been planned by Orri, matured by Amelot, and rendered efficient by his wise and vigorous management, became null, if not injurious, in the hands of indolent ministers, hostile to the system itself, and ignorant of the very elements of political economy. The same dilatory spirit again palsied all the departments of administration ; and Spain, under the unskilful and negligent management of her own natives, was rapidly falling into her former debility and distress. Philip, without the power or abilities to devise a remedy, without counsellors in whom he could confide, relapsed into his former indolence, and sought to dissipate his chagrin by devoting himself to the pleasures

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\* St. Philippe, t. 8, p. 280.—Noailles, t. 4, p. 68—70.

of the chace, and the monotonous amusements of the palace ; and nothing but the secret interference of the queen and princess, through the agency of Grimaldo, could have prevented a total stagnation of business, and dissolution of the government.\*

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\* Noailles, t. 4, p. 102.

Besides the authorities particularly quoted in different parts of this chapter, we have consulted on the whole, the general histories of Desormeaux and Ortiz, as well as our own and the french historians.

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